On the Significance of Difference‐Making Principles

It has been claimed that difference‐making plays important roles in both metaphysics and epistemology. The idea is that facts often make a difference to other facts. Thus, causes are said to make a difference to their effects, and the world is thought to make a difference to what is believed. One way to cash out this idea is in terms of the notion of counterfactual dependence between the facts in question. It has recently been objected by some philosophers, however, that the counterfactual‐dependence account misrepresents the difference‐making idea, prompting them to offer a different, weaker construal of the idea in question, which, they claim, illuminates a number of problems in both epistemology and metaphysics. This article, while acknowledging that the difference‐making idea is a genuine constraint on some of our concepts, challenges the claim that the weaker interpretation has significant philosophical potentials and, having delineated its real function, spells out the lessons that should be drawn from its failure.     

Causes As Difference‐Makers For Processes

It is natural to think of causes as difference‐makers. What exact difference causes make, however, is an open question. In this paper, I argue that the right way of understanding difference‐making is in terms of causal processes: causes make a difference to a causal process that leads to the effect. I will show that this way of understanding difference‐making nicely captures the distinction between causing an outcome and helping determine how the outcome happens and, thus, explains why causation is not transitive. Moreover, the theory handles tricky cases that are problematic for competing accounts of difference‐making.     

Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution

Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti‐luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti‐luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.     

Four Varieties of Character‐Based Virtue Epistemology

The terrain of character‐based or “responsibilist” virtue epistemology has evolved dramatically over the last decade — so much so that it is far from clear what, if anything, unifies the various views put forth in this area. In an attempt to bring some clarity to the overall thrust and structure of this movement, I develop a fourfold classification of character‐based virtue epistemologies. I also offer a qualified assessment of each approach, defending a certain account of the probable future of this burgeoning subfield.     

Goal‐Proximity Decision‐Making

Reinforcement learning (RL) models of decision‐making cannot account for human decisions in the absence of prior reward or punishment. We propose a mechanism for choosing among available options based on goal‐option association strengths, where association strengths between objects represent previously experienced object proximity. The proposed mechanism, Goal‐Proximity Decision‐making (GPD), is implemented within the ACT‐R cognitive framework. GPD is found to be more efficient than RL in three maze‐navigation simulations. GPD advantages over RL seem to grow as task difficulty is increased. An experiment is presented where participants are asked to make choices in the absence of prior reward. GPD captures human performance in this experiment better than RL.     

Making e‐working work

It is estimated that by 2010 there will be 20 million full‐ and part‐time telecommuters working in the United States. The purpose of this article is to assist employment counselors in their work with organizations in implementing e‐worker programs as well as in their counseling of e‐workers. The authors define e‐worker, summarize the growth of e‐worker programs, outline benefits and drawbacks to teleworking, discuss critical elements of a successful teleworker program, and elaborate on potential strategies for becoming a successful e‐worker.     

Graph‐Framing Effects in Decision Making

This study manipulated the graphical representation of options by framing the physical characters in figures and found that preferences could be affected even when the words and numbers of the problem were constant. Based on attribute substitution theory and an equate‐to‐differentiate approach, we proposed a two‐process model of graph‐framing effects. In the first mental process, the graph‐editing process, the physical features (e.g., distance, size) represented in the graph are visually edited, and the perceived numerical difference between the options is judged based on its physical features. The second mental process, the preferential choice process, occurs by an equate‐to‐differentiate approach in which people seek to equate the difference between options on the dimension on which the difference is smaller, thus leaving the greater other‐dimensional difference to be the determinant of the final choice. Four experiments were tested for graph‐framing effects. Experiment 1 found a graph‐framing effect in coordinate graphs resting on the (de)compression of the scales employed in the figures. Experiment 2 revealed additional graph‐framing effects in other question scenarios and showed that preference changes were mediated by perceived numerical distances. Experiment 3 further confirmed the presence of graph‐framing effects in sector graphs similar to those found in coordinate ones. Experiment 4 suggested that such graph‐framing effects could be eliminated when logical processing (e.g., introducing a mathematical operation before a choice task) was encouraged. This paper discusses related research and a possible substrate basis for graph‐framing effects. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Democracy,Epistemology and the Problem of All‐White Juries

Does it matter that almost all juries in England and Wales are all‐White? Does it matter even if this result is the unintended and undesired result of otherwise acceptable ways of choosing juries? Finally, does it matter that almost all juries are all‐White if this has no adverse effect on the treatment of non‐White defendants and victims of crime? According to Cheryl Thomas, there is no injustice in a system of jury selection which predictably results in juries with no minority members so long as this result is not deliberate, and does not adversely affect the treatment of minority defendants and victims of crime. My view is different. In and of itself, I believe, something is wrong with a system of jury selection that predictably results in all‐White juries in a diverse society, such as our own. Absent reason to believe that we lack a better alternative to current modes of jury selection, a commitment to democratic government and to the equality of citizens – or so I will argue – condemns existing arrangements as unjust, whether or not they have adverse effects on jury decisions, or on the ways in which our society approaches issues of race and crime.     

Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12

Much has been written about Kemp Smith's (1941) famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has been unduly neglected. This paper seeks to address Kemp Smith's problem from the standpoint of Hume's treatment of scepticism in EHU 12, and finds an interesting internalist account that makes sense both of Hume's discussion in EHU 12, and his aims in the Enquiry as a whole. Moreover, it is one that is of substantive philosophical interest, having intriguing parallels to contemporary epistemological accounts.     

For the Win: Risk‐Sensitive Decision‐Making in Teams

Risk‐sensitivity theory predicts that decision‐makers should prefer high‐risk options in high need situations when low‐risk options will not meet these needs. Recent attempts to adopt risk‐sensitivity as a framework for understanding human decision‐making have been promising. However, this research has focused on individual‐level decision‐making, has not examined behavior in naturalistic settings, and has not examined the influence of multiple levels of need on decision‐making under risk. We examined group‐level risk‐sensitive decision‐making in two American football leagues: the National Football League (NFL) and the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I. Play decisions from the 2012 NFL (Study 1; N = 33 944), 2013 NFL (Study 2; N = 34 087), and 2012 NCAA (Study 3; N = 15 250) regular seasons were analyzed. Results demonstrate that teams made risk‐sensitive decisions based on two distinct needs: attaining first downs (a key proximate goal in football) and acquiring points above parity. Evidence for risk‐sensitive decisions was particularly strong when motivational needs were most salient. These findings are the first empirical demonstration of team risk‐sensitivity in a naturalistic organizational setting. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

High School Students' Career‐Related Decision‐Making Difficulties

The present study examined the construct of career‐related decision‐making difficulties among 1,843 Israeli adolescents: choosing a high school (9th grade), choosing high school elective courses (10th grade), and deciding on a military job preference (11th grade). Three versions of the Career Decision‐Making Difficulties Questionnaire (CDDQ) were constructed to match the 3 decision situations. The structures of the 10 difficulty categories of the revised CDDQ were found similar to that proposed by I. Gati, M. Krausz, and S. H. Osipow (1996). Boys reported higher difficulties than girls in external conflicts and dysfunctional beliefs. Research and counseling implications are discussed.     

Gloria E. Anzaldúa's Autohistoria‐teoría as an Epistemology of Self‐Knowledge/Ignorance

In this article, I examine the relationship between self‐knowledge practices among women of color and structural patterns of ignorance by offering an analysis of Gloria E. Anzaldúa's discussions of self‐writing. I propose that by writing about her own experiences in a manner that hails others to critically interrogate their own identities, Anzaldúa develops important theoretical resources for understanding self‐knowledge, self‐ignorance, and practices of knowing others. In particular, I claim that in her later writings, Anzaldúa offers a rich epistemological account of these themes through her notion of autohistoria‐teoría. The notion of autohistoria‐teoría demonstrates that self‐knowledge practices, like all knowledge practices, are social and relational. Moreover, such self‐knowledge practices require contestation and affirmation as well, including, resistance and productive friction.     

Career Decision‐Making Self‐Efficacy Change in Italian High School Students

The authors explored the effects of a structured‐group career intervention among 280 Italian high school students. Hierarchical linear models indicated the intervention's effectiveness in increasing career decision‐making self‐efficacy and, consequently, career exploration, but not in decreasing career choice anxiety. In addition, partial confirmation was found for the moderating effects of participants' expectations and motivation to change on the relationship between career decision‐making self‐efficacy and career choice anxiety. The findings support the development of a systematic vocational guidance program in Italian schools.     

A Topsis‐Based Approach for Prioritized Aggregation in Multi‐Criteria Decision‐Making Problems

Aggregation in multi‐criteria decision‐making environments is a process of combining the values of a set of attributes into one representative value for the entire set of attributes. Many aggregation methods—ranging from the simple averaging approach to more sophisticated methods, such as ordered weighted averaging—have been applied in previous research. One challenge in aggregation arises in special cases of prioritized aggregation, wherein the prioritized relationships between attributes must be considered during aggregation. This paper presents a new approach to aggregating attributes with prioritized relationships. First, an overview of past research is conducted to identify different aggregation methods, classes and properties. Next, the concept of prioritized aggregation is explained in detail. A prioritized aggregation method utilizing the technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution is then presented. Subsequently, the presented prioritized aggregation method is applied on an actual case study. According to the results, the aggregation method presented in this paper is, through the application of technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution, capable of quantifying and considering the prioritized relationship between a set of attributes undergoing aggregation. Finally, conclusions are stated, and a discussion describing future work pertinent to this paper is presented. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Epistemology, the History of Epistemology, Historical Epistemology

A brief discussion of the ways in which awareness of and sensitivity to the history of philosophy can contribute to epistemology even if epistemology is understood as a distinctively philosophical and not primarily historical enterprise.