通过斯特劳森而思

斯特劳森在《个体》中提出的描述性形而上学与修正性形而上学的区分对20世纪后半叶分析哲学的走向产生了重要影响。正是基于斯特劳森的这个区分,我们可以从范畴之是与潜能现实之是的区分这一角度去解析亚里士多德。在相当程度上,亚里士多德对范畴之是的研究是描述性形而上学,而他对潜能现实之是的研究则是修正性形而上学。然而,以主谓关系为核心概念结构的描述性形而上学只是相对于印欧语系而言的,不是普遍的。我们应该发展一门以中文思维结构为对象的描述性形而上学,这样的研究必定可以使中国哲学对形而上学做出特有的贡献。     

Self And Body: Gallen Strawson

What are the grounds of self-consciousness? I consider 29 proposals and reject 22, including a number of proposals that experience of body (or bodies) is necessary for self-consciousness. A popular strategy in debates of this sort is to argue that one cannot be said to have some concept C (e.g. the concept ONESELF, necessary for self-consciousness) unless one has a need or a use for C given the character of one's experience considered independently of the character that it has given that one possesses C. I suggest that such arguments are invalid.     

IV. Strawson on the traditional logic

In his Introduction to Logical Theory, Strawson argues that Aristotelian logic can be given a successful interpretation into ordinary English, but not into the symbolism of Principia Mathematica, on the grounds that Aristotelian logic and ordinary English share something absent in PM, namely, the doctrine of presupposition. It is argued that Strawson is mistaken. PM does justice to the logical rules of Aristotelian logic and also has a fully articulated doctrine of presupposition.     

斯特劳森思想的启发：寻求一种哲学拓扑学

根据斯特劳森哲学提供的基本思路,我提出,哲学拓扑学不同于一般的元哲学理论,它更强调通过对具体哲学家思想发展历程的分析,揭示哲学观念产生和形成的内在逻辑,由此说明哲学思想的内在连续性。哲学拓扑学不是一种理论观点,而是一门以强调思想连续性为主要任务的哲学学科。因而,它适用于分析和研究各种不同的哲学理论观点。     

Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility

Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents.