Two Systems of Self-Regulation and the Differential Application of Psychoanalytic Technique

Out of our work over the years on child development, clinical technique, and sadomasochism, we have begun to formulate a model of development that describes two possible ways of responding to feelings of helplessness in the face of the challenges of internal and external experience. Any psychoanalytic model has implications for how we think about technique and can be tested on the basis of its utility in generating technical ideas and enhancing our therapeutic repertoire. At this juncture in the history of our field, it is crucial for us to demonstrate that psychoanalytic techniques are effective in helping people enter treatment, change, and finish in a way that consolidates their gains. In this paper we explore the utility of our two-systems model for expanding the discourse about psychoanalytic technique.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

Prenatal auditory experience and its sequelae

Towards the end of the second trimester of gestation, a human fetus is able to register environmental sounds. This in utero auditory experience is characterized by comprising strongly low-pass-filtered versions of sounds from the external world. Here, we present computational tests of the hypothesis that this early exposure to severely degraded auditory inputs serves an adaptive purpose—it may induce the neural development of extended temporal integration. Such integration can facilitate the detection of information carried by low-frequency variations in the auditory signal, including emotional or other prosodic content. To test this prediction, we characterized the impact of several training regimens, biomimetic and otherwise, on a computational model system trained and tested on the task of emotion recognition. We find that training with an auditory trajectory recapitulating that of a neurotypical infant in the pre-to-postnatal period results in temporally extended receptive field structures and yields the best subsequent accuracy and generalization performance on the task of emotion recognition. This strongly suggests that the progression from low-pass-filtered to full-frequency inputs is likely to be an adaptive feature of our development, conferring significant benefits to later auditory processing abilities relying on temporally extended analyses. Additionally, this finding can help explain some of the auditory impairments associated with preterm births, suggests guidelines for the design of auditory environments in neonatal care units, and points to enhanced training procedures for computational models.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

Scepticism and the Senses

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such‐and‐such is so, where what we perceive to be so is the very state of the world that we thereby know to be so. This is not proposed as a better answer to the philosophical problem, but as a way of seeing how that problem as traditionally understood could not really present a threat to anyone who can think about the world at all.     

Do you see what I know? On reasons,perceptual evidence,and epistemic status

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don't necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn't very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don't figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief‐like to provide us with something premise‐like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn't let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don't think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don't seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I've found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don't find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson's (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.     

From sensory to long-term memory: evidence from auditory memory reactivation studies

Everyday experience tells us that some types of auditory sensory information are retained for long periods of time. For example, we are able to recognize friends by their voice alone or identify the source of familiar noises even years after we last heard the sounds. It is thus somewhat surprising that the results of most studies of auditory sensory memory show that acoustic details, such as the pitch of a tone, fade from memory in ca. 10-15 s. One should, therefore, ask (1) what types of acoustic information can be retained for a longer term, (2) what circumstances allow or help the formation of durable memory records for acoustic details, and (3) how such memory records can be accessed. The present review discusses the results of experiments that used a model of auditory recognition, the auditory memory reactivation paradigm. Results obtained with this paradigm suggest that the brain stores features of individual sounds embedded within representations of acoustic regularities that have been detected for the sound patterns and sequences in which the sounds appeared. Thus, sounds closely linked with their auditory context are more likely to be remembered. The representations of acoustic regularities are automatically activated by matching sounds, enabling object recognition.     

Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time

Does the language you speak affect how you think about the world? This question is taken up in three experiments. English and Mandarin talk about time differently--English predominantly talks about time as if it were horizontal, while Mandarin also commonly describes time as vertical. This difference between the two languages is reflected in the way their speakers think about time. In one study, Mandarin speakers tended to think about time vertically even when they were thinking for English (Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that March comes earlier than April if they had just seen a vertical array of objects than if they had just seen a horizontal array, and the reverse was true for English speakers). Another study showed that the extent to which Mandarin-English bilinguals think about time vertically is related to how old they were when they first began to learn English. In another experiment native English speakers were taught to talk about time using vertical spatial terms in a way similar to Mandarin. On a subsequent test, this group of English speakers showed the same bias to think about time vertically as was observed with Mandarin speakers. It is concluded that (1) language is a powerful tool in shaping thought about abstract domains and (2) one's native language plays an important role in shaping habitual thought (e.g., how one tends to think about time) but does not entirely determine one's thinking in the strong Whorfian sense.     

Auditory grouping

Although our subjective experience of the world is one of discrete sound sources, the individual frequency components that make up these separate sources are spread across the frequency spectrum. Listeners. use various simple cues, including common onset time and harmonicity, to help them achieve this perceptual separation. Our ability to use harmonicity to segregate two simultaneous sound sources is constrained by the frequency resolution of the auditory system, and is much more effective for low-numbered, resolved harmonics than for higher-numbered, unresolved ones. Our ability to use interaural time-differences (ITDs) in perceptual segregation poses a paradox. Although ITDs are the dominant cue for the localization of complex sounds, listeners cannot use ITDs alone to segregate the speech of a single talker from similar simultaneous sounds. Listeners are, however, very good at using ITD to track a particular sound source across time. This difference might reflect two different levels of auditory processing, indicating that listeners attend to grouped auditory objects rather than to those frequencies that share a common ITD.     

The Automaton Self: Defensive organisation,psychodynamics and treatment approaches

Abstract

This paper is not primarily concerned with the content of theory and what we then, in the light of this and of our own experience, say to our clients. Rather, it is concerned with the nature of this knowledge that we are using and that the client in turn uses and experiences in the counselling.

How, or the way in which, we know, defines our knowledge as much as the actual content of that knowledge. The paper delineates two fundamental ways of knowing. One is our ordinary practical and rational way of understanding reality and is usually about achieving some goal – this is what I am calling the product side of counselling: the other is concerned with our more immediate first-hand experiential knowing of ourselves and our world.

The paper opens with a definition of these two kinds of knowledge, product and process, and presents some clinical material to show how these different ways of knowing can have a real effect on the counselling. It then moves on to the question of why counselling trainings are becoming increasingly concerned with product knowledge, and ends with a discussion of how Freud himself was constantly using both ways of knowing as if they were the same, without understanding the implications of this for therapeutic practice.     

Imagining Experiences

It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for a special imagistic way of thinking about experiences is instead a special way of misconstruing them. It is this tendency to misrepresent experiences through the use of imagery that gives rise to the appearance of an explanatory gap. The pervasiveness and tenacity of this misrepresentational reflex can be traced to its roots in a particular heuristic for monitoring and remembering the mental states of others. The arguments together amount to a new path for defending the transparency of perceptual experience.     

Attentional modulation of electrophysiological activity in auditory cortex for unattended sounds within multistream auditory environments

In three experiments, we addressed the issue of attention effects on unattended sound processing when one auditory stream is selected from three potential streams, creating a simple model of the cocktail party situation. We recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to determine the way in which unattended, task-irrelevant sounds were stored in auditory memory (i.e., as one integrated stream or as two distinct streams). Subjects were instructed to ignore all the sounds and attend to a visual task or to selectively attend to a subset of the sounds and perform a task with the sounds (Experiments 1 and 2). A third (behavioral) experiment was conducted to test whether global pattern violations (used in Experiments 1 and 2) were perceptible when the sounds were segregated. We found that the mismatch negativity ERP component, an index of auditory change detection, was evoked by infrequent pattern violations occurring in the unattended sounds when all the sounds were ignored, but not when attention was focused on a subset of the sounds. The results demonstrate that multiple unattended sound streams can segregate by frequency range but that selectively attending to a subset of the sounds can modify the extent to which the unattended sounds are processed. These results are consistent with models in animal and human studies showing that attentional control can limit the processing of unattended input in favor of attended sensory inputs, thereby facilitating the ability to achieve behavioral goals.     

Infant crying: Acoustics,perception and communication

This paper first reviews briefly the literature on the acoustics of infant cry sounds and then presents two empirical studies on the perception of cry and noncry sounds in their social-communicative context. Acoustic analysis of cry sounds has undergone dramatic changes in the last 35 years, including the introduction of more than a hundred different acoustic measures. The study of cry acoustics, however, remains largely focused on neonates who have various medical problems or are at risk for developmental delays. Relatively little is known about how cry sounds and cry perception change developmentally, or about how they compare with noncry sounds. The data presented here support the notion that both auditory and visual information are important in caregivers' interpretations of infant sounds in naturalistic contexts. When only auditory information is available (Study 1), cry sounds become generally more recognizable from 3 to 12 months of age; perception of noncry sounds, however, generally does not change over age. When auditory and visual information contradict each other (Study 2), adults tend to perform at chance levels, with a few interesting exceptions. It is suggested that broadening studies of acoustic analysis and perception to include both cry and noncry sounds should increase our understanding of the development of communication in infancy. Finally, we suggest that examining the cry in its developmental context holds great possibility for delineating the factors that underlie adults' responses to crying.     

Does visual experience influence the spatial distribution of auditory attention?

Sighted individuals are less accurate and slower to localize sounds coming from the peripheral space than sounds coming from the frontal space. This specific bias in favour of the frontal auditory space seems reduced in early blind individuals, who are particularly better than sighted individuals at localizing sounds coming from the peripheral space. Currently, it is not clear to what extent this bias in the auditory space is a general phenomenon or if it applies only to spatial processing (i.e. sound localization). In our approach we compared the performance of early blind participants with that of sighted subjects during a frequency discrimination task with sounds originating either from frontal or peripheral locations. Results showed that early blind participants discriminated faster than sighted subjects both peripheral and frontal sounds. In addition, sighted subjects were faster at discriminating frontal sounds than peripheral ones, whereas early blind participants showed equal discrimination speed for frontal and peripheral sounds. We conclude that the spatial bias observed in sighted subjects reflects an unbalance in the spatial distribution of auditory attention resources that is induced by visual experience.     

没听到？“听”到！——来自听觉表象神经机制研究的证据

近年来听觉表象开始得到关注,相关研究包括言语声音、音乐声音、环境声音的听觉表象三类。本文梳理了认知神经科学领域对上述三种听觉表象所激活的脑区研究,比较了听觉表象和听觉对应脑区的异同,并展望了听觉表象未来的研究方向。     

A Time for Silence? Its Possibilities for Dialogue and for Reflective Learning

From the beginning of history sounds have played a fundamentally important role in humanity’s development as ways of expression and of communication. However in contemporary western society, and indeed globally, we are experiencing an excess of speech and a relentless encouragement to expression. Such excess indicates a misunderstanding about what expression and dialogue should be. This condition encourages us to think about silence, solitude and contemplation and the role they might play in restoring the realm of personal understanding of the Self and of one’s authentic experience of the Other. The purpose of this article is to explore the potency of a silence that arises from our participation in the world. We present first some ideas about silence as a human phenomenon. This is followed by an examination of silence and language, an investigation of silence in dialogue, and of its educational implications. The article concludes by emphasising the value of silence as potency in itself, assisting in recovering the expressive powers of language. We argue that it is important to understand the positive status of silence in order to recognise and avoid repressive speech and to introduce its potential for reflective learning.     

Foundational beliefs and the structure of justification

I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience is sufficient to justify beliefs about the external world. I propose that justification for propositions describing our perceptual experiences partially constitutes any justification we may possess for beliefs concerning the external world. In this way, our justification for beliefs about the physical world may only be inferential since it is grounded in any justification we have for at least one other proposition. This theory occupies an intermediate position between the two aforementioned foundationalist accounts, which allows it to sidestep problems that confront each of them.     

Feature assignment in perception of auditory figure

Because the environment often includes multiple sounds that overlap in time, listeners must segregate a sound of interest (the auditory figure) from other co-occurring sounds (the unattended auditory ground). We conducted a series of experiments to clarify the principles governing the extraction of auditory figures. We distinguish between auditory "objects" (relatively punctate events, such as a dog's bark) and auditory "streams" (sounds involving a pattern over time, such as a galloping rhythm). In Experiments 1 and 2, on each trial 2 sounds-an object (a vowel) and a stream (a series of tones)-were presented with 1 target feature that could be perceptually grouped with either source. In each block of these experiments, listeners were required to attend to 1 of the 2 sounds, and report its perceived category. Across several experimental manipulations, listeners were more likely to allocate the feature to an impoverished object if the result of the grouping was a good, identifiable object. Perception of objects was quite sensitive to feature variation (noise masking), whereas perception of streams was more robust to feature variation. In Experiment 3, the number of sound sources competing for the feature was increased to 3. This produced a shift toward relying more on spatial cues than on the potential contribution of the feature to an object's perceptual quality. The results support a distinction between auditory objects and streams, and provide new information about the way that the auditory world is parsed.     

Editorial Notice

Abstract

John McDowell has claimed that the rational link between perceptions and empirical judgements allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality, one which extends beyond the objects perceived. In this way, we can be said to have a perceptual awareness of the world. I argue that McDowell's account of this perceptual awareness does not succeed. His account as it stands does not have the resources to explain how our perceptions can present objects as belonging to a wider reality, regardless of the judgements we make about that reality. I suggest that we can give a better account of this perceptual awareness of the world by appealing to transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenological study of perceptual experiences describes how they are structured by a sense of the perceived objects as belonging to a world containing other objects of possible perception. I shall outline this sense we have of the world, and argue that it allows us to perceive objects as belonging to a wider reality. Transcendental phenomenology can thus help to explain our perceptual awareness of the world.     

Deep, dark…or transparent? Knowing our desires

The idea that introspection is transparent—that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item—seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages—for example, it is thought to avoid the need to posit any extra mental faculties peculiar to introspection. In this paper I discuss recent attempts to extend this kind of outwards-looking account to our introspective knowledge of desire. According to these accounts, we know our desires by attending to what in the world we judge to be valuable. This, however, does not deal satisfactorily with cases where my value judgments and introspective knowledge of my desires come apart. I propose a better alternative for the proponent of transparency, but one that requires giving up on the supposed metaphysical advantages.