Parity,Intransitivity, And A Context-Sensitive Degree Analysis of Gradability

Larry Temkin challenged what seems to be an analytic truth about comparatives: if A is Φ-er than B and B is Φ-er than C, then, A is Φ-er than C. Ruth Chang denies a related claim: if A is Φ-er than B and C is not Φ-er than B, but is Φ to a certain degree, then A is Φ-er than C. In this paper I advance a context-sensitive semantics of gradability according to which the data uncovered by Temkin and Chang leave both statements intact.     

Complexity and the Value of Lives—some philosophical dangers for mentally handicapped people

ABSTRACT In his book The End of Life James Rachels argues that in a situation of forced choice if we must choose between a more and a less complex human being we have good reason to choose in favour of the normal human. He argues also that since some humans have less complex mental abilities than some animals it will sometimes be right to choose a non-human animal in preference to a human being.
I do not consider Rachels'belief that sometimes non-human animals are to be preferred to retarded humans; I focus rather on the seemingly less contentious belief that in situations of forced choice, we should choose human beings with more rather than less complex lives. I reject this contention both because Rachels does not seem to have offered a worthwhile argument in its favour and also because I find his cavalier approach to the lives of people with intellectual disabilities morally offensive. En route I argue against his simplistic separation of human lives into the categories 'simple'and 'complex'on the basis of whether the individuals in question fall into what he seems to take as given—the clear cut categories 'mentally retarded'and 'normal'[1] [2].     

Nothing Matters in Survival

Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an “extreme” view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, we conclude that simplicity decides in its favor. Throughout the essay we honor Jim Rachels, whose final days exemplified his own unselfish morality as well as the “neutralist” ideal we espouse. As an appendix, we include the last original work to be published by James Rachels, in which he criticizes Sidgwick’s most famous defense of egoism.     

What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

Consistent Liberalism does not Require Active Euthanasia

I argue that ‘classical liberalism’ does not sanction any easy permissiveness about suicide and active euthanasia. I will use liberal arguments to argue that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is real and that assisted suicide is, at the very least, deeply troubling when viewed from an authentic liberal perspective. The usual argument for active euthanasia is a utilitarian, not a liberal argument, as recent calls to eliminate the conscientious objection rights of doctors who refuse participation in such procedures plainly demonstrate. The paper focuses on arguments in the public sphere (such as those articulated by James Rachels).     

Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)

If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non‐identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non‐identity. I also argue that the standard explanation cannot be salvaged by a shift to personal time. Appeals to a lack of continuity, or to the absence of unity of consciousness likewise fail. Rather, B and C are non‐identical simply because A branched into B and C. Why branching should be problematic for personal identity remains a deep puzzle though I offer some tentative suggestions.     

What Do Gestational Mothers Deserve?

This paper analyzes the following question: What do women deserve, ethically speaking, when they agree to gestate a fetus on behalf of third parties? I argue for several claims. First, I argue that gestational motherhood’s moral significance has been misunderstood, an oversight I attribute to the focus in family ethics on the conditions of parenthood. Second, I use a less controversial version of James Rachels’s account of desert to argue that gestational mothers deserve a parent-like voice as well as significant care and support, conclusions that have implications for commercial surrogacy. Finally, I argue that we should not make requests of others when fulfilling them will lead others to deserve goods we cannot reasonably expect them to receive, and I conclude based on this thesis, what I call the “strings attached thesis,” that pro-life arguments in support of prohibitions on abortion commit their proponents to policies which they may not be willing to support.     

Intransitivity,Essential Comparativeness,and Objective Value

Building on Goldman 2008 and 2009, which argue that objective values would be strange in coming in degrees but in no determinate number of degrees, this paper argues that related properties having to do with degrees of value make a further case against objective values. The properties of giving rise to intransitive orderings and being essentially comparative are explained by Larry Temkin in Rethinking the Good. He shows that “better than” is intransitively ordered. Many subjective states are too. But similar arguments for the intransitive orderings of intrinsic objective properties fail. Furthermore, subjective properties and states can change without these changes being explained by changes in their objects. This is similar to the essentially comparative nature of goodness. Given the analogies to subjective states and lack of analogies to objective properties that the present article points out, it argues that we should infer, as Temkin does not, that values are subjective.     

THE VALUE OF EXTERNAL DIRECTION AND INDIVIDUAL DISCOVERY IN LEARNING SITUATIONS: The learning of a mathematical principle

W erdelin , I. The value of external direction and individual discovery in learning situations. I. The learning of a mathematical principle. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1968, 9, 241–247.—Three samples (A, B, C), selected at random from seven sixth grade classes, were instructed differently how to use a mathematical principle. A was told the principle and applied it on examples; B was given most examples first, then told the principle, and given additional examples; C was given examples only. A learned the principle better, as measured by a test given immediately after the experiment. C was comparatively better as to retention and transfer. B was between A and C.     

Political reconciliation at the level of global governance1

This article applies the idea of political reconciliation to current debates on the role and legitimacy of global governance. My underlying thesis is that the idea of reconciliation fits better with the non-ideal circumstances of global injustice. To this end, I will first of all develop a three-tiered model of political reconciliation and introduce the related concept of restorative justice. I will then look at some of the most obvious forms of international and global injustice – historical injustice, economic exploitation, and political domination – and argue that a normative theory of political reconciliation provides better proposals for feasible global governance reforms than do theories of corrective, retributive, or distributive justice. Finally, I will make a few comments on the role of political philosophy as a medium of ‘narrative reconciliation’.     

The ‘Practical Turn’ and the Convergence of Traditions

Abstract

This paper explores the idea that the structure of intentionality is fundamentally the structure of a practice, not the structure of a language, or some quasi-linguistic system of representational entities. I show how and why neo-Fregean theory of content is committed to this practical turn. Mis-representation is often thought to be problematic for the neo-Fregean, but I show not only that it accommodates the phenomena better than the representationalist position, but also that the idea of error that the representationalist wants with empty singular terms is redundant, for it has no role to play in explaining the systematicity of thought.     

Life Extension versus Replacement

abstract   It seems to be a widespread opinion that increasing the length of existing happy lives is better than creating new happy lives although the total welfare is the same in both cases, and that it may be better even when the total welfare is lower in the outcome with extended lives. I shall discuss two interesting suggestions that seem to support this idea, or so it has been argued. Firstly, the idea there is a positive level of well-being above which a life has to reach to have positive contributive value to a population, so-called Critical Level Utilitarianism. Secondly, the view that it makes an outcome worse if people are worse off than they otherwise could have been, a view I call Comparativism. I shall show that although these theories do capture some of our intuitions about the value of longevity, they contradict others, and they have a number of counterintuitive implications in other cases that we ultimately have to reject them.     

Blocking the Vagueness Block - A New Restricted Answer to the Special Composition Question

The vagueness objection seems to block any moderate answer to the Special Composition Question leaving us with the two extreme alternatives that there either is no composite object or that any set of things compose an object. In this technical paper I introduce the notion of causal objects and a definition of a predicate that permits the set of all parts to be divided into equivalence classes. On this view we can use equivalence classes of parts to define the notion of composite objects why vagueness is blocked. The block works in a hypothetical domain where all parts have a cause so the aim is not to suggest empirically detectable parts and composites, nor to claim any kind of existence of the things being defined, but to present a consistent account of a possible moderate answer to the Special Composition Question that avoids the vagueness objection. The underlying idea is that an object, as such, is not caused whereas its parts are. For example, if we have three caused parts A, B and C constituting the composite D, we have three things that are caused (A, B and C) whereas the composite D has no cause over and above the three causes of A, B and C.

     

One-year follow-up of patients with cluster C personality disorders: a prospective study comparing patients with "pure" and comorbid conditions within cluster C, and "pure" C with "pure" cluster A or B conditions.

This one-year, post-treatment prospective study of consecutively admitted patients to a national psychiatric in-patient clinic, compares patients belonging to four subgroups of DSM-III-R personality disorder (PDs): "pure cluster A (N = 21), "pure" B (N = 67), "pure" C (N = 251), and Axis II "comorbid" C (N = 138). Outcome was measured by SCl-90 and occupational status. Axis I disorders were controlled for in all analyses. Contrary to our hypothesis, patients in pure cluster C had no better outcome than either Axis II comorbid cluster C patients or patients with pure cluster A or B. Although pure C patients relapsed in symptom distress after discharge, comorbid C patients did not. C patients with an additional Histrionic PD were less at risk to be a case at follow up (GSI level > 1.00). Cluster C disorders as a whole had negative impact upon outcome in the total sample. These findings suggest the need for better treatment of patients with cluster C conditions.     

When logic fails: Implicit transitive inference in humans

Transitive inference (TI) in animals (e.g., choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C) has been interpreted by some as reflecting a declarative logical inference process. We invert this anthropomorphic interpretation by providing evidence that humans can exhibit TI-like behavior on the basis of simpler associative mechanisms that underlie many theories of animal learning. In this study, human participants were trained on a five-pair TI problem (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, E+F-) and, unlike in previous human TI studies, were prevented from becoming explicitly aware of the logical hierarchy, so they could not employ logical reasoning. They were then tested with three problems: B versus D, B versus E, and C versus E. Participants only reliably chose B over E, whereas the other test conditions yielded chance performance. This result is inconsistent with the use of logical reasoning and is instead consistent with an account developed to explain earlier TI studies with rats that found the same pattern of results. In this account, choice performance is based on differential associative strengths across the stimulus items that develop over training, despite equal overt reinforcement.     

替罗非班不同给药途径对DM合并急性STEMI患者PCI术后血小板α-颗粒膜蛋白及心肌灌注水平的影响

为探讨替罗非班不同给药途径对糖尿病（DM）合并急性ST段抬高型心肌梗死（STEMI）患者PCI术后血小板α-颗粒膜蛋白及心肌灌注水平的影响,对149例DM合并急性STEMI患者进行研究,测定并比较经静脉（A组）、冠脉给药途径（B组）和无替罗非班（C组）的患者术前及术中应用替罗非班后血小板α-颗粒膜蛋白GMP140浓度、造影结果、心肌酶及肌钙蛋白I水平峰值及峰值时间、心电图变化。结果显示A、B两组术中血小板α-颗粒膜蛋白浓度较术前明显降低（P〈0．05）,且B组较A组降低更明显（P〈0．05）,而C组未见明显变化（P〉0．05）,A、B两组术后即刻TIMI血流、2h sumSTR、心肌酶及肌钙蛋白Ⅰ峰值及峰值时间的变化均优于C组（P〈0．05）,且B组优于A组（P〈0．05）。因此,替罗非班可以降低血小板α-颗粒膜蛋白浓度和改善心肌灌注水平,与静脉途径给药相比,经冠脉给药更具有优势。     

A Logical Foundation for Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy

Rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) depends on the implications A ? B and B ? C where A is an activating event, B is a belief and C is an emotional consequence. We use this idea to present a logical theory for REBT, and show how it can be used to create a computer program that can be used as a therapist’s aid.     

Alternative Actions and the Spirit of Consequentialism

The simple idea behind act-consequentialism isthat we ought to choose the action whoseoutcome is better than that of any alternativeaction. In a recent issue of this journal, ErikCarlson has argued that given a reasonableinterpretation of alternative actions thissimple idea cannot be upheld but that the newtheory he proposes nevertheless preserves theact-consequentialist spirit. My aim in thispaper is to show that Carlson is wrong on bothcounts. His theory, contrary to his ownintentions, is not an act-consequentialisttheory. By building on a theory formulated byHolly Smith, I will show that the simple ideacan be upheld. The new theory I will proposehas all the merits of Carlson's theory withoutsharing its demerits.     

‘Incommensurability’ and Vagueness: Is the Vagueness View Defensible?

The vagueness view holds that when evaluative comparisons are hard, there is indeterminacy about which comparative relation holds. It is sceptical about whether there are any incommensurate items (in some domain). The sceptical element of John Broome’s version of this view rests on a controversial principle. Robert Sugden advances a similar view which does not depend on this principle. Sugden’s argument fails as a vagueness view because it assumes rather than shows that there are no incommensurate items (in some domain). Nonetheless, I argue that an interpretation of his argument constitutes a defensible vagueness view which is supported by intuition about examples. On this interpretation Sugden’s view can be mapped onto Broome’s application of a supervaluationist view of vagueness. It is also (on this reading) a close relative of James Griffin’s ‘rough equality’ view when this is interpreted in terms of vagueness. On an alternative interpretation Sugden’s view is not sceptical about incommensurateness. On this interpretation he does not defend a vagueness view and is ‘sceptical’ about the contribution of the philosophical literature to our understanding of rational choice.     

Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value Rankings

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs.