Content-blind norms, no norms, or good norms? A reply to Vranas

In the psychology of thinking, little thought is given to what constitutes good thinking. Instead, normative solutions to problems have been accepted at face value, thereby determining what counts as a reasoning fallacy. I applaud Vranas (Cognition 76 (2000) 179) for thinking seriously about norms. I do, however, disagree with his attempt to provide post hoc justifications for supposed reasoning fallacies in terms of 'content-neutral' norms. Norms need to be constructed for a specific situation, not imposed upon it in a content-blind way. The reason is that content-blind norms disregard relevant structural properties of the given situation, including polysemy, reference classes, and sampling. I also show that content-blind norms can, unwittingly, lead to double standards: the norm in one problem is the fallacy in the next. The alternative to content-blind norms is not no norms, but rather carefully designed norms.     

Children’s emotional norms for 600 French words

The present study provides a French child database containing a large corpus of words (N=600) that were rated on emotional valence (positive, neutral, and negative) by French children differing in both age (5, 7, and 9 years old) and sex (girls and boys). Good response reliability was observed in each of the three age groups. The results showed some age differences in the children’s ratings. With increasing age, the percentage of words rated positive decreased, whereas the percentage of neutral words increased and the percentage of negative words remained stable. Our study did not reveal marked differences across sex groups. The database compiled here should become a useful tool for experimental studies in which verbal material is used with children. It would be worthwhile in future research to study how children process emotional words and also to control the emotional variable in the same way as other linguistic variables in the experimental design. The norms from this study may be downloaded from brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work

Abstract

Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.     

French categorization norms for 70 semantic categories and comparison with Van Overschelde et al.’s (2004) English norms

The present methodological note provides categorization norms for 70 semantic categories collected from 200 participants. The categories were mainly derived from a French translation of the Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) inductor terms including a large set of semantic categories. Our study also extends recent French norms (Léger, Boumlak, & Tijus, 2008; Marchal & Nicolas, 2003) and tests their stability. These 70 categories constitute the widest French categorization norms to date and will be of use to studies in the fields of both linguistics and psycholinguistics. A cross-linguistic comparison, with both quantitative and qualitative results, is also performed, which should prove useful for bilingual and/or cross-linguistic studies. The norms collected for all 70 categories are available for download as supplemental materials from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Some age norms for the “woodworth-wells's substitution test”

If we seek to analyse causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals then we must assume that there is a class of counterfactuals whose members (i) are all and only those we need to support our judgements of causation, (ii) have truth-conditions specifiable without any irreducible appeal to causation. I argue that (i) and (ii) are unlikely to be met by any counterfactual analysis of causation. I demonstrate this by isolating a class of counterfactuals called non-projective counterfactuals, or NP-counterfactuals, and indicate how counterfactual analyses of causation must appeal to them to account for the correct causal judgements we make. I show that the truth-conditions of NP-counterfactuals are specifiable only by irreducible appeal to causation. A dilemma then holds: if counterfactual analyses of causation eschew appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are empirically inadequate, but if they appeal to NP-counterfactuals they are circular and thus conceptually inadequate.     

Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide

More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be. In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory. In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection.     

Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?

Philosophical Studies - In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a...     

Fear of success and failure,or norms for achievement?

Previous research has indicated that success in competitive situations is differentially perceived, considering the level of success and sex of person who succeeded. The amount of projected negative imagery of 100 college students under various degrees of a man's or woman's failure in medical school was investigated in the present study. Data indicated a pervasive tendency to downgrade unsuccessful men in relation to unsuccessful women. The possibility that subjects' responses reflect anxiety about the level of success and failure obtained, rather than anxiety about success and failure in general, is discussed.The authors thank D. F. Ricks for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Portions of this article were presented at the 6th Annual Conference for Research on Women and Education, Pacific Grove, California, December, 1980.     

BatMon II: Children’s category norms for 33 categories

Four hundred forty-eight children 3–12 years of age generated category exemplars for 33 distinct categories. The percentage of the participants reporting each exemplar, the percentage of the participants reporting each exemplar first, the percentage of the participants reporting each exemplar across age groups (3–5 years, 6–8 years, and 9–12 years), and the mean rank of each exemplar are presented. A full version of the 29 category norms may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Deference in Indians' decision making: introjected goals or injunctive norms?

We examine the claim that Indians are more likely than Americans to act deferentially in the presence of authority figures and explore 2 possible psychological mechanisms for this cultural difference: introjected goals and injunctive norms. Studies 1 and 2 showed that after reflecting upon an authority's expectations, Indians were more likely than Americans to make clothing and course choices consistent with the authority's expectations, but there was no such cultural difference for peers' expectations. Study 3 showed that merely activating the concept of authority figures, without highlighting specific expectations, was sufficient to influence Indians' choices but not their evaluations. Examining a more basic distinction underlying introjected goals versus injunctive norms, Study 4 showed that authority primes influenced Indians' sense of what they should do but not what they want to do. Study 5 showed that, inconsistent with the internalized goal mechanism, the effect of explicit authority primes did not increase after brief delays. However, Indian participants who were less likely to accommodate to the salient authority experienced more guilt across delay conditions, which supported the injunctive norms mechanism. The findings suggest that manipulating injunctive norms can be an effective means for inducing or eliminating deferential behaviors in Indian settings.     

Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?

Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes something a norm, with consideration both of norms in general and a specific example: norms for informal argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so.     

How do children coordinate information about mental states with social norms?

We investigated how 3-7-year-olds weigh and coordinate information about specific mental states with social norms in the domain of contextually conventional rules. With increasing age, participants increasingly took into account an actor's mental state to predict that actor's behavior. In a criticism judgment task, 7-year-olds could assign criticism conditional on mental state, with response patterns similar to those of adults; 5-year-olds assigned criticism regardless of the actor's mental state. Three-year-olds tended not to assign criticism at all, irrespective of the actor's mental state. Results indicated that the ability to weigh and coordinate information about mental states with understanding of norms depends on age and on the particular type of judgment being made. To some extent, our results may also reflect the influence of culture and parenting.     

Neuropsychological test norms controlled for physical health: Does it matter?

The objective of the present study was to investigate the effects of physical health on neuropsychological test norms. Medical and neuropsychological data from 118 healthy volunteer controls, aged 26–91 years, were collected during five recruitment occasions. The examinations included a clinical investigation, brain neuroimaging, and a comprehensive neuropsychological test battery. Test‐specific statistical regression‐weights for age, education and gender were calculated to establish preliminary test norms. Hierarchical regression analyses demonstrated that control in addition for physical health moved best performance from age 60 to 65 for abstraction; replaced a plateau above age 70 for verbal fluency, with a continued rise in performance; eliminated significant negative influences of age on auditory learning, spatial reasoning and complex copying; reduced them on wordlist recall, psychomotor speed, visual scanning and mental shifting; and slightly reduced negative influences of low education on most verbal tests, several memory tests, and psychomotor speed, indicating rises in normative scores of up to 0.8 SD at age 80 and 0.4 SD at age 60. No differences were found at age 40. Although the sample size is not adequate to be used for normative data, the findings indicate that norms uncontrolled for health overestimate the negative influence of advanced age and low education, implying a risk of drawing false diagnostic conclusions.     

Children’s reasoning about norms and traits as motives for behavior

Two important sources of information for social judgments are personality dispositions (traits) and social norms. Existing research suggests that young children do not find traits salient. To what extent might they rely on a different source of information? Two experiments explored how information about preferences (what someone likes) and rules (what is allowed or forbidden) affected social judgments. Five-year-olds predicted people’s future behavior would be consistent with rules, but appeared insensitive to information about preferences. Preferences were better predictors than rules for 8-year-olds. Older children and adults consistently judged that actors would want to, and be happy to, satisfy preferences rather than rules. Younger children were more likely to use rules to infer people’s psychological states. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that deontic relations, such as rules and norms play a central role in young children’s social cognition, with ideas of individual psychological dispositions emerging in middle childhood.     

What ever happened to the norms for the Matching Familiar Figures Test?

The Matching Familiar Figures Test is used almost exclusively to assess cognitive tempo, e.g., impulsive-reflective, etc., in subjects. Although norms for this test were published by Salkind in 1978, a comprehensive review of the literature on cognitive tempo covering 1979 through 1984 showed only 8% of the reviewed studies used the norms. The problems associated with the failure to use norms, most notably, the inability to generalize findings from one sample to another, are covered.