The contributions of anchoring and past-test performance to the underconfidence-with-practice effect

In the underconfidence-with-practice effect, people's judgments of learning (JOLs) typically underestimate memory performance across multiple study-test phases. Whereas the past-test hypothesis suggests that this underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on earlier test performance to make subsequent JOLs (despite new learning), the anchoring hypothesis suggests that the underconfidence stems from participants' reliance on a fixed psychological anchor point low on the JOL scale to make their JOLs. To contrast the predictions of these hypotheses, we had college students study, make JOLs, and test over several dozen paired-associate items across two study-test phases. We parametrically manipulated the presence or absence of testing and judging within participants during Phase 1. Contrary to the past-test hypothesis, items tested during Phase 1 demonstrated less underconfidence during Phase 2 than did nontested items. Furthermore, participants did not increase JOLs from Phase 1 to Phase 2 for items that they had not recalled or for items that had not been tested at all, suggesting that the underconfidence stemmed largely from participants' overreliance on a psychological anchor point to make their JOLs. Past test performance, however, seems to be a major cue that participants use to adjust their JOLs away from the anchor, reducing underconfidence. This was most evident when we used a between-participants manipulation (Exp. 2) to cause our participants to anchor their JOLs either high or low on the JOL scale, producing differential underconfidence independent of any adjustment. Taken together, these results support the anchoring hypothesis over the past-test hypothesis for explaining underconfidence with practice.     

The mnemonic effect of choice

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Making choices during encoding leads to superior memory compared with having the same choices made for you. Evidence also suggests that chosen items might be...     

Generation and mnemonic encoding induce a mirror effect in the DRM paradigm

Encoding tasks that increase memory accuracy are appealing from both practical and theoretical perspectives. Within the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, we found that generating list words from anagrams (relative to reading) produced a mirror effect: enhanced recognition of studied words coupled with a reduction in false recognition. Signal detection analyses suggest that the increase in correct recognition was due to enhanced item-specific encoding of the list words, whereas the reduction in false recognition was due to enhanced strategic monitoring at test (i.e., a distinctiveness heuristic), rather than to reduced relational encoding at study. Further support for a distinctiveness heuristic account was obtained using both "theme judgment" instructions and within-group conditions. In our final experiment, we replicated this mirror effect using a purely mnemonic (self-referential) encoding task, showing that extra perceptual cues are not necessary to induce participants to adopt a successful memory-improvement strategy at test.     

Lack of pervasiveness of the underconfidence-with-practice effect: boundary conditions and an explanation via anchoring

The authors investigated whether underconfidence in judgments of learning (JOLs) is pervasive across multiple study-test trials as suggested by A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, and H. Ma'ayan (2002) or whether underconfidence with practice (UWP) might be a kind of anchoring-and-adjustment effect, such that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the UWP effect depends on whether recall is above a psychological anchor. Participants studied normatively difficult items or normatively easy items and made immediate JOLs or delayed JOLs. The UWP effect occurred for easy items, but for difficult items an overconfidence-with-practice (OWP) effect occurred for delayed JOLs and no bias occurred for immediate JOLs. The systematic occurrence of all 3 outcomes establishes boundary conditions for the UWP effect and confirms the hypothesis that underconfidence (or the lack thereof) may arise at least in part from an anchoring-and-adjustment mechanism.     

Tests of a cognitive-resource-allocation account of the bizarreness effect

The authors examined the role of cognitive-resource allocation in obtaining the often reported memory advantage for bizarre relative to common information by using the secondary-task method in 4 experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, they investigated the relationship between differences in cognitive resource allocation during comprehension and in recall for common and bizarre information. In Experiments 3 and 4, they investigated the same relationship but measured cognitive-resource allocation during imaging rather than during comprehension. Although bizarre items required more time to comprehend and to image than did common items, the differences were not reliable predictors of the recall differences between item types. Furthermore, analyses of response latencies to a secondary task provided no compelling evidence in support of a cognitive-resource-allocation explanation of bizarreness effects. Implications for the development of a comprehensive model of the influence of bizarreness on memory are discussed.     

A pragmatic account of a presuppositional effect

Two different theoretical accounts of a presuppositional effect in sentence interpretation were considered. One is a semantic account based on componential analysis. The other is a pragmatic account based on relevance theory which does not call for lexical decomposition. The two theoretical points of view were tested against each other by making use of a well-known riddle, studied by Noordman (1979), whose standard form is: “You are my son, but I am not your father. Who am I?” In the first experiment, a manipulation based on the replacement of a lexical unit with a paraphrastic expression that did not contain the critical semantic component failed to enhance performance, whereas in the second experiment, a manipulation of contextual information leaving the lexical unit unaltered was successful in modifying performance. Both results conform to the predictions of relevance theory, but are at variance with the predictions of the componential theory.     

Exploring a neural-network account of age-of-acquisition effects using repetition priming of faces

The question of whether age-of-acquisition (AoA), frequency, and repetition priming effects occur at a common stage or at different stages of processing is addressed. Two single-stage accounts (i.e., cumulative frequency and a neural-network simulation) are considered in regard to their predictions concerning the interactions between AoA and frequency with aging and priming effects. A repetition-priming face-classification task was conducted on both older and younger participants to test these predictions. Consistent with the predictions of the neural-network simulation, AoA had an effect on reaction times that could not be explained by cumulative frequency alone. Also, as predicted by the simulation, the size of the priming effect was determined by the cumulative frequency of the item. It is discussed how this evidence is supportive of the notion that AoA , frequency, and priming all have effects at a common and single stage during face processing.     

Further investigation on the mnemonic effect of gestures: Their meaning matters

Three experiments are reported that examine the nature of knowledge underlying performance in the invariant learning task. Previous research (Bright & Burton, 1994; McGeorge & Burton, 1990) has supported an account of performance based on the implicit abstraction and application of a rule pertaining to the invariant feature. In contrast, we found effects in both the digit and clock invariant tasks that are difficult to explain solely in terms of subjects acquiring the experimenters' rule. In all three experiments, manipulation of test item properties that are independent of the invariant feature led to a detriment in performance that is not predicted by an account based on the experimenters' rules. Furthermore, the use of an on-line measure of awareness (confidence ratings) provided some evidence that performance is mediated by low confidence explicit knowledge.     

A response-discrimination account of the Simon effect

Simon effects might partly reflect stimulus-triggered response activation. According to the response-discrimination hypothesis, however, stimulus-triggered response activation shows up in Simon effects only when stimulus locations match the top-down selected spatial codes used to discriminate between alternative responses. Five experiments support this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, spatial codes of each response differed by horizontal and vertical axis position, yet one axis discriminated between alternative responses, whereas the other did not. Simon effects resulted for targets on discriminating axes only. In Experiment 2, both spatial axes discriminated between responses, and targets on both axes produced Simon effects. In Experiment 3, Simon effects resulted for a spatial choice-reaction task but not for a go/no-go task. Even in the go/no-go task, a Simon effect was restored when a two-choice reaction task preceded the go/no-go task (Experiment 4) or when participants initiated trials with responses spatially discriminated from the go response (Experiment 5).     

The effect of subject-generated and experimentersupplied code words on the phonetic mnemonic system

The hypothesis tested proposed that subjects using the phonetic mnemonic system who were supplied code words by the experimenter would recall more numbers than either subjects generating their own code words or a control group. In Experiment 1,36 undergraduate subjects serving in a 3 × (3) mixed-factorial design confirmed the hypothesis, but the possibility existed that the superiority of the experimenter-supplied group was attributable to the failure of the subject-generated group to devise a complete set of code words. In Experiment 2 a new group of 12 self-generated subjects was tested with a modified procedure designed to maximize number of correct code words. However, the experimenter-supplied group recalled significantly more numbers than this group, too. In Experiment 3 the possibility was tested that the superiority of the experimenter-supplied subjects was an artifact based on insufficient training in the phonetic method of subjects creating code words. Accordingly, all 28 subjects received extended training before recall of a subject-generated group was tested against that of an experimenter-supplied group in a 2 × (2) factorial design. Once again the experimentersupplied group recalled significantly more numbers, confirming the hypothesis. These results represent an exception to the general finding that subject-generated mnemonics are superior to those supplied by the experimenter. The data suggest that the relative efficacy of the two sources interacts with the difficulty of the mnemonic.     

Children's note taking as a mnemonic tool

When given the opportunity to take notes in memory tasks, children sometimes make notes that are not useful. The current study examined the role that task constraints might play in the production of nonmnemonic notes. In Experiment 1, children played one easy and one difficult memory game twice, once with the opportunity to make notes and once without that opportunity. More children produced functional notations for the easier task than for the more difficult task, and their notations were beneficial to memory performance. Experiment 2 found that the majority of children who at first made nonmnemonic notations were able to produce functional notations with minimal training, and there was no significant difference in notation quality or memory performance between spontaneous and trained note takers. Experiment 3 revealed that the majority of children could transfer their training to a novel task. The results suggest that children’s production of nonmnemonic notes may be due in part to a lack of knowledge regarding what task information is important to represent or how to represent it in their notes rather than to an inability to make functional notes in general.     

An alternative account of the minimal counterintuitiveness effect

This paper outlines two approaches to account for the finding that concepts that are minimally counterintuitive are better remembered than intuitive or maximally counterintuitive concepts. The first approach considers such memory advantages to be a property of the concepts themselves while the second approach emphasizes the role played by the context in which such concepts appear in allowing a reader to make sense of them. The context-based view also suggests that counterintuitive concepts lose their advantages as they become widely accepted and embedded in a cultural milieu. In the new context, ideas with enhanced counterintuitiveness obtain transmission advantages. This ratcheting up of counterintuitiveness helps explain cultural innovation and dynamism. It also allows us to account for the development and spread of complex cultural ideas such as the overly counterintuitive religious concepts including the Judeo–Christian–Islamic conceptions of God.     

Interrupting recognition memory: Tests of a criterion-change account of the revelation effect

The revelation effect is evidenced by an increase in positive recognition responses when the test probe is immediately preceded by an unrelated problem-solving task. As an alternative to familiarity-based explanations of this effect (Hicks & Marsh, 1998; Westerman & Greene, 1998), Niewiadomski and Hockley (2001) proposed a decision-based account in which it is assumed that the problem-solving task displaces the study list context in working memory, leading subjects to adopt a more liberal recognition criterion. In the present study, we show that the revelation effect is seen when the stimulus materials are pure lists of very rare words or nonwords. In contrast, for mixed lists of common words and very rare words or nonwords, the revelation effect is found for common words but disappears for very rare words and nonwords. We argue that, in mixed lists, the liberal decision bias following the revelation task and the criterion changes between common words and very rare words and nonwords serve to offset each other.     

The mnemonic effect of speech gestures: Pantomimic and non-pantomimic gestures compared

Abstract

A video-taped model presented subjects with sets of sentences to be free-recalled. under three presentation conditions: (1) accompanied by pantomimic gestures; (2) accompanied by non-pantomimic gestures; and (3) no gestures present. When the sentences formed a narrative, the gestures did not affect recall. When the sentences were unconnected, recall was higher for the gestured than for tbe non-gestured sentences. The pantomimic and non-pantomimic gestures showed about the same mnemonic effect. The subjects were given a second test, either recall-cued by the gestures, or else free recall of the gestured Sentences only. The pantomimic conditions were superior to the non-pantomimic conditions in both these tests. Possible explanations for the mnemonic effects of the gestures are discussed.     

A contextual change account of the directed forgetting effect

The authors propose that the costs and benefits of directed forgetting in the list method result from an internal context change that occurs between the presentations of 2 lists in response to a "forget" instruction. In Experiment 1 of this study, costs and benefits akin to those found in directed forgetting were obtained in the absence of a forget instruction by a direct manipulation of cognitive context change. Experiment 2 of this study replicated those findings using a different cognitive context manipulation and investigated the effects of context reinstatement at the time of recall. Context reinstatement reduced the memorial costs and benefits of context change in the condition where context had been manipulated and in the standard forget condition. The results are consistent with a context change account of directed forgetting.     

Deductive reasoning and matching-bias inhibition training: Evidence from a debiasing paradigm

Using the matching bias example, the aim of the present studies was to show that adults' reasoning biases are due to faulty executive inhibition programming. In the first study, the subjects were trained on Wason's classical card selection task; half were given training in how to inhibit the perceptual matching bias (experimental group) and half in logic without the inhibition component (control group). On the pre- and post-tests, their performance was assessed on the Evans conditional rule falsification task (with a negation in the antecedent of the rule), a task that also involves matching bias. In addition, subjects were tested for perceptual field dependence/independence using the Embedded Figures Test. The results brought out a specific inhibition training effect, as well as a clear-cut relationship in the experimental group between receptiveness to training and perceptual field independence. In the second study, the training paradigm was the same except that on the pre- and post-tests, the negation was in the consequent of the conditional rule (in this case, the perceptual matching response corresponds to the logical response). The subjects succeeded on the pre-test, and the matching-bias inhibition training had a negative effect on post-test performance. This specific negative priming effect confirms the inhibitory impact of our experimental training and outlines the dissociation of inhibition and logical components.     

Testing the limits of the phonetic mnemonic system

Three experiments tested the efficacy of the phonetic mnemonic system under varying conditions of application. The first study attempted unsuccessfully to replicate and extend the work of Morris and Greer (1984), who had shown training in the phonetic mnemonic method to facilitate memorization of a serial list of two-digit numbers. In the present study, subjects trained in the phonetic mnemonic method failed to learn lists of two-, four-, and six-digit numbers better than control subjects. The second experiment partially replicated the first, the differences being that training in the phonetic mnemonic method was strengthened, and time allotted for number recall was extended. Under these circumstances the phonetic mnemonic group recalled the two-, four-, and six-digit numbers significantly better than the control groups, a finding conforming with Morris and Greer's (1984) results. The third experiment partially replicated the second, everything being the same except that, in this case, subjects constructed their own key words representing each number, instead of these words being supplied by the experimenter. Under these conditions, subjects trained in the phonetic mnemonic method recalled significantly fewer numbers than control subjects.     

Stories as a mnemonic aid for older learners

The effectiveness of a story mnemonic for free-recall learning was assessed in 71 community-dwelling elderly adults. Participants received 1 of 3 memory-training programs: (a) narrative story, (b) method of loci, or (c) placebo training. The stimuli consisted of 26 nouns chosen for being highly imagible and concrete. Recall was examined immediately following study of the words, after 1 hr, and after 3 days. At each testing interval, both mnemonic condition groups outperformed the placebo group. The results suggest that a story mnemonic can enhance word retention on a free-recall task.     

The testing effect in recognition memory: a dual process account

The testing effect, or the finding that taking an initial test improves subsequent memory performance, is a robust and reliable phenomenon--as long as the final test involves recall. Few studies have examined the effects of taking an initial recall test on final recognition performance, and results from these studies are equivocal. In 3 experiments, we attempt to demonstrate that initial testing can change the ways in which later recognition decisions are executed even when no difference can be detected in the recognition hit rates. Specifically, initial testing was shown to enhance later recollection but leave familiarity unchanged. This conclusion emerged from three dependent measures: source memory, exclusion performance, and remember/know judgments.     

A perceptual-economy account for the inverted-optimal viewing position effect

In reading, fixation durations are longer when the eyes fall near the center of words than when fixation occurs toward the words' ends-the inverted-optimal viewing position (I-OVP) effect. This study assessed whether the I-OVP effect was based on the fixation position in the word or the fixation position in the visual stimulus. In Experiments 1-3, words were presented at variable locations within longer strings of symbols. On trials with short fixation durations, there were effects of fixation position in the string. When long fixations were made, there were effects of fixation position in the word. In Experiment 4, an I-OVP effect was found for meaningless number strings, and its strength depended on the task's processing demands. The findings show that (a) the I-OVP effect is unrelated to orthographic informativeness and (b) the eyes are not constrained to spend more time at the center of visual stimuli. These results support a perceptual-economy account: Fixations are held longer when the eyes are estimated to be at locations in words/stimuli in which greater amounts of information are anticipated. Implications for eye movements in reading are discussed.