Desacralizing Political Theology: Dionysius the Areopagite and Giorgio Agamben

Giorgio Agamben argues that Christian thought provides the paradigm of modern governmental power, which reinforces mundane government by investing it with glory. Agamben claims that Dionysius the Areopagite exemplifies this structure; in his view, Dionysian negative theology serves to sacralize ecclesiastical power. In response, I argue that Dionysius desacralizes every authority, affirming that some things are sacred even as he subjects that affirmation to thoroughgoing critique. Against both dogmatic adherence and pure profanation, Dionysius models a politics that draws on the power of the sacred while holding it open to unpredictable development.     

The Perfection of Glory in Humility: What Karl Barth would have had to Say about Redemption

Karl Barth famously was not able to complete his magnum opus, Church Dogmatics, the final volume of which was to treat the doctrine of redemption. But the general contours of what Barth would have had to say in that volume can be discovered by following the trajectory of his thought, specifically as key developments in his later work are set next to his discussion of redemption in his first lecture cycle in dogmatics at Göttingen. This article contends that in view of revisions to his treatment of Christ's humiliation and exaltation, which reflect his handling of election in CD II/2, Barth would have had to conclude three things about redemption. First, Christ's humiliation for us is an eternal act not set aside in the eschaton. Secondly, humanity's eschatological exaltation takes the form of actualized utter dependence on God defined by corresponding life‐acts of uninterrupted self‐giving. And thirdly, that ‘redemption’ entails having a share in God's unique freedom to have his life in and with another; just this is life in the Spirit. Together, these conclusions characterize a kind of glory which is not opposed to humility but perfected in humility.     

Behavioral Consequences of Fluctuating Group Success: An Internet Study of Soccer-Team Fans

Abstract

The authors tested the hypothesis that fans of a sports team avoid private contact with their team when it is unsuccessful (cutting off reflected failure, or CORF), whereas fans actively seek private contact with their team when it is successful (basking in reflected glory, or BIRG). During the 2nd half of the 1999–2000 soccer season, the authors registered the number of visitors who had surfed the Web sites of 16 Belgian and 18 Dutch 1st-division teams on the 1st working day following a championship game. The authors obtained 586 valid measurements, which were transformed into z scores for each team separately. In line with the hypothesis, there were significantly more visitors after the teams won (BIRG) than after they lost (CORF). The effects of game outcome were not mediated by pregame expectations or by the size of the wins or losses.     

The Glory of God in the Theology of Eberhard Jüngel

Abstract:  The German Lutheran theologian Eberhard Jüngel offers an account of God as One whose many attributes are but more specific renderings of his glory. By describing the attributes as ingredient in God's inner-trinitarian life as expressed in the passion history, Jüngel offers a rich doctrine of God's glory that emphasizes the communicative character of the divine glory inasmuch as God communicates himself to us as he is , and is true to himself in all that he does . However, from a classical Reformed perspective, critical questions are raised with regards to Jüngel's understanding of the communicatio idiomatum , and his singular focus on the suffering and death of Jesus to the neglect of the life of Jesus.     

Continuous assessment of Peter Senge's learning organization model for improving the quality of Christian higher education in Indonesia

This paper briefly discusses Peter Senge's Continuous Assessment Learning Organization Model for Quality Improvement, and describes how it is implemented in improving the quality of education by Christian Religious Colleges in Indonesia. The main conclusion of this paper is that Christian Religious Colleges in Indonesia must develop an organizational culture where continuous assessment for quality improvement is part of everyday practice in schools. To achieve this, it is proposed that schools should become learning communities based on Peter Senge's Learning Organization model. While this paper is not based on research, the main implication is that every school should seek creative ways to implement Peter Senge's Continuous Assessment Learning Organization Model for Quality Improvement according to its culture and spirituality. A second implication is a Christian learning organization should be a prayer-defined organization. Every activity, every decision should be informed by prayer and be done in prayer, seeking the will of God, his approval, and his glory. Prayer should play a key role in any assessment. This conceptual paper is original as it explores the fit of applying Peter Senge's Continuous Assessment Learning Organization Model with seeking the will of God, his approval, and his glory for quality improvement in Christian Religious Colleges in Indonesia.     

Contours for a Public Lutheran Theology in the Face of Empire

Abstract : Three themes structure Lutheranism's interpretation of the biblical narrative as it intersects with the present challenges of Empire: justification by faith as a declaration of inclusiveness; God's threefold‐multidimensional action creating and sustaining democratic practices (two kingdoms); and the cross as the critical ‘weapon’ against the ‘glory’ of Empire. This implies placing our theology within the present cultural and religious debate in a way consistent with the methodology of the cross: a theology done from the bowels of Empire, revealing its true face behind its alleged ‘benevolent’ mask.     

A Public Atonement: The Public Nature of Sin and Salvation in the American Moral Governmental Theory of the Atonement

The American moral governmental theory of the atonement was distinct from other Protestant views in several ways, but truly unique in one. Its definition of forgiveness as a pardon instead of a debt paid, its insistence that Christ died for the good of the moral universe, and its rejection of the distributive understanding of penal substitution all stemmed from its relentless commitment to view both God and humanity in terms of public life. It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that the most foundational element in the American moral governmental theory of the atonement was the idea of publicity, namely the public nature it ascribed to sin, salvation and the glory of God.     

Christopher Southgate on Glory and Compassion

This article was presented at the 2018 American Academy of Religion conference at a panel honouring the work of Christopher Southgate. The first half is a response to the theology of glory in Southgate’s Theology in a Suffering World (CUP 2018). The second half expands on Southgate’s work on practical theodicy. I argue for a redirection of the work of theodicy toward a compassionate approach, outlined by three principles that are centred around helping those who suffer create their own theodicies. The job of the practical and compassionate theodicist, then, is not to provide answers for why suffering occurs, but rather to offer resources to help others frame their own experience.     

A House of Living Stones

This report to the 6th Assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Vancouver in 1983 describes the church as a “House of Living Stones,” based on the First Letter of Peter. The ecumenical movement is the means by which the churches that form the house, the oikos of God, are seeking to live and witness before all peoples. The image of the house of living stones is a reminder that only as the churches relate to each other as living stones will they discover new realities about their essential calling to be the church, the house of the triune God, as a fellowship of confessing, learning, participating, sharing, healing, reconciliation, unity, and expectancy to the glory of God.     

Contextuality in the Theology of Douglas John Hall

The theology of Douglas John Hall has much to offer us in a time of wanton warfare and social injustices. Hall contends that the modern paradigm, supported by an "eternal, universal theology of glory" proves inadequate for addressing the problems of the world in which we live, and offers us a "contextual theology of the cross." This theology, unlike theologies of glory, is not afraid to "walk" into the darkness; in fact, Hall contends that is the only place where the light of God is revealed.     

ARE SCIENCE AND HUMANISM SUITED TO ENTER THE ANCIENT QUEST OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY? A RESPONSE TO LLUÍS OVIEDO

This response reverses the title of Lluís Oviedo's essay (2006) while retaining the structure. In the pendulum swing between science and humanism, theology finds its uniqueness not in refuting either but in subverting them: subverting the scientific quest for certainty without denying its pursuit, and subverting the humanist quest for the unique dignity of the human by reducing it to the most despoiled creature, yet finding in it the presence of the divine. Theological pursuit is about reason and its limits, about brokenness and glory in it. Yet the engagement is unavoidable, for without the scientific pursuit of certainty, incompleteness could never be established; without the humanist search for the uniqueness of the human, its admixed and impure character would not be recognized. The concept of hybridity tries to convey that and is presented in three instantiations: the conflation of the human with machine (cyborg), of humans and other animals (oncomouse), and of the human and the divine. Following these ontological cases of hybridity, at the epistemological level theology becomes hybrid “science” in search of the mythos in the midst of logos, and conversely it is hybrid humanism, for it locates God in the greatest depravity of mammalian existence.     

SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND METAPHYSICS

The tendency to take scientific realism to be a richer metaphysical view than it ought to be stems from the fact that there are two ways in which we can conceive of reality. The first is to conceive of reality as comprising all facts and the other is to conceive of it as comprising all and only fundamental facts. I argue that scientific realism should be committed to the factualist view of reality and not, in the first instance, to the fundamentalist. An anti‐fundamentalist conception of reality acts as a constraint on scientific realism, but it is a further and (conceptually) separate issue whether or not a scientific realist should come to adopt a fundamentalist view of reality. I argue that scientific realism is independent of physicalism and non‐Humeanism and that the concept of truth is required for a sensible understanding of the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism.     

The authority of pleasure

The aim of the paper is to reassess the prospects of a widely neglected affective conception of the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art. On the proposed picture, the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of art are non‐contingently constituted by a particular kind of pleasure. Artworks that are valuable qua artworks merit, deserve, and call for a certain pleasure, the same pleasure that reveals (or at least purports to reveal) them to be valuable in the way that they are, and constitutes their aesthetic evaluation and appreciation. This is why and how art is non‐contingently related to pleasure. Call this, the Affective View. While I don't advance conclusive arguments for the affective view in this paper, I aim to reassess its prospects by (1) undermining central objections against it, (2) dissociating it from hedonism about the value of artworks (the view that this value is grounded in, and explained by, its possessors’ power to please), and (3) introducing some observations on the practice of art in support of it. Given that the objections I discuss miss their target, and given the observations in support of it, I conclude that the affective view is worth serious reconsideration.     

Accommodating Presuppositions Is Inappropriate in Implausible Contexts

According to one view of linguistic information (Karttunen, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974), a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: (a) by asserting the content as new information; or (b) by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it (e.g., von Fintel, 2008; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 2002). A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly open to challenge (e.g., Gazdar, 1979; van der Sandt, 1992). Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self‐paced reading experiments with an on‐line stops‐making‐sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate (makes less sense) relative to non‐presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition‐assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions.     

What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?

Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct.     

The philosophy of science at the turn of the millenium

Abstract

Central to a new, or ‘resolute’, reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an ‘austere’ view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a feature of some readings which in other respects are clearly not Resolute. This paper forms part of a reply to Hans-Johann Glock’s work in which he argues (in part) that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus held a view of nonsense other than the austere view. Instead, Glock argues, Wittgenstein there held that there are many logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Here, I outline and defend the austere view, together with its attribution to the early Wittgenstein, against a number of Glock’s criticisms, and focussing especially on Wittgenstein’s reformulation in the Tractatus of Frege’s context-principle.     

Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation

What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evidential amplification. I focus on a popular and intuitive view of disagreement, the equal weight view. I take it to state that in cases of peer disagreement, a subject ought to end up equally confident that her own opinion is correct as that the opinion of her peer is. I say why we should regard the equal weight view as a synchronic constraint on (prior) credence functions. I then spell out a trilemma for the view: it violates what are intuitively correct updates (also leading to violations of conditionalisation), it poses implausible restrictions on prior credence functions, or it is non‐substantive. The sorts of reasons why the equal weight view fails apply to other views as well: there is no blanket answer to the question of how a subject should adjust her opinions in cases of peer disagreement.     

Lockean Essentialism and the Possibility of Miracles

If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke's view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention . While other views of laws also make miracles counterfactually dependent on God's will, I show how this view is consistent with the essentialist commitment to the view that the laws are metaphysically necessary. Further, I argue that Locke's view is a relatively attractive version of essentialism, in part, because it allows for the possibility of miracles.     

Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility

According to Universal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible. This paper explores whether this puzzle can be resolved, and Universal Epistemic Deontology defended, by appealing to a view of responsibility it calls the Revelatory View. On that view, an agent is responsible for something when it reveals the kind of person the agent is. The paper explores four ways of developing the Revelatory View and argues that none of the views ultimately defends Universal Epistemic Deontology.     

Tyrannized Souls: Plato's Depiction of the ‘Tyrannical Man’

In book 9 of Plato's Republic, Socrates describes the nature and origins of the ‘tyrannical man’, whose soul is said to be ‘like’ a tyrannical city. In this paper, I examine the nature of the ‘government’ that exists within the tyrannical man's soul. I begin by demonstrating the inadequacy of three potentially attractive views sometimes found in the literature on Plato: the view that the tyrannical man's soul is ruled by his ‘lawless’ unnecessary appetites, the view that it is ruled by sexual desire, and the view that it is ruled by a lust for power. I then present my own account. On the view I defend, the tyrannical man's soul is to be understood as ruled by a single, persistent, powerful desire for bodily pleasure: as much as he can get, and however he can get it. Finally, I show how understanding the tyrannical man's soul in the way I recommend helps resolve some commonly expressed concerns about this part of the Republic. I suggest, on this basis, that Plato's procedure in constructing his catalogue of corrupt cities and souls in Republic 8 and 9 was more carefully thought out and systematic than has sometimes been supposed.