Who Is to Blame? Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence

Research has documented that individuals consider outcomes, intentions, and transgressor negligence when making morally relevant judgments (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Engelhardt, 2017). However, less is known about whether individuals attend to both victim and transgressor negligence in their evaluations. The current study measured 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 70), 7- to 12-year-olds (N = 54), and adults' (N = 97, ages 18–25 years) moral judgments about scenarios in which an accidental transgression occurred involving property damage or physical harm. Participants were either assigned to conditions where the victim or the transgressor was negligent. Results revealed attention to negligence among all participants across a range of different moral judgment measures (including acceptability judgments, punishment judgments, and attributions of blame), with age-related increases in attention to negligence evident. Results provide novel evidence that children and adults consider not just outcomes and intentions, but also the role of negligence in both victims and transgressors, when making social decisions.     

Moral Judgments of Aggressive and Nonaggressive Children

Abstract

Moral judgments were studied in 103 aggressive and 79 nonaggressive 10-year-old Finnish children. Their aggressiveness was evaluated by means of peer ratings. Moral judgments were assessed by presenting them with stories from their daily lives that contained moral conflicts. The results showed that the children did not adopt a constant level of moral reasoning; instead, judgments were situation specific. Furthermore, the moral cognitions of aggressive children did not differ from those of their nonaggressive peers, although sex-related differences tended to be significant: Boys adopted absolute moral standards, whereas girls' judgments were more relative.     

MORAL THEME COMPREHENSION IN THIRD GRADERS,FIFTH GRADERS,AND COLLEGE STUDENTS

Abstract

Proponents of character education (e.g., Bennett, author of The Book of Virtues) argue that children should hear moral stories in order to develop moral character. But do children necessarily understand the moral message of a narrative? Third and fifth grade students and adults were tested for their ability to apprehend the moral messages in three stories selected from The Book of Virtues and other sources. After listening and reading along with three moral stories, participants were asked to generate the message, select the message from a list of possible messages and select a vignette with the same message from three possible vignettes. Subjects also heard and read a non‐moral story and answered comprehension questions about it. Results indicate a developmental difference in moral theme understanding unexplained by reading comprehension scores alone.     

Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third‐party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third‐party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent.     

Action Perception and Outcome Valence: Effects on Children's Inferences of Intentionality and Moral and Liking Judgments

The influences of different action-outcome scenarios on children's evaluative judgments and inferences of outcome intentionality were assessed. One hundred forty-five kindergartners, 2nd graders, and 4th graders heard 4 stories about child actors who engaged in 1 action or 3 equifinal actions and caused a positive or negative outcome. The stories made no mention of the actors' anticipated outcome so that we could assess the children's inferences of whether the actors wanted and had tried to cause the outcome. Children also rated their liking for the actors and the actors' morality. Children's moral and liking judgments were not significantly differentiated by action condition. However, actors who caused positive outcomes received favorable liking and moral judgments, and actors who caused negative outcomes received neutral liking and moral judgments. Children's intentionality inferences varied by the actors' actions and were moderated by outcome valence. The authors discuss children's apparent use of the valence rule when inferring intentionality and their reluctance to judge harshly actors who cause negative outcomes when not privy to the actors' intentions.     

The cheating and intention of a partner as determinants of evaluative decisions among juvenile offenders

Male juvenile offenders were asked to evaluate the work of an experimental partner (confederate) who completed a work task four times. The work partner cheated on two trials and did not cheat on two trials while working for a charity (one cheat and one noncheat trial) or for selfish gain (one cheat and one noncheat trial). It was found that subjects rated the work done on cheating trials lower than work done on noncheating trials. In addition, subjects shared less reward money on cheating trials relative to noncheating trials. However, the intentions of the confederate, defined as the reward recipient, failed to affect subjects' judgments. These results were described as supporting previous studies which have indicated that delinquents fail to take account of others' intentions when making moral judgments.     

意图信息在物权判断和道德判断中的作用

意图会影响人们的道德判断，但尚不清楚意图在物权判断中的作用。本研究以156名非法学专业的大学生为被试，通过包含不同意图（恶意/善意/无意）的故事情景，考察了在损失求偿和获益分享情境中人们的物权判断和道德判断。结果发现，在损失求偿情境中，不管是出于善意、恶意还是无意，被试均判断行为者应当赔偿他人损失，但不认为善意和无意的行为者应受谴责。在获益分享情境中，被试仅认为善意的行为者应当分享给他人带来的收益且应当受赞扬，但不认为恶意和无意的行为者应当受到赞扬。综合来看，意图对常人物权判断和道德判断的影响不一致，物权判断比道德判断较少受意图信息的影响，涉及更多的理性思维，反映其具有领域特异性。     

Action perception and outcome valence: effects on children's inferences of intentionality and moral and liking judgments.

The influences of different action-outcome scenarios on children's evaluative judgments and inferences of outcome intentionality were assessed. One hundred forty-five kindergartners, 2nd graders, and 4th graders heard 4 stories about child actors who engaged in 1 action or 3 equifinal actions and caused a positive or negative outcome. The stories made no mention of the actors' anticipated outcome so that we could assess the children's inferences of whether the actors wanted and had tried to cause the outcome. Children also rated their liking for the actors and the actors' morality. Children's moral and liking judgments were not significantly differentiated by action condition. However, actors who caused positive outcomes received favorable liking and moral judgments, and actors who caused negative outcomes received neutral liking and moral judgments. Children's intentionality inferences varied by the actors' actions and were moderated by outcome valence. The authors discuss children's apparent use of the valence rule when inferring intentionality and their reluctance to judge harshly actors who cause negative outcomes when not privy to the actors' intentions.     

Children's Understanding of Lies in Elementary School Years

The author examined whether children's understanding of lies exhibits developmental trends in the elementary school years. Four story contexts were presented to 51 first-grade students, 44 fourth-grade students, and 58 adults. These stories represented combinations of a protagonist's intention (truthful or deceptive) and the truth of the protagonist's message (true or false). The results showed that adults judged whether these messages were lies by considering the protagonist's intentions. By contrast, approximately 30% of first-grade students and some fourth-grade students did not consider intentions in making judgments, although they appropriately predicted the outcomes of the messages. These results suggest that children in the early elementary school years have a conception of lies different from that of adults, and their conception of lies becomes more sophisticated after middle childhood.     

Mediation and production deficiencies in children's judgments of morality

This study investigated the influence of intentions and consequences on moral judgments. Children's and adults' production of inferences about an actor's intentions was assessed separately from their use of intentions as mediators of moral judgments. Two hundred and sixteen kindergarten, fourth grade and adult subjects viewed one of four videotaped episodes in which an actor either intentionally or accidentally produced a positive or negative result. Participants received one of two prompts to produce inferences about the actor's intentions or received no prompt. Each subject rated the actor's intent and the good-ness-badness of the actor. Results supported a mediational deficiency explanation for children's objective moral judgments. Both 6- and 10-year-old children made reliable, adult-like inferences of intentions. However, children's moral evaluations were based primarily on objective consequences while adults' evaluations were based primarily on the intentions of the actor. Young children did have intentionality information available, yet even with prompting this information did not mediate their judgments in an adult-like way; suggesting that there may be a period in development during which the child understands and produces subjective inferences but does not use this information as a basis for moral judgments.     

Moral judgments of aggressive and nonaggressive children

Moral judgments were studied in 103 aggressive and 79 nonaggressive 10-year-old Finnish children. Their aggressiveness was evaluated by means of peer ratings. Moral judgments were assessed by presenting them with stories from their daily lives that contained moral conflicts. The results showed that the children did not adopt a constant level of moral reasoning; instead, judgments were situation specific. Furthermore, the moral cognitions of aggressive children did not differ from those of their nonaggressive peers, although sex-related differences tended to be significant: Boys adopted absolute moral standards, whereas girls' judgments were more relative.     

Foreseeability and self-interest as moral judgment factors with normal and acting-out adolescent boys

Thirty-two male adolescents participated in a study of moral judgment and its relationship to social functioning. Half of the subjects were selected for frequent acting-out, aggressive behavior, and half were selected from regular eighth-grade classes and matched for intelligence. The moral stories featured good intentions with bad outcomes and varied as to whether or not the outcome was foreseeable and in the actor's self-interest. Subjects judged the actor, attributed judgments to adults, and casually explained the outcome. The difference in judgments between foreseeable and nonforeseeable actions was greater for “normal” subjects. Furthermore, although normal subjects judged foreseeable actions more harshly than acting-out subjects, the reverse was true for nonforeseeable actions. Judgments attributed to adults were harsher than subjects' own judgments, and this difference was greater for acting-out subjects. Causal attributions (personal vs. situational) and other reasoning related strongly to the foreseeability and self-interest factors but not to subject group.     

Development and validation of a scale of social and moral judgments (ABB scale) and its use in prison settings

IntroductionThe traditional approach to value judgments involves determining the position of an individual on a scale designed to evaluate the underlying mechanisms and dimensions of judgments.ObjectiveThe purpose of this study was to develop and validate a scale among a general population and to apply it to individuals particularly affected by, or directly involved in, acts of transgression.MethodThe scale comprises three types of behavior involving an expression of personal values (atypism or idiosyncratic behavior) or a violation of moral or conventional standards. Subjects were asked to assess a range of actions and behaviors on three dimensions (Likert format): seriousness, excusability and rejection of the transgressor.Results and conclusionAs predicted, factor analysis shows a clear hierarchy of values. The results demonstrate the multidimensional nature of the instrument and indicate good reliability. Tolerance and severity indices were developed to understand the underlying dynamics of social and moral judgments. The study found that inmates’ judgments of violations and transgressions differed in some respects from the judgments made by the general population. The influence of context and the role of group membership as an explanatory factor are examined from the point of view of the identity strategies used.     

Children's Moral Evaluations of Ecological Damage: The Effect of Biocentric and Anthropocentric Intentions1

Moral evaluations of ecologically damaging events were studied in 5^th, 8^th, and 11^th graders and college students (N = 246). Participants made 4 kinds of judgments about 2 scenarios: decision rightness, damage rightness, blame of the decision maker, and blame of the agents causing the damage. In both scenarios, the decision maker's intentions varied (biocentric vs. anthropocentric) as did the damage severity. Overall, participants' judgments were less harsh when the decision maker had biocentric intentions and when the damage was less severe. However, there were age differences in use of intentions to judge decision rightness. The proposition that judgments of blame of the decision maker should be a joint function of decision and damage rightness was also supported.     

Children's utilization of emotion expectancies in moral decision‐making

This study investigated the relevance of emotion expectancies for children's moral decision‐making. The sample included 131 participants from three different grade levels (M = 8.39 years, SD = 2.45, range 4.58–12.42). Participants were presented a set of scenarios that described various emotional outcomes of (im)moral actions and asked to decide what they would do if they were in the protagonists' shoes. Overall, it was found that the anticipation of moral emotions predicted an increased likelihood of moral choices in antisocial and prosocial contexts. In younger children, anticipated moral emotions predicted moral choice for prosocial actions, but not for antisocial actions. Older children showed evidence for the utilization of anticipated emotions in both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. Moreover, for older children, the decision to act prosocially was less likely in the presence of non‐moral emotions. Findings suggest that the impact of emotion expectancies on children's moral decision‐making increases with age. Contrary to happy victimizer research, the study does not support the notion that young children use moral emotion expectancies for moral decision‐making in the context of antisocial actions.     

When actions speak volumes: The role of inferences about moral character in outrage over racial bigotry

Inferences about moral character may often drive outrage over symbolic acts of racial bigotry. Study 1 demonstrates a theoretically predicted dissociation between moral evaluations of an act and the person who carries out the act. Although Americans regarded the private use of a racial slur as a less blameworthy act than physical assault, use of a slur was perceived as a clearer indicator of poor moral character. Study 2 highlights the dynamic interplay between moral judgments of acts and persons, demonstrating that first making person judgments can bias subsequent act judgments. Privately defacing a picture of Martin Luther King, Jr. led to greater moral condemnation of the agent than of the act itself only when the behavior was evaluated first. When Americans first made character judgments, symbolically defacing a picture of the civil rights leader was significantly more likely to be perceived as an immoral act. These studies support a person‐centered account of outrage over bigotry and demonstrate that moral evaluations of acts and persons converge and diverge under theoretically meaningful circumstances. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the “intent-to-outcome” shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.     

Young children's moral judgments of commission and omission related to the understanding of Knowledge or Ignorance

This study examined developmental change in young children's moral judgments of commission and omission related to mental states, especially knowledge or ignorance. 4–5 and 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds (n=67) made moral judgments about the tasks related to the understanding of knowledge or ignorance. The tasks were also composed of two types of acts: commission or omission. The results showed that the both age groups understood knowledge and ignorance, but that the older group made moral judgments based on this understanding more similar to adults compared to the younger group. There was not an age difference concerning whether the acts were of commission or omission. These findings indicate that there is no difference for young children in the difficulty in moral judgments of acts of commission and omission related to mental states, whereas there is a developmental difference in using the understanding of knowledge or ignorance for making moral judgments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of negligence, intention, and outcome on children’s moral judgments

Piaget (1932) and subsequent researchers have reported that young children’s moral judgments are based more on the outcomes of actions than on the agents’ intentions. The current study investigated whether negligence might also influence these judgments and explain children’s apparent focus on outcome. Children (3–8 years of age) and adults (N = 139) rated accidental actions in which the valences of intention, negligence, and outcome were varied systematically. Participants of all ages were influenced primarily by intention, and well-intentioned actions were also evaluated according to negligence and outcome. Only two young children based their judgments solely on outcome. It is suggested that previous studies have underestimated children’s use of intention because outcome and negligence have been confounded. Negative consequences are considered to be important because children assume that they are caused by negligence. The findings indicate that young children can show sophisticated understanding of the roles of intention and negligence in moral judgments.     

Popular and Rejected Children's Social Reasoning: Linking Social Status and Social Knowledge

The relationship between children's social status/sex and their moral judgments was examined. Sixty-four second- and third-grade children (33 boys, 31 girls) who were identified as popular or rejected by peer sociometric measures were shown pictures of children engaged in moral and second-order transgressions. The children were asked to rate each event on (a) the degree of seriousness for other and self, (b) the amount of punishment for other and self, and (c) rule alterability. The children were also asked for justification of the transgressions (why they thought the transgressions were wrong). The popular and rejected children differentiated between moral and second-order transgressions based upon criterion ratings and justifications. Differences emerged between the popular and the rejected children's ratings and justifications for moral transgressions, suggesting that children's moral judgments are related to social experiences associated with peer acceptance and rejection.