有关具身认知思潮的理论心理学思考

具身认知强调了心智或认知对身体及其感觉运动系统的依赖性。与传统认知心理学的符号加工模式不同的是, 它认为身体的构造和状态、身体的物理属性及其大脑与身体的特殊感觉—运动通道对认知具有塑造作用。认知既是具身的, 也是嵌入的, 大脑嵌入身体、身体嵌入环境, 构成了一体的认知系统。最初, 具身认知仅仅是一种反对笛卡尔身心二元论的哲学思潮, 经由认知科学哲学和理论心理学而逐渐进入了实验领域。具身认知研究充分利用了神经科学的方法和技术、数据和结论, 但是它并不主张把心理还原为生理或物理, 同时, 具身认知的神经科学取向仅仅给传统心理研究提供一个认识心智的新视角, 其目标并非取消行为水平的心理研究, 因此不会损害心理学的独立地位。     

The extended cognition thesis: Its significance for the philosophy of (cognitive) science

While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand “big science” or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?     

The functional‐cognitive framework as a tool for accelerating progress in cognitive neuroscience: On the benefits of bridging rather than reducing levels of analyses

The subject matter of neuroscience research is complex, and synthesising the wealth of data from this research to better understand mental processes is challenging. A useful strategy, therefore, may be to distinguish explicitly between the causal effects of the environment on behaviour (i.e. functional analyses) and the mental processes that mediate these effects (i.e. cognitive analyses). In this article, we describe how the functional‐cognitive (F‐C) framework can accelerate cognitive neuroscience and also advance a functional treatment of brain activity. We first highlight that cognitive neuroscience can particularly benefit from the F‐C approach by providing an alternative to the problematic practice of reducing cognitive constructs to behavioural and/or neural proxies. Next, we outline how functional (behaviour–environment) relations can serve as a bridge between cognitive and neural processes by restoring mental constructs to their original role as heuristic tools. Finally, we give some examples of how both cognitive neuroscience and traditional functional approaches can mutually benefit from the F‐C framework.     

“具身”涵义的理论辨析

“具身”是当代心理学和认知科学领域的热门话题, 其基本涵义是指认知对身体的依赖性。经典认知科学主张“非具身”, 认为认知是一种信息的表征与加工, 从本质上讲与承载它的身体无关。“弱具身”强调了认知对身体的依赖性, 但是却保留了认知的计算和表征功能。“强具身”则极力主张认知是被身体作用于世界的活动塑造出来的, 身体的特殊细节造就了认知的特殊性。在怎样理解“具身”方面, 存在着不同的解释。从本文作者的观点来看, 具身的性质和特征表现在4个方面：(1)身体参与了认知, 影响了思维、判断、态度和情绪等心智过程。(2)我们对于客观世界的知觉依赖于身体作用于世界的活动, 身体的活动影响着关于客观世界表象的形成。(3)意义源于身体, 抽象的意义有着身体感觉—运动系统的基础。(4)身体的不同倾向于造就不同的思维和认识方式。有关具身的研究将从理论和实践两个层面对心理学产生冲击。     

Extended cognition & constitution: Re-evaluating the constitutive claim of extended cognition

This paper explores several paths by which the extended cognition (EC) thesis may overcome the coupling-constitution fallacy. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings in the contemporary literature. First, on the dimension of first-wave EC, I argue that constitutive arguments based on functional parity suffer from either a threat of cognitive bloat or an impasse with respect to determining the correct level of grain in the attribution of causal-functional roles. Second, on the dimension of second-wave EC, I argue that especially the complementarity approach suffers from a similar sort of dilemma as first-wave EC: an inability to justify just what entails the ontological claim of EC over the scaffolding claim of weaker approaches in cognitive science. In this paper I show that two much more promising explanations by which to ground the ontological claim of EC are available, both starting from an exploration of the coordination dynamics between environmental resources and neural resources. On the one hand, I argue that second-wave EC based on cognitive integration, with its focus on bodily manipulations constrained by cognitive norms, is capable of resolving the coupling-constitution fallacy. On the other hand, I argue that the framework of cognitive integration can be supplemented by philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation, because such accounts enable us to explain the emergence of higher-level cognitive properties due to a system's organization-dependent structure.     

Relational knowledge: the foundation of higher cognition

Accumulating evidence on the nature, function and acquisition of relational knowledge indicates a crucial role of such knowledge in higher cognitive processes. In this review, we specify the essential properties of relational knowledge, together with the role it plays in reasoning, categorisation, planning, quantification and language. Furthermore, we discuss the processes involved in its acquisition and how these processes have been implemented in contemporary neural network models. We present evidence demonstrating that relational knowledge integrates heuristic and analytic cognition, is important for symbolic processes and the creation of novelty, activates specific regions of the prefrontal cortex, and is the most recently evolved and slowest-developing cognitive process. Arguably, relational knowledge represents the core of higher cognition.     

有关具身认知的三种理论模型

具身认知强调了身体在认知中的关键作用,主张身体的构造和状态、身体的物理属性及其大脑与身体的特殊感觉—运动通道对认知的形成产生了根本影响。具身认知的相关理论虽然直接或者间接承认身体对心智的塑造关系,但是存在一些观点的不一致,导致具身认知理论难以统一到相同的框架上来,具身认知大致可以归结为三种模型:概念隐喻理论,知觉符号理论和感知运动模拟隐喻理论。     

Neural correlates of infant action processing relate to theory of mind in early childhood

The mechanisms that support infant action processing are thought to be involved in the development of later social cognition. While a growing body of research demonstrates longitudinal links between action processing and explicit theory of mind (TOM), it remains unclear why this link emerges in some measures of action encoding and not others. In this paper, we recruit neural measures as a unique lens into which aspects of human infant action processing (i.e., action encoding and action execution; age 7 months) are related to preschool TOM (age 3 years; n = 31). We test whether individual differences in recruiting the sensorimotor system or attention processes during action encoding predict individual differences in TOM. Results indicate that reduced occipital alpha during action encoding predicts TOM at age 3. This finding converges with behavioral work and suggests that attentional processes involved in action encoding may support TOM. We also test whether neural processing during action execution draws on the proto‐substrates of effortful control (EC). Results indicate that frontal alpha oscillatory activity during action execution predicted EC at age 3—providing strong novel evidence that infant brain activity is longitudinally linked to EC. Further, we demonstrate that EC mediates the link between the frontal alpha response and TOM. This indirect effect is specific in terms of direction, neural response, and behavior. Together, these findings converge with behavioral research and demonstrate that domain general processes show strong links to early infant action processing and TOM.     

Sensorimotor synchronization: A review of the tapping literature

Sensorimotor synchronization (SMS), the rhythmic coordination of perception and action, occurs in many contexts, but most conspicuously in music performance and dance. In the laboratory, it is most often studied in the form of finger tapping to a sequence of auditory stimuli. This review summarizes theories and empirical findings obtained with the tapping task. Its eight sections deal with the role of intention, rate limits, the negative mean asynchrony, variability, models of error correction, perturbation studies, neural correlates of SMS, and SMS in musical contexts. The central theoretical issue is considered to be how best to characterize the perceptual information and the internal processes that enable people to achieve and maintain SMS. Recent research suggests that SMS is controlled jointly by two error correction processes (phase correction and period correction) that differ in their degrees of cognitive control and may be associated with different brain circuits. They exemplify the general distinction between subconscious mechanisms of action regulation and conscious processes involved in perceptual judgment and action planning.     

Cognitive processes supporting episodic memory formation in childhood: The role of source memory,binding, and executive functioning

Episodic memories contain various forms of contextual detail (e.g., perceptual, emotional, cognitive details) that need to become integrated. Each of these contextual features can be used to attribute a memory episode to its source, or origin of information. Memory for source information is one critical component in the formation of episodic memories. Likewise, the establishment of episodic memories also requires binding, which reflects the process of encoding the relations among stimuli and provides the experience that certain features of a memory episode belong together. The aims of the present review are to explore the roles of (1) cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in source memory and binding and how the development of these cognitive processes relates to episodic memory formation in childhood and (2) other higher-order cognitive processes, namely executive functioning, in early episodic memory development. We conclude by examining the challenges within this field of research, highlighting the role of other cognitive processes (e.g., sense of self, language, use of strategies) that may contribute to episodic memory formation, addressing areas that can be improved with additional research, and exploring directions for future work.     

努力控制及其神经基础

本文对努力控制的概念、发展及其神经基础进行了归纳和总结。我们发现努力控制涉及的脑区主要包括背外侧和腹外侧前额叶,前扣带回,顶上和顶下小叶以及辅助运动皮层等。此外,通过分析对比后发现努力控制与执行功能之间在行为表现和神经基础上有密切关系：两者都与个体的学业成绩、情绪状态和攻击行为等有关;努力控制涉及的脑区有很大部分处于具有执行功能的突显网络和额顶控制网络。这些证据表明两者之间可能有共同的脑结构基础。     

Decomposing rhythm processing: electroencephalography of perceived and self-imposed rhythmic patterns

Perceiving musical rhythms can be considered a process of attentional chunking over time, driven by accent patterns. A rhythmic structure can also be generated internally, by placing a subjective accent pattern on an isochronous stimulus train. Here, we investigate the event-related potential (ERP) signature of actual and subjective accents, thus disentangling low-level perceptual processes from the cognitive aspects of rhythm processing. The results show differences between accented and unaccented events, but also show that different types of unaccented events can be distinguished, revealing additional structure within the rhythmic pattern. This structure is further investigated by decomposing the ERP into subcomponents, using principal component analysis. In this way, the processes that are common for perceiving a pattern and self-generating it are isolated, and can be visualized for the tasks separately. The results suggest that top-down processes have a substantial role in the cerebral mechanisms of rhythm processing, independent of an externally presented stimulus.     

The influence of action observation on action execution: Dissociating the contribution of action on perception,perception on action,and resolving conflict

For more than 15 years, motor interference paradigms have been used to investigate the influence of action observation on action execution. Most research on so-called automatic imitation has focused on variables that play a modulating role or investigated potential confounding factors. Interestingly, furthermore, a number of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have tried to shed light on the functional mechanisms and neural correlates involved in imitation inhibition. However, these fMRI studies, presumably due to poor temporal resolution, have primarily focused on high-level processes and have neglected the potential role of low-level motor and perceptual processes. In the current EEG study, we therefore aimed to disentangle the influence of low-level perceptual and motoric mechanisms from high-level cognitive mechanisms. We focused on potential congruency differences in the visual N190 ? a component related to the processing of biological motion, the Readiness Potential ? a component related to motor preparation, and the high-level P3 component. Interestingly, we detected congruency effects in each of these components, suggesting that the interference effect in an automatic imitation paradigm is not only related to high-level processes such as self-other distinction but also to more low-level influences of perception on action and action on perception. Moreover, we documented relationships of the neural effects with (autistic) behavior.     

Keeping the “cognitive” in cognitive neuroscience, the “affective” in affective neuroscience, and the “behavioral” in behavioral neuroscience: The CABN mission for the next five years

The fields of cognitive, affective, and behavioral neuroscience have been with us for many years now, and have served to spawn an ever growing body of research that has helped to clarify the mechanisms by which the brain gives rise to the diverse processes that govern our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. These fields of research have grown exponentially as more and more tools have become available for invasive and noninvasive measures of brain function in both humans and animals, and as information about the human and animal genomes has increased. These advances in neurosciencebased tools have clearly advanced our knowledge and understanding of brain—behavior relationships. However, there is also a danger that lurks in the shadows of these methodological and empirical advances. This danger is that the enticement of understanding neural processes sometimes leads us to forget about the exact phenomena that we ultimately wish to understand and explain—namely, cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes. What do I mean by danger? I mean the concern that we often seem to prioritize the sophistication of our neural and genetic tools and theorizing over our psychological tools and theorizing, and that we may overlook the absence of linkage between neural (e.g., imaging results at a range of levels) or genetic findings and well—grounded psychological theories about specific cognitive, affective, or behavioral mechanisms. In other words, we can be seduced by the “call of the brain mechanism,” without a reminder of the phenomena we wish to explain.     

Cognitive extension: the parity argument,functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive

During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues and their interconnections. Section 1 provides a brief introduction. Section 2 argues that some of the most prominent objections against the appeal to parity considerations fail. Section 3 shows that such considerations are nevertheless unsuitable as an argument for cognitive extension. First, the actual argumentative burden is carried by an underlying commitment to functionalism, not by the parity considerations themselves. Second, in the absence of an independently motivated mark of the cognitive, the argument based on parity considerations does not get off the ground, but given such a mark, it is superfluous. Section 4 argues that a similar dilemma arises for the attempt to defend cognitive extension by a general appeal to functionalism. Unless it can be independently settled what it is for a process to be cognitive, functionalism itself will be undermined by the possibility of cognitive extension. Like parity considerations, functionalism is thus either unable to support cognitive extension or superfluous. Hence, nothing short of the specification of an appropriate mark of the cognitive that can be fulfilled not only by intracranial but also by extended processes will do as an argument for cognitive extension.     

节律在听觉言语理解中的作用

言语理解是听者接受外部语音输入并且获得意义的心理过程。日常交流中,听觉言语理解受多尺度节律信息的影响,常见有韵律结构节律、语境节律、和说话者身体语言节律三方面外部节律。它们改变听者在言语理解中的音素判别、词汇感知以及言语可懂度等过程。内部节律表现为大脑内神经振荡,其能够表征外部言语输入在不同时间尺度下的层级特征。外部节律性刺激与内部神经活动的神经夹带能够优化大脑对言语刺激的处理,并受到听者自上而下的认知过程的调节进一步增强目标言语的内在表征。我们认为它可能是实现内外节律相互联系并共同影响言语理解的关键机制。对内外节律及其联系机制的揭示能够为理解言语这种在多层级时间尺度上具有结构规律的复杂序列提供了一个研究窗口。     

Complex attentional control settings

One way that dis/likes are formed is through evaluative conditioning (EC). In two experiments we investigated the role of cognitive resources in flavour–flavour conditioning. Both experiments employed an EC procedure in which three novel flavoured conditioned stimuli (CSs) were consumed. One was consumed with a pleasant unconditioned stimulus (US; CS+ sugar), one with an aversive US (CS+ saline), and a third with plain water (CS–). Half of participants in each experiment performed a cognitive load task during conditioning. We measured EC using self-reported measures of liking (Experiments 1 and 2) and an indirect measure of liking: drink pick-up latency (Experiment 2). In both experiments, differential EC was observed in the no cognitive load condition but not in the cognitive load condition. This pattern of results was observed in self-reported measures of liking as well as in the drink pick-up latency data. Results from both experiments show that EC occurs only when there are sufficient cognitive resources available. The fact that this was observed using both self-reported and indirect measures suggests that insufficient cognitive resources affect learning itself rather than merely obstructing reporting.     

Reprint of: 'Brain insulin signaling: A key component of cognitive processes and a potential basis for cognitive impairment in type 2 diabetes'

Understanding of the role of insulin in the brain has gradually expanded, from initial conceptions of the brain as insulin-insensitive through identification of a role in regulation of feeding, to recent demonstration of insulin as a key component of hippocampal memory processes. Conversely, systemic insulin resistance such as that seen in type 2 diabetes is associated with a range of cognitive and neural deficits. Here we review the evidence for insulin as a cognitive and neural modulator, including potential effector mechanisms, and examine the impact that type 2 diabetes has on these mechanisms in order to identify likely bases for the cognitive impairments seen in type 2 diabetic patients.