SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE KRAKÓW SCHOOL

This article outlines the contributions of the Kraków School to the field of science and religion. The Kraków School is a group of philosophers, scientists, and theologians who belong to the milieu of the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies. The members of the group are engaged in inquiries pertaining to the relationship between theology and various sciences, in particular cosmology, evolutionary theory, and neuroscience. The article includes a presentation of the historical background of the School, as well as its main original contributions pertaining to the history of the interactions between science and religion, the rationality and mathematicity of the universe, theology of science, and the role of logic in theology.     

Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars – including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber – take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue – pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz – that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence.     

Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

This paper is the second of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some prominent contemporary scholars, including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber, have argued that Descartes is an Occasionalist about natural motion. On their reading, Descartes holds that God alone causes the motions that are not caused by the free actions of finite minds. Hatfield and Garber offer similar, but independent arguments that Descartes's views about physics – in particular, his arguments that the laws of nature are grounded in God's immutability – entail Occasionalism about natural motion. In this paper I argue contra Hatfield and Garber that Descartes's natural philosophy does not entail Occasionalism. Descartes holds that God is a direct efficient cause of every natural motion. Yet he does not take this to imply that bodies lack genuine causal powers. According to Descartes, God concurs with bodies to cause natural motion in such a way that both God and bodies are genuine, efficient causes of motion. I conclude by presenting an account of how Descartes's theory of body is compatible with the thesis that bodies have intrinsic active causal powers.     

Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which are Basic and Which are Derived?

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs.

Minimal Anti-Humeanism

There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I argue that this view has a variety of advantages that could make it attractive to people with both Humean and anti-Humean inclinations.     

Naturism as a Form of Religious Naturalism

The version of religious naturalism sketched here is called naturism to distinguish it from conceptions of religious naturalism that make fundamental appeal to some idea of deity, deities, or the divine, however immanental, functional, nonontological, or purely valuational or existential such notions may be claimed to be. The focus of naturism is on nature itself as both metaphysically and religiously ultimate. Nature is sacred in its own right, not because of its derivation from some more–ultimate religious principle, state, being, beings, or order of being. Humans, their cultures, and their histories are conceived as integral parts of nature, manifestations of potentialities that lie within it and have been actualized by biological evolution. While there is no purpose of nature, the natural order contains beings capable of purposive behavior. With this purposive behavior, and the goals and ideals implicit in it, humans have the capacity to give significant direction to their ongoing cultural evolution and to discover and maintain their appropriate place within the community of creatures.     

The making of careers, the making of a discipline: Luck and chance in migrant careers in geriatric medicine

The geriatric specialty, unpopular among most UK born and trained medical graduates, provided an opportunity for career development and achievement for those doctors whose training had been non-standard for a variety of reasons. Migrant doctors who have played a substantive role in the UK National Health Service since its inception made an important contribution to the building of that specialty, at the same time building their own careers. This paper draws on oral history interviews with the UK trained pioneers of geriatric medicine and with South Asian overseas trained doctors who entered the geriatric specialty in the middle decades of the twentieth century. It critically reviews the literature of skilled migration, specifically in terms of ‘brain drain’ and ‘push–pull’, focusing on historical and socio-cognitive communities and emphasizes the contribution of individual narratives of career development in the lives of migrants. Focusing on the use of luck and chance in accounts it suggests that although such terms are indicative of chance upon opportunity, they also suggest a role for agency in career development in contexts which were not auspicious. The outcome, for those interviewed, was regarded positively in career terms, but also had a significant part to play in the development of the career of the specialty of geriatric medicine and in the lives of the marginalized people for whom they developed a service.     

来自经济学的启示:关于心理学科的一些思考

从许多方面看,经济学与心理学都存在着共同之处。自20世纪70年代起,主流经济学在解释现实上的失败引发了经济学界的深刻反思,这些反思带给心理学的启示有：(1)心理学与经济学同属社会科学,而不是中间科学或二重科学;(2)统一的范式并不见得是这类以人为研究对象的社会科学的理想状态;(3)实验方法的发展方向不在于越来越精密地控制试验,而是允许不确定性的存在,并通过对不确定性的研究和发掘促进学科的进步。     

A RANDOMNESS‐BASED THEODICY FOR EVOLUTIONARY EVILS

We develop and knit together several theodicies in order to find a more complete picture of why certain forms of (nonhuman) animal suffering might be permitted by a perfect being. We focus on an especially potent form of the problem of evil, which arises from considering why a perfectly good, wise, and powerful God might use evolutionary mechanisms that predictably result in so much animal suffering and loss of life. There are many existing theodicies on the market, and although they offer helpful resources, we combine and further develop several proposals to produce a composite theodicy that avoids certain shortcomings of the individual theodicies. An important element of our project is locating a role for randomness in cosmic and biological evolution. In particular, we show how randomness might enhance or enable certain goods, including everlasting goods, at the risk of temporary evils.     

Religion and Science in Taiwan: Rethinking the Connection

The author draws upon his experience in teaching courses in religion and science in Taiwan, as well as more traditional sources in the history of Chinese religions and the history of science in China, to discuss the relationship of religion and science in contemporary Taiwan. Various aspects of Chinese and Taiwanese understandings of both science and religion are discussed. It is suggested that the nexus for the science-religion dialogue does not lie in a doctrine of creation, which is noticeably absent in Buddhism and most Chinese religions, but rather in the human person who seeks personal health and wholeness, right relations with fellow human beings, and harmony with the cosmos. The author notes that many of these ideas are not unique to China and Taiwan and that in considering other cultures, our understanding of our own culture is enriched.     

NATURAL LAWS AND DIVINE INTERVENTION: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES BEING PENTECOSTAL OR CHARISMATIC MAKE?

The question about divine action remains contested in the discussion between theology and science. This issue is further exacerbated with the entry of pentecostals and charismatics into the conversation, especially with their emphases on divine intervention and miracles. I explore what happens at the intersection of these discourses, identifying first how the concept of “laws of nature” has developed in theology and science and then probing what pentecostal‐charismatic insights might add into the mix. Drawing from the triadic and evolutionary metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce, I propose a reconsideration of the “laws of nature” as habitual, dynamic, and general but nevertheless real tendencies through which the Holy Spirit invites the world to inhabit the coming kingdom of God. This proposal contributes to the articulation of an authentic Pentecostal‐charismatic witness at the theology‐and‐science table while also enabling a more plausible and coherent account of divine action for pentecostal‐charismatic piety and Christian practice in the twenty‐first century.     

评中国思想家对道德与法律之关系的探索

儒家礼法合一论的真义是对“善法”的追求 ,对“恶法”的否定。因为善法体现了儒家的道德精神 ,反映了一种人道主义的价值取向 ,而恶法则是反人道的。墨家强调“法不仁不可以为法” ,其真实的意思是不道德的法律不是真正的法律 ,与儒家的礼法合一论有相似之处。法家主张“法虽不善犹善于无法” ,从而否定了法律的道德基础和价值根据。今天 ,我们在立法中贯彻道德的法律化取向需要谨慎从事 :一是注意把那些体现时代精神、合乎社会潮流的道德予以法律化 ,不能把落伍于时代的道德法律化 ;二是切忌把过高的道德义务转化为法律义务。必须认识到 ,应该法律化的道德只是“底线道德” ,而高层次的道德是不宜法律化的 ,否则就是强人所难。     

人与自然关系:作为中西文学发展的重要线索

人与自然关系是文学表现的重要母题。透过文学的发展,可以窥视出人类社会在社会实践推动下所走过的历史道路。本文意在通过中西文学发展中人与自然关系的描写,揭示人与自然关系的变化过程,并在历史的视野中审视生态批判的当代意义。     

中国心理学思想史范畴体系的重建

中国心理学思想史理论层次的进一步提升呼唤着新的范畴体系的建构。本文分析了已有范畴说存在的不足,提出了范畴建构的几条原则,最后详尽解说了在天人合一背景中的以人性为元范畴所构建的中国心理学思想史范畴体系,它向人们展示了其内在的逻辑脉络,精深内蕴及鲜明个性。