Globalisation and global justice

The discussion about justice has often been limited to a specific territory, i.e. a nation. However, globalisation has undermined the relevance of this presupposition. John Rawls's theory of justice is a starting point for contemporary discussions about justice. But, contrary to Rawls's view, principles of global justice should not only include principles of non-interference and respect for universal human rights, but also a principle of democratic legitimacy of global governance and a principle of global distributive justice. The notion of global justice is not uncontroversial. It is argued that the meaning of justice differs between different communities and, thus, one cannot hope for a universal approval of the concept of global justice, that a principle of global distributive justice does not take into account that global differences in wealth are caused by differences in the ambitions of individuals and nations and that the idea of global justice overlooks crucial institutional differences between a nation and the global situation. However, these arguments are not conclusive.     

Revenge of the Philosophical Mole: Another Response to David Miller on Nationality

ABSTRACT David Miller has written extensively on the ethical value of the nation. A satisfactory response to Miller's ideas on nationalism requires an assessment of the whole range of his writings on the subject. After stating the outlines of Miller's conception of 'nationality', I evaluate the most important arguments for and against any attribution of ethical importance to the nation. Finally, I assess Miller's commitment to conational ethical priority in the context of duties of justributive justice. My main conclusions are as follows. (i) Miller's conservative strategy of justification is unacceptable, and a critical strategy suggests several plausible arguments for valuing national attachments. These arguments are not conclusive, however, (ii) In so far as Miller's position depends on real historical connections between persons, it is susceptible to the objection from historical myth. (iii) Miller offers an unexpected and ultimately unsuccessful response to the claim that national sentiments are partial and hence biased, (iv) Miller provides no good reason to believe that the duties of distributive justice are owed in the first instance to conationals.     

THE CONFLICTING LOYALTIES OF STATISM AND GLOBALISM: CAN GLOBAL DEMOCRACY RESOLVE THE LIBERAL CONUNDRUM?

Abstract: The cosmopolitan ideal of liberal universalism seems to be at odds with liberalism's insistence on national borders for liberal democratic communities, creating disparate standards of distributive justice for insiders and outsiders. The liberal's dilemma on the question of cosmopolitan justice would seem to be an extension of this broader conundrum of conflicting loyalties of statism and globalism. The challenge for liberalism, then, seems to be to show how the practices of exclusive membership embody the principle of moral equality. While discerning a variety of liberal reasons to give some scope to the claim that statism and globalism need not be an irreconcilable dilemma within liberalism, the essay argues that these reasons fail to provide a satisfactory resolution. Instead, the essay points out, global democracy can be the direction for both a statist and a cosmopolitan liberal, and the two camps a case not of conflicting loyalties but of multiple loyalties.     

Towards a Critical Social Psychological Account of National Sentiments: Patriotism and Nationalism Revisited

In the social sciences and in social psychology as well, a distinction is often drawn between two different types of national sentiments. The first one is frequently represented as defensive and positive and it is termed patriotism, while the second one is considered a negative one that potentially has destructive consequences and it is termed nationalism. Within social psychology there have been attempts to map the differences between these different types of national sentiments and to discover the various factors that seem to be associated with them. Some critical social psychologists have adopted a different perspective, arguing that we should regard patriotism and nationalism as an ideological dilemma people face when they talk about nations. This approach allows researchers to examine the way the ideology of nationhood is represented in common sense as well as the specific aspects of national ideology in each country.     

Justice as a dependent variable: subordinate charisma as a predictor of interpersonal and informational justice perceptions

Research in the organizational justice literature has shown that interpersonal and informational justice are significant predictors of subordinate attitudes and behaviors. However, scholars have neglected to explore whether certain subordinate characteristics might be associated with managers' adherence to interpersonal and informational justice rules. The current authors' study tested a model, inspired by approach-avoidance perspectives (e.g., Gray, 1990), in which manager ratings of subordinate charisma influenced subordinate ratings of interpersonal and informational justice through the mechanisms of positive and negative sentiments (i.e., emotions felt by the manager toward the subordinate). A field study of 181 employees of a large national insurance company revealed partial support for this model. Structural equation modeling revealed that subordinate charisma was related to interpersonal justice perceptions, a relationship that was fully mediated by positive and negative sentiments. However, subordinate charisma was not associated with informational justice perceptions. These findings signal the potential utility in examining subordinate-based predictors of justice variables.     

In Defence of Nationality

ABSTRACT The principle of nationality is widely believed to be philosophically disreputable and politically reactionary. As defined here, it embraces three propositions: national identities are properly part of personal identities; they ground circumscribed obligations to fellow-nationals; and they justify claims to political self-determination. To have a national identity is to think of oneself as belonging to a community constituted by mutual belief, extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and marked off from others by its members'distinct traits. Such identities are inevitably partly mythical in nature, yet they answer a pressing modern need, the maintenance of solidarity in large, anonymous societies. They are allied to no particular political programme. They do not require the suppression of minority cultures within the political community. They do not justify a secessionist free-for-all. Nor finally does recognition of the role of sentiments in constituting national communities commit us to a subjectivist view of social obligations. Philosophers should recognise the value of these loyalties even if they cannot be rationally grounded in a strong sense. [1]     

Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy: A Critique of Anderson and Satz

Some theorists argue that rather than advocating a principle of educational equality as a component of a theory of justice in education, egalitarians should adopt a principle of educational adequacy. This paper looks at two recent attempts to show that adequacy, not equality, constitutes justice in education. It responds to the criticisms of equality by claiming that they are either unsuccessful or merely show that other values are also important, not that equality is not important. It also argues that a principle of educational adequacy cannot be all there is to justice in education.     

Remedial responsibilities beyond nations

David Miller's theory of nationalism and national responsibility offers the leading alternative ‘anticosmopolitan’ theory of global justice. His theory claims that ‘nations’ may be held responsible for the benefits and harms resulting from their collective decisions. Nations may be held remedially responsible to help nations in need even where the former lack causal or moral responsibility, for example. This article critically examines Miller's position that remedial responsibilities – the responsibilities of nations to remedy others in need – can and should only be satisfied by nations. I argue that the characteristics that define and justify a particular understanding of nationalism extend to further constructions of identity, such as religious affiliation and other connections. The problem with Miller's position is that it is overly narrow by focusing solely on our national identities as the characteristic most relevant for determining remedial responsibilities. It is possible and desirable to widen our focus, enriching our understanding of global justice and remedial responsibility. Moreover, this wider perspective is an extension, and not a break from, Miller's position. Our shared identities should have significance for considerations of global justice and they can help us to develop a more robust view of anticosmopolitanism.     

The Myth of Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment

Abstract

Collectivities, just like individuals, exist, can act, bear responsibility for their acts and omissions, and be guilty. It sometimes makes sense to hold them responsible for what they do, or don't do, and to punish them for their misdeeds. With respect to many collectivities there is no practical purpose in holding them responsible, since there is not way that we can bring them to justice. But there are exceptions from this rule. In particular it is plausible to assume that sanctions against entire nations or peoples or populations living in open and democratic states may be an effective means to setting them straight where, collectively, they act wrongly. The best present example of this seems to be the Israelis.     

Democratic Control of Information in the Age of Surveillance Capitalism

Carol Gould's article offers a powerful argument against the sufficiency of informed consent in an age of surveillance capitalism. In this review, I assess the three main claims that Gould makes in her article, namely that (1) democratic control is required by the all‐affected principle; (2) democratic control is a means of ensuring that surveillance corporations and governments track public, rather than merely private, interests; and (3) democratic control is constitutive of freedom as self‐development and self‐transformation.     

论柯亨对社会主义的平等主义的辩护

柯亨是分析学马克思主义的主要代表人物之一。在《自我所有、自由和平等》等著作中,他从早期专注于历史唯物主义转向了对政治哲学的研究。柯亨结合当代西方社会历史条件的变化,通过批     

Farewell to multiculturalism? sharing values and identities in societies of immigration

For critics of multiculturalism, societies of immigration need to strengthen cohesion based on shared democratic values and national identities. This article suggests that democratic values are not a sufficient basis for political cohesion, because they are universal and cannot identify a particular polity toward which one ought to be loyal. Immigrants are always asked to accept a package deal that includes not only democratic values, but also the hegemony of established national cultures. Shared democratic values may also not be strictly necessary for political cohesion. They must be embedded in political institutions and ought to be respected by office holders, democratic politicians, and parties, but democratic states must tolerate that most citizens appear to hold illiberal beliefs including illiberal attitudes toward immigrants. Immigrants are then often asked to profess a commitment to values that citizens do not widely share. If political loyalty, cannot be exclusively based on democratic values, must societies of immigration then ask newcomers to assimilate into a shared national identity? The article argues that this requires, first, a self-transformation of these identities in response to immigration. Instead of regarding shared identities as overriding all other affiliations, democratic states should see them as overarching and overlapping. Different attitudes toward dual nationality illustrate the implication of this suggestion. The article concludes by proposing a catalyst model of multiculturalism as an alternative to the metaphors of the melting pot, the salad bowl, and the mosaic.     

Virtue or Art?: Political Friendship Reconsidered

In Talking to Strangers (2004), Danielle Allen argues that democratic citizens will need to acquire new habits for contending with distrust in order to prolong the democratic experiment. Though Allen's solution recalls her reading of the Republic, it is to Aristotle, not Plato, that she turns for help theorizing those habits. Drawing upon the Nicomachean Ethics, she proposes arts or techniques that might substitute for and outpace justice by enabling democratic strangers to treat one another like friends. While I endorse Allen's analysis of the problems posed by rising levels of distrust, I propose a different solution. First, I argue that the habits Allen describes would have to be virtues and not merely techniques in order to effect real political change. Then, second, I identify those habits as “piety” and “gratitude”—virtues which, I contend, are not so much substitutes for as supplements to justice. My argument thus elaborates Thomas Aquinas's account of justice and its “potential parts” in the Summa Theologiae.     

The Concept, and Conceptions, of Justice

ABSTRACT Occasioned by but not pretending to constitute a critique of Julian Le Grand's 'Equity as an Economic Objective', published in the first issue of the Journal of Applied Philosophy , this paper argues that the concept of justice must be distinguished from conceptions thereof. Once this is done it emerges that many of what are both offered and accepted as conceptions of justice really are not. By proceeding next both to enquire what are the incentives to such misrepresentations and to reveal some of their unrecognized costs, this is shown to be by no means a merely trifling and purely verbal matter. In particular, by misrepresenting the imposition of their peculiar and characteristic ideal of equality of outcome as the enforcement of the mandate of justice, Procrusteans unwittingly imply that they are themselves involved in appallingly shabby and discreditable practices.     

No Postmaterialists in Foxholes: Postmaterialist Values,Nationalism, and National Threat in the People's Republic of China

In this article, I present findings from a survey experiment in which Chinese university students exposed to a treatment designed to increase feelings of national threat were—based on their responses to the four‐item postmaterialism values‐priority battery—significantly more likely to be classified as “pure materialists.” These findings are presented in support of the proposition that perception of a hostile international environment may tend to exaggerate citizens' authoritarian and nationalistic sentiments at the expense of more democratically favorable value orientations. Media and political figures in the West who rail against the evils of China's authoritarian leadership might believe that they are championing and encouraging democratic aspirations among the Chinese people, but might instead be inciting impulses and attitudes that are far less “democracy‐friendly.”     

秦汉时代之匈奴道德生活

秦汉时代,匈奴的道德生活在道德原则上奉行以生存为指南的功利主义原则,并形成了相应的道德风尚;在道德原则和道德规范的创新方面,冒顿具有杰出的贡献;在处理民族关系和阶级关系方面,他们的道德行为往往远离正义原则;在权力的继承和分配方面,由于缺少相应的道德规范和道德教育对之调节,使他们长期陷入内斗之中;在与汉民族的长期交往中,他们的道德生活也染上了相当的汉族道德色彩。     

Justice and Game Advantage in Sporting Games

This paper is a case study of what Jon Elster calls "local justice"; particular schemes of justice which, on a relatively autonomous basis, are designed and implemented by institutions and practices to meet particular preferences and goals. The paper suggests an interpretation of the role of justice in sporting games. First, a framework for examinations of schemes of local justice is suggested. Second, norms are suggested that express the requirements that have to be met in order to consider a sporting game as just. The discussion shows that sports are characterized by a particular blend of meritocratic justice in which goods and burdens are distributed according to performance, and a non-meritocratic distribution through which goods and burdens arise as matters of chance. The essay concludes by arguing that the optimal blend of meritocratic justice and chance results in the realization of not merely fair sporting games, but of exciting and good games as well.     

Confronting Chaos: Migration Law Responds to Images of Disorder

This paper argues that in liberal nations migration law orders chaotic images and is an important site for the construction of national identities. Empirical illustrations are drawn primarily from Australia, but the thesis is applicable to all immigrant nations and also provides insights for the “Old World”. The argument proceeds by first examining the role of migration laws in liberal democratic societies. Building on this framework, it then looks at how Australian migration law responds to images of disorder outside the nation. Finally, it considers how migration law addresses disorder within the nation by reflecting a coherent picture of Australian national identity. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Against Global Egalitarianism

This article attacks the view that global justice should be understood in terms of a global principle of equality. The principle mainly discussed is global equality of opportunity – the idea that people of similar talent and motivation should have equivalent opportunity sets no matter to which society they belong. I argue first that in a culturally plural world we have no neutral way of measuring opportunity sets. I then suggest that the most commonly offered defences of global egalitarianism – the cosmopolitan claim that human lives have equal value, the argument that a persons nationality is a morally arbitrary characteristic, and the more empirical claim that relationships among fellow-nationals are no longer special in a way that matters for justice – are all defective. If we fall back on the idea of equality as a default principle, then we have to recognize that pursuing global equality of opportunity systematically would leave no space for national self-determination. Finally, I ask whether global inequality might be objectionable for reasons independent of justice, and argue that the main reason for concern is the inequalities of power that are likely to emerge in a radically unequal world.I am very grateful to Gillian Brock and Kok-Chor Tan for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

Equality in Education – Why We Must Go All the Way

In this paper I present and defend a highly demanding principle of justice in education that has not been seriously discussed thus far. According to the suggested approach, “all the way equality”, justice in education requires nothing short of equal educational outcome between all individual students. This means not merely between equally able children, or between children from different groups and classes, but rather between all children, regardless of social background, race, sex and ability. This approach may seem implausible at first, due to the far-reaching implications it entails, primarily its requirement to deny better-off children their advantage for the sake of equality. However the paper argues that all-the-way-equality, in fact, does a better job realizing the goals of justice in education than alternative conceptions of justice. It is further argued that at least some of the principle’s most radical consequences, those that make it seem counterintuitive, can be mitigated by balancing all-the-way-equality with competing interests.