Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts?

Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers have held that there is a logical Is/Ought gap. According to the doctrine of the Is/Ought gap, there are no valid (i.e., non-fallacious) arguments from purely factual premises about whatis the case to moral or normative conclusions about whatought to be. Occasionally, this doctrine has been challenged, but frequently it has been accepted without argumentation. Charles Pigden has recently argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden's argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, and does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic. Moreover, my argument does not rely, as other alleged counter-examples do, on controversial assumptions from Aristotelian biology about natures or ends, or about institutions such as promise-making.     

Farewell to multiculturalism? sharing values and identities in societies of immigration

For critics of multiculturalism, societies of immigration need to strengthen cohesion based on shared democratic values and national identities. This article suggests that democratic values are not a sufficient basis for political cohesion, because they are universal and cannot identify a particular polity toward which one ought to be loyal. Immigrants are always asked to accept a package deal that includes not only democratic values, but also the hegemony of established national cultures. Shared democratic values may also not be strictly necessary for political cohesion. They must be embedded in political institutions and ought to be respected by office holders, democratic politicians, and parties, but democratic states must tolerate that most citizens appear to hold illiberal beliefs including illiberal attitudes toward immigrants. Immigrants are then often asked to profess a commitment to values that citizens do not widely share. If political loyalty, cannot be exclusively based on democratic values, must societies of immigration then ask newcomers to assimilate into a shared national identity? The article argues that this requires, first, a self-transformation of these identities in response to immigration. Instead of regarding shared identities as overriding all other affiliations, democratic states should see them as overarching and overlapping. Different attitudes toward dual nationality illustrate the implication of this suggestion. The article concludes by proposing a catalyst model of multiculturalism as an alternative to the metaphors of the melting pot, the salad bowl, and the mosaic.     

Congruence and functions of personal and cultural values: do my values reflect my culture's values?

Two studies are described examining the correlation between self- and culture-referenced values at a culture level (Study 1) and correlation between self- and culture-referenced values and self-reported behavior at an individual level (Study 2). It is found that values related to individual-group relationships (embeddedness) and expression and experience of affective feelings and emotions (affective autonomy) are significantly correlated at a culture level. In Study 2, culture-referenced values are shown to correlate with behaviors attached to social norms, whereas self-rated values are found to correlate with behaviors that are not norm-governed. Implications for measurement of cultural values and cultural and cross-cultural research designs are discussed.     

European values in bioethics: why,what, and how to be used?

Are there distinctly European values in bioethics, and if there are, what are they? Some Continental philosophers have argued that the principles of dignity, precaution, and solidarity reflect the European ethos better than the liberal concepts of autonomy, harm, and justice. These principles, so the argument goes, elevate prudence over hedonism, communality over individualism, and moral sense over pragmatism. Contrary to what their proponents often believe, however, dignity, precaution, and solidarity can be interpreted in many ways, and it is not clear which reading would, or should, be favored by popular opinion. It is therefore dangerous to think that any one understanding of "European", or any other, values could be legitimately imposed on those who have different ideas about morality in health care and related fields. Bioethical principles should be employed to promote discussion, not to suppress it.     

Counselor values—Client freedom

A framework for an approach to counseling which respects the freedom of clients and yet leaves them open to the consideration of different value systems is presented. The framework is based upon values shared by many counselors and a stage model of counseling compatible with different theoretical approaches. It is hoped that consciousness of shared values and continuing dialogue will lead to a greater commonality of values.Michael J. O'Brien is Professor of Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago. He is active in the undergraduate Applied Psychology Program where there is a dual emphasis on theory and practice. For eleven years he was director of the M.A. program in Counseling Psychology for religious workers. (It is now a part of the Institute of Pastoral Studies at Loyola.) His thinking on values has developed through the realization of the central part values in counseling. This article strives to synthesize devergent approaches to the question of values.     

Exploring the relationship between students’ values and the values of postsecondary institutions

Little is known of how institutional and individual value systems are related among university undergraduates. With three different measures and samples of college students, perceptions of university mission and values (i.e., institutional values, creating pro-social climates, and developing a life-long commitment to values) loaded independently of their personal values systems, and often negatively with social desirability. Perceptions of institutional values were generally independent of personal value systems, using either a rank-order (Sample 1, n = 199) or rating scale method (Sample 2, n = 107), or by focusing on moral behavior structures (Sample 3, n = 208). Together, these results indicate that higher education assessment may reflect institutional values that are independent of student personal value systems.Portions of this paper were presented at the 2004 Institute for College Student Values, Tallahassee, FL     

Are teachers’ personal values related to their attitudes toward inclusive education? A correlational study

Social Psychology of Education - Inclusive education is a major challenge for educational systems. In order to better understand the background to teachers’ attitudes toward inclusive...     

Affective and normative commitment to organization, supervisor, and coworkers: Do collectivist values matter?

Employees’ commitment to their organization is increasingly recognized as comprising of different bases (affect-, obligation-, or cost-based) and different foci (e.g., supervisor, coworkers). Two studies investigated affective and normative commitment to the organization, supervisor and coworkers in the Turkish context. The results of Study 1 confirmed that employees differentiate between affect versus obligation-based commitment towards the organization, supervisor and coworkers. Study 2 tested the “cultural hypothesis” which argues for the moderating influence of collectivistic values on the relationship between person (local) commitments and organizational-level (global) outcomes. The results failed to support the cultural hypothesis and showed that commitment to organization was predictive of organizational-level outcomes (e.g., turnover intentions), and commitment to supervisor was predictive of supervisor-related outcomes (e.g., citizenship towards supervisor). These findings suggest that the influence of culture may be less straightforward and may require a more sophisticated measurement of the nature of relationships and organizational characteristics in general.     

Youth and the Great Recession: Are values,achievement orientation and outlook to the future affected?

This special section brings together leading experts in psychology and sociology to examine the consequences of the Great Recession for young people's values, achievement orientation, and outlook to the future. Evidence from Europe and the United States suggests that the impact of the recession varies for distinct outcomes and by age, the latter pointing to potential sensitive periods for interventions. Although the direct effects of the recession are not strong, they accelerate pre‐existing trends towards more prolonged and precarious transitions to independence, and are likely to bring with them long‐term scarring with respect to health and well‐being. While feelings of self‐confidence and self‐worth have eroded, young people continue to subscribe to the “American Dream,” the belief that in principle it is possible to make it – even if limitations to one's own capabilities are recognised. Trust in institutions has declined, but support and concern for others have increased, suggesting that in times of economic hardship and uncertainty social relationships become more salient. Young people's response to the recession appears to be less of a “me‐first” reaction than “let's help each other”: a form of “collective agency” to counter the inadequacy of social safety nets.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

How serious are expressions of protected values?

People think that some things that they value should be protected from trade-offs with other things. For example, people think that no economic gain is great enough to justify clear-cutting old-growth forest. The authors probed the stability of these protected values (PVs) in several ways. Subjects were asked to think of counterexamples, and this had some effect on PVs. Subjects were then asked how they would resolve conflicts between 2 PVs. Resolutions did not differ from those between other values, but subjects tended to feel that conflicts between PVs did not occur in reality. Despite people's claims that PVs are unchanged by variation in quantity, expression of PVs was reduced when the magnitude or probability of the violation of a PV was smaller. In summary, PVs appear to be labile and amenable to challenge. Despite earlier concerns, apparent PVs may not always preclude the use of valuation measures in cost-effectiveness analysis or negotiated agreement on controversial issues.     

Using a new analysis of the best interests standard to address cultural disputes: Whose data,which values?

Clinicians sometimes disagree about how much to honor surrogates’ deeply held cultural values or traditions when they differ from those of the host country. Such a controversy arose when parents requested a cultural accommodation to let their infant die by withdrawing life saving care. While both the parents and clinicians claimed to be using the Best Interests Standard to decide what to do, they were at an impasse. This standard is analyzed into three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and used to resolve the question of how much to accommodate cultural preferences and how to treat this infant. The extreme versions of absolutism and relativism are rejected. Properly understood, the Best Interests Standard can serve as a powerful tool in settling disputes about how to make good decisions for those who cannot decide for themselves.     

Admissible values of γ in direct oblimin rotation

It is shown that for nonpositive values of the parameter in the oblimin criterion, the criterion achieves a minimum on the manifold of all possible oblique rotations of any given full rank initial loading matrixA. For every positive value of , on the other hand, it is shown that there exists a full rank initial loading matrixA for which the oblimin criterion does not achieve a minimum over the manifold of all oblique rotations ofA. These results help explain the sometimes divergent behavior that results from using direct oblimin algorithms with set to a positive value.This research was supported in part by National Institutes of Health Grant RR-3.     

What's in a flag? Subliminal exposure to New Zealand national symbols and the automatic activation of egalitarian versus dominance values

Three experiments tested whether the subliminal presentation of national symbols automatically elicited societally prescribed normative values in the New Zealand (NZ) context using a lexical decision task. Consistent with research in the United States, the presentation of the NZ flag (Study 1), but not another consensually validated NZ national symbol (The Silver Fern, Study 2), increased the cognitive accessibility of egalitarian value concepts. The NZ flag did not, however, activate values in a comparable sample of foreign nationals (Study 3). National flags, it seems, automatically activate normative values for ingroup members, and this effect is not limited to nations with a high frequency of flag-display behavior such as the United States.     

Can values moderate the attitudes of right-wing authoritarians?

This investigation explored how right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and endorsement of egalitarian beliefs may interact to determine attitudes toward immigrants, homosexuals, and African Americans. Study 1 (N = 239) found that RWA was negatively related to evaluations of immigrants for those who weakly endorsed egalitarian beliefs. In contrast, endorsement of egalitarian beliefs was associated with positive evaluations of immigrants for both low and high RWAs. RWA did not interact with egalitarianism to determine attitudes toward homosexuals or African Americans. Study 2 analyzed data from the 1992 National Election Study and replicated these effects in a young adult (age < or = 24) sample (n = 102) using moral traditionalism as a proxy for RWA. Partial support for the hypotheses also was found in the adult (age > or = 25) sample (n = 1,257). It is concluded that when tradition and/or social norms offer unclear positions, endorsement of egalitarian beliefs influences the attitudes of authoritarians.     

What are the values of young people and how are these different from the values of older generations in Georgia?

This article examines the basic values of young people (aged 18 to 25) and analyses how, if at all, these are different from the values of older generations in Georgia. Based on Shalom H. Schwartz’s Theory of Basic Values (2012), the study uses quantitative (secondary analysis of the World Values Survey [WVS]) and qualitative (40 in-depth interviews) research methods to explore basic values, perceptions and attitudes, as well as tolerance towards different minority groups in Georgia. The research findings reveal that Schwartz’s higher-ordered values ‘conservation’ (including ‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’) and ‘self-transcendence’ (including ‘benevolence’ and ‘universalism’) are very important for all age groups in Georgia. In contrast, the values of ‘openness to change’ and ‘self-enhancement’ are assessed quite dissimilarly by young and older generations. In addition, the youth turned out to be more tolerant towards different minority groups, such as people of a different religion and race, immigrants and sexual minorities.     

Exploration of values: Israeli teachers’ professional ethics

The main purpose of this study was to explore Israeli teachers’ professional ethics and values using the Facet Theory (Guttman in Psychmetrika 33:469–506, 1968). Since Israel does not have a teachers’ code of ethics, such exploration can be a basis for constructing one. The study is mainly exploratory, and the main hypotheses that guided the study were based upon universal structure of values (Pakizeh et al. in J Exp Soc Psychol 43(3): 458–465, 2007 Schwartz, in Advances in experimental social psychology. Academic Press, San Diego, 1992), and were examined using a mapping sentence. The initial findings showed the data deployment on the SSA map exhibits both a radial and an angular form in a Radex configuration. Israeli teachers believe that professional ethics is based on conditioned values. The variables in the SSA map appear in a radial configuration forming three concentric circles: personal values, social values, and universal values. The components representing the code of ethics were deployed in an angular form showing three elements: professionalism, reliability and honesty, and decency.     

Carnap’s logical empiricism,values, and American pragmatism

Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy.