Will we be working together again? The impact of future interdependence on group members' task motivation

The extent to which group members contribute effort efficiently, i.e. to the extent that their efforts add to the group product, or equally to their fellow worker is investigated as a function of group members' expectations about future interdependence. An experimental set‐up was employed in which (1) participants were able to determine what would be an efficient and what would be an equal amount of effort to exert, and (2) in which efficiency and equality required different levels of effort: Participants worked on a physical motor‐production task and expected to work with a partner twice (continued interdependence) or only on the first task (no continued interdependence). Before working on the first task, they received information about their relative task ability (high versus low) and information about their partner's effort expenditure (high versus low). It is argued and demonstrated that group members expecting continued interdependence are likely to equal their fellow worker's effort expenditure, whereas group members expecting no continued interdependence are likely to exert effort efficiently. The results are discussed from various theoretical perspectives. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time,space, and process in Anne Conway

ABSTRACT

Many scholars have drawn attention to the way that elements of Anne Conway’s system anticipate ideas found in Leibniz. This paper explores the relationship between Conway and Leibniz’s work with regard to time, space, and process. It argues – against existing scholarship – that Conway is not a proto-Leibnizian relationist about time or space, and in fact her views lie much closer to those of Henry More; yet Conway and Leibniz agree on the primacy of process. This exploration advances our understanding of Conway’s system, and the intellectual relationships between Conway, More, and Leibniz.     

On Exploring Normative Constraints in New Situations

Philip Pettit's ethocentric account of rule-following is elaborated and defended in this paper as basically a story about the capacity to reason organized around largely implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal. It is argued that this account can be insightfully used to elucidate the practical reasoning of agents confronted with the normative indeterminacy that seems to be characteristic of radically new situations. It is shown that practical reasoning consists to a large extent in the capacity to articulate, specify, and evaluate implicit assumptions about what is and what is not normal. One corollary of this account of practical reason is investigated in some detail: the predominant role of intrapersonaldivergence of habits in reasoning about an apparent normative indeterminacy and the related, merely criteriological role of convergence with respect to determining the right rules to follow.     

Ontological and epistemological reflexivity: A core skill for therapists

This paper argues that a core skill needed to be an effective therapist is to have developed an awareness of one's own ontological and epistemological positions in relation to one's work as a therapist. In the same way that researchers need to develop reflexive awareness of their assumptions about what there is to know (ontology) and how they can come to know about it (epistemology), therapists need to be aware of their fundamental assumptions about human beings and the world they live in (ontology), as well as their beliefs about how best to develop an understanding of their clients and the meaning(s) of their experiences (epistemology). Regardless of which therapeutic model is adopted, the language used to talk about (and in) therapy, the kinds of questions asked of clients and the comments/interpretations offered, all presuppose and reinforce particular versions of human being and experiencing, which are themselves not usually questioned or challenged during the course of therapy. It is essential that therapists are aware of their own fundamental assumptions about what it means to be human and that they recognise their ontological and epistemological positions as positions that they are taking (rather than perceiving them to be self‐evident truths). This is important for two reasons: (a) if clients do not share the therapist's assumptions, the therapeutic work cannot proceed and be effective; and (b) without such an awareness, therapists are at risk of unwittingly imposing their own model of the person upon the client which raises ethical issues.     

Free Will,Foreknowledge, and Future‐Dependent Beliefs

Recently, a time‐honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: (A) if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on (A). This argument is interesting in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing (A) to block incompatibilism.     

Suffering for Justice in Anne Conway and Maria W. Stewart

Anne Conway and Maria W. Stewart are quietly revolutionary philosophers who provide valuable insights into the nature of suffering and its relation to justice. Conway scholars have claimed that she offers a theodicy, trying to reconcile suffering with the existence of a just God. However, this does not make sense of her arguments or audience. Instead, we should see her as a theoretician of the role of suffering in a person's life. Moving beyond the personal, Stewart's emphasis on social sources of suffering leads her to posit a vision for bringing about a more just society in the near term that is absent in Conway. Both philosophers provide fascinating insight into how to theorize suffering and justice, including the role of unity in a just society.     

The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness

In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing.     

Testing assumptions of deliberate practice theory, relevance, effort, and inherent enjoyment of practice on a novel task

This study examined three assumptions of the theory of deliberate practice: that deliberate practice is perceived as relevant for improving performance and that it requires effort, but that it is not perceived as being inherently enjoyable. Of particular interest was the assumption of inherent enjoyment of practice since that has been questioned in previous research. 30 undergraduate and graduate students combined practiced a maze memorization and recall task and rated relevance of practice for improving recall, the practice effort, and inherent enjoyment of practice. The findings were consistent with three assumptions, but also suggested that perceptions about relevance, effort, and inherent enjoyment of practice may change with increasing experience and performance.     

Introduction: The Meaning of Work

Abstract

The theme of this special issue is how cultural, societal, group, and individual factors shape what working has meant, means, and is going to mean in future societies. Concepts and empirical data from the Meaning of Working study (MOW, 1987), an eight-country comparison of work-related attitudes and values, and from complementary follow-up studies, serve as the “red thread” or empirical basis throughout the issue. The original MOW (1987) study and some of the follow-up studies reported in this issue are based on a heuristic model for the subjective meaning of work, which is briefly discussed in the first paper by Ruiz Quintanilla and Wilpert. However, as nearly all of the discussants point out, and Heller's paper tries to discuss specifically, there is still a lot of theoretical work to do. The studies reported in this issue provide some empirical data bases and point towards new and crucial questions that are raised by the results. On the other hand, this issue also wants to contribute to a focused discussion about alternative conceptions of the meaning of work and its central role in understanding the concept of work. Since the way we conceptualize a particular problem issue crucially determines the kind of answers and explanations we derive, as Brief points out in his discussant paper, a thorough and lively discussion about how we are to understand work (and “non-work”), what meaning it has in a person's life, what significance the meaning attributed to work has, and by what processes work attains its meaning for society in general, becomes of utmost importance. Moreover, in the light of European integration across cultures and the global internationalization of organizations, differences in cultural contexts for the meaning of work take on a particularly urgent problem for better understanding. Finally, Fineman in his discussant paper raises the crucial point, that the basic epistemological assumptions that guided both the basic conceptual framework and the methodology used in the MOW (1987) and the follow-up studies reported in this issue can be questioned. He argues that these assumptions allow only a rather restricted view of the meaning of work and forego many options in addressing more holistic perspectives of work and its meaning generating processes. Given the fact that meaning is in principle a product of subjective interpretation processes, the question about what social processes form the basis for the meaning of work and its consequences, as well as what epistemological assumptions make sense in trying to understand better the holistic nature of work and its meaning, must be finally addressed.

In this sense this issue attempts: (1) to contribute to the ongoing debate on the concept of meaning of work; as well as (2) to invite interested researchers and practitioners in W & 0 psychology to join in this debate. This journal strongly encourages such a debate and will publish quality rejoinders, commentaries, and critical alternatives to the problems raised in this special issue.     

An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of (modal or amodal) format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate.     

Substantive assumptions in interaction: a logical perspective

In this paper we study substantive assumptions in social interaction. By substantive assumptions we mean contingent assumptions about what the players know and believe about each other’s choices and information. We first explain why substantive assumptions are fundamental for the analysis of games and, more generally, social interaction. Then we show that they can be compared formally, and that there exist contexts where no substantive assumptions are being made. Finally we show that the questions raised in this paper are related to a number of issues concerning “large” structures in epistemic game theory.     

A model of exact small-number representation

To account for the size effect in numerical comparison, three assumptions about the internal structure of the mental number line (e.g., Dehaene, 1992) have been proposed. These are magnitude coding (e.g., Zorzi & Butterworth, 1999), compressed scaling (e.g., Dehaene, 1992), and increasing variability (e.g., Gallistel & Gelman, 1992). However, there are other tasks besides numerical comparison for which there is clear evidence that the mental number line is accessed, and no size effect has been observed in these tasks. This is contrary to the predictions of these three assumptions. Moreover, all three assumptions have difficulties explaining certain symmetries in priming studies of number naming and parity judgment. We propose a neural network model that avoids these three assumptions but, instead, uses place coding, linear scaling, and constant variability on the mental number line. We train the model on naming, parity judgment, and comparison and show that the size effect appears in comparison, but not in naming or parity judgment. Moreover, no asymmetries appear in primed naming or primed parity judgment with this model, in line with empirical data. Implications of our findings are discussed. This work was supported by Grant P5/04 from the Interuniversity Attraction Poles Program—Belgian Science Policy and by a GOA grant from the Ghent University Research Council to W.F.     

Patients' Motivations and the Analyst's Experience

Although the analyst's way of organizing what he or she hears is influenced by assumptions about human motivation, the analyst's experience in the room with a patient is quite removed from any theories about motivation he or she might hold. So compelling is the clinical interaction that it may only be retrospectively that it is possible to observe how one's theory of motivation influences one's work. Several years ago, on the day before I began working on this paper, I took verbatim notes on the last three sessions of a holiday shortened week to see whether I could discern what assumptions about motivation I was making. I would not describe my theory of motivation as it appears at the end of the essay the way I did at the time I wrote this essay. Today, I would try to integrate drive theory with object relations more explicitly.     

A Defense of Two Optimistic Claims in Ethical Theory

I aim to show that (i) thereare good ways to argue about what has intrinsicvalue; and (ii) good ethical arguments needntmake ethical assumptions. I support (i) and(ii) by rebutting direct attacks, by discussingnine plausible ways to argue about intrinsicvalue, and by arguing for pains intrinsicbadness without making ethical assumptions. If(i) and (ii) are correct, then ethical theoryhas more resources than many philosophers havethought: empirical evidence, and evidencebearing on intrinsic value. With moreresources, we can hope to base all of our moralbeliefs on evidence rather than on, say,emotion or mere intuition.     

Estimating causal strength: the role of structural knowledge and processing effort.

The strength of causal relations typically must be inferred on the basis of statistical relations between observable events. This article focuses on the problem that there are multiple ways of extracting statistical information from a set of events. In causal structures involving a potential cause, an effect and a third related event, the assumed causal role of this third event crucially determines whether it is appropriate to control for this event when making causal assessments between the potential cause and the effect. Three experiments show that prior assumptions about the causal roles of the learning events affect the way contingencies are assessed with otherwise identical learning input. However, prior assumptions about causal roles is only one factor influencing contingency estimation. The experiments also demonstrate that processing effort affects the way statistical information is processed. These findings provide further evidence for the interaction between bottom-up and top-down influences in the acquisition of causal knowledge. They show that, apart from covariation information or knowledge about mechanisms, abstract assumptions about causal structures also may affect the learning process.     

INEVITABLE HUMANS: SIMON CONWAY MORRIS'S EVOLUTIONARY PALEONTOLOGY

Abstract. Simon Conway Morris, noted Cambridge University paleontologist, argues that in evolutionary natural history humans (or beings rather like humans) are an inevitable outcome of the developing speciating processes over millennia; humans are “inherent” in the system. This claim, in marked contrast to claims about contingency made by other prominent paleontologists, is based on numerous remarkable convergences—similar trends found repeatedly in evolutionary history. Conway Morris concludes approaching a natural theology. His argument is powerful and informed. But does it face adequately the surprising events in such history, particularly notable in unexpected co‐options that redirect the course of life? The challenge to understand how humans are both on a continuum with other species and also utterly different remains a central puzzle in paleontology.     

A grand theory of motivation: Why not?

Baumeister asks what a grand theory of motivation might look like, and he identifies the key problems, challenges, and opportunities that need to be considered in its pursuit. I address four of these challenges—how to define motivation, whether motivation is a state or a trait, the primacy of motivation in psychology, and the necessity to not only manage motivational conflict but also to vitalize motivational assets. I focus primarily, however, on the key obstacle that prevents a grand theory—our non-shared assumptions about the nature and dynamics of motivation. I suggest we capitalize on new advances in statistics, methodology, and technology to test what used to be untestable assumptions about motivation. Shared assumptions are necessary for a coherent science, and only a coherent science is capable of constructing a general theory.     

Future self-appraisals and global self-esteem: Who benefits more from thinking about the future,and why?

People tend to think positively about their future selves. However, it remains unclear to what extent this tendency depends on the positivity of their current self-appraisal. To study this problem, we employed the assumptions of construal level theory, the concept of self-enhancement, and the assumptions of temporal self-appraisal theory, and we examined the role of global self-esteem in the relationship between temporal distance and future self-appraisals measured in absolute (Study 1), comparative temporal (Study 2), or comparative social (Study 3) ways. In all three studies, when assessed in terms of specific dimensions, future self-appraisals increased with temporal distance only in people with low self-esteem, but when assessed in terms of general dimensions, self-appraisals were higher in the distant compared to the near future irrespective of self-esteem level.     

Semantics and the sacred

ABSTRACT

This article looks at four different scholarly perspectives on ‘sacred’ – the ineffable sacred, the experienced sacred, the polarized sacred and the contextualized sacred – in order to draw out their implicit presuppositions about meaning. The first two stances presuppose that meaning depends on what bits of language are about (referentialism), and the other two stances presuppose that meaning depends on relations between bits of language (holism). The article concludes three things: these prominent views of ‘sacred’ rest on usually implicit or unrecognized assumptions about the nature of meaning; some of those assumptions explain why certain theories are contentious and problematic and others ground more promising and productive approaches.