When groups are wrong and deviants are right

How do group members respond when their group wrongfully punishes a group member? In two experiments, participants were presented with an ingroup member who argued for group change on moral (Experiment 1, N = 73) or scientific grounds (Experiment 2, N = 94). Despite being right, the member was treated as deviant by the group. We manipulated whether the group retained its former opinion or adopted the deviant's position, and whether the deviant's punishment was ongoing or whether the deviant was reinstated. We tested opposing predictions about how these group actions would affect group members' negativity towards the deviant. Both studies showed that negativity towards the deviant was highest when the group opinion was unchanged and the deviant was not reinstated. Further, opinion change or reintegration defused negativity towards the deviant. Implications of groups rejecting or embracing change, and their effects on the evaluation of wrongfully accused deviants are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral value transfer from regulatory fit: what feels right is right and what feels wrong is wrong

People experience regulatory fit (E. T. Higgins, 2000) when the strategic manner of their goal pursuit suits their regulatory orientation, and this regulatory fit feels right. Fit violation feels wrong. Four studies tested the proposal that experiences of fit can transfer to moral evaluations. The authors examined transfer of feeling wrong from fit violation by having participants in a promotion or prevention focus recall transgressions of commission or omission (Studies 1 and 2). Both studies found that when the type of transgression was a fit violation, participants expressed more guilt. Studies 3 and 4 examined transfer of feeling right from regulatory fit. Participants evaluated conflict resolutions (Study 3) and public policies (Study 4) as more right when the means pursued had fit.     

What young children think you see when their eyes are closed

The common assumption that young children egocentrically believe you cannot see them when their own eyes are closed was investigated in two studies. It was found that 2.5-4-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds and adults, would indeed often give negative reply to the experimenter's question “Do I see you?” when their eyes were closed and covered with their hands. However, they would also correctly reply that the experimenter did see their arm and an object placed in front of them and did not see their eyes and back, indicating that they were making veridical, nonegocentric inferences about the experimenter's visual experience. In addition, their eyes being visible to the experimenter did not prove to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for their judgment that the experimenter could see “them” (“you”). It was concluded that, in this context, adults take “you” to mean their whole body while young children take it to mean primarily their face region. Speculations were made as to how young children could have acquired this meaning, and about possible similarities and differences between the self conceptions of young children and adults.     

Decisions among time saving options: when intuition is strong and wrong

When people judge the time that can be saved by increasing the speed of an activity, they are often victims of a time saving bias. That is, they overestimate the time that can be saved by increasing the speed. Judgments of time savings following speed increase when driving follow the Proportion heuristic [Svenson, O. (1970). A functional measurement approach to intuitive estimation as exemplified by estimated time savings. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 204-210]. In a choice between time saving options, this heuristic simplifies to the Ratio rule. The first study tested this rule and found that the Ratio rule predicted incorrect decisions when planning to save traveling time in road traffic. The second study showed that the time saving bias was also present in planning of health care; to specify, in decisions about which one of two clinics to reorganize to save more of the doctors' time for personal contacts with patients. To further test the Ratio rule, Study 3 used a matching procedure in which two decision alternatives were made equal by the participants. The results supported the Ratio rule. Practical implications of the results are discussed including the Planning fallacy. In conclusion, the present set of studies have illustrated a time saving bias and provided evidence explaining why people make systematic errors when judging and deciding about time saved following a speed increase.     

Religion is natural,atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by‐product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics     

The artful dodger: answering the wrong question the right way

What happens when speakers try to "dodge" a question they would rather not answer by answering a different question? In 4 studies, we show that listeners can fail to detect dodges when speakers answer similar-but objectively incorrect-questions (the "artful dodge"), a detection failure that goes hand-in-hand with a failure to rate dodgers more negatively. We propose that dodges go undetected because listeners' attention is not usually directed toward a goal of dodge detection (i.e., Is this person answering the question?) but rather toward a goal of social evaluation (i.e., Do I like this person?). Listeners were not blind to all dodge attempts, however. Dodge detection increased when listeners' attention was diverted from social goals toward determining the relevance of the speaker's answers (Study 1), when speakers answered a question egregiously dissimilar to the one asked (Study 2), and when listeners' attention was directed to the question asked by keeping it visible during speakers' answers (Study 4). We also examined the interpersonal consequences of dodge attempts: When listeners were guided to detect dodges, they rated speakers more negatively (Study 2), and listeners rated speakers who answered a similar question in a fluent manner more positively than speakers who answered the actual question but disfluently (Study 3). These results add to the literatures on both Gricean conversational norms and goal-directed attention. We discuss the practical implications of our findings in the contexts of interpersonal communication and public debates.     

Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by-product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics.     

The relative unnaturalness of atheism: On why Geertz and Markússon are both right and wrong

Commonly scholars in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have advanced the naturalness of religion thesis. That is, ordinary cognitive resources operating in ordinary human environments typically lead to some kind of belief in supernatural agency and perhaps other religious ideas. Special cultural scaffolding is unnecessary. Supernaturalism falls near a natural anchor point. In contrast, widespread conscious rejection of the supernatural as in atheism appears to require either special cultural conditions that upset ordinary function, cognitive effort, or a good degree of cultural scaffolding to move people away from their maturationally natural anchor-points. Geertz and Markússon (2009) identify ways to strengthen cognitive approaches to the study of religion and culture, including atheism, but fail to demonstrate that atheism is as natural in a comparable respect as theism.     

Fun is more fun when others are involved

Fun activities are commonly sought and highly desired yet their affective side has received little scrutiny. The present research investigated two features of fun in two daily diary studies and one laboratory experiment. First, we examined the affective state associated with fun experiences. Second, we investigated the social context of fun, considering whether shared fun is more enjoyable than solitary fun. Findings from these studies indicated that fun is associated with both high-activation and low-activation positive affects, and that it is enhanced when experienced with others (especially friends). However, social fun was associated with increases in high-activation but not low-activation positive affect, suggesting that social interaction emphasizes energizing affective experiences. We also found that loneliness moderated the latter effects, such that lonely individuals received a weaker boost from shared compared to solitary fun. These results add to what is known about the impact of social contexts on affective experience.     

What is wrong with the world

In 'Subjunctive Conditionals: Two Parameters vs. Three' Pavel Tichy articulates and defends a three-parameter account of counterfactuals. In the paper, he responds to a well known objection against the validity of various forms of inference, in particular strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition, and hypothetical syllogism. In this paper, I argue that his response to the objection is inadequate. I then propose an alternative form of the three-parameter account of counterfactuals that avoids the objection in question.     

What is perceived when two images are combined?

When two images are combined three perceptual outcomes are possible. One, they can be perceived as they are--separate and independent images. Two, they can become perceptually fused into a new image. Three, one image may dominate, or mask, the other. These possibilities are demonstrated with a variety of images and it is proposed that it is their spatial correlation rather than their spatial frequency similarities or differences which is critical in determining the particular outcome.     

The Earth is flat when personally significant experiences with the sphericity of the Earth are absent

Participants with personal and without personal experiences with the Earth as a sphere estimated large-scale distances between six cities located on different continents. Cognitive distances were submitted to a specific multidimensional scaling algorithm in the 3D Euclidean space with the constraint that all cities had to lie on the same sphere. A simulation was run that calculated respective 3D configurations of the city positions for a wide range of radii of the proposed sphere. People who had personally experienced the Earth as a sphere, at least once in their lifetime, showed a clear optimal solution of the multidimensional scaling (MDS) routine with a mean radius deviating only 8% from the actual radius of the Earth. In contrast, the calculated configurations for people without any personal experience with the Earth as a sphere were compatible with a cognitive concept of a flat Earth.     

What''s right and what''s wrong with transference theories

This paper examines the Transference Theory of causation, developed originally by Aronson (1971) and Fair (1979). Three difficulties for that theory are presented: firstly, problems associated with the direction of transference and causal asymmetry; secondly, the case of persistence as causation, for example where a body's own inertia is the cause of its motion; and thirdly the problematic notion of identity through time of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. Finally, the theory is compared with the Conserved Quantity Theory (Dowe 1992c), and it is shown that that account embodies the modifications that the transference theory needs to adopt.     

Hawking and the METI Hawks: right for the wrong reasons

Stephen Hawking is right to oppose messaging other worlds, not because of the level of risk this would involve, but because the risks such a message would impose must be explicitly accepted by all of humanity.