TOWARD A NEW CREATION OF BEING

Abstract. The author traces the path from split brains to basic beliefs by linking the deautomatized pattern of spiritual masters, as reorted in Rorschach protocols, with subsymbolic, parallel, distriguted processing, The older brain structures constitute humanity's common heritage, while the new brain constitutes particular cultural heritages. Expanding levels of complexity move from the limbic system throuh conitive left-mind vigilance and right-mind responsiveness to %Pelie patterns of proclamation and manifestation to the world-integrating mysticism of limbic input and the world-fulfilling action of the new brain. Whole brain activity combines emotional meaning and propositional explanation. Analogically seaking, the brain provides clues to understanding God. A ialectical theology parallels the reciprocal integration of brain processes. Whole brain belief originates in the old brain's evolutionary adaptation to our genetic inheritance and in the new brain's conscious intention to fulfill the will of God through our cultural inheritances.     

Not only in the brain: Cabanis and the Montpellierian tradition of localization

Antonio Damasio (1995) has recently presented evidence to the effect that we are perhaps wrong in thinking that it is only the brain that thinks. Rational decision making involves emotional reactions as a necessary condition and background. And since emotions involve bodily reactions which are not limited to the brain but which embrace the autonomous nervous system and the viscera, one could say that we actually think with our bodies and not merely with our brains. According to Damasio the incapacity of patients with frontal lobe pathology in decision making could be explained by a disturbance in emotional reactions involving the whole organism. Philosophical discussions concerning brains in a vat have completely forgotten these aspects of our mental life. Despite the fact that the idea that we think exclusively with our brains has during the modern age been a rather widely held "received view," there is a physiological and philosophical tradition which regarded mental functions as the result of the interaction of several organs, instead of seeing them as the result of the activity of the brain alone.     

Psychology in sub‐Saharan Africa: Challenges,prospects and promises

The experiences of African communities are significantly underrepresented in the current psychological literature as compared to those of Western European and North American communities. Professional psychology in sub‐Saharan African is either nonexistent or strongly modeled after practices in North America and Western Europe. The modeling of psychology in sub‐Saharan Africa on the North American and Western European experience is a result of the more extensive marketing of the Western cultural heritage around the globe by national governments, education institutions and international aid agencies vis a vis the marketing of alternative cultural heritages. It is also reflective of the historically unequal intercultural exchanges between Western and African cultural heritages and in favour of the former. A greater representation of the African experience in the psychological literature could add to the richness and global relevance of psychology.     

多感官线索整合的理论模型

日常生活中,人脑能联合来自不同感官通道的线索对外部世界中的物体和事件进行感知。这些感官通道采用不同的参照系来表征物体的特征和位置;而且各种线索的可靠性也不恒定,根据环境而改变。但是人脑依然能够有效地整合这些线索,对物体和事件进行正确的感知。在以往研究的基础上,总结评述了多感官线索整合的几种理论模型及其验证结果,其中重点介绍了近年来引起广泛关注的贝叶斯统计优化模型。未来的研究应结合虚拟现实技术和脑成像技术对多感官线索整合进行探讨。     

The Murderer at the Door: What Kant Should Have Said

Embarrassed by the apparent rigorism Kant expresses so bluntly in 'On a Supposed Right to Lie,' numerous contemporary Kantians have attempted to show that Kant's ethics can justify lying in specific circumstances, in particular, when lying to a murderer is necessary in order to prevent her from killing another innocent person. My aim is to improve upon these efforts and show that lying to prevent the death of another innocent person could be required in Kantian terms. I argue (1) that our perfect Kantian duty of self-preservation can require our lying to save our own lives when threatened with unjust aggression, and (2) that Kant's understanding of moral duty was that duties are symmetrical , such that if one has a duty to perform a given action on one's own behalf or to protect one's own rational nature, then one also has a duty to perform similar acts on other's behalf or to protect their rational nature. Thus, that the individual protected against aggression by means of deception is not oneself should be of no consequence from a Kantian perspective. Lying to the murderer is thus an extension of the Kantian requirement of self-defense.     

Gamma-band synchronous oscillations: recent evidence regarding their functional significance.

How do our brains represent distinct objects in consciousness? In order to consciously distinguish between objects, our brains somehow selectively bind together activity patterns of spatially intermingled neurons that simultaneously represent similar and dissimilar features of distinct objects. Gamma-band synchronous oscillations (GSO) of neuroelectrical activity have been hypothesized to be a mechanism used by our brains to generate and bind conscious sensations to represent distinct objects. Most experiments relating GSO to specific features of consciousness have been published only in the last several years. This brief review focuses on a wide variety experiments in which animals, including humans, discriminate between sensory stimuli and make these discriminations evident in their behavior. Performance of these tasks, in humans, is invariably accompanied by conscious awareness of both stimuli and behavior. Results of these experiments indicate that specific patterns of GSO correlate closely with specific aspects of conscious sensorimotor processing. That is, GSO appear to be closely correlated with neural generation of our most paradigmatic cognitive state: consciousness.     

If only I had taken my usual route…: age-related differences in counter-factual thinking

Previous research suggests that young adults can shift between rational and experiential modes of thinking when forming social judgments. The present study examines whether older adults demonstrate this flexibility in thinking. Young and older adults completed an If-only task adapted from Epstein, Lipson, and Huh's (1992 , Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 328) examination of individuals' ability to adopt rational or experiential modes of thought while making a judgment about characters who experience a negative event that could have been avoided. Consistent with our expectations for their judgments of the characters, young adults shifted between experiential and rational modes of thought when instructed to do so. Conversely, regardless of the mode of thought being used or the order with which they adopted the different modes of thought (i.e., shifting from experiential to rational in Study 1 and from rational to experiential in Study 2), older adults consistently offered judgments and justifications that reflected a preference for experiential-based thought.     

Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience

According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.     

Deontological Restrictions and the Self/Other Asymmetry

This paper offers a partial justification of so‐called “deontological restrictions.” Specifically it defends the “self/other asymmetry,” that we are morally obligated to treat our own agency, and thus its results, as specially important. The argument rests on a picture of moral obligation of a broadly Kantian sort. In particular, it rests on the basic normative assumption that our fundamental obligations are determined by the principles which a rational being as such would follow. These include principles which it is not essential for rational beings to accept, but acceptance of which we could non‐arbitrarily attribute to them simply in their capacity as rational. Among these principles is the asymmetry mentioned above.     

Nonconsensual neurocorrectives,bypassing, and free action

Philosophical Studies - As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our...     

The mind-brain relationship: the emergent self

This paper explores the mind-brain relationship, using insights from contemporary neuroscience. It seeks to investigate how our brains become who we are, how subjective experience arises. In order to do this some explanation is given of the basic concepts of how the brain produces our subjective mental life. Current neuropsychological and neurobiological understanding of early brain development, memory, emotion and consciousness are explored. There is also an attempt at mapping the mind-brain-self relationship from a uniquely Jungian perspective. Clinical material is included in order to show the relevance of these insights to our work in the consulting room, arguing the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of the analytic dyad that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection. Such experience forms the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function.     

Going Topless

The view that people go where their brains go remains popular in discussions of personal identity. But since the brain is only a small part of the body, defenders of that view need to provide an account of what it is that makes the brain specially relevant to personal identity. The standard answer is that the brain is special because it is the carrier of psychological continuity. But Peter van Inwagen has recently offered (in Material Beings ) an alternative account of the brain' special relevance. Those who reject the view that we go with our brains obviously need to respond to this new account. According to van Inwagen, there is an important difference between the life-support requirements of a severed head and those of a headless body: whereas a severed head would need only a pump to survive, a headless body would need the functional equivalent of a computer in its life-support system. It follows, according to van Inwagen, that we go with our brains. In this paper I argue that van Inwagen's argument is doubly defective: the inference from his premisses to his conclusion is dubious; and in any case his premisses misrepresent the relevant physiological facts.     

The Moral Laboratory: On Kant’s Notion of Pedagogy as a Science

Following Kant, it is clear that, but probably not completely how we are morally obligated. I will point out that there are three possible ways to struggle for an understanding of how we can be obligated as rational beings and also as ordinary human beings. There is (a) the argument from rational feeling (‘Achtung’), (b) the argument from language, and finally (c) the argument from systematization. Reading the later passages of the ‘Critique of pure Reason’ and following its instructions, we will understand why education has to be founded by the same kind of argumentation as the natural sciences. The systematical analysis of Kant’s analogy between the physical body and the moral obligation will explain the suspected gap between our just rational and our whole selves. The most important part of the demanded bridge will be Kant’s Moral Laboratory.     

The complementary brain: unifying brain dynamics and modularity

How are our brains functionally organized to achieve adaptive behavior in a changing world? This article presents one alternative to the computer analogy that suggests brains are organized into independent modules. Evidence is reviewed that brains are in fact organized into parallel processing streams with complementary properties. Hierarchical interactions within each stream and parallel interactions between streams create coherent behavioral representations that overcome the complementary deficiencies of each stream and support unitary conscious experiences. This perspective suggests how brain design reflects the organization of the physical world with which brains interact. Examples from perception, learning, cognition and action are described, and theoretical concepts and mechanisms by which complementarity might be accomplished are presented.     

理性-经验加工对不公正情绪和行为反应的影响:公正敏感性的调节作用

基于认知-经验理论,采用行为实验法和情境故事法,探讨了不同信息加工方式对不公正情绪和行为反应的影响,以及受害者敏感性对两者关系的调节作用。结果表明,与理性加工相比,经验加工下个体对不公正有更强烈的负性情绪反应,合作意向更低;受害者敏感性调节加工方式与不公正行为反应之间的关系,即受害者敏感性低时,加工方式与人际公正对合作意向交互作用显著,受害者敏感性高时,加工方式与人际公正对合作意向没有交互作用。     

Argument versus dialogue: a response to Luepnitz, Madigan and other argumentative authors

In the context of family therapy's task of serving families, the purpose of theorizing is ultimately practical. It is a prevailing cultural practice among intellectuals to use up a vast amount of 'space' in our brains and in the pages of our journals theorizing at a great distance from the practical. One of the reasons for this distance from the practical may be the sophistic habit of argumentativeness. An alternative is proposed in which priority is given to the practical and dialogue is focused on the co-creation of meanings.     

Truth approximation,belief merging,and peer disagreement

In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the inquirers’ quest for truth. In particular, they vindicate the intuition that scientific inquiry, and rational discussion in general, benefits from some heterogeneity in opinion and interaction among different viewpoints. The links between our approach and related analyses of truth tracking, judgment aggregation, and opinion dynamics, are also highlighted.     

Reasons

The temptation to look for the “purely normative essence” of argument stems from the understandable ambition to distinguish rational persuasion from mere persuasion. But in seeking a purely normative notion of argument it is easy to overlook—or actually deny—that rational persuasion is a kind of persuasion. The burden of this essay is to show that the concept of reason from which our interest in argument derives can only exist and have normative force as a kind of persuasion, that is, as something (also) causal.

     

Updating Yin and Yang

Ethicists haven’t paid much attention recently to the Chinese complementarity of yin and yang. That complementarity can be updated to take into account and also form the basis for some of our contemporary ethical thinking. In my From Enlightenment to Receptivity, I argue that Western thought has overemphasized rational control/autonomy at the expense of the countervailing virtue of receptivity, and it turns out that the yin/yang complementarity can be profitably viewed as anticipating and clarifying a complementarity between receptivity and rational control that recent developments in Western philosophical thought point us toward. But just as Western philosophy has overemphasized rational autonomy, Chinese thinking hasn’t sufficiently appreciated its importance. Both Chinese and Western thought need to seek a more even balance between autonomy/control and receptivity, but the idea of such balance comes more from yin and yang than from anything in previous Western philosophy.     

Shrinkage in the perceived duration of speech and tone by acoustic replacement1

Abstract: To investigate mechanisms for perceiving the duration of an auditory event, an effect of perceptual grouping upon perceived duration was studied psychophysically. In the first experiment, the perceived duration of a spoken word was measured under three conditions of acoustic continuity (i.e., (a) intact, (b) noise‐replaced, and (c) gap‐replaced) as a function of the duration of the target stimulus. Under the noise‐replaced condition, a portion of the target stimulus was physically replaced with a noise burst. Under the gap‐replaced condition, the replacement was made with a gap. The gap‐replacement resulted in a prominent shrinkage of the perceived duration. In the case of noise‐replacement, the amount of shrinkage was moderate but highly significant, although the word employed was perceived to be phonetically intact. Independent of this effect of replacement, the amount of shrinkage was also affected by the physical duration of the target stimulus. The second experiment tested an effect of noise replacement on the perceived duration of a tone burst. In this case, the noise replacement also shrunk the perceived duration of the non‐speech stimulus. This noise‐induced shrinkage could be regarded as being general for the auditory duration. The phenomenon is discussed in relation to a revised model for perceived duration.