Which studies test whether self‐enhancement is pancultural? Reply to Sedikides,Gaertner, and Vevea, 2007

What types of studies test the question of pancultural self‐enhancement? Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2007) have identified inclusion criteria that largely limit the question to studies of the better‐than‐average effect (i.e. 27 out of 29 effects that they include as ‘validated’ and ‘relevant’). In contrast, other effects which they labelled as ‘unvalidated’ or ‘irrelevant’ used methods other than the better‐than‐average effect (i.e. 24 out of 24 effects). Because Sedikides et al. are drawing conclusions about pancultural self‐enhancement and not the pancultural better‐than‐average effect, these excluded studies are relevant to the hypothesis under question. Ignoring the findings from other methods is highly problematic, in particular because these other methods yield results that conflict with those from the better‐than‐average effect. An analysis of effects from all studies reveals no support for pancultural self‐enhancement.     

Which is the real intelligence? A reply to Robinson (1999)

Robinson's ([Robinson, D.L. (1999). The ‘IQ’ factor: implications for intelligence theory and measurement. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 715–735]) arguments that crystallized intelligence represents the “one valid intelligence factor” are disputed. It is argued that Robinson seriously underestimated the relevance of fluid abilities to “intelligence”, by using an inappropriate criterion for assessing the intelligence-saturation of cognitive ability variables. The relevance of fluid and crystallized abilities to popular, psychometric, and biological conceptions of intelligence is discussed, and the issue of age-related changes in fluid and crystallized intelligence is also addressed.     

Is there evidence of robust,unconscious self-deception? A reply to Funkhouser and Barrett

Robust self-deception, in Funkhouser and Barrett’s sense, consists in the strategic pursuit of the goal of misleading oneself with respect to some proposition. Funkhouser and Barrett’s thesis is that an evaluation of the relevant empirical literatures reveals that the unconscious mind engages in robust self-deception. If Funkhouser and Barrett are correct, the psychological evidence vindicates an account of self-deception that challenges the orthodox motivationalist approach and makes clear the distinction between self-deception and other forms of motivated belief formation such as wishful thinking. The aim of this paper is to show that the evidence adduced by Funkhouser and Barrett fails to establish the existence of robust, unconscious self-deception.     

Where is the randomness for the human computer?

Psychologists traditionally have employed both statistical and process assumptions in models of human learning and performance. The corresponding tradition in the field of artificial intelligence is to minimize or eliminate the use of statistical assumptions. This article reviews some stochastic and nonntochastic models of human memory, probability learning, medical diagnosis, and concept identification. Some stochastic models are found to have a larger deterministic component than was previously realized; deterministic models applicable with random selection of stimuli can be represented in stochastic form. A policy of methodological determinism is recommended in which the model builder originally assumes that no random processes take place within the organism. If necessary, and as a last resort, such processes can be appended to an otherwise deterministic model for predictive convenience.     

Unskilled and unaware--but why? A reply to Krueger and Mueller (2002)

J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999) argued that the unskilled suffer a dual burden: Not only do they perform poorly, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller (2002) replicated these basic findings but interpreted them differently. They concluded that a combination of the better-than-average (BTA) effect and a regression artifact better explains why the unskilled are unaware. The authors of the present article respectfully disagree with this proposal and suggest that any interpretation of J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller's results is hampered because those authors used unreliable tests and inappropriate measures of relevant mediating variables. Additionally, a regression-BTA account cannot explain the experimental data reported in J. Kruger and D. Dunning or a reanalysis following the procedure suggested by J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller.     

Cultural variations on optimistic and pessimistic bias for self versus a sibling: is there evidence for self-enhancement in the west and for self-criticism in the east when the referent group is specified?

A culturally relevant framework was used to examine variations on optimistic and pessimistic bias in Westerners and Easterners. Study 1 showed that 136 European Americans compared with 159 Japanese were more likely to predict typical positive events to occur to self than to a sibling. The opposite pattern emerged in the prediction of typical negative events. Study 2 replicated these findings on the basis of predictions for atypical events in 175 European Americans and 130 Japanese. Across both studies, within-groups analyses indicated that European Americans held an optimistic bias in the prediction of positive and negative events, whereas Japanese held a pessimistic bias for negative events. These findings are taken to offer support for presumed cultural differences in self-enhancement and self-criticism between Westerners and Easterners, respectively.     

Composites, compromises, and CHARM: what is the evidence for blend memory representations?

Metcalfe's (1990) distributed memory model simulates many misinformation effects by assuming representations that superimpose information from multiple sources. In the present article, two types of evidence are reviewed for such "blend" representations: composite recollections, including items from both the original and postevent sources (e.g., a previously seen intersection is remembered with a subsequently suggested stop sign), and compromise recollections, including features that cannot be exclusively associated with either source (e.g., a green car that was later suggested to be blue is remembered as bluish green). The considerable evidence for composite recollections provides little support for blend representations. Compromise recollections, though seemingly more persuasive, are both rare and interpretable without postulating blend representations. Speculation is made about potential findings that would support blend representations.     

When is an easy task difficult and vice versa? A reply to lane

Lane has argued that kantowitz and Knight incorrectly predicted an interaction between primary and secondary task difficulty for the variable-allocation model of attention. It is shown that such an interaction is indeed obtained if task-performance difficulty is defined in terms of capacity and only reasonable transformations of data are permitted. This interaction holds for any set of monotonic resource operating characteristics.     

Life satisfaction and the ‘end of history illusion’: A reply to Quoidbach,Gilbert, and Wilson (2020)

Contrary to the ‘end of history illusion’, in a longitudinal sample of American adults Harris and Busseri (2019) found that most individuals were accurate or expected too much change in their future life satisfaction, rather than expecting too little change. Quoidbach, Gilbert, and Wilson (2020) suggested that the discrepancy in conclusions arose because we focused on mean-level trends rather than individual differences. Here we clarify that the discrepancy stems from the analysis of directional versus absolute change, with the latter preferred by Quoidbach et al. (2020). Both approaches are informative. Indeed, in addition to determining whether the altitude of an elevator in a skyscraper is changing over time, it matters very much whether the elevator is going up or down.     

How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003)

Recently, [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] used a masked priming paradigm to argue that neither the 'elaborate processing' or the 'evolving automaticity' view can account for the processing of unconscious numerical stimuli. In our Experiment 1 we replicated [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] Experiment 4 and show that with a less demanding mask than that used by Kunde et al., 'elaborate processing' can explain priming results given that there are side conditions to trigger elaborate processing of unconscious stimuli. The second experiment further explores this influence of the masks by increasing the relevance of the symbols by which the mask is composed. The results show that an increase in relevance of the mask is accompanied by a decrease in the priming effect, though there was no significant change in conscious awareness of the prime.     

Interactive computation is interaction with what?: A reply to Clark

In this response essay, we argue that Andy Clark’s assessment of our position on cyborgs is rooted in a misconception of the notion of “interaction” that we advance.     

Event-based and emergent timing: dichotomy or continuum? A reply to Repp and Steinman (2010)

B. H. Repp and S. R. Steiman (2010) suggested that event-based and emergent timing, usually conceived as mutually exclusive modes of timing, could in fact coexist in a single activity. According to this point of view, rhythmic activities could exploit mixtures of control modes, in which the relative importance of event-based and emergent components could depend on task characteristics. This point of view, in the opinion of the authors of the present article, corresponds to a fundamental misunderstanding of the theoretical basis of the event-based and emergent distinction, and is not supported by any experimental evidence. However, they present some new results that could support new lines of reasoning for the future developments of research in this domain.     

“Where is the sun” for hemi-neglect patients?

Human observers use prior constraints to disambiguate a scene; in particular, light is preferentially seen as coming from above but also slightly from the left. One explanation of this lateral bias could be a cerebral hemispheric difference. The aim of the present study was to determine the preferred light source position for neglect patients. For this purpose, we used the ambiguous shaded “Polo Mint” stimulus, a ring divided into eight equal sectors. All sectors but one were the same shape, convex or concave, as determined by the light source position. Participants had to report the side (left or right) of the odd sector or, in a separate experiment, to report its shape (convex or concave). Eight patients with spatial neglect (left neglect N = 7, right neglect N = 1) after a right or left temporo-parietal or thalamic lesion and 14 control participants ran the experiment. Left neglect patients showed a significantly different light bias from the bias observed for controls and for the right neglect patient (i.e., a reduction of the left bias or a right bias rather than a left bias). We conclude that some disabilities presented by patients with spatial neglect may be due to difficulties processing information that is not present in the visual field or imagined in the representational scene.