Valence resolution of ambiguous facial expressions using an emotional oddball task

Previous research suggests that neural and behavioral responses to surprised faces are modulated by explicit contexts (e.g., "He just found $500"). Here, we examined the effect of implicit contexts (i.e., valence of other frequently presented faces) on both valence ratings and ability to detect surprised faces (i.e., the infrequent target). In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that participants interpret surprised faces more positively when they are presented within a context of happy faces, as compared to a context of angry faces. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used the oddball paradigm to evaluate the effects of clearly valenced facial expressions (i.e., happy and angry) on default valence interpretations of surprised faces. We offer evidence that the default interpretation of surprise is negative, as participants were faster to detect surprised faces when presented within a happy context (Exp. 2). Finally, we kept the valence of the contexts constant (i.e., surprised faces) and showed that participants were faster to detect happy than angry faces (Exp. 3). Together, these experiments demonstrate the utility of the oddball paradigm to explore the default valence interpretation of presented facial expressions, particularly the ambiguously valenced facial expression of surprise.     

Individual differences in causal learning and decision making

In judgment and decision making tasks, people tend to neglect the overall frequency of base-rates when they estimate the probability of an event; this is known as the base-rate fallacy. In causal learning, despite people's accuracy at judging causal strength according to one or other normative model (i.e., Power PC, DeltaP), they tend to misperceive base-rate information (e.g., the cause density effect). The present study investigates the relationship between causal learning and decision making by asking whether people weight base-rate information in the same way when estimating causal strength and when making judgments or inferences about the likelihood of an event. The results suggest that people differ according to the weight they place on base-rate information, but the way individuals do this is consistent across causal and decision making tasks. We interpret the results as reflecting a tendency to differentially weight base-rate information which generalizes to a variety of tasks. Additionally, this study provides evidence that causal learning and decision making share some component processes.     

Aging and retrospective revaluation of causal learning

In a 2-stage causal learning task, young and older participants first learned which foods presented in compound were followed by an allergic reaction (e.g., STEAK-BEANS→ REACTION) and then the causal efficacy of 1 food from these compounds was revalued (e.g., BEANS→ NO REACTION). In Experiment 1, unrelated food pairs were used, and although there were no age differences in compound- or single-cue-outcome learning, older adults did not retrospectively revalue the causal efficacy of the absent target cues (e.g., STEAK). However, they had weaker within-compound associations for the unrelated foods, and this may have prevented them from retrieving the representations of these cues. In Experiment 2, older adults still showed no retrospective revaluation of absent cues even though compound food cues with pre-existing associations were used (e.g., STEAK-POTATO), and they received additional learning trials. Finally, in Experiment 3, older adults revalued the causal efficacy of the target cues when small, unobtrusive icons of these cues were present during single-cue revaluation. These findings suggest that age-related deficits in causal learning for absent cues are due to ineffective associative binding and reactivation processes.     

Feeling bad about being sad: the role of social expectancies in amplifying negative mood

Our perception of how others expect us to feel has significant implications for our emotional functioning. Across 4 studies the authors demonstrate that when people think others expect them not to feel negative emotions (i.e., sadness) they experience more negative emotion and reduced well-being. The authors show that perceived social expectancies predict these differences in emotion and well-being both more consistently than-and independently of-personal expectancies and that they do so by promoting negative self-evaluation when experiencing negative emotion. We find evidence for these effects within Australia (Studies 1 and 2) as well as Japan (Study 2), although the effects of social expectancies are especially evident in the former (Studies 1 and 2). We also find experimental evidence for the causal role of social expectancies in negative emotional responses to negative emotional events (Studies 3 and 4). In short, when people perceive that others think they should feel happy, and not sad, this leads them to feel sad more frequently and intensely.     

Paying for sanctions in social dilemmas: The effects of endowment asymmetry and accountability

The present research examines whether or not endowment asymmetry leads those with many endowments to contribute more than those with few endowments towards the public good (i.e., a first-order dilemma), but also towards the implementation of a sanctioning system (i.e., a second-order dilemma). In Experiment 1, we found that those with many endowments contributed more than those with few endowments in a public good dilemma without a sanctioning system present, whereas those with many endowments did not contribute more than those with few endowments toward the implementation of a sanctioning system. The latter effect, however, was eliminated when participants were accountable (i.e., when expectations that they would have to justify their decisions to others in the group were high). Experiment 2 showed that when participants were accountable, the contributions of those with many endowments (and not those with few endowments) toward the sanctioning system increased, but only when they perceived the group to be more self-evaluative in terms of morality (i.e., high-evaluation expectancy). Experiment 3 showed that this effect of evaluation expectancy only emerged when participants were accountable to the whole group rather than to only one group member.     

Putting color back where it belongs

I disagree with Ross about the location of colors: They are in the brain, not in the external world. It is difficult to deny that there are colors in our conscious visual experience, and if we take the causal theory of perception seriously, we cannot identify these colors with the beginning of the causal chain in perception (external objects in the distal stimulus field), but we must search for them at the end of the causal chain (in the brain). Several lines of compelling evidence from cognitive neuroscience (e.g., synesthesia, dreaming, and achromatopsia) demonstrate unambiguously that color is in the brain. Furthermore, it seems that Ross has failed to consider one substantial version of subjectivism in his article. This monistic approach to color and consciousness appears to be the least implausible alternative when we try to understand what colors are and where they reside.     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

Psychological distance and judgments of causal impact

When assessing causal impact, individuals have to consider two pieces of information: the magnitude of the cause that resulted in an effect, and the magnitude of the resulting effect. In the present research, participants judged the causal impact of cause–effect relationships in which the magnitude of causes and effects varied independently. Participants mainly relied on effect magnitude, rating causal impact to be much higher when strong (vs. weak) effects emerged. When participants took cause magnitude into account (which they did, but to a lesser extent), their judgments reflected a covariation rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for strong causes generating strong effects) rather than a ratio rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for weak causes generating strong effects). These distinct views on causal impact were moderated by psychological distance: Effect magnitude dominated judgments of proximal events, whereas cause magnitude had relatively more impact on causal judgments of distal events.     

Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available (Experiment 1), participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their decisions on them. When allowed to learn cue validities in addition to causal information (Experiment 2), participants also became more frugal (i.e., they searched fewer of the available cues), made more accurate decisions, and were more precise in estimating cue validities than was a control group that did not receive causal information. These results can be attributed to the causal relation between the cues and the criterion, rather than to greater saliency of the causal cues (Experiment 3). Overall, our results support the hypothesis that causal knowledge aids in the learning of cue validities and is treated as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues.     

Associative history affects the associative change undergone by both presented and absent cues in human causal learning

R. A. Rescorla (2000) noted that a number of influential theories of associative learning do not take the associative history of cues (i.e., the prior training that they have received) into account when calculating the associative change undergone by those cues. The authors tested this assumption in a human causal learning paradigm and found associative history to be an important determinant of the learning undergone by cues that are presented on a trial. Moreover, associative history was also found to influence the amount of retrospective revaluation undergone by absent cues. These findings conflict with models of causal learning in which the associative change undergone by an element of a cue compound is governed by a summed error term (e.g., R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972).     

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.     

What is false memory development the development of? Comment on Brainerd, Reyna, and Ceci (2008)

In this commentary, assumptions about the nature and development of children's false memories as described in a recent article by C. J. Brainerd, V. F. Reyna, and S. J. Ceci (2008) are reviewed. Specifically, questions are raised about what drives the development of false memories in fuzzy-trace theory (FTT). Recent studies that challenge a core assumption of FTT, that false memory illusions increase across development as children learn to establish meaningful connections across items (i.e., establish gist), are discussed. An alternative conceptualization of the development of false memory illusions, associative-activation theory (AAT), is presented. AAT provides as viable an account of the development of false memory illusions as does FTT and anticipates a unique set of outcomes that have recently appeared in the developmental literature on false memory illusions.     

When Breaking the Rules Relates to Creativity: The Role of Creative Problem-Solving Demands and Organizational Constraints

Drawing on theoretical views of creative deviance, the present study hypothesized that employees with a tendency to break rules are more creative at their jobs (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we expected that this is particularly the case when employees face high problem-solving demands (i.e., they are expected to be creative) but at the same time they face high organizational constraints (e.g., they are not given the resources they need in order to be creative; Hypothesis 2). To test these expectations, we conducted a cross-sectional survey study (Study 1) and a daily diary survey study (Study 2) among employees from different occupational groups. Study 1 provided evidence that employee rule-breaking is related to other-rated employee creativity. Study 2 replicated this finding with a day-level measure of self-rated employee creativity. Furthermore, multilevel regression analyses revealed that the link is stronger when day-level problem-solving demands and organizational constraints are both high. Our findings contribute to the literature by providing empirical support to hardly examined propositions, namely, that non-compliant behaviors (i.e., rule-breaking) and obstacles (i.e., organizational constraints) may, in fact, boost creativity. Finally, suggestions for practice are made, recognizing the challenges posed to management in regulating employee rule-breaking.     

Blickets and babies: the development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference.     

People want to see information that will help them make valid inferences in human causal learning

According to higher order reasoning accounts of human causal learning (e.g., Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, and Frohardt, 2003; Waldmann and Walker, 2005) ceiling effects in forward blocking (i.e., smaller blocking effects when the outcome occurs with a maximal intensity on A+ and AX+ trials) are due to the fact that people are uncertain about the causal status of a blocked cue X in a forward blocking design when the outcome is always fully present on A+ and AX+ trials. This should not be the case for a reduced overshadowing cue Y (B- trials followed by BY+ trials). We tested this hypothesis by asking participants which additional information they preferred to see after seeing all learning trials. Results showed (1) that all participants preferred to see the effect of the blocked cue X over seeing the effect of the reduced overshadowing cue Y (Experiment 1), and (2) that more participants preferred to see the blocked cue X on its own when the outcome on A+ and AX+ trials was fully present than when the outcome on those trials had a submaximalintensity (Experiment 2).     

Why group apologies succeed and fail: intergroup forgiveness and the role of primary and secondary emotions

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions can lay the groundwork for intergroup forgiveness, but evidence for a causal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Drawing on the infrahumanization literature, we argue that a possible reason for the muted effectiveness of apologies is that people diminish the extent to which they see outgroup members as able to experience complex, uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse). In Study 1, Canadians forgave Afghanis for a friendly-fire incident to the extent that they perceived Afghanis as capable of experiencing uniquely human emotions (i.e., secondary emotions such as anguish) but not nonuniquely human emotions (i.e., primary emotions such as fear). Intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups expressed secondary emotions rather than primary emotions in their apology (Studies 2a and 2b), an effect that was mediated by trust in the genuineness of the apology (Study 2b). Indeed, an apology expressing secondary emotions aroused no more forgiveness than a no-apology control (Study 3) and less forgiveness than an apology with no emotion (Study 4). Consistent with an infrahumanization perspective, effects of primary versus secondary emotional expression did not emerge when the apology was offered for an ingroup transgression (Study 3) or when an outgroup apology was delivered through an ingroup proxy (Study 4). Also consistent with predictions, these effects were demonstrated only by those who tended to deny uniquely human qualities to the outgroup (Study 5). Implications for intergroup apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.     

The artful dodger: answering the wrong question the right way

What happens when speakers try to "dodge" a question they would rather not answer by answering a different question? In 4 studies, we show that listeners can fail to detect dodges when speakers answer similar-but objectively incorrect-questions (the "artful dodge"), a detection failure that goes hand-in-hand with a failure to rate dodgers more negatively. We propose that dodges go undetected because listeners' attention is not usually directed toward a goal of dodge detection (i.e., Is this person answering the question?) but rather toward a goal of social evaluation (i.e., Do I like this person?). Listeners were not blind to all dodge attempts, however. Dodge detection increased when listeners' attention was diverted from social goals toward determining the relevance of the speaker's answers (Study 1), when speakers answered a question egregiously dissimilar to the one asked (Study 2), and when listeners' attention was directed to the question asked by keeping it visible during speakers' answers (Study 4). We also examined the interpersonal consequences of dodge attempts: When listeners were guided to detect dodges, they rated speakers more negatively (Study 2), and listeners rated speakers who answered a similar question in a fluent manner more positively than speakers who answered the actual question but disfluently (Study 3). These results add to the literatures on both Gricean conversational norms and goal-directed attention. We discuss the practical implications of our findings in the contexts of interpersonal communication and public debates.     

What we know about what we have never heard: evidence from perceptual illusions

Are speakers equipped with preferences concerning grammatical structures that are absent in their language? We examine this question by investigating the sensitivity of English speakers to the sonority of onset clusters. Linguistic research suggests that certain onset clusters are universally preferred (e.g., bd>lb). We demonstrate that such preferences modulate the perception of unattested onsets by English speakers: Monosyllabic auditory nonwords with onsets that are universally dispreferred (e.g., lbif) are more likely to be classified as disyllabic and misperceived as identical to their disyllabic counterparts (e.g., lebif) compared to onsets that are relatively preferred across languages (e.g., bdif). Consequently, dispreferred onsets benefit from priming by their epenthetic counterpart (e.g., lebif-lbif) as much as they benefit from identity priming (e.g., lbif-lbif). A similar pattern of misperception (e.g., lbif-->lebif) was observed among speakers of Russian, where clusters of this type occur. But unlike English speakers, Russian speakers perceived these clusters accurately on most trials, suggesting that the perceptual illusions of English speakers are partly due to their linguistic experience, rather than phonetic confusion alone. Further evidence against a purely phonetic explanation for our results is offered by the capacity of English speakers to perceive such onsets accurately under conditions that encourage precise phonetic encoding. The perceptual illusions of English speakers are also irreducible to several statistical properties of the English lexicon. The systematic misperception of universally dispreferred onsets might reflect their ill-formedness in the grammars of all speakers, irrespective of linguistic experience. Such universal grammatical preferences implicate constraints on language learning.     

Causal competition based on generic priors

Although we live in a complex and multi-causal world, learners often lack sufficient data and/or cognitive resources to acquire a fully veridical causal model. The general goal of making precise predictions with energy-efficient representations suggests a generic prior favoring causal models that include a relatively small number of strong causes. Such “sparse and strong” priors make it possible to quickly identify the most potent individual causes, relegating weaker causes to secondary status or eliminating them from consideration altogether. Sparse-and-strong priors predict that competition will be observed between candidate causes of the same polarity (i.e., generative or else preventive) even if they occur independently. For instance, the strength of a moderately strong cause should be underestimated when an uncorrelated strong cause also occurs in the general learning environment, relative to when a weaker cause also occurs. We report three experiments investigating whether independently-occurring causes (either generative or preventive) compete when people make judgments of causal strength. Cue competition was indeed observed for both generative and preventive causes. The data were used to assess alternative computational models of human learning in complex multi-causal situations.