Target–target similarity and the attentional blink: Task-relevance matters!

Studies of the attentional blink (AB) indicate that similarity modulates the magnitude of the impairment in reporting the second of two masked targets. The present experiments tested whether similarity-based modulations of the AB are determined by all object dimensions or by task-relevant dimensions only. Similarity between target faces was manipulated on two dimensions, only one of which was task relevant. The results indicated that similarity on the task-relevant dimension modulated the AB, whereas similarity on task-irrelevant dimension did not. These results suggest that selection during the AB can occur on the level of task-relevant dimensions.     

Is the attentional blink effect located in short-term memory?

The attentional blink (AB) effect is characterized by a failure to detect a second target following the identification of a previous target in a RSVP stream. This effect has been attributed to capacity limitations at a central level of visual information processes. Postperceptual models suppose that the AB locus is located in short-term memory. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of a short-term memory deficit on the AB effect in a patient with such a deficit. The three main results of this study are (1) the persistence of an AB effect, (2) a large number of T1 missed identifications and (3) a T2 detection deficit for a specific delay (367 ms). These results indicate that a short-term memory deficit disrupts the processing of each target (T1 and T2) but does not product an abolition of the AB effect.     

Priming in the attentional blink: Perception without awareness?

The attentional blink refers to a reduction in accuracy that occurs when observers are required to identify the second of two rapidly sequential targets. Even when the second target cannot be reported, however, it is still capable of priming the response to a subsequent related item. At issue in the present work was whether this priming is attributable mainly to conscious or unconscious processes. To answer this question, we used an exclusion procedure that permitted an assessment of the relative dominance of conscious and unconscious processes. The results showed that second targets that are identified incorrectly are nonetheless processed extensively outside of awareness. Moreover, this processing is sufficient to prime a subsequent response for at least 1 s after the onset of the prime.     

A late locus of the distractor frequency effect in picture–word interference: Evidence from event-related potentials

In this study, we investigated how people deal with irrelevant contextual information during speech production. Two main models have been proposed. WEAVER++ assumes that irrelevant information is removed from the production system by an early blocking mechanism. On the other hand, the response exclusion hypothesis assumes a blocking mechanism that operates late, after lexical selection has finished. To delineate between these models, we focused on the distractor frequency effect (i.e., longer picture naming latencies in the context of low-frequency compared to high-frequency words) and measured ERPs concurrently. Behaviorally, the distractor frequency effect was replicated. In the ERPs, three effects were found. One effect occurred very early and is interpreted as an effect of low-level visual feature processing. The two other effects occurred after lexical access and are thus in line with the response exclusion hypothesis.     

Distributional analyses in the picture–word interference paradigm: Exploring the semantic interference and the distractor frequency effects

The present study explores the distributional features of two important effects within the picture–word interference paradigm: the semantic interference and the distractor frequency effects. These two effects display different and specific distributional profiles. Semantic interference appears greatly reduced in faster response times, while it reaches its full magnitude only in slower responses. This can be interpreted as a sign of fluctuant attentional efficiency in resolving response conflict. In contrast, the distractor frequency effect is mediated mainly by a distributional shift, with low-frequency distractors uniformly shifting reaction time distribution towards a slower range of latencies. This finding fits with the idea that distractor frequency exerts its effect by modulating the point in time in which operations required to discard the distractor can start. Taken together, these results are congruent with current theoretical accounts of both the semantic interference and distractor frequency effects. Critically, distributional analyses highlight and further describe the different cognitive dynamics underlying these two effects, suggesting that this analytical tool is able to offer important insights about lexical access during speech production.     

The locus of semantic interference in the “Stroop” color-naming task

In two experiments, introductory psychology students responded in two ways to three lists of 60 words printed in different colors. The lists consisted of color words and two sets of words associated with the colors (e.g., SKY, BLOOD, etc.). When the subjects responded by naming the color in which each word was printed, it took longer for the color word list than for either list of associates, i.e., the classical Stroop interference effect. The other response required the subjects to say words from one of the association lists which corresponded to the color in which each word was printed, e.g., they saw the word BLACK (or NIGHT, or COAL) printed inred ink, and had to respond by saying “blood.” Using this response, it took longest for the subjects to complete the list of words which were the same as those required as responses. Color words were somewhat less difficult, and the other association words were completed most quickly. The results do not pinpoint the locus of interference, but clarify additional assumptions which must be accepted to maintain alternative hypotheses.     

Does failure to mask T1 cause lag-1 sparing in the attentional blink?

The attentional blink (AB) effect demonstrates that when participants are instructed to report two targets presented in a rapid visual stimuli stream, the second target (T2) is often unable to be reported correctly if presented 200-500 msec after the onset of the first target (T1). However, if T2 is presented immediately after T1, in the conventional lag-1 position (100-msec stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA), little or no performance deficit occurs. The present experiments add to the growing literature relating the "lag-1 sparing" effect to T1 masking. Using a canonical AB paradigm, our results demonstrate that T2 performance at lag 1 is significantly reduced in the presence of T1 masking. The implications of this outcome are discussed in relation to theories of the AB.     

Is the emotional modulation of the attentional blink driven by response bias?

Several studies have shown that the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is diminished for highly arousing T2 stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005). Whereas this effect is most often interpreted as evidence for a more efficient processing of arousing information, it could be due also to a bias to report more arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli. We introduce a paradigm that allows one to control for such a response bias. Using this paradigm, we obtained evidence that the diminished AB for taboo words cannot be explained by a response bias. This supports the idea that the emotional modulation of the AB is caused by attentional processes.     

Training and the attentional blink: Limits overcome or expectations raised?

The attentional blink (AB) refers to a deficit in reporting the second of two sequentially presented targets when they are separated by less than 500 ms. Two decades of research has suggested that the AB is a robust phenomenon that is likely attributable to a fundamental limit in sequential object processing. This assumption, however, has recently been undermined by a demonstration that the AB can be eliminated after only a few hundred training trials (Choi, Chang, Shibata, Sasaki, & Watanabe in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109:12242–12247, 2012). In the present work, we examined whether this training benefited performance directly, by eliminating processing limitations as claimed, or indirectly, by creating expectations about when targets would appear. Consistent with the latter option, when temporal expectations were reduced, training-related improvements declined significantly. This suggests that whereas training may ameliorate the AB indirectly, the processing limits evidenced in the AB cannot be directly eliminated by brief exposure to the task.     

Cannot avert the eyes: reduced attentional blink toward others’ emotional expressions in empathic people

Empathy is one of the core components of social interaction. Although current models of empathy emphasize the role of attention, few studies have directly examined the relationship between attentional processes and individual differences in empathy. This study hypothesized that empathic people would process emotional expressions more efficiently and automatically compared to less empathic people. Crucially, such a processing advantage should be present only for faces of others compared to one’s own face. To test this hypothesis, 100 healthy participants varying in their self-reported empathy levels underwent an attentional blink task that tested preferential attentional processing. Results showed a diminished attentional blink effect for sad faces of others in the high-empathy group. Additionally, performance differences in the task were related to both trait empathy and daily prosocial behavior. Overall, our results show that emotional stimuli preferentially capture the attention of empathic people, leading to automatic processing.     

Do happy faces capture attention? The happiness superiority effect in attentional blink

This study investigated the influence of positive affect on attentional blink (AB) with schematic faces. Results of Experiment 1 showed that the AB effect was smaller for both upright and inverted positive face icons than other face icons (neutral and angry faces) of corresponding orientations, confirming and extending the results of the earlier study by Mack, Pappas, Silverman, and Gay (2002). Results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that this attenuation of AB was unlikely to be attributable to attentional capture by the happy face. Perceptual saliency is suggested as a likely cause of the effect.     

Control over experience? Magnitude of the attentional blink depends on meditative state

The information processing capacity of the human mind is limited, as is evidenced by the so-called ‘attentional-blink’ deficit. This deficit is believed to result from competition between stimuli for limited attentional resources. We examined to what extent advanced meditators can manipulate their attentional state and control performance on an attentional blink task. We compared the magnitude of the attentional blink between states of focused attention meditation (in which one focuses tightly on an object) and states of open monitoring meditation (in which one is simply aware of whatever comes into experience) in a sample of experienced meditators. We found a smaller attentional blink during open monitoring compared to focused attention meditation due to reduced T1 capture. Of note, this effect was only found for very experienced meditators (on average 10,704 h of experience). These data may suggest that very advanced practitioners can exert some control over their conscious experience.     

Revisiting within-modality and cross-modality attentional blinks: Effects of target—distractor similarity

When two masked targets (T1 and T2) require attention and are presented within half a second of each other, the report accuracy for T2 is reduced, relative to when the two targets are presented farther apart in time. This effect is known as the attentional blink (AB). Potter, Chun, Banks, and Muckenhoupt (1998) argued that all AB-like effects observed when at least one of the targets was presented outside of the visual modality did not represent true instances of the AB, but instead were artifacts of task-set switching. However, in the Potter et al. experiments the presence or absence of task-set switching opportunities was confounded with the T2 task, as well as the alphanumeric class of T2 with respect to the distractors. In the present experiment, we examine the influence of T1 alphanumeric class, T2 alphanumeric class, and switching operations in a fully crossed design that unconfounds these factors. In contrast to the conclusions of Potter et al., the present results suggest that the T2 alphanumeric class can account for the pattern of ABs observed across conditions, without necessarily implicating a separate switch cost. The implications for theoretical models of the AB and the debate over the validity of cross-modal ABs are discussed.     

Consciousness of targets during the attentional blink: a gradual or all-or-none dimension?

Models of consciousness differ in whether they predict a gradual change or a discontinuous transition between nonconscious and conscious perception. Sergent and Dehaene (Psychological Science, 15, 720-728, 2004) asked subjects to rate on a continuous scale the subjective visibility of target words presented during an attentional blink. They found that these words were either detected as well as targets outside the attentional-blink period or not detected at all, and interpreted these results as support for a discontinuous transition between nonconscious and conscious processing. We present results from 4 attentional-blink experiments showing that this all-or-none rating pattern disappears with the use of an alternative measure of consciousness (post-decision wagering) and a more difficult identification task. Instead, under these circumstances, subjects used the consciousness rating scales in a continuous fashion. These results are more consistent with models that assume a gradual change between nonconscious and conscious perception during the attentional blink.     

Consciousness isn’t all-or-none: Evidence for partial awareness during the attentional blink

Alternative views of the nature of consciousness posit that awareness of an object is either an all-or-none phenomenon or that awareness can be partial, occurring independently for different levels of representation. The all-or-none hypothesis predicts that when one feature of an object is identified, all other features should be consciously accessible. The partial awareness hypothesis predicts that one feature may reach consciousness while others do not. These competing predictions were tested in two experiments that presented two targets within a central stream of letters. We used the attentional blink evoked by the first target to assess consciousness for two different features of the second target. The results provide evidence that there can be a severe impairment in conscious access to one feature even when another feature is accurately reported. This behavioral evidence supports the partial awareness hypothesis, showing that consciousness of different features of the same object can be dissociated.     

Differences in the strength of distractor inhibition do not affect distractor–response bindings

Distractor inhibition and distractor–response binding were investigated in two experiments by analyzing distractor repetition benefits and their interaction with response repetition effects in a sequential-priming paradigm. Distractor repetition benefits were larger for distractors that were incompatible with the to-be-executed response (task-related distractors) than for distractors that were not assigned to a response (neutral distractors), indicating that the strength of distractor inhibition was a function of response interference for the distractors. In contrast, the distractor–response bindings were found to be of equal strength for both task-related and neutral distractors. Thus, differences in the strengths of distractor inhibition did not affect the integration of distractors with responses into event files. Instead, our results suggest that distractor–response binding and distractor inhibition are independent mechanisms that are recruited for the automatization of behavior and action control.     

Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink

Several theories of the neural correlates of consciousness assume that there is a continuum of perception, associated with a gradual change in the intensity of brain activation. But some models, considering reverberation of neural activity as necessary for conscious perception, predict a sharp nonlinear transition between unconscious and conscious processing. We asked participants to evaluate the visibility of target words on a continuous scale during the attentional blink, which is known to impede explicit reports. Participants used this continuous scale in an all-or-none fashion: Targets presented during the blink were either identified as well as targets presented outside the blink period or not detected at all. We suggest that a stochastic nonlinear bifurcation in neural activity underlies the all-or-none perception observed during the attentional blink.     

Temporary suppression of visual processing in an RSVP task: an attentional blink? .

Through rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), we asked Ss to identify a partially specified letter (target) and then to detect the presence or absence of a fully specified letter (probe). Whereas targets are accurately identified, probes are poorly detected when they are presented during a 270-ms interval beginning 180 ms after the target. Probes presented immediately after the target or later in the RSVP stream are accurately detected. This temporary reduction in probe detection was not found in conditions in which a brief blank interval followed the target or Ss were not required to identify the target. The data suggest that the presentation of stimuli after the target but before target-identification processes are complete produces interference at a letter-recognition stage. This interference may cause the temporary suppression of visual attention mechanisms observed in the present study.     

The root cause of the attentional blink: First-target processing or disruption of input control?

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented shortly after the first (T1). T1-based theories ascribe this attentional blink (AB) to a T1-initiated period of inattention. Distractor-based theories ascribe it to a disruption of input control caused by post-T1 distractors. The finding that an AB occurs without intertarget distractors (Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:159-169, 2009) seemingly disconfirms distractor-based theories. The present experiments addressed different ways in which distractor-based theories might account for that finding. Intertarget events were varied in four experiments. Experiment 1 replicated Nieuwenstein, Potter, and Theeuwes??s findings. The next two experiments tested two ways (lack of visual stimulation, violation of expectation) in which the blank intertarget interval might cause an AB. Experiment 4 explored whether backward-masking of T1 can account entirely for the larger AB obtained with intervening distractors or whether distractors also disrupt input control. The results disconfirm predictions from distractor-based theories and support the claim of T1-based theories that T1 processing alone is sufficient for the AB. Simulations based on the eSTST (Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:787-807, 2009) and the B&B models (Olivers & Meeter, Psychological Research, 115, 836-863 2008) were compared. Predictions were more accurate from the T1-based theory (eSTST) than from the distractor-based theory (B&B).     

The “beam of darkness”: Spreading of the attentional blink within and between objects

When two targets (T1 and T2) are inserted into a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream of nontargets, observers are impaired at identifying T2 when it is presented within half a second after T1. This transient drop in performance, or attentional blink (AB), has been attributed to a temporary unavailability of task-critical processing resources. In the present study, we investigated how object-based attention modulates the AB, by presenting four synchronized RSVP streams in the corners of two rectangular bars (e.g., one above and one below fixation). The results from four experiments revealed that the AB increased within short temporal lags (of up to ～400 msec) when T2 was presented on the same, rather than a different, bar as T1 (with T1–T2 spatial distance controlled for). Thus, the AB is seen to spread across entire object groupings, suggesting that the spatiotemporal resolution of attention is modulated by global-object information.