Pity: a mitigated defence

The aim of this article is to offer a mitigated moral justification of a much maligned emotional trait, pity, in the Aristotelian sense of ‘pain at deserved bad fortune’. I lay out Aristotle's taxonomic map of pity and its surrounding conceptual terrain and argue – by rehearsing modern accounts – that this map is not anachronistic with respect to contemporary conceptions. I then offer an ‘Aristotelian’ (albeit not Aristotle's) moral justification of pity, not as a full virtue intrinsically related to eudaimonia but as a positive moral quality that has instrumental value in developing and sustaining a certain intrinsically valuable state of character – namely compassion. The justification offered is mitigated in the sense that it does not elevate pity to a virtuous disposition, constitutive of the good life; yet it does offer a crucial counterweight to Aristotle's own denunciation of pity.     

Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice

This article describes, and proposes a solution to, an interpretive conundrum at the heart of Hume's theory of the passions. Hume tells us explicitly that pity and malice are indirect passions. But there is strong textual evidence suggesting that Hume takes pity and malice to be direct passions. Indeed, some of this evidence points to (1) the identification of pity with a kind of grief and malice with a kind of joy, while the rest of the evidence points to (2) the identification of pity and malice with different combinations of desire and aversion. Here, I argue that option (1) is the one that Hume would have chosen upon careful reflection.     

Pity for economically disadvantaged groups motivates donation and ally collective action intentions

We argue that pity can motivate collective action intentions toward groups that are both politically and economically deprived. We tested this connection in four online surveys and an experiment. In Study 1 (N = 1,007), pity for the Roma in Hungary predicted collective action intentions, which was replicated in Study 2 in connection with refugees in Germany (N = 191) and in Hungary (N = 563). Study 3 (N = 475) demonstrated that for not economically but politically disadvantaged groups (e.g., sexual minorities), pity was not a predictor of ally action. In an experiment (Study 4, N = 447), pity was just as strong a predictor of collective action intentions as outrage on behalf of an economically and politically disadvantaged outgroup. Pity can be a mobilizing emotion when it comes to groups that are both economically and politically disadvantaged; however, outrage remains more important in the absence of economic hardship.     

Judgments of Aggressive, Withdrawn and Prosocial Behavior: Perceived Control, Anger, Pity and Sympathy in Young Dutch Children

In two studies, we examined first- and second-grade children's judgments of aggressive, withdrawn, and prosocial behavior by means of fictional scenarios. In study I, we compared judgments of fictional aggressive children with those of fictional withdrawn children. Aggressive children were perceived as more responsible for their behavior and elicited more feelings of anger, while withdrawn children were more likely to be chosen as a friend and elicited more feelings of pity. In study II, we compared judgments of fictional aggressive, withdrawn, and prosocial children with each other. Again aggressive children elicited the strongest feelings of anger, while withdrawn children elicited the strongest feelings of pity. These withdrawn children were perceived as more similar to the prosocial children. In an attempt to test the ecological validity of our sympathy measure, we asked children to rate their peers on a three-point liking scale and checked the scores of those judged to be aggressive by their teachers. These aggressive children were found to receive the lowest liking scores. The results are discussed.