Global shape cannot be attended without object identification.

Whether the global shape of objects can be processed without accessing semantic or identity information was tested. Ss judged which of 2 fragmented forms had the same global shape as a reference stimulus. Matching stimuli could be physically identical, semantically related, or unrelated. The reference stimulus and nonmatching (distractor) form could be semantically related or unrelated. Similarity effects in the related condition were unconfounded with matches nameable and nonnameable forms. For nameable forms, related matching forms facilitated performance; a related distractor disrupted performance. Semantic interference was eliminated when nameable distractors were replaced with nonnameable partners; semantic similarity effects on matching were eliminated with a nonnameable reference stimulus and with inverted targets and distractors. Access to information concerning global shape does not normally occur without object identification.     

Sensory and conceptual representations in memory: Motor images that cannot be imaged

Summary The paper argues for a distinction between sensory-and conceptual-information storage in the human information-processing system. Conceptual information is characterized as meaningful and symbolic, while sensory information may exist in modality-bound form. Furthermore, it is assumed that sensory information does not contribute to conscious remembering and can be used only in data-driven process reptitions, which can be accompanied by a kind of vague or intuitive feeling. Accordingly, pure top-down and willingly controlled processing, such as free recall, should not have any access to sensory data. Empirical results from different research areas and from two experiments conducted by the authors are presented in this article to support these theoretical distinctions. The experiments were designed to separate a sensory-motor and a conceptual component in memory for two-digit numbers and two-letter items, when parts of the numbers or items were imaged or drawn on a tablet. The results of free recall and recognition are discussed in a theoretical framework which distinguishes sensory and conceptual information in memory.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.     

Effects of age on searching for and enumerating targets that cannot be detected efficiently

We investigated the effects of old age on search, subitizing, and counting of difficult-to-find targets. In Experiment 1, young and older adults enumerated targets (Os) with and without distractors (Qs). Without distractors, the usual subitization-counting function occurred in both groups, with the same subitization span of 3.3 items. Subitization disappeared with distractors; older adults were slowed more overall by their presence but enumeration rates were not slowed by ageing either with or without distractors. In contrast, search rates for a single target (O among Qs) were twice as slow for older as for young adults. Experiment 2 tested and ruled out one account of age-equivalent serial enumeration based on the need to subvocalize numbers as items are enumerated. Alternative explanations based on the specific task differences between detecting and enumerating stimuli are discussed.     

Why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot be Solved

Philosophia - What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have...     

When two memories can and cannot be retrieved concurrently

We examined whether two memories can be retrieved concurrently from long-term memory. In Experiment 1, the subjects recalled words, either from two categories—alternating between the two—or from just one category. In Experiment 2, the subjects recalled two words belonging to either the same category or different categories, and the category prompts for these two responses appeared either simultaneously or successively. The results of both studies are consistent with the view that two items from different categories must be retrieved serially, whereas two items from the same category can be retrieved in parallel.     

Hypothetical high-level cognitive functions cannot be localized in the brain: another argument for a revitalized behaviorism

A key epistemological difference between behaviorism and cognitivism concerns their respective attitudes toward the analysis of so-called cognitive processes into functional modules. Behaviorists generally say it is not possible. Cognitivists argue that this is an achievable goal. The question has been concretized by recent developments in brain imaging technology. A consideration of the matter suggests that technical and conceptual difficulties abound in the effort to localize "high-level cognitive functions" in narrowly circumscribed regions of the brain. Some of the most serious involve the ambiguous definition of the putative mental components that are to be localized and the generally unacknowledged nonlinear complexity of both psychological processes and the brain. In addition, the imaging techniques themselves are replete with technical difficulties that raise additional questions about this particular application, even though these wonderful machines can make extraordinary contributions to our knowledge of brain anatomy and physiology. The cumulative implication of these difficulties is that the cognitive approach to the study of scientific psychology has once again set out on a search for a chimera. New approaches to behaviorism may be required to set psychology back on the correct track.     

Daylight savings: what an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be

Philosophical Studies - Significant variations in the way objects appear across different viewing conditions pose a challenge to the view that they have some true, determinate color. This view...     

Leonardo's constraint: two opaque objects cannot be seen in the same direction

Given Leonardo's constraint that 2 opaque objects cannot be seen in the same direction, how are the regions of objects occluded to 1 eye included in perception? To answer this question, the authors presented 3-dimensional stimuli, similar to the ones that concerned Leonardo, and measured the visual directions of their monocular and binocular regions. When the distance between near and far objects was large, the nonfixated object was seen as double and blurry. Leonardo's constraint was met by seeing the near object as double and transparent or the distant object as double and superimposed. When the distance between near and far objects was small, the constraint was met by a perceptual displacement and compression of parts of the nonfixated object.     

Method of constant stimuli: Recalculations show that response-frequency equalization cannot fit the data

The bias found in the method of constant stimuli has been attributed either to an adaptation-level effect or to a response bias. Restle and Levison presented data purported to show that the result could not be explained by response frequency equalization, the best available response-bias theory. Erlebacher and Sekuler elaborated their theory and calculated a version of the model that would fit the main experimental result, but chose an erroneously large value for the standard deviation of their model. Their model does not produce an acceptable fit to the data, and therefore does not successfully compete with the adaptation-level model.     

Social constructionism in the study of career: Accessing the parts that other approaches cannot reach

In this article we consider the contribution of a social constructionist perspective to our understandings of career. We examine this approach in relation to two studies: a study of women's career transition from organizational employment to portfolio work, and a study of the careers of research scientists. Within the career literature a dichotomy has emerged between what are seen as “traditional” and “new” careers. On the face of it these studies seem to neatly illustrate this dichotomy. However, when examined from a social constructionist perspective, questions are raised about the viability of this binarism. In this article we argue this approach enables us to transcend dualisms which have prevailed in career theory, facilitates analyses of the relationship between careers and the social contexts in which they are embedded, and illuminates issues of power and ideology which are often eclipsed by more positivistic research approaches.     

The ideal self at play: the appeal of video games that let you be all you can be

Video games constitute a popular form of entertainment that allows millions of people to adopt virtual identities. In our research, we explored the idea that the appeal of games is due in part to their ability to provide players with novel experiences that let them "try on" ideal aspects of their selves that might not find expression in everyday life. We found that video games were most intrinsically motivating and had the greatest influence on emotions when players' experiences of themselves during play were congruent with players' conceptions of their ideal selves. Additionally, we found that high levels of immersion in gaming environments, as well as large discrepancies between players' actual-self and ideal-self characteristics, magnified the link between intrinsic motivation and the experience of ideal-self characteristics during play.     

Achieving what cannot be done: coping with the time constants in a dynamic decision task by doing something else

This study examines how people handle the time constants in dynamic decision tasks, using a microworld called NEWFIRE which simulates forest fire fighting. The results showed that the participants did not adapt to the time constants, as shown by the fact that they did not discriminate between fires requiring different number of fire fighting units when varying the number of fire fighting units was a means of compensating for the time constants. If they were allowed to move units before the fire started their performance improved, suggesting that they could compensate for their problems with the time constants by restructuring the task in such a way that they did not need to consider them. It is suggested that such restructuring may well be how people handle dynamic tasks also in other circumstances, and that more effort should be put into studying what people actually do in dynamic tasks, rather than into only assessing whether or not they perform optimally.