Learning to de-escalate: The effects of regret in escalation of commitment

The current research investigates whether and how individuals are able to learn from one escalation situation to another, hypothesizing that post-escalation regret will reduce subsequent escalation. In Experiment 1, individuals participated in an escalation task after escalating their commitments in a first escalation situation. In Experiment 2, participants’ regret was manipulated by asking them to imagine engaging in an escalation situation. The experiments expand our theoretical and practical understanding of how to prevent escalation of commitment by demonstrating that escalation-specific regret—either experienced from an earlier escalation or primed through imagining an escalation scenario—reduced subsequent escalation in a different context. The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical impact of regret and emotions in general in escalation of commitment.     

The promise and peril of self-affirmation in de-escalation of commitment

Drawing on the motivated cognition literature, we examine how self-affirmation processes influence self-justification needs and escalation decisions. Study 1 found that individuals with a larger pool of affirmational resources (high self-esteem) reduced their escalation compared to those with fewer affirmational resources (low self-esteem). Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that individuals also de-escalated their commitments when they were provided an opportunity to affirm on an important value. Finally, Study 3 found that affirming on traits that were of low relevance (e.g., creativity) to an initial decision reduced escalation, but affirming on decision-relevant traits (e.g., decision-making ability) ironically increased escalation. Across three studies, using three instantiations of self-affirmations and two measures of escalation, the results highlight the potential benefits and costs of using self-affirmation as a vehicle to de-escalate commitment.     

Desire for a positive moral self-regard exacerbates escalation of commitment to initiatives with prosocial aims

Across three experiments, people escalated commitment more frequently to a failing prosocial initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of others in need) than they did to a failing egoistic initiative (i.e., an initiative that had the primary aim of improving the outcomes of the decision-maker). A test of mediation (Study 1b) and a test of moderation (Study 2) each provided evidence that a desire for a positive moral self-regard underlies people’s tendency to escalate commitment more frequently to failing prosocial initiatives than to failing egoistic initiatives. We discuss the implications of these findings for the resource-allocation decisions that people and organizations face when undertaking initiatives with prosocial aims.     

Group decision process and incrementalism in organizational decision making

In two studies examining resource allocation, support is found for the notion that group decisions are affected in systematic ways depending on whether or not there was individual consideration of the problem before meeting as a group. Specifically, compared to no prior consideration groups, prior consideration groups (1) escalate their commitment more in progress (i.e., ongoing) decisions, and (2) are less willing to concentrate resources on a single project in adoption (i.e., resource utilization) decisions. The findings challenge the blanket assertion that promoting divergent views in a group decision context is always related to better decisions.     

Preference-based escalation: A new interpretation for the responsibility effect in escalating commitment and entrapment

A prominent finding in escalating commitment and entrapment research is the “responsibility effect”: people invest more in a losing course of action or persist with it for longer if they themselves initiated this action (responsibility) as opposed to if it was assigned to them. We argue that this effect is driven by participants’ preferences. Responsible participants usually prefer the chosen alternative since they have chosen it themselves. Non-responsible participants, in contrast, represent a mix of persons who either favor or disfavor the chosen alternative. In two experiments, we demonstrate that responsible participants favor the chosen course of action more strongly than non-responsible participants do, that these preferences facilitate reinvestment in and persistence with the chosen course of action, and that responsibility has no effect over and above this effect of preferences. Non-responsible participants preferring the chosen course of action made similar reinvestments and exhibited similar persistence as responsible participants.     

责任归因对公平感与情感承诺关系的调节作用研究

以上海市部分企业员工为研究对象,运用问卷调查法和分层回归分析技术探讨了责任归因对公平感与情感承诺之间关系的调节作用。结果表明,组织责任分别调节组织人际公平、组织信息公平与组织情感承诺之间的关系;主管责任分别调节主管程序公平、主管人际公平、主管信息公平与主管情感承诺之间的关系。     

The effect of decision risk and project stage on escalation of commitment

We investigate the joint effects of decision risk and the stage of project completion on escalation of commitment. In two experiments, we demonstrate that the effect of decision risk is moderated by project stage such that the decision risk has the strongest effect on escalation of commitment at the intermediate stage of project completion. This is due to the dynamic influences underlying escalation of commitment. Whereas the need for project information influences resource commitment at the initial stage of a project, the need for project completion affects resource allocation at the terminal stage. In contrast, motivation to commit resources is disproportionately low at the intermediate stage since both the need for project information and the need for project completion are relatively weak. As such, the decision to commit resources is most sensitive to the moderating effect of decision risk when the project is about half complete.     

Another Search for the “Hot” Cognitions: Appraisal, Irrational Beliefs, Attributions, and Their Relation to Emotion

One study examined the hypothesized status of appraisal and irrational beliefs relative to attributions, as proximal antecedents of emotion. In our study, which looked at 4 pairs of functional and dysfunctional negative emotions (i.e., concern/anxiety, sadness/depression, remorse/guilt, annoyance/anger), undergraduates (N = 120) reported on their attributions, appraisal, irrational beliefs, and emotions during past encounters associated with various negative events. Congruent with both Smith and Lazarus' (1993) appraisal theory and Ellis' (1994) cognitive theory of emotion, the results of this study indicate that the emotions (both functional and dysfunctional negative emotions) were more directly associated with appraisal and with irrational beliefs (dysfunctional negative emotions only) than they were with attributions. Also, irrational beliefs were strongly associated with appraisal; while demandingness (DEM) was associated more with primary appraisal, awfulizing/catastrophizing, low frustration tolerance, and global evaluation of human worth (including self-downing) were associated more with secondary appraisal. Dysfunctional emotions seem to involve primary appraisal associated with DEM while functional emotions involve primary appraisal associated with preferences. These findings lend to support the status of appraisal and irrational beliefs as the proximal cognitive antecedents of emotion and the status of irrational beliefs as a differencing factor between functional and dysfunctional emotions.     

愤怒和悲伤情绪对助人决策的影响:人际责任归因的作用

基于具体情绪理论——评价倾向框架理论(ATF),采用两项研究考察负性情绪愤怒和悲伤对助人决策的影响,并探究人际责任归因在这一关系中的作用。两项研究均采用自传体情绪记忆任务诱发情绪,研究一中自变量情绪为组间变量,包括愤怒、悲伤和中性三个水平,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费时间;研究二中自变量1为组间变量情绪,包括愤怒和悲伤,自变量2为组内变量人际责任归因,操作为模糊归因、不可控的情景归因、可控的自我归因三种情境,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费金钱。结果发现:(1)与愤怒情绪相比,悲伤情绪下个体为他人花费的时间和捐助的金钱更多;(2)在模糊的人际责任归因条件下,悲伤个体会比愤怒个体捐助更多的钱。研究表明:同为负性情绪的愤怒和悲伤在助人决策上的作用不同,悲伤个体比愤怒个体做出更多的助人决策;人际责任性归因会影响附带情绪和助人决策的关系。研究结论有助于理解附带情绪对助人决策的影响,进一步丰富并延伸ATF理论的证据和领域,对发挥情境中人际责任归因在助人决策中的作用具有一定的现实意义。     

Culture and group-based emotions: could group-based emotions be dialectical?

Group-based emotions are experienced when individuals are engaged in emotion-provoking events that implicate the in-group. This research examines the complexity of group-based emotions, specifically a concurrence of positive and negative emotions, focusing on the role of dialecticism, or a set of folk beliefs prevalent in Asian cultures that views nature and objects as constantly changing, inherently contradictory, and fundamentally interconnected. Study 1 found that dialecticism is positively associated with the complexity of Chinese participants’ group-based emotions after reading a scenario depicting a positive intergroup experience. Study 2 found that Chinese participants experienced more complex group-based emotions compared with Dutch participants in an intergroup situation and that this cultural difference was mediated by dialecticism. Study 3 manipulated dialecticism and confirmed its causal effect on complex group-based emotions. These studies also suggested the role of a balanced appraisal of an intergroup situation as a mediating factor.     

权力对压力应对行为倾向的影响：认知评估的中介作用

摘 要 采用实验法探讨权力对压力应对行为的影响以及认知评估在二者关系中的作用。实验一通过回忆法操纵权力,测量被试在压力情境下的认知评估和行为倾向。结果发现,权力水平影响压力下的生理反应,高权力者产生挑战,低权力者产生威胁;认知评估在权力和压力应对行为倾向间起中介作用。实验二进一步探究了权力对压力应对行为的影响,结果发现认知评估中介权力和压力应对行为倾向,且不同权力水平者的压力应对行为存在显著差异。     

Coupling and decoupling of unfairness and anger in ultimatum bargaining

Although previous research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in ultimatum bargaining, this research provides a more direct, convergent test of the role of anger in explaining rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. First, using appraisal theory of emotions, this research examines the extent to which the cognitive appraisal of unfairness leads to the emotion of anger, which in turn, drives punitive behavior (i.e., rejection of offers). Second, this research explores the possibility of decoupling the emotion of anger from its antecedent appraisal of unfairness in order to attenuate responders' inclination to reject unfair offers. Third, following the current research tradition that goes beyond a valence‐based approach, we differentiate between the negative emotions of anger and sadness and examine whether it is the specific emotion of anger that is relevant to the cognitive appraisal of unfairness or the general negative valence of the emotion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.