共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Dana Kay Nelkin 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2013,86(2):476-491
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John Hyman 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2018,97(1):249-261
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Anil Gupta 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):329-343
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Andrew Feenberg 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(2):225-237
1. Thomson's critique: Despite the efforts of his followers to show that Heidegger had a progressive theory of technology, his work is clouded by nostalgia. His positive contribution is a fragmentary opening toward a phenomenology of daily technical practice, which I use to develop de Certeau's distinction between the strategic control of technical systems and their tactical usage by subordinates. Heidegger himself made no such application of his own phenomenological approach. 2. Stump's critique: Can an ontological essentialism and a historically oriented constructivism be combined as Questioning Technologyattempts to do? Stump claims they cannot, but assumes that I accept far more ontological and epistemological baggage from each position than I do. In fact, what I retain from essentialism is primarily the analysis of the basic technical relation to reality, and from constructivism, historical and hermeneutic methods of analysis of the realization of that relation in actual systems and devices. These elements of the two theories are compatible. 相似文献
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Donald L. M. Baxter 《Axiomathes》2013,23(2):291-299
One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those who have grappled with it in print. There are various criticisms by commentators: that it is rendered absurd by the transitivity of identity, that it makes instantiation necessary instead of contingent, that it is unclear what counts are, that aspects are simply tropes, that my view does not capture multiple location, that I make an unclear reference to a theory of composition as identity, that the account suffers from problems with polyadicity, and that it is not a realist account of universals after all. I give responses to these objections. 相似文献
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Elizabeth Barnes 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2020,100(1):232-243
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DAVID PAPINEAU 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,71(1):171-171
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Jeff Speaks 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2017,95(2):492-506