Reappraising the Moral Nature of Emotions in Decision Making: The Case of Shame and Guilt

Emotions play a crucial role in moral behavior. The present paper does not contest this point but argues that qualifications of certain feelings such as shame and guilt as moral emotions should not exclusively be based on a proximal analysis of their function. A proximal analysis details how moral emotions produce moral behavior. Emotions are qualified as moral when they are elicited by concerns for others rather than the self and produce prosocial action tendencies. Although researchers have acknowledged that moral emotions may also have an ultimate function that details why it is in the individual interest that these moral effects occur, they have neglected to translate such ideas into testable hypotheses. Using guilt and shame as an example, we show how an analysis of ultimate functions accommodates recent findings, which contest the view that guilt is more moral than shame and provides new insights as to when and why moral emotions will produce moral effects.     

Acknowledging the skeletons in our closet: the effect of group affirmation on collective guilt, collective shame, and reparatory attitudes

Just as with threats to personal identity, people defend against social identity threats. In the context of intergroup injustice, such defensiveness undercuts collective guilt and its prosocial consequences. The current research examines whether group affirmation allows perpetrator groups to disarm threat without undermining guilt. In Study 1, men accepted greater guilt for gender inequality after affirming the ingroup. Given the distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, Studies 2-4 assessed both emotions and revealed that Canadians accepted greater guilt and shame over the mistreatment of Aboriginals following group affirmation. In Study 3, group affirmation also moderated the relation of each emotion with reparatory attitudes. When controlling for each other, collective shame predicted compensation in a nonaffirmation control condition whereas guilt predicted compensation once identity threat had been disarmed by group affirmation. In Study 4, the effect of group affirmation on the collective emotions was mediated by defensive appraisals of the injustice.     

Reassessing the dimensionality of the moral emotions

The dimensionality of the moral emotions was tested to examine whether theoretical distinctions between specific emotions were empirically supported. A total of 720 drink‐driving offenders indicated the degree to which they experienced feelings associated with the moral emotions, in an interview conducted after attending court or a restorative justice conference. Expected distinctions between shame and guilt were not found. Instead the principal components analysis identified three factors: shame‐guilt, embarrassment‐exposure, and unresolved shame. The results also show that shame‐guilt was related to higher feelings of empathy and lower feelings of anger/hostility. It is concluded that differences between shame and guilt may be overstated. Furthermore, it is suggested that the relationship between situational experiences of shame and the disposition to feel it may be more complicated than initially thought.     

Profiles of Peritraumatic Emotions

Researchers have identified peritraumatic emotions as important predictors of who will develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. However, such investigations have not examined full profiles of emotions, perhaps because of the typical emphasis on fear or other Criterion A2 emotions. Such an examination could help us identify which peritraumatic emotions are prominent, and how they relate to important posttrauma outcomes. Thus, the aim of this study was to identify distinct profiles of peritraumatic emotions and their correlates using a comprehensive survey of peri- and posttraumatic reactions. We conducted a latent profile analysis of peritraumatic emotions in 398 undergraduate students who reported a DSM–IV A1 trauma and then compared the resulting profiles on trauma type, PTSD, depression, and posttraumatic cognitions. Six distinct profiles emerged: 3 had consistently low, medium, or high levels across the range of emotions, with 3 others primarily characterized by low shame and guilt, high anger and guilt, and low guilt. These profiles significantly differed in terms of trauma type, PTSD, depression, and posttraumatic cognitions. In particular, profiles with high levels of anger, shame, and guilt were consistently related to overall worse functioning. Importantly, fear and associated emotions did not differentiate between profiles. These results have important implications for the phenomenology of posttrauma emotional reactions and strongly suggest that the clinical assessment of traumatic experiences go beyond fear-based conceptualizations.     

What do the TOSCA guilt and shame scales really measure: Affect or action?

Psychologists have long used the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) as an instrument for empirically distinguishing between trait emotions of guilt and shame. Recent assessments of the internal structure of the TOSCA guilt scale suggest that it may not measure the experience of guilt, but rather motivation to make amends for personal wrongdoing. In contrast, TOSCA shame may better assess the tendency to experience negative self-conscious affect. Previous research did not take into account that TOSCA guilt theoretically should only predict emotions in a situation of wrongdoing; we put this idea to the test in two studies. Experimental, but not control, participants received believable feedback that they had shown involuntary prejudice towards a member of a minority group. In both studies TOSCA guilt predicted reparative action after feedback was given, including expressing non-prejudiced views and recommending financial compensation to the minority group. However, TOSCA guilt had no relationship with feelings of guilt or shame after expressing prejudice. In contrast, TOSCA shame was a better predictor of feelings of guilt, shame and other self-critical emotions, but did not predict compensatory action. These findings suggest motivation rather than emotion as a mechanism behind past findings involving TOSCA guilt.     

Group‐Based Shame and Guilt: Emerging Directions in Research

Research on the role of emotion in social identity, group processes, and intergroup conflict is burgeoning. This paper examines recent research on group‐based shame and guilt and describes important themes in this research. Guilt and shame are distinguished by different appraisals and motivations in intergroup contexts. Group‐based shame is associated with threats to group‐image and motivations to protect and repair that image. In contrast, group‐based guilt is associated with efforts to repair and apologize for ingroup wrongdoing. Current research is expanding in several important directions. First, the scope of emotions is expanding beyond that of shame and guilt to consider the roles of emotions such as ingroup‐directed anger in situations that may also provoke group‐based shame and guilt. Second, people’s motivations to avoid feeling group‐based shame and guilt are becoming better understood, particularly in relation to different aspects of social identification. Finally, we argue that dynamic processes in emotion expression and experience, particularly due to the relation between perpetrator and victim groups, are an important future direction in research on group‐based shame and guilt.     

Maternal Guilt and Shame: The Role of Self-discrepancy and Fear of Negative Evaluation

Guilt and shame are emotions commonly associated with motherhood. Self-discrepancy theory proposes that guilt and shame result from perceived discrepancies between one’s actual and ideal selves. Fear of negative evaluation by others may enhance the effects of self-discrepancy especially for shame, which involves fear of others’ reproach. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between self discrepancy, guilt, shame, and fear of negative evaluation in a cross-sectional, self report study of mothers. Mothers of children five and under (N = 181) completed an on-line survey measuring guilt, shame, fear of negative evaluation, and maternal self-discrepancies. Guilt and shame were related to maternal self-discrepancy and fear of negative evaluation. In addition, fear of negative evaluation moderated the relationship between maternal self-discrepancy and shame such that mothers who greatly feared negative evaluation had a very strong relationship between these variables. Maternal self-discrepancy and shame were not related among mothers who had low fear of negative evaluation. The results are discussed in terms of the detrimental effects of internalizing idealized standards of perfect motherhood.     

Small or Big in the Eyes of the Other: On the Developmental Psychopathology of Self-Conscious Emotions as Shame,Guilt, and Pride

The self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, and pride typically occur when people evaluate their own self through the eyes of another person. This article will first of all discuss the nature and function of self-conscious emotions, and describe their developmental course in children and adolescents. Then, a number of variables are discussed that are thought to increase young people’s proneness to experience self-conscious emotions. Following this, the empirical evidence on the relationships between guilt, shame, and pride and various types of psychopathology in children and adolescents will be summarized. A model is presented to explain why these self-conscious emotions are associated with a diversity of psychopathological outcomes. Finally, recommendations for clinical practice are made in terms of assessment and interventions targeting the origins and sequelae of self-conscious emotions.     

Tracking the trajectory of shame, guilt, and pride across the life span

The authors examined age differences in shame, guilt, and 2 forms of pride (authentic and hubristic) from age 13 years to age 89 years, using cross-sectional data from 2,611 individuals. Shame decreased from adolescence into middle adulthood, reaching a nadir around age 50 years, and then increased in old age. Guilt increased from adolescence into old age, reaching a plateau at about age 70 years. Authentic pride increased from adolescence into old age, whereas hubristic pride decreased from adolescence into middle adulthood, reaching a minimum around age 65 years, and then increased in old age. On average, women reported experiencing more shame and guilt; Blacks reported experiencing less shame and Asians more hubristic pride than other ethnicities. Across the life span, shame and hubristic pride tended to be negatively related to psychological well-being, and shame-free guilt and authentic pride showed positive relations with well-being. Overall, the findings support the maturity principle of personality development and suggest that as people age they become more prone to experiencing psychologically adaptive self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and authentic pride, and less prone to experiencing psychologically maladaptive ones, such as shame and hubristic pride.     

Group-based guilt and shame in the context of intergroup conflict: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs about group malleability

Group-based guilt and shame are part of a wide range of moral emotions in intergroup conflicts. These emotions can potentially motivate group members to make compromises in order to promote conflict resolution, and increase support for reparations and apologies following moral transgressions committed by the in-group. Thus, it is important to understand how to induce these emotions and the mechanisms for their effects. In the present paper, we examined the mechanisms underlying group-based guilt and shame in four studies. Across the first three studies, conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that group-based guilt was mostly predicted by individuals’ implicit theories about groups (ITG). Specifically, we found that the more participants believed that groups are malleable, the more they experienced group-based guilt. Group-based shame, however, was found to be dependent upon individuals’ perception of other people’s perceptions about the malleability of groups (i.e., meta-ITG), as the perceived damage to one’s in-group image is a major component in experiencing shame. In Study 4, conducted in the context of gender relations, we differentiated between the two components of shame, that is, moral and image shame. As predicted, while group-based guilt and moral shame showed similar patterns of results, meta-ITG had a moderating effect on the association between ITG and group-based image shame. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed in relation to promoting intergroup conflict resolution and reconciliation.     

When stepping outside the self is not enough: A self-distanced perspective reduces the experience of basic but not of self-conscious emotions

Despite recent increased interest in self-conscious emotions, few studies have investigated their regulation. The current research examines the effectiveness of self-perspective in regulating negative self-conscious (guilt, shame) versus basic (anger, sadness) emotions. We predict that adopting a distanced perspective on the self would attenuate the experience of anger and sadness, as previous research has shown (e.g., Kross et al., 2005). However, because the experience of self-conscious emotions involves self-evaluation as well as the evaluation of the self from the perspective of others, a self-distanced perspective may enable these emotions and fail to attenuate the experience of shame and guilt. As predicted, a self-distanced perspective attenuated feelings of sadness and anger, but not of shame and guilt. These findings suggest the appraisal of the experienced emotion (i.e., whether it involves self-evaluations and/or the perspective of others) may influence the effectiveness of emotion-regulation strategies.     

Body-related state shame and guilt in women: Do causal attributions mediate the influence of physical self-concept and shame and guilt proneness

Guided by the process model of self-conscious emotions, this study examined whether physical self-concept (PSC) and shame and guilt proneness were associated with body-related self-conscious emotions of state shame and guilt and if these relationships were mediated by attributions of stability, globality, and controllability. Female participants (N = 284; Mean age = 20.6 ± 1.9 years) completed measures of PSC and shame and guilt proneness before reading a hypothetical scenario. Participants completed measures of attributions and state shame and guilt in response to the scenario. Significant relationships were noted between state shame and attributions of globality and controllability, and shame proneness, guilt proneness, and PSC. Similar relationships, with the additional predictor of stability, were found for state guilt. Mediation analysis partially supported the process model hypotheses for shame. Results indicate PSC and shame proneness are important in predicting body-related emotions, but the role of specific attributions are still unclear.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: guilt, shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

大学生心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感对反事实思维的影响

研究以128名大学生为研究对象,采用2 (心理控制源: 外控型、内控型)×2 (自我道德感: 内疚感、羞耻感) 两因素被试间实验设计,考察了外控和内控大学生在内疚感和羞耻感两种不同的自我道德情感下反事实思维内容的差异。结果表明:(1) 心理控制源对大学生反事实思维不同内容的诱发具有重要的影响:外控者更倾向于产生行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者更倾向于产生自我导向的反事实思维。内疚感和羞耻感对大学生反事实思维内容的产生没有直接的影响;(2) 反事实思维内容的产生受到了心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感两种自我道德情感的交互影响:外控者在羞耻感的启动条件下比在内疚感的启动条件下表现出了更多的行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者在内疚感的启动条件下比在羞耻感的条件下表现出了更多的自我导向的反事实思维。研究结果有助于解释以中西方不同被试而得出的内疚感和羞耻感与反事实思维关系的矛盾结论。     

The Effect of Shame‐Proneness,Guilt‐Proneness,and Internalizing Tendencies on Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury

Nonsuicidal self‐injury is especially common in adolescents and young adults. Self‐injury may be related to shame or guilt—two moral emotions—as these differentially predict other maladaptive behaviors. Using a college sample, we examined not only how shame‐proneness, guilt‐proneness, and internalizing emotional tendencies related to self‐injury, but also whether these moral emotions moderate the relation between internalizing tendencies and self‐injury. High shame‐proneness was associated with higher frequencies of self‐injury. High guilt‐proneness was associated with less self‐injury, although this effect was mitigated at higher levels of internalizing tendencies. These results suggest shame‐proneness is a risk factor for self‐injury, while guilt‐proneness is protective.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt,shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

Differentiating shame from guilt

How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.     

Assessment of self-conscious emotions: a Swedish psychometric and structure evaluation of the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA)

The Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) is a well-established scenario-based questionnaire assessing self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, which have been shown to be differentially associated with a variety of functional, motivational, behavioral and health outcomes. The aim of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties and internal structure of a Swedish version of TOSCA in a sample of 361 healthy adults. The psychometric properties and internal consistency of the Swedish version were at level with the original US TOSCA version for shame, guilt and detachment. The internal structure of the Swedish version was acceptable for shame, guilt and detachment but contained shortcomings in assessment of externalization.     

Social cuing of guilt by anger and of shame by disgust

Scholars have proposed a conceptual structure for the self-critical moral emotions of guilt and shame and the other-critical emotions of anger and disgust. In this model, guilt is linked with anger and shame with disgust. This relationship may express itself in asymmetrical social cuing between emotions: In a social context, other people's angry facial expressions may communicate that the target should feel guilty, and other people's disgusted facial expressions may communicate that the target should feel ashamed. We conducted two experiments, one in the United Kingdom and the other in Spain, in which participants were shown pictures of faces expressing either anger or disgust. Participants rated the degree to which the faces would make them feel guilt or shame in a casual social encounter, and they answered questions about inferences concerning the emotional expressions. In both studies, angry expressions led to greater guilt and less shame than did disgusted expressions. This relationship was explained better by the type of norm violation inferred than by whether the violation was thought to involve the target's action or personality versus the target's character.