Fidgeting as self-evidencing: A predictive processing account of non-goal-directed action

Non-goal-directed actions have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, but are ubiquitous and related to important cognitive functions. Fidgeting is seemingly one subtype of non-goal-directed action which is ripe for a functional account. What's the point of fidgeting? The predictive processing framework is a parsimonious account of brain function which says the brain aims to minimise the difference between expected and actual states of the world and itself, that is, minimise prediction error. This framework situates action selection in terms of active inference for expected states. However, seemingly aimless, idle actions, such as fidgeting, are a challenge to such theories. When our actions are not obviously goal-achieving, how can a predictive processing framework explain why we regularly do them anyway? Here, we argue that in a predictive processing framework, evidence for the agent's own existence is consolidated by self-stimulation or fidgeting. Endogenous, repetitive actions reduce uncertainty about the system's own states, and thus help continuously maintain expected rates of prediction error minimisation. We extend this explanation to clinically distinctive self-stimulation, such as in Autism Spectrum Conditions, in which effective strategies for self-evidencing may be different to the neurotypical case.     

The Calibration Issue: Theoretical Comments on Suantak,Bolger, and Ferrell (1996)

In this comment on a recent article in this journal on calibration of subjective probabilities by Suantak, Bolger, and Ferrell (1996) we point to methodological problems with the data presented in the article, with computer simulations we demonstrate that the results claimed by the authors to refute the ecological models (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin, 1994) are actually predicted by them, and we respond to the criticisms of the notion of “ecological cue validity.” It is further argued that contrary to the claims by the authors: Thedecision variable partition modeladvocated by the authors fails to account for the results reported in the article, but there is one error model—thecombined error model(Juslin, Olsson, & Björkman, 1997)—that predicts the observed symmetric hard-easy effect with crossover at proportion correct .75. Finally, an analysis of 44 cognitive and 21 sensory tasks demonstrates that there is a difference in calibration for sensory and cognitive tasks.     

Brain-inspired distributed cognitive architecture

In this paper we present a brain-inspired cognitive architecture that incorporates sensory processing, classification, contextual prediction, and emotional tagging. The cognitive architecture is implemented as three modular web-servers, meaning that it can be deployed centrally or across a network for servers. The experiments reveal two distinct operations of behaviour, namely high- and low-salience modes of operations, which closely model attention in the brain. In addition to modelling the cortex, we have demonstrated that a bio-inspired architecture introduced processing efficiencies. The software has been published as an open source platform, and can be easily extended by future research teams. This research lays the foundations for bio-realistic attention direction and sensory selection, and we believe that it is a key step towards achieving a bio-realistic artificial intelligent system.     

Attention in the predictive mind

It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it cannot accommodate. We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is ‘all the brain ever does’.     

Neural predictive mechanisms and their role in cognitive incrementalism

Many neuroscientists view prediction as one of the core brain functions, especially on account of its support of fast movements in complex environments. This leads to the natural question whether predictive knowledge forms the cornerstone of our common-sense understanding of the world. However, there is little consensus as to the exact nature of predictive information and processes, or of the neural mechanisms that realize them. This paper compares procedural versus declarative notions of prediction, examines how the brain appears to carry out predictive functions, and discusses to what degree, and at what level, these neural mechanisms support cognitive incrementalism: the notion that high-level cognition stems from sensorimotor behavior.     

Controlled information processing,automaticity, and the burden of proof

Cognitive psychologists often distinguish between voluntary and involuntary/automatic processes in attention and cognitive control. Dedicated experimental paradigms have been developed to isolate involuntary information processing, but these paradigms tend to assume a rigid and inflexible process that is either stimulus-driven or built up through simple repetition. In contrast, voluntary information processing is often assumed when processing is in line with arbitrarily defined task-specific goals. Here I review evidence from multiple cases suggesting that ostensibly goal-directed cognitive processes may not be so voluntary and controlled. It is argued that automatic processes can be conditionalized to reflect the task relevance of the stimuli and selection history in a variety of ways, rapidly and flexibly adjusting in order to facilitate future goal-directed behavior. As a result, many studies assumed to have measured a voluntary cognitive process have likely measured an amalgam of voluntary and automatic processes, thus blurring the distinction between the two. Automaticity may be much broader and more sophisticated than has previously been thought, which has wide-reaching implications for our conception of human cognitive control.     

Priors in perception: Top-down modulation,Bayesian perceptual learning rate,and prediction error minimization

I discuss top-down modulation of perception in terms of a variable Bayesian learning rate, revealing a wide range of prior hierarchical expectations that can modulate perception. I then switch to the prediction error minimization framework and seek to conceive cognitive penetration specifically as prediction error minimization deviations from a variable Bayesian learning rate. This approach retains cognitive penetration as a category somewhat distinct from other top-down effects, and carves a reasonable route between penetrability and impenetrability. It prevents rampant, relativistic cognitive penetration of perception and yet is consistent with the continuity of cognition and perception.     

Bayes,predictive processing,and the cognitive architecture of motor control

Despite their popularity, relatively scant attention has been paid to the upshot of Bayesian and predictive processing models of cognition for views of overall cognitive architecture. Many of these models are hierarchical; they posit generative models at multiple distinct “levels,” whose job is to predict the consequences of sensory input at lower levels. I articulate one possible position that could be implied by these models, namely, that there is a continuous hierarchy of perception, cognition, and action control comprising levels of generative models. I argue that this view is not entailed by a general Bayesian/predictive processing outlook. Bayesian approaches are compatible with distinct formats of mental representation. Focusing on Bayesian approaches to motor control, I argue that the junctures between different types of mental representation are places where the transitivity of hierarchical prediction may be broken, and I consider the upshot of this conclusion for broader discussions of cognitive architecture.     

Neurophysiological measures of involuntary and voluntary attention allocation and dispositional differences in need for cognition

Need for cognition (NFC) refers to stable individual differences in the intrinsic motivation to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors and has been a useful predictor of dispositional differences in information processing. Although cognitive resource allocation conceptualized as cognitive effort is assumed to be the key mediator of NFC-specific processing, to date no research has systematically addressed its underpinnings. Using a neurocognitive paradigm and recording event-related potentials associated with bottom-up and top-down-driven aspects of attention, the present research contributes to filling this gap. In Study 1, high-NFC individuals showed larger P3a amplitudes to contextually novel events, indicating greater involuntary (automatic) attention allocation. This effect was replicated in Study 2, where NFC also was positively correlated with the P3b to target stimuli, indicating voluntary (controlled) processes of attention allocation. Thus, our findings provide first evidence for neurophysiological correlates of NFC and can improve the understanding of NFC-specific processing.     

Beyond naïve cue combination: salience and social cues in early word learning

Children learn their earliest words through social interaction, but it is unknown how much they rely on social information. Some theories argue that word learning is fundamentally social from its outset, with even the youngest infants understanding intentions and using them to infer a social partner's target of reference. In contrast, other theories argue that early word learning is largely a perceptual process in which young children map words onto salient objects. One way of unifying these accounts is to model word learning as weighted cue combination, in which children attend to many potential cues to reference, but only gradually learn the correct weight to assign each cue. We tested four predictions of this kind of naïve cue combination account, using an eye‐tracking paradigm that combines social word teaching and two‐alternative forced‐choice testing. None of the predictions were supported. We thus propose an alternative unifying account: children are sensitive to social information early, but their ability to gather and deploy this information is constrained by domain‐general cognitive processes. Developmental changes in children's use of social cues emerge not from learning the predictive power of social cues, but from the gradual development of attention, memory, and speed of information processing.     

Modulation of brain oscillations during fundamental visuo-spatial processing: A comparison between female collegiate badminton players and sedentary controls

ObjectivesThe present study aimed to investigate the difference in fundamental cognitive processing and neural oscillations between badminton players and sedentary controls.DesignA cross-sectional design was adopted to address this issue.MethodsWe compared time-frequency electroencephalographic (EEG) activity from collegiate female badminton players (n = 12, aged 20.58 ± 2.75 years) and age-and gender-matched sedentary non-athletic controls (n = 13, aged 19.08 ± 2.10 years) when they performed a task that involves visuo-spatial attention and working memory.ResultsWe observed that players responded faster than controls on the task without suffering any increase in error responses. Correspondingly, the players, relative to controls, exhibited higher task-related modulations in beta power in the attention condition as well as in theta and beta power in the working memory condition. Notably, the behavior-EEG correlations revealed that better attention performance is associated with lower beta power, while greater working memory is related to higher theta power.ConclusionsOur results shed light on the mechanisms of athletic superiority in fundamental cognitive functioning: the higher theta synchronization points to a greater engagement of attention, whereas the higher beta desynchronization supports the contribution of processing speed (or motor-related processing) to better performance in athletes. This study extends current understanding by suggesting that enhanced neurocognitive function seen in athletes may transfer to fundamental tasks, giving insight into the generalizability of sport experience to neurocognitive functioning.     

老年人汉语阅读中预测误差成本的产生机制

阅读的认知加工机制随年龄变老只发生了量变还是也产生了质变,是毕生发展研究领域的重要问题。要进行有效的语言处理,读者必须结合已有的经验知识和当前语境对即将出现的信息进行预测加工。因此,要解决上述问题就要回答老年人阅读中预测加工机制发生了怎样变化,即预测误差成本是如何产生的。研究拟采用眼动脑电同步记录技术,在自然阅读过程中实时获取语言处理的行为和神经指标,聚焦老年人预测误差成本的产生机制,主要从副中央凹视觉、工作记忆负荷及语言能力三方面解释预测误差成本产生的原因。研究成果对构建汉语阅读的毕生发展模型有重要意义。     

Voluntary Attention Enhances Contrast Appearance

ABSTRACT— Voluntary (endogenous, sustained) covert spatial attention selects relevant sensory information for prioritized processing. The behavioral and neural consequences of such selection have been extensively documented, but its phenomenology has received little empirical investigation. We asked whether voluntary attention affects the subjective appearance of contrast—a fundamental dimension of visual perception. We used a demanding rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task to direct endogenous attention to a given location and measured perceived contrast at the attended and unattended locations. Attention increased perceived contrast of suprathreshold stimuli and also improved performance on a concurrent orientation discrimination task at the cued location. We ruled out response bias as an alternative account of the pattern of results. Thus, this study establishes that voluntary attention enhances perceived contrast. This phenomenological consequence links behavioral and neurophysiological studies on the effects of attention.     

Transcending the evidentiary boundary: Prediction error minimization,embodied interaction,and explanatory pluralism

In a recent paper, Jakob Hohwy argues that the emerging predictive processing (PP) perspective on cognition requires us to explain cognitive functioning in purely internalistic and neurocentric terms. The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the view that PP entails a wholesale rejection of positions that are interested in the embodied, embedded, extended, or enactive dimensions of cognitive processes. I will argue that Hohwy’s argument from analogy, which forces an evidentiary boundary into the picture, lacks the argumentative resources to make a convincing case for the conceptual necessity to interpret PP in solely internalistic terms. For this reason, I will reconsider the postulation and explanatory role of the evidentiary boundary. I will arrive at an account of prediction error minimization and its foundation on the free energy principle that is fully consistent with approaches to cognition that emphasize the embodied and interactive properties of cognitive processes. This gives rise to the suggestion that explanatory pluralism about the application of PP is to be preferred over Hohwy’s explanatory monism that follows from his internalistic and neurocentric view of predictive cognitive systems.     

Massive redeployment,exaptation, and the functional integration of cognitive operations

The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components—originally developed to serve some specific purpose—were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of “motor” areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of “language” areas like Broca’s area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control.     

Imagery and overflow: We see more than we report

The question of whether our conscious experience is rich or sparse remains an enduring controversy in philosophy. The “overflow” account argues that perceptual consciousness is far richer than cognitive access: when perceiving a complex scene, subjects see more than they can report. This paper draws on aphantasia (the condition of absent voluntary imagery) to propose a new argument in favor of overflow. First, it shows that opponents of overflow explain subjects’ performance in a change detection paradigm by appealing to a type of “internal imagery.” Second, it provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that aphantasics are incapable of generating this imagery. However, aphantasics perform equally well in this task; and so the no-overflow account fails to explain their performance. This means that proponents of this view are committed to an unsupported view of perception.     

Unconscious attention modulates the silencing effect of top-down predictions

The brain is considered to be proactive in that it continuously generates predictions about external environment stimuli. Recent Bayesian models of perception have demonstrated that prediction and attention operate synergistically to optimize stimulus processing. However, the relation between prediction and unconscious attention remains unclear given the relative neglect of unconscious attention in scholarly literatures. To investigate this issue, twenty participants (12 women) performed an orientation identification task in which a circular grating appeared either in the left or in the right visual field in a single 30–40 min session, during which 64-channel EEG data were acquired. Behavioral results showed an unconscious-attended effect and a facilitated effect. Importantly, prediction-related P1 and N1 silencing effects were observed in the unconscious-attended condition, probably reflecting that unconscious attention improves the precision of top-down predictions at an early stage of processing, thereby increasing the synaptic gain of predictor neurons. Moreover, unlike the early ERP components, P3 revealed a reversed pattern of results, which displayed a silencing effect of prediction only in the unattended condition, suggesting that the influence of unconscious attention on the silencing effect may change over time.     

The cognitive attitude of rational trust

I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to inspire trustworthiness, coping trust to simplify one’s planning, or corrective trust to avoid doing a testimonial injustice. To accommodate such types of trust, without accepting doxastic voluntarism, requires an account of the cognitive attitude of trust broader than belief alone. I argue that trust involves taking the proposition that someone will do something as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, which can be a matter of believing or accepting the proposition. I defend this account against objections that it (i) provides insufficient rational constraints on trust, (ii) conflates trust and pretense of trust, and (iii) cannot account for the rationality of back-up planning.     

Voluntary attention increases perceived spatial frequency

Voluntary covert attention selects relevant sensory information for prioritized processing. The behavioral and neural consequences of such selection have been extensively documented, but its phenomenology has received little empirical investigation. Involuntary attention increases perceived spatial frequency (Gobell & Carrasco, 2005), but involuntary attention can differ from voluntary attention in its effects on performance in tasks mediated by spatial resolution (Yeshurun, Montagna, & Carrasco, 2008). Therefore, we ask whether voluntary attention affects the subjective appearance of spatial frequency—a fundamental dimension of visual perception underlying spatial resolution. We used a demanding rapid serial visual presentation task to direct voluntary attention and measured perceived spatial frequency at the attended and unattended locations. Attention increased the perceived spatial frequency of suprathreshold stimuli and also improved performance on a concurrent orientation discrimination task. In the control experiment, we ruled out response bias as an alternative account by using a lengthened interstimulus interval, which allows observers to disengage attention from the cued location. In contrast to the main experiment, the observers showed neither increased perceived spatial frequency nor improved orientation discrimination at the attended location. Thus, this study establishes that voluntary attention increases perceived spatial frequency. This phenomenological consequence links behavioral and neurophysiological studies on the effects of attention.