Should Student-Athletes be Paid?

Abstract:

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) currently prohibits student-athletes from receiving compensation from many non-school-affiliated sources, including sports agents, advertising agencies, and merchandizers. Moreover, student-athletes are prohibited from receiving compensation for media appearances, endorsing products, and autographs. Athletes and schools that violate these rules are subject to various punishments, such as fines, suspensions, and forfeiture of games. This paper challenges this NCAA policy. Accordingly, although colleges and universities often compensate student-athletes with free tuition, room, board, and other expenses, I argue that some prohibitions against athletes receiving compensation from non-school-affiliated sources are: (1) arbitrary and unfair to student-athletes; (2) such policies moreover are non-beneficial to student-athletes since we lack good reason to think the reception or pursuit of outside compensations will harm the student-athlete; (3) no foreseeable detrimental effects to higher education arise if student-athletes are allowed to pursue or receive various compensations; and (4) the integrity of college sports will not be compromised if certain forms of compensation are permitted. I take (1)–(4) as good reasons for doing away with the NCAA’s current policies. Ultimately, while I do not think colleges or universities should compensate student-athletes beyond what they already provide (e.g. free tuition, room, and board), I think student-athletes should be allowed to pursue an assortment of economic-related activities currently prohibited by the NCAA.     

Should reason be fragmented?

Cognitive relativists‐pragmatists (Stich, Churchland) claim that human cognitive strategies, lacking a common goal, are in addition divergent to the point of incommensurability. They appeal to the study of reasoning heuristics for evidence on cognitive diversity and incorrigibility. It is here argued that no such evidence is offered by the research, which, on the contrary (1) presents heuristics as uniform across great variations; (2) offers advice for correcting and improving human reasoning; and (3) very often postulates a uniformity of core logical strategies, built into reasoning competence. Cognitive research thus supports a moderate rationalism rather than relativism‐pragmatism.     

Should Communitarians be Nationalists?

ABSTRACT It is widely supposed by both its proponents and critics that communitarianism is committed to the defence of lies of nationhood: the nation forms a surviving communal attachment in a world in which the individual is otherwise denuded of ties of community. I argue in this paper that this assumption is mistaken. It depends on a romantic image of the nation which was constructed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That image hides the recent historical origins of the nation and its foundation in the suppression of older allegiances or their later privatisation; it continues to disguise the illusory nature of the national community. The nation is not a surviving pre-modern community to which individuals are attached as a bulwark against the impersonality of public life in modern society. Rather the nation is one of the main vehicles for the construction of the modern unencumbered self. Communitarians need not be committed to the defence of the specifically modem forms of public irrationality and immorality that nationalism embodies.     

Should technological imperatives be obeyed?

This paper argues that both technological determinism (the development of technology is uniquely determined by internal laws) and technological voluntarism (technological change can be externally directed and regulated by the wants and free choice of human beings) are one‐sided and partly mistaken. The determinists are right in the sense that technology has a power to influence our values and behaviour, and thereby appear to direct ‘technological imperatives’ to us. However, such commands are always conditional on some value premises; the voluntarists are thus right in pointing out that we need not obey such imperatives. The principle ‘Can implies Ought’ (all technological possibilities should be realized) is therefore invalid.     

Should assisted dying be legalised?

When an individual facing intractable pain is given an estimate of a few months to live, does hastening death become a viable and legitimate alternative for willing patients? Has the time come for physicians to do away with the traditional notion of healthcare as maintaining or improving physical and mental health, and instead accept their own limitations by facilitating death when requested? The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge held the 2013 Varsity Medical Debate on the motion “This House Would Legalise Assisted Dying”. This article summarises the key arguments developed over the course of the debate. We will explore how assisted dying can affect both the patient and doctor; the nature of consent and limits of autonomy; the effects on society; the viability of a proposed model; and, perhaps most importantly, the potential need for the practice within our current medico-legal framework.     

Should Engineering Ethics be Taught?

Should engineering ethics be taught? Despite the obvious truism that we all want our students to be moral engineers who practice virtuous professional behavior, I argue, in this article that the question itself obscures several ambiguities that prompt preliminary resolution. Upon clarification of these ambiguities, and an attempt to delineate key issues that make the question a philosophically interesting one, I conclude that engineering ethics not only should not, but cannot, be taught if we understand “teaching engineering ethics” to mean training engineers to be moral individuals (as some advocates seem to have proposed). However, I also conclude that there is a justification to teaching engineering ethics, insofar as we are able to clearly identify the most desirable and efficacious pedagogical approach to the subject area, which I propose to be a case study-based format that utilizes the principle of human cognitive pattern recognition.     

Should physicians be Bayesian agents?

Because physicians use scientific inference for the generalizations of individual observations and the application of general knowledge to particular situations, the Bayesian probability solution to the problem of induction has been proposed and frequently utilized. Several problems with the Bayesian approach are introduced and discussed. These include: subjectivity, the favoring of a weak hypothesis, the problem of the false hypothesis, the old evidence/new theory problem and the observation that physicians are not currently Bayesians. To the complaint that the prior probability is subjective, Bayesians reply that there will be ultimate convergence, but the rebuttal to this is that there will not be uniform convergence. Secondly, since the Bayesian scheme favors a weak hypothesis, theories turn out to be a gratuitous risk. The problem with the false hypothesis comes out in the denominator of the theorem, revealing that a factor which is not a theory at all is being considered in the reasoning. On the old evidence/new theory problem old evidence cannot confirm a new theory so that the posterior probability will equal the prior probability. Finally, empiric studies have shown that current physicians are not Bayesians. But on consideration of Bayesian inference as a system of inference, it can be reasoned that physicians should be Bayesians. However, the problem of physicians' and patients' own subjectivity continue to plague this system of medical decision making.     

Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?

Synthese - How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic....     

Can Planck's constant be measured with classical mechanics?

An interesting case of the complex interaction between theory and experiment can be found in many experiments in quantum physics employing classical reasoning. It is expected that this practice would lead to quantitative inaccuracy, unless the measurements’ results were averaged. Whether or not this inaccuracy is significant depends critically on the details of the particular experimental situation. The example of Millikan's photoelectric experiment, in which he obtained a precise value of Planck's constant, provides a good case for illustrating the process of estimating the inaccuracy resulting from the classical‐quantum discrepancy. In the case of Millikan's experiment, it seems that a significant inaccuracy was avoided because of fortunate coincidences. In general, in the absence of a careful analysis, it is impossible to say whether the use of classical reasoning interferes with the accuracy of a quantum‐physical experiment.     

Why Should Nanoscience Students be Taught to be Ethically Competent?

During the education of scientists at the university level the students become more and more specialized. The specialization of the students is a consequence of the scientific research becoming specialized as well. In the interdisciplinary field of nanoscience the importance of specialization is also emphasized throughout the education. Being an interdisciplinary field of study the specialization in this area is not focused on scientific disciplines, but on the different branches of the research. Historically ethics has not been a priority in science education, however, in recent years the importance of such teachings has been highly recognize especially in medicine, biotechnology and engineering. The rapid development, the many new and unknown areas and the highly specialized focus of nanotechnology suggest the importance of having ethically competent researchers. In this article the importance of ethical competence in nanoscience research is argued for by an example of a dilemma that could occur in a research project. The dilemma is analyzed using two different ethical views, generating two different choices for action. It is seen that the dilemma can have more than one solution and that ethical competence can help in justifying the choice of solution in a specific situation. Furthermore it is suggested that a way to reach this competence is through education in ethics incorporated into the nanoscience education curriculum.     

Should physicians be empathetic? Rethinking clinical empathy

The role and importance of empathy in clinical practice has been widely discussed. This paper focuses on the ideal of clinical empathy, as involving both cognitive understanding and affective resonance. I argue that this account is subject to a number of objections. Affective resonance may serve more as a liability than as a benefit in clinical settings, and utilizing this capacity is not clearly supported by the relevant empirical literature. Instead, I argue that the ideal account of empathy in medicine remains cognitive, though there is a central role for expressing empathic concern toward patients.     

Should assessment center dimension ratings be mechanically-derived?

This study examined the relationship between consensusderived and mechanically-derived assessment center ratings using a sample of 110 police candidates. It was determined that the two sets of dimension ratings were highly correlated (medianr=.83). Further, the mechanically-derived and the consensus-derived assessment ratings both correlated with the overall assessment ratings (OAR) at .71. It was estimated that the organization in this study could save $6137.92 a year, and $36.89 per assessee by eliminating the team meeting (consensus decision-making).