心理学和经济学的相互作用

心理学和经济学之间有着天然的联系：他们有互通的核心概念；神经心理学、认知心理学、实验心理学、进化心理学通过对人的心理和行为的深入研究，不仅给予经济学很多有益的启发，还挑战了经济学一些关键的假设并用形成了与经济学的交叉学科。心理学对经济学渗透力加强的同时，也需要接受经济学的帮助，因为神经学家善于分析均衡关系也善于定量分析和建立模型。     

来自经济学的启示:关于心理学科的一些思考

从许多方面看,经济学与心理学都存在着共同之处。自20世纪70年代起,主流经济学在解释现实上的失败引发了经济学界的深刻反思,这些反思带给心理学的启示有：(1)心理学与经济学同属社会科学,而不是中间科学或二重科学;(2)统一的范式并不见得是这类以人为研究对象的社会科学的理想状态;(3)实验方法的发展方向不在于越来越精密地控制试验,而是允许不确定性的存在,并通过对不确定性的研究和发掘促进学科的进步。     

神经经济学:迈向脑科学的决策科学

神经经济学是一门应用神经科学技术来确定经济决策的神经机制的新兴学科。文章首先概述了神经经济学这一学科,说明了经济学、心理学和神经科学与神经经济学之间的关系并主要介绍决策与奖惩系统和情绪在神经经济学中的研究发现及相关理论。文章最后评价了神经经济学在发展中的问题。     

Daniel Kahneman与行为经济学

主要介绍诺贝尔奖得主Daniel Kahneman在行为经济学领域的主要贡献。传统经济学和心理学在对决策过程的研究上存在基本假设上的区别,Kahneman等人从心理学研究基础上开创的展望理论是行为经济学的理论基石。展望理论相对于预期效用理论更准确地描绘了决策人在风险下的决策行为,为将来经济学的理论和实证研究打下了坚实的基础。     

经济学与心理学实验的差异及其借鉴意义

经济学与心理学实验在报酬给付、实验情境、欺骗被试和数据分析四个方面存在差异 ,本文分析了导致这些差异的原因和心理学家可以从经济学实验的这些不同做法中得到的启示.     

儿童公平行为的发展——来自博弈实验的证据

公平正义一直是人类不懈追求的目标,是心理学、经济学等多个学科共同关注的一个重要课题。发展心理学常采用故事法对儿童的公平认知进行研究,博弈范式的引入则为研究儿童的公平行为提供了新的方法和角度。该文主要介绍了独裁者博弈和最后通牒博弈中儿童公平行为的发展趋势,并对已有的矛盾性结论进行了原因分析,探讨了公平行为的内团体偏差效应、公平的本质是意图公平还是结果公平、以及心理理论与公平行为的关系等问题。最后,该文指出今后对儿童公平行为的研究应充分考虑社会情境与社会认知能力的影响。     

心理学与经济学的交叉与渗透——写在“纪念Kahneman和Smith获得诺贝尔经济学奖专栏”的前面

心理学是研究人类心理活动的发生、发展规律的学科,其研究成果可以帮助我们了解自身心理活动的规律,理解周围人的行为特点,帮助我们更好地适应多变的环境。而经济学是通过市场机制,研究资源配置问题的学科,可以帮助我们了解经济运行规律,有助于人们进行理性的选择与决策。由于基本假设及研究方法等方面存在的差异,心理学与经济学对同一问题的看法往往存在根本的不同。以决策为例,传统经济学认为人类的决策是受外界物质动机驱动的,是完全理性的,是以追求自我利益最大化为目的的。决策者在进行决策时,需要对所有可以得到的信息进行分析,针对众…     

神经经济学及其相关研究

虽然神经科学已经有了很长的历史,但只是在最近若干年,这一学科才用于回答关于决策、选择、偏好、风险和快乐等问题。这一新的研究领域,被称为神经经济学,它试图揭示广泛的经济和消费行为的神经机能。该文主要回顾了神经经济学研究的重要发展过程、主要的研究主题。     

心理学家Daniel Kahneman获2002年诺贝尔经济学奖

心理学家Daniel Kahneman被授予2002年诺贝尔经济学奖。他遵循1978年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者Herbert A. Simon的“有限理性”理论和启发式的思想,提出3种常见的启发式:代表性、可得性以及锚定和调整。Kahneman发现人类的决策行为常常是非理性和有偏差的,这与传统经济学理论 (期望效用理论)的预期不符,而且这种偏差是有规律的。Kahneman提出前景理论以解释人类在不确定条件下的判断和决策行为。他获得诺贝尔经济学奖是因为他“把心理学的,特别是关于不确定条件下人的判断和决策的研究思想,结合到了经济科学中。”该文列举实例简单介绍了Daniel Kahneman对心理学和经济学的贡献。     

儿童经济学认知的发展

儿童经济学认知发展的研究是儿童认知发展研究中的新领域。文章主要介绍了发展心理学家在皮亚杰“阶段论”和目前新兴的“朴素理论”两大理论阵营中的研究成果和进展,并从理论和实践两方面阐述了开展儿童经济学认知研究的重要意义。     

Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.     

决策与决策执行的关系——一种行动理性的观点

本文以分析决策与执行的关系为出发点,对人类理性的本质进行了讨论。指出决策研究中存在的“理性分析范式”偏面地把认知分析当作人类理性的本质,忽视了行动的作用,提出了人类理性是“行动理性”的思想。行动既是一种分析方法,是人们深化对客观世界的认识,理解决策问题的独特手段,也是人们创造外界环境、实现决策目标的有效途径。由此提出,决策研究,尤其是组织决策研究,应该重视“行动分析范式”。     

论情绪的生态理性

生态理性强调环境对人的塑造作用,强调人在适应环境过程中获得的功能作用.该文在全面解读生态理性内涵的基础上,从两个方面寻找证据论证情绪具有生态理性：（1）情绪是环境自然塑造的结果,携带着丰富的环境信息;（2）情绪的功能反映环境结构,自动调节人类行为。在上述论证的基础上,我们尝试提出情绪影响个体行为的工作机制,并在一定范围内分析了不良情绪与生态理性之间的关系。     

The Philosophical Underpinnings of Western HRM Theory

As a typical American Product, the Human resource management (HRM) system provides a strong sense of equity, of a trustworthy exchange relationship, and alleges that assessment and promotion mainly depend on an individual’s merits. The critical perspectives of HRM reveal that the “soft” HRM offers a smokescreen for “hard” HRM to cover its unchanged reality, which emphasizes rationality, individualism, control and short-term orientation. This article analyzes the underlying philosophy of HRM, which offers the fundamental theoretical support for it, from four aspects: individualism, meritocracy, rationality and short-termism.     

善的多元论与合理性

当代西方伦理学家布兰特和罗尔斯,一个注重现实的伦理道德规范,一个深究善的合理性之所在,都是既诉诸现实的人类理性、又关注社会生活实际,但分别独特地阐明了善恶规则的多元性与道德善的合理性,并致力于解答个人与社会、功利与道德、情感与理性、个人的自由平等与社会公平正义等的矛盾统一.他们的基本出发点和主要理论极富启发意义,而缺乏历史观的共同缺陷则是我们应当引以为戒的.     

Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality

The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.

On the Role of Intuition in Decision Making and Some Ways of Multicriteria Aid of Intuition

Practical experiences in decision-making—including the experience in the reform of the system of funding of scientific research in Poland—lead to the conclusion that it is important to understand better the role of intuition in decision-making processes. For this purpose a more specific definition of intuition is proposed. One of the conclusions from this definition is that multicriteria aid for decisions should concentrate more on supporting earlier stages of decision processes that precede choice. The role of and possible tools for multicriteria aid for model simulation and analysis are presented. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Enkratic Agency

An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well.     

"RATIONALITY" IN SCIENCE AND MORALS

Abstract. Martin Eger's comparison of controversies in science and morals is extended to a consideration of the nature of "rationality" in each. Both theoretical science and moral philosophy are held to be relativist in social and historical terms, but science also has definitive non-relativist pragmatic criteria of truth. The problem for moral philosophy is to delineate its own appropriate types of social criteria of validity.     

Extreme Betting

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational.