Jealousy reconsidered: A reply to DeSteno (2010)

In a recent commentary, DeSteno (2010) critiqued the work of Levy and Kelley (2010) which investigated the relationship of attachment style to the sex difference in jealousy. This commentary addresses the concerns raised by DeSteno; I briefly review some of the literature that was not addressed by DeSteno's commentary and discuss directions that future research may take.     

Grammaticality is inferred from global similarity: A reply to Kinder (2010)

Jamieson and Mewhort (2009b) proposed an account of performance in the artificial-grammar judgement-of-grammaticality task based on Hintzman's (1986) model of retrieval, Minerva 2. In the account, each letter is represented by a unique vector of random elements, and each exemplar is represented by concatenating its constituent letter vectors. Although successful in simulating several experiments, Kinder (2010) showed that the model fails for three selected experiments. We track the model's failure to a constraint introduced by concatenating letter vectors to construct the exemplar representation. To fix the problem, we use a holographic representation. Holographic representation not only provides the flexibility missing with the concatenation scheme but also acknowledges variability in what subjects notice when they inspect training exemplars. Armed with holographic representations, we show that the model successfully captures the three problematic data sets. We argue for retrospective accounts, like the present one, that acknowledge subjects' skill in drawing unexpected inferences based on memory of studied items against prospective accounts that require subjects to learn statistical regularities in the training set in anticipation of an undefined classification test.     

Conscious awareness of action potentiates sensorimotor learning

Many everyday skills are unconsciously learned through repetitions of the same behaviour by binding independent motor acts into unified sets of actions. However, our ability to be consciously aware of producing newly and highly trained motor skills raises the question of the role played by conscious awareness of action upon skill acquisition. In this study we strengthened conscious awareness of self-produced sequential finger movements by way of asking participants to judge their performance in terms of maximal fluency after each trial. Control conditions in which participants did not make any judgment or performance-unrelated judgments were also included. Findings indicate that conscious awareness of action, enhanced via subjective appraisal of motor efficiency, potentiates sensorimotor learning and skilful motor production in optimising the processing and sequencing of action units, as compared to the control groups. The current work lends support to the claim that the learning and skilful expression of sensorimotor behaviours might be grounded upon our ability to be consciously aware of our own motor capability and efficiency.     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: reply to Wiens and Ohman (2002) and Manns et al. (2002)

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (2002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, 2002) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (2002) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models.     

Useful scientific theories are useful: A reply to Rouder, Pratte, and Morey (2010)

In a recognition memory experiment, Mickes, Wixted, and Wais (2007) reported that distributional statistics computed from ratings made using a 20-point confidence scale (which showed that the standard deviation of the ratings made to lures was approximately 0.80 times that of the targets) essentially matched the distributional statistics estimated indirectly by fitting a Gaussian signal-detection model to the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC). We argued that the parallel results serve to increase confidence in the Gaussian unequal-variance model of recognition memory. Rouder, Pratte, and Morey (2010) argue that the results are instead uninformative. In their view, parametric models of latent memory strength are not empirically distinguishable. As such, they argue, our conclusions are arbitrary, and parametric ROC analysis should be abandoned. In an attempt to demonstrate the inherent untestability of parametric models, they describe a non-Gaussian equal-variance model that purportedly accounts for our findings just as well as the Gaussian unequal-variance model does. However, we show that their new model—despite being contrived after the fact and in full view of the to-be-explained data—does not account for the results as well as the unequal-variance Gaussian model does. This outcome manifestly demonstrates that parametric models are, in fact, testable. Moreover, the results differentially favor the Gaussian account over the probit model and over several other reasonable distributional forms (such as the Weibull and the lognormal).     

Facts and findings: A reply to Powell and Nettelbeck (2014)

In their recent article Powell and Nettelbeck (2014) question the predictive validity of intellectual curiosity for academic performance. We discuss here three issues we found with their report.     

Semantic priming without awareness: Some methodological considerations and replications

Previous studies of subliminal semantic priming effects are considered. The distinction between subjective and objective detection thresholds proposed by Cheesman and Merikle (1984) is accepted, and it is concluded that no convincing evidence has been adduced to support or deny the existence of semantic priming effects at or below objective threshold. New criteria for the assessment of objective thresholds are proposed, and four experiments are reported in each of which pattern-masked primes were presented 10% below objective threshold. The first three experiments presented primes, mask, and targets binocularly; the fourth used dichoptic presentation. Data were analysed using both conventional F ratios and the quasi F ratio advocated by Clark (1973). Results showed that significant subliminal semantic priming effects occurred in each experiment when conventional F ratios were used, and significant effects occurred in all but the first experiment when quasi F was used. Binocular and dichoptic presentation of stimuli gave semantic priming effects whose magnitudes did not differ significantly. It is concluded that semantic priming effects can be obtained below objective detection threshold. It is also concluded that replication with different participants and different stimuli is preferable to the use of quasi F ratios in investigations where verbal stimuli are used.     

Conscious control and memory awareness when recognising famous faces

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing.     

The response of counsellors to apartheid: A reply to Dryden (1990) and De Jager (1992)

This reply to Dryden (1990) and De Jager (1992) explores the role of organised counselling psychology in challenging, maintaining or promoting apartheid. Counsellors have an important role to play in newly racially integrated tertiary institutions. This role should be informed by an acknowledgement of the central involvement of race and politics within counselling psychology so that appropriate politically contextualised organisational interventions can be implemented.     

Processing of lexical ambiguities: a comment on Milberg, Blumstein, and Dworetzky (1987)

In a study by Milberg, Blumstein, and Dworetzky (1987), normal control subjects and Wernicke's and Broca's aphasics performed a lexical decision task on the third element of auditorily presented triplets of words with either a word or a nonword as target. In three of the four types of word triplets, the first and the third words were related to one or both meanings of the second word, which was semantically ambiguous. The fourth type of word triplet consisted of three unrelated, unambiguous words, functioning as baseline. Milberg et al. (1987) claim that the results for their control subjects are similar to those reported by Schvaneveldt, Meyer, and Becker's original study (1976) with the same prime types, and so interpret these as evidence for a selective lexical access of the different meanings of ambiguous words. It is argued here that Milberg et al. only partially replicate the Schvaneveldt et al. results. Moreover, the results of Milberg et al. are not fully in line with the selective access hypothesis adopted. Replication of the Milberg et al. (1987) study with Dutch materials, using both a design without and a design with repetition of the same target words for the same subjects led to the original pattern as reported by Schvaneveldt et al. (1976). In the design with four separate presentations of the same target word, a strong repetition effect was found. It is therefore argued that the discrepancy between the Milberg et al. results on the one hand, and the Schvaneveldt et al. results on the other, might be due to the absence of a control for repetition effects in the within-subject design used by Milberg et al. It is concluded that this makes the results for both normal and aphasic subjects in the latter study difficult to interpret in terms of a selective access model for normal processing.     

Mixing qualitative and quantitative research in developmental science: uses and methodological choices

Multiple methods are vital to understanding development as a dynamic, transactional process. This article focuses on the ways in which quantitative and qualitative methodologies can be combined to enrich developmental science and the study of human development, focusing on the practical questions of "when" and "how." Research situations that may be especially suited to mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches are described. The authors also discuss potential choices for using mixed quantitative- qualitative approaches in study design, sampling, construction of measures or interview protocols, collaborations, and data analysis relevant to developmental science. Finally, they discuss some common pitfalls that occur in mixing these methods and include suggestions for surmounting them.     

The lengthening effect revisited: A reply to Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999)

In the present study, the lengthening phenomenon (Tsal & Shalev, 1996), namely, the increase in perceived length of unattended lines, was reexamined in light of criticisms by Prinzmetal and Wilson (1997) and Masin (1999). Prinzmetal and Wilson suggested that the effect was not due to attentional factors but to the spatial interaction between the attended line and the cue used to direct attention. We have replicated the lengthening effect when both attended and unattended lines are preceded by cues at a nearby location, showing that the effect is not caused by spatial cues per se, but instead reflects an inherent property of the attentional system. Masin argued that the lengthening effect is not robust, because it occurs for some but not for all participants. In the present study, the lengthening effect was highly reliable, occurring for each participant for a variety of line lengths.     

Negative priming and stimulus repetition: A reply to Neill and Joordens (2002)

Negative priming is reliably obtained with repeated items, but not with novel items. Here, we review why these stimulus repetition effects raise problems for memorybased theories of negative priming. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence casting doubt on Neill and Joordens’s (2002) claim that perceptual facilitation masks the effects of episodic retrieval with novel items. Finally, we discuss several theoretical and methodological issues raised in the reply by Neill and Joordens. We conclude that a more straightforward interpretation of these stimulus repetition effects is one based on activation-sensitive inhibition.     

Missing the target: A reply to Koehler & Macchi (2009)

Koehler and Macchi 2009 criticize the experiments presented in Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes 2008 as being “virtually irrelevant” to exemplar cuing theory. This reply addresses that interpretation and argues that the experiments dealt with issues at the heart of the theory and provided evidence highly relevant to understand how people think about low‐probability events. The role of the ‘target’ in probabilistic statements is examined, highlighting the need for further theoretical and empirical clarification of the concept. The remaining specific criticisms raised in the commentary are discussed as well. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Negative priming and multiple repetition: A reply to Grison and Strayer (2001)

Strayer and colleagues (Grison & Strayer, 2001; Malley & Strayer, 1995; Strayer & Grison, 1999) have reported experiments in which negative priming by ignored stimuli occurred only for stimuli that were repeatedly sampled from small sets. These results were argued to be inconsistent with episodic/mismatch accounts of negative priming. We show here that a dependence of negative priming on multiple repetition is wholly consistent with such theories. Furthermore, we argue that the inhibitory theory proposed by Strayer and colleagues cannot account for major findings regarding negative priming and that anomalies in the data reported by Grison and Strayer are more parsimoniously explained by episodic/mismatch accounts.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.