Counterfactual and prefactual conditionals.

We consider reasoning about prefactual possibilities in the future, for example, "if I were to win the lottery next year I would buy a yacht" and counterfactual possibilities, for example, "if I had won the lottery last year, I would have bought a yacht." People may reason about indicative conditionals, for example, "if I won the lottery I bought a yacht" by keeping in mind a few true possibilities, for example, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht." They understand counterfactuals by keeping in mind two possibilities, the conjecture, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht" and the presupposed facts, "I did not win the lottery and I did not buy a yacht." We report the results of three experiments on prefactuals that examine what people judge them to imply, the possibilities they judge to be consistent with them, and the inferences they judge to follow from them. The results show that reasoners keep a single possibility in mind to understand a prefactual.     

Christian Initiation,Apprenticeship in Prayer

Abstract

I confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know what time is. Yet I confess too that I do know that I am saying this in time, that I have been talking about time for a long time, and that this long time would not be a long time if it were not for the fact that time has been passing all the while. How can I know this, when I do not know what time is? Is it that I do know what time is, but do not know how to put what I know into words? I am in a sorry state, for I do not even know what I do not know!     

Empathy and Its Role in Morality

In this paper, I will argue, contra Prinz, that empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives. In particular, I argue that empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action; that empathy is sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right action; and that empathy is sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for an action. I begin by explaining what I take empathy to be. I then discuss some alleged problems for empathy and explain why some argue that empathy is unnecessary and sometimes even problematic in the moral domain. Next, I criticize a prominent alternative to an empathy‐based morality. Finally, I argue that that empathy is sometimes epistemologically and psychologically necessary for doing the right thing and is sometimes necessary for moral worth. I conclude with a discussion of the important role of empathy in our everyday lives.     

Interdigital transfer of kinesthetic after-effects

Two experiments investigated the effect of using a different finger for inspection (I) than is used in making judgments on the size of a kinesthetic aftereffect (KAE). Experiment I investigated transfer of I stimulation of the ring finger to judgments made with the index finger, A control group used the index finger for both judgments and I period. Results indicated significant KAE for both groups. Experiment II replicated Experiment I except the second finger was used to test for transfer of I stimulation to judgments made with the index finger. Results indicated KAE for only the control group which used the index finger for both judgments and I stimulation.     

Children's Resilience as Assets for Safe Schools

In this article I argue that employing positive psychology conceptions in research allows for a continuum of findings for educational psychology. I illustrate my contention by means of a participatory action research (PAR) survey-based case study in which methodological decisions were informed by an asset-focused resilience conceptual framework. First I provide a rationale, as well as contextual information for the article. Then I explicate asset-focused resilience as a conceptual framework. Subsequently, I present the methodological background of the PAR survey-based case study, after which I align the scope of the findings to the contention of my article. I conclude that the choice of a positive psychology theoretical stance enriched the scope of the findings.     

In search and proof of human beings, not machines

My intentions are twofold in this autobiographical account. On one hand, I hope to present empirical and theoretical evidence for a freely willing human being. On the other, I carefully record the developing stages I lived through to cement my confidence in the image of humanity I would like my readers to accept. I have, in my career development, worked hard to redefine psychological terminology, defend traditional scientific practices, and provide support for all those colleagues who can no longer stand the mechanistic characterization that so many psychology departments insist on. I have spent over 40 years pursuing such goals. It is not likely that I will ever give up my quest for what I take to be a genuine humanity.     

Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections

I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account and finally present my own view which, I argue, retains Ryle's insights while avoiding his mistakes.     

On Being Wholeheartedly Ambivalent: Indecisive Will,Unity of the Self,and Integration by Narration

In this paper, I want to discuss the relation between ambivalence and the unity of the self. I will raise the question whether a person can be both ambivalent about his own will and nevertheless be wholehearted. Since Harry Frankfurt’s theory is my main point of reference, I briefly introduce his account of the will and the reasons for his opposition towards ambivalence in the first section. In the second section, I analyse different interpretations of ambivalence. In the third section, I provide a narrative account of a diachronic integration of the self that allows for the integration of volitional ambivalence. Finally, I scrutinise different meanings of the unity of the self, since disintegration, not ambivalence, seems to be bad for us. I conclude that persons can indeed be wholeheartedly ambivalent.     

Theoretical Hubris and the Willingness To Be Radical: An Open Letter to James J. Gibson

J.J. Gibson's direct perception thesis is the cornerstone of ecological psychology. Not to understand this is not to understand ecological psychology. Beginning in the summer of 1968, when I first met Gibson, and after working with him for the next year at Cornell, I underwent a conversion crisis. I came to appreciate his thesis through a few philosophical insights that I here share with the reader through an open letter to Gibson, where I seek to illuminate the reasons for my conversion from being a Miller-Chomsky psycholinguist and a Piaget devotee to a radical Gibsonian. This conversion has influenced my work even until the present. Indeed, I am still working through its implications in all that I attempt. I share this intimate portrait of my relationship to Gibson and his profound ideas in hope that others who have struggled with his thesis might be helped along their way as I was.     

Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle

The likelihood principle (LP) is a core issue in disagreements between Bayesian and frequentist statistical theories. Yet statements of the LP are often ambiguous, while arguments for why a Bayesian must accept it rely upon unexamined implicit premises. I distinguish two propositions associated with the LP, which I label LP1 and LP2. I maintain that there is a compelling Bayesian argument for LP1, based upon strict conditionalization, standard Bayesian decision theory, and a proposition I call the practical relevance principle. In contrast, I argue that there is no similarly compelling argument for or against LP2. I suggest that these conclusions lead to a restrictedly pluralistic view of Bayesian confirmation measures.     

Anti-Poverty,Development, and the Limits of Progress

In this paper I critically engage with Hennie Lötter’s impressive book, Poverty, Ethics and Justice. I discuss his conception of poverty, and offer an interpretation of his claim that poverty is a uniquely human scourge. I exam the various harms of poverty that Lötter discusses. I consider two reasons that he offers for why we have a moral duty to end poverty, and I argue that the reason based on what we can justify to others if we take their human dignity seriously is most compelling. Finally, I argue that Lötter overemphasizes of the moral importance of aid and downplays in the importance of the justice of institutional and structural change. I close by considering the prospects for social equality given our experience of capitalist development as a means for poverty eradication. I consider the moral importance of limits to the achievement of robust equality.     

Visual evoked potentials to the geometric forms in the randomized presentation

Two outlined geometric figures, an equilateral triangle and a circle, of equal contour length, were randomly presented at a fixed position in the lower or upper part of the visual field (LVF and UVF). Transient visual evoked potentials (VEPs) were recorded monopolarly from the inion (I), 5, 10, 15 cm above it (I5, I10, I15) and Fz, for 12 subjects. Grand-averaged VEPs were computed. A negative (N) wave (averaged peak latency 155 ms) was identified in the LVF and a positive (P) wave (130 ms) in the UVF. In the LVF, the N amplitude of the triangle was significantly larger than that of the circle at I5 and I. Regarding the P wave in the UVF, the triangle was of a significantly longer latency than the circle at I15, I10 and I5. The enhancement of the N amplitude for the triangle in the LVF is not attributable to the arousal caused by the preparatory state for the figure, since the subject could not predict the figure to be presented next or its position.     

My Perspective on Psychotherapy Integration: An Outsider Who's Out of It

My rejoinder is a response to two commentaries on my SEPI keynote in 1997: commentaries written by Goldfried and Cullari. Instead of grappling with the ideas I presented, both respondents were distracted by my satirical beginning. In my talk I proposed a method for studying psychotherapy integration. I am not pessimistic about the potential for integration, nor am I pessimistic about psychotherapy. But I am a skeptic, and science is driven—and indeed advance—by skepticism. In fact, psychotherapy integration requires that its advocates be skeptics. I still do not know what psychotherapy integration is, and remain confused. I can only conclude that I am not only an outsider, but out of it.     

论牟宗三哲学中的易学研究

牟宗三的易学研究为的是从易学中发见与解析中国哲学、中国思想,旨在抉发中国的玄学与道德哲学,而不是作一种历史的研究。他从哲学上为《周易》的解释提供了一个逻辑符号论的模型,为中国古典思想的现代诠释作出了首开先河的有益尝试;他对易学的“实在论的价值论”或“超越的内在”的价值论的诠释,与康德、维特根斯坦关于道德世界的“超越的外在论”不同;他对易之道德世界的分析与解释也是极其形式化的逻辑的。在这些分析与解释中,《周易》的“逻辑世界”或“符号世界”变成了语义的价值世界,或者说,作为“数理物理”世界的《周易》变成了价值论的道德世界。无论是在叙述方式,或内容的阐释与解析上,牟氏的这项研究都是十分新颖的,为国内所未有。但是,牟氏的易学研究只是他学思的开端起步,相对于他的逻辑研究来说,易学研究构成了他的哲学思想发展进路的前逻辑起点,而非逻辑起点,具有形式的象征意义。     

What is Wrong with Sufficiency?

In this paper, I ask what is wrong with sufficiency. I formulate a generic sufficiency principle in relation to which I discuss possible problems for sufficientarianism. I argue against the arbitrariness–concern, that sufficiency theory need only to identify a possible space for determining a plausible threshold, and I argue against the high–low threshold dilemma concern, that multiple-threshold views can solve this dilemma. I then distinguish between currency-pluralist and currency-monist multiple-threshold views and test them against two different versions of the widely shared ‘ignorance of inequality objection’ to sufficientarianism—a benefit-driven and a burden-driven version. I argue that currency-pluralist sufficiency views are better capable of responding to the former than currency-monist views. However, I show that no existing sufficiency view can provide a plausible response to the burden-driven version. Hence, I conclude that the problem of unequal distribution of burdens above the thresholds represents an overlooked threat to the sufficiency view, in any version.

     

A Patient's Perspective on Genetic Counseling and Predictive Testing for Alzheimer's Disease

The availability of genetic testing for Alzheimer's disease is anticipated to be widespread in the future. As an individual at risk with a family history of Alzheimer's disease, I discuss why I sought predictive tests and how I would use the information from such tests. I relay what I learned in my genetic counseling session, my response to the counseling process, and steps I have since taken. I discuss life planning, psychological and fear of discrimination issues from a patient's perspective.     

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: In this article, I propose one way of understanding the expression "feminist epistemology." I begin from the premise that improper philosophical attention has been paid to the implications of what I call The Fact of Preconditions for Agency: that moral and rational agents become such only through a long, deliberate, and intensive process of intervention and teaching, a process that requires commitments of time, effort and emotion on the part of other agents. I contend that this is a sufficiently important aspect of what it is to be a person that accounting for its philosophical implications may have repercussions not only for moral and political theory, but for epistemology as well. I contend further that, given the current configuration of social possibilities, a theory that acknowledges this Fact might appropriately be deemed "feminist."
My argument is presented in four segments. In Section II, I show how such a theory could be feminist by providing a discussion of categories of social identity; in Section III, I show how such a theory could be epistemology by describing a strategy of argument from parity. In Section IV, I apply this strategy to a case from political philosophy to show why its counter-intuitive implications do not provide good grounds for rejecting the suggested redistricting. And in Section V, I apply the same strategy to a case from epistemology to bring out how it might lead to a theory that might legitimately claim to be feminist epistemology.     

The Question of Conscientiousness and Religious Engagement in Public Schools

In this paper, I examine the question of how to nurture and develop conscientiousness thinkers and future citizens of diverse liberal-democratic societies from the perspective of virtue epistemology (VE). More specifically, I examine this question in terms of how public schools might frame engagement with religious perspectives in the classroom. I begin by distinguishing between good and bad conscientiousness through an exploration of current work in the field of virtue epistemology. I then follow Kenneth Strike in his defense of the need for a more robust engagement with religious perspectives as a liberal educational imperative. I argue that basing a framework for engagement on VE, particularly the notion of subjective justification, has significant benefits. My main interest in developing a framework for what I deem to be a necessary supplemental dimension of citizenship education focused on religious engagement is in underlining the responsibility that liberal educators have in regulating what is often a highly contentious and unfortunately caddish debate surrounding religion and the religious. I conclude that by eschewing this responsibility educators are potentially missing out on significant resources for supporting the liberal-democratic educational agenda.     

The logical form of categorical sentences

In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.     

The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting

I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point.