Robust,unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible

In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of limited cognitive sophistication.     

Intrinsicality without Naturalness

Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property"that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of"notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."     

Characterizing hallucination epistemically

According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being ‘introspectively indiscriminable’, in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms of the impossibility that a hallucinator might possess a certain type of knowledge on a certain basis. I argue that the standard assumption is mistaken. I argue that the relevant notion of introspective indiscriminability is better construed in terms of positive epistemics: in particular, I argue that the notion is better explained by reference to the fact that it would be rational for a hallucinator positively to make a certain type of judgement, were that judgement made on a certain basis.     

Changing minds in a changing world

I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject??s location. The rule combines standard conditioning with a ??shifting?? operation that moves the center of each doxastic possibility forward to the next point where information arrives. I show that well-known arguments for conditioning lead to this combination when centered information is taken into account. I also discuss how my proposal relates to other recent proposals, what results it delivers for puzzles like the Sleeping Beauty problem, and whether there are diachronic constraints on rational belief at all.     

The cosmic lottery

One version of the argument for design relies on the assumption that the apparent fine-tuning of the universe for the existence of life requires an explanation. I argue that the assumption is false. Philosophers who argue for the assumption usually appeal to analogies, such as the one in which a person was to draw a particular straw among a very large number of straws in order not to be killed. Philosophers on the other side appeal to analogies like the case of winning a lottery. I analyze the two analogies and explain why the lottery analogy is the right one to use. In the light of such an analysis, we can see that although the cosmic feature of being life-permitting is rare, it does not allow life-permitting possible universes to stand out because there are other rare cosmic features that other possible universes have.     

Maintaining lies: The multiple-audience problem

In an examination of lying in social context, undergraduates were videotaped while describing teachers. Each student described a teacher truthfully to one peer, described the teacher deceptively to a second peer, and was then required to describe the teacher to both peers as the latter sat side-by-side. Three experiments examined the psychology of this multiple-audience predicament. Results of an initial experiment show that students who are in the predicament appear deceptive. They appear deceptive whether they are lying or telling the truth. A second experiment replicates this finding, and suggests that the students’ apparent deceptiveness is conveyed more strongly by audible than visible cues. In the interpersonal predicament created by multiple audiences, students offer equivocal, disfluent remarks, as a third experiment shows. Discussion centers on the challenge of maintaining lies in the context of multiple relationships.     

Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan

Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is necessarily 1, precluding such updating. In response, Horgan maintains that the probability claims in his argument are to be taken, not as claims about possible rational degrees of belief, but rather as claims about “quantitative degrees of evidential support.” This paper argues that the most plausible account of quantitative degree of support, when conjoined with any of the three major accounts of indexical thought in such a way as to plausibly constrain rational credence, contradicts essential elements of Horgan’s argument.     

On the alleged ineffability of death

A number of recent theorists, all proceeding on the assumption that there is no afterlife, argue that the notion of one's own death defies comprehension in ways that have important implications. Some argue this "ineffability" of death precludes a rational decision to die. Dr. Edwin Shneidman maintains that it makes the notion of our own death unintelligible to each of us. In this paper, these arguments are criticized. It is maintained that death is not so inscrutible as these theorists would have us believe.     

Rational cooperation

The Nash-Harsanyi theory of bargaining is usually taken as the correct theory of rational bargaining, and, as such, as the correct theory for the basic political contract for a society. It grafts a theory of cooperation to a base that essentially articulates the perspective of non-cooperative interaction. The resultant theory is supposed make clear how rational bargaining can fully realize the mutual gains that cooperation can make possible. However, its underlying commitment to the concepts of non-cooperative interaction renders this doubtful. I argue for an alternative theory??the theory of Full Cooperation??that avoids this difficulty. As applied to bargaining over the basic political contract, it calls for the selection of the most egalitarian of the Strictly Pareto-Optimal outcomes. This is essentially a version of Rawls?? principle of Justice as Fairness, but it is derived, unlike Rawls?? theory, without appeal to a problematic theory of individual decision-making behind the veil of ignorance. It also provides an alternative basis for what Hart calls the Principle of Mutual Restrictions, and what Rawls?? calls the Duty of Fair Play.     

Bayesian chance

This paper explores how the Bayesian program benefits from allowing for objective chance as well as subjective degree of belief. It applies David Lewis??s Principal Principle and David Christensen??s principle of informed preference to defend Howard Raiffa??s appeal to preferences between reference lotteries and scaling lotteries to represent degrees of belief. It goes on to outline the role of objective lotteries in an application of rationality axioms equivalent to the existence of a utility assignment to represent preferences in Savage??s famous omelet example of a rational choice problem. An example motivating causal decision theory illustrates the need for representing subjunctive dependencies to do justice to intuitive examples where epistemic and causal independence come apart. We argue to extend Lewis??s account of chance as a guide to epistemic probability to include De Finetti??s convergence results. We explore Diachronic Dutch book arguments as illustrating commitments for treating transitions as learning experiences. Finally, we explore implications for Martingale convergence results for motivating commitment to objective chances.     

On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities

We argue that in spite of their apparent dissimilarity, the methodologies employed in the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities can both be justified by appeal to a single principle of inductive reasoning, viz., the principle of symmetry. The difference between these two methodologies consists in the way in which information about the single-trial probabilities in a repeatable chance process is extracted from the constraints imposed by this principle. In the case of a posteriori reasoning, these constraints inform the analysis by fixing an a posteriori determinant of the probabilities, whereas, in the case of a priori reasoning, they imply certain claims which then serve as the basis for subsequent probabilistic deductions. In a given context of inquiry, the particular form which a priori or a posteriori reason may take depends, in large part, on the strength of the underlying symmetry assumed: the stronger the symmetry, the more information can be acquired a priori and the less information about the long-run behavior of the process is needed for an a posteriori assessment of the probabilities. In the context of this framework, frequency-based reasoning emerges as a limiting case of a posteriori reasoning, and reasoning about simple games of chance, as a limiting case of a priori reasoning. Between these two extremes, both a priori and a posteriori reasoning can take a variety of intermediate forms.     

Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a ??Grand State Space??, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. On the other hand, this notion of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs.     

The Epistemic Integrity of Scientific Research

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.     

Baselining affects the production of deceptive narratives

Recent research shows that the quality of a baseline (i.e., the analysis of one's behavior in normal conditions) decreases when the second narrative is expected and deceitful. However, a first step would be to investigate whether the writing of a first narrative might influence the second, independently of its expectancy. In this study, we hypothesized that second narratives would be less detailed, especially if these narratives are deceptive. Participants (N = 71) were asked to narrate two consecutive truthful and deceptive narratives. The second narrative was unexpected, and the order of the narratives was counterbalanced. Results suggest a detrimental effect of deceptiveness and order on the frequency of details. Moreover, an interaction was observed, suggesting when narratives are written after a first one, the frequency of details decreases, all the more if they were deceptive. The results of this experiment are discussed from both a theoretical and an applied perspective.     

The effectiveness of penalty takers' deception: A scoping review

Attackers are supposed to take advantage of producing deceptive actions in competitive ball sports, particularly in penalty situations. We conducted a scoping review of the experimental literature to scrutinize whether penalty takers do indeed benefit from using deceptive actions in penalty situations, especially by increasing the likelihood to score a goal. Studies using video-based and in-situ tasks in which soccer and handball goalkeepers try to save a penalty were evaluated. Results showed that penalty takers' manipulation of spatial information available to the goalkeeper during deception (i.e., by using misleading and/or disguising actions) is less effective in in-situ than video-based studies. We argue that this difference occurs because goalkeepers adapt differently to the spatiotemporal constraints in the video-based and in-situ tasks. Goalkeepers appear to prioritize picking up spatial information in video-based tasks while prioritizing temporal information in-situ tasks. Therefore, the manipulation of spatial information appears to be less effective in the more representative in-situ studies than in video-based studies. In order to deceive, penalty takers are advised to manipulate temporal information during on-field penalty situations.     

On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver.     

MILFS and Matrons: Images and Realities of Mothers’ Sexuality

Motherhood and sexual appeal are rarely linked in Western culture. There seems to be a notion that once a woman has children she is first and foremost an example, and must be responsible and conservative in a culturally specific way. Most women become mothers at some point in their lives and this is a major physical, emotional, and role transition, one that many women struggle with privately given societal ideals of a ??good?? mother. Despite its essential role in motherhood and life, and the health benefits known to be associated with sexual activity, public expression of sexuality is still primarily associated with being young, childless, and unmarried. Using a social constructionist perspective, we look at the ways in which acceptable expressions of mothers?? sexuality are defined and negotiated by contemporary women. Based on in-depth interviews with fifty women in their 20s, 30s, and 40s, we discuss women??s images of mothers?? sexuality and the ways in which motherhood impacts women??s experiences of sexuality. We find that for most mothers interviewed, the way they felt about sex, their sexual appeal, and their level of sexual desire changed after having children. Coupled with the fatigue and responsibility associated with being a new mother, women felt disconnected from their sexuality for a period of time.     

An analysis of indefinite probability statements

An analysis of indefinite probability statements has been offered by Jackson and Pargetter (1973). We accept that this analysis will assign the correct probability values for indefinite probability claims. But it does so in a way which fails to reflect the epistemic state of a person who makes such a claim. We offer two alternative analyses: one employing de re (epistemic) probabilities, and the other employing de dicto (epistemic) probabilities. These two analyses appeal only to probabilities which are accessible to a person who makes an indefinite probability judgment, and yet we prove that the probabilities which either of them assigns will always be equivalent to those assigned by the Jackson and Pargetter analysis.     

Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS) Among Police Officers: Accounting for the Investigator Bias Effect1

Research shows that police officers are no more accurate than non‐officers in discerning between truthful and deceptive statements, but more biased than non‐officers to judge statements as deceptive. This was labeled by Meissner and Kassin (2002) as the investigator bias effect. A likely explanation could be that, since officers are normally involved in situations where questioning the truthfulness of the interviewee is essential, they could develop a generalized communicative suspicion (GCS). Levine and McCornack's (1991) GCS scale was adapted to the Spanish context and used to compare the GCS ratings of 152 undergraduates, 88 experienced officers, and 89 police recruits. Experienced officers’ GCS scores were significantly higher than those of the other groups, which did not differ from each other. This suggests that socialization within the police force increases the officers’ suspicion, leading them to make deceptiveness judgments.