Inconsistency as an interactional problem: a lesson from political rhetoric

The classical theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that when two related cognitions are mutually inconsistent, one of them will change to restore consistency. However, Billig suggests that inconsistency is primarily an interactional problem between subjects and not a cognitive problem within a subject. In the current paper, we adopt Billig's rhetorical approach to inconsistency and study inconsistency as an interactional problem in the context of political rhetoric. More specifically, we use Action-Implicative Discourse Analysis to identify the discursive strategies the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, used to cope with the inconsistency between his national ideology and his contradictory behavior during his short term in office.     

Consciousness: converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience

Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective attention, working memory and cognitive control involve competition between widely distributed representations. This competition is biased by top-down projections (notably from prefrontal cortex), which can selectively enhance some representations over others. This view has now been implemented in several connectionist models. In this review, we emphasize the relevance of these models to understanding consciousness. Interestingly, the models we review have striking similarities to others directly aimed at implementing 'global workspace theory'. All of these models embody a fundamental principle that has been used in many connectionist models over the past twenty years: global constraint satisfaction.     

Marxist guidance: a dialectic lesson

Based on primary sources published in the Soviet Bloc, this article reviews orthodox Marxist theory, methodology, and practice. It compares the stated goals of Marxist guidance with actual outcomes, and identifies the foundations of guidance in the Soviet Bloc in terms of Marxist philosophy and social doctrine. The application of dialectic methodology to guidance is also explained. Current symptoms of ideological unrest in socialist society as exemplified by the now-suppressed reform movement in Czechoslovakia are analyzed and its dynamics identified. Finally, the article draws conclusions applicable to guidance in this country.     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

Creativity and schizotypy from the neuroscience perspective

Behavioral research has revealed that some cognitive features may be similar between creative and psychotic/schizophrenic-like thoughts. In this study, we addressed the potential link between creativity and schizotypy at the level of the brain by investigating functional patterns of brain activity (using functional magnetic resonance imaging) during creative cognition in preselected groups with low versus high psychometrically determined schizotypy. Our findings revealed an association between the originality component of creativity and reduced deactivation of right parietal brain regions and the precuneus during creative cognition, congruent with the idea that more-creative people may include many more events/stimuli in their mental processes than do less-creative people. Similarly, the high-schizotypy group showed weaker deactivation of the right precuneus during creative cognition. The fact that originality and schizotypy show similar functional brain activity patterns during creative ideation (i.e., reduced deactivation of the right precuneus) strongly supports the contention that similar mental processes may be implicated in creativity and in psychosis proneness.     

The kove and the karai a lesson from the Paraguayan Chaco

Reflections of an anthropologist who has lived both with Uamah herders in the Andes and with hunting-and-gathering people inhabiting the lowland forests of the Paraguayan Chaco.     

Human recognition memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

For many years the cognitive processes underlying recognition memory have been the subject of considerable interest in experimental psychology. To account for a broad range of behavioral findings, psychologists have put forward a variety of 'dual-process' models, all of which propose that recognition memory is supported by two forms of memory - familiarity and recollection - that differ in their speed of operation and the specificity of the retrieved information. More recently, the dual-process framework has been extended to encompass findings from studies investigating the neural basis of recognition memory. Results from neuropsychological, ERP and functional neuroimaging studies can be accommodated within the framework, and suggest that familiarity and recollection are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.     

Self-awareness: behavior analysis and neuroscience

Self-awareness is a specific type of autoclitic discriminative behavior and inferential generalization to similar performances exhibited by other people. Brain imaging findings take on special importance within behavior analysis when they indicate that dysfunctions in these areas are related to differential effects of our interventions, with some acquiring substantially typical self-awareness skills and others failing to do so. It appears that those individuals whose brain dysfunctions are limited to these areas, and are not part of more generalized brain abnormalities, are amenable to substantial acquisition of those most basic of human skills called self-awareness, whereas individuals with more generalized brain dysfunction are not so disposed. Through a combination of less or more effective teaching contingencies during childhood, and degrees of dysfunction of those brain structures, some children grow up lacking self-reflective abilities and self-insight, whereas others are extraordinarily astute at those capacities. Among children with autism spectrum disorders who lack those skills due to abnormal brain development, approximately half of them can acquire those skills, at least to some degree through the use of effective, intensive, early behavior therapy methods.     

Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: a challenge for neuroscience and medicine

A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain - spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data - is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form a centralized functional design in which an upper brain stem system organized for conscious function performs a penultimate step in action control. This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an expanding forebrain - culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals - came to serve as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone.     

The unconscious and consciousness of the memory: A contribution from neuroscience

Abstract

By integrating data from general psychology and perinatal clinical psychology with neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the author discusses the relations between memory and consciousness, the aim being a unitary definition of the concept of unconscious. Nobody has a brain that can be the same as any other person's: the biology of memory lies in neural networks that have been constructed in the brain of that specific person by their experience. From the fetal stage, each brain progressively learns its own individual functions during its relational neuropsychic development. The author underlines how the continuous emotional biological work of the brain, together with a person's entire relational life, produces the construction of the whole functional and individual mindbrain. The whole construction is memory and this is unconscious; indeed it may be the true unconscious. From the continuous silent work of the mindbrain of a person, some forms of conscious level may emerge in his individual's subjectivity: some functioning of mindbrain makes what an individual person can consciously remember. The unconscious is only what appears in some form in an analyst's consciousness, at some specific moment in his relationship with a patient, and which the analyst translates into some form of his verbal interpretation.     

The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience

A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general.     

Cognitive neuroscience: origins and promise

Both Freud and Wundt had hoped to base psychology on an understanding of the neural basis of mental events. Their efforts were unsuccessful because the structure and function of the human brain was not available for empirical study at the physiological level. Over the last part of this century, there has been amazing growth and vitality in the field of human brain function. In this paper, we trace critical developments in the fields of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and brain imaging related to the development of cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive Neuroscience has established that the decomposition of mental events can be united with an understanding of the mental and emotional computations carried out by the human brain. Cognitive neuroscience has the capability of influencing psychology in diverse areas from how children develop to how adults age; from how humans learn to how we imagine; from volitional control to psychopathologies.     

A lesson from Katrina: pastoral care from an Asian theological perspective

Situating pastoral caregivers in the dramatic catastrophe caused by hurricane "Katrina" in New Orleans, this article attempts to address some appropriate pastoral responses toward the disaster from an Asian theological perspective. The article highlights the significance of remembrance and connection rather than repression and forgetfulness in order to bring justice to all victims of Katrina. It builds on Jacoby's "social amnesia," calls for redefining the meaning of community, and attempts to address the human predicaments on the surface of Katrina through an Asian perspective. In order to address pastoral responses, the article builds upon Martin Luther King, Jr.'s concept of interrelatedness and shared destiny. It critically examines Jung Young Lee's theology of marginality, and draws the pastoral implications of this theology of marginality with respect to Katrina.