Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

     

The influence of inhibitory processes on affective theory of mind in young and old adults

The primary aim of this study was to examine the impact of an inhibition manipulation on the effect of age on theory of mind (ToM) in an ecologically valid, affective ToM task. Participants were 30 young and 30 old adults. The Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery was used to measure ToM; in addition, measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence were taken. Participants were subjected to three levels of inhibitory demand during ToM reasoning: emotional inhibition, non-emotional inhibition, and no inhibition. Old adults performed worse than young adults. The emotional and non-emotional inhibition conditions resulted in worse ToM performance compared to the no inhibition condition. There were no differences in the impact of the inhibition conditions on old and young adults. Regression analyses suggested that old adults’ crystallized intelligence was a significant predictor of ToM performance, whereas it did not predict young adults’ ToM performance. Results are discussed in terms of verbal ability as a possible compensatory mechanism in coping with verbal inhibitory load in ToM reasoning.     

Cognitive load on working memory both encourages and discourages reasoning bias regarding the mental states of others

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about the mental states of others. An increasing number of studies have revealed that working memory (WM) plays an important role in ToM. The present study applied WM loads to adults during a ToM task in order to investigate the impact on mental‐state reasoning performance. The task required participants to estimate the probabilities of several possible behaviours for a protagonist following the presentation of a ToM story. Participants were also required to maintain a meaningless two‐ (light WM load) or seven‐letter English alphabet string (heavy WM load) during story comprehension and mental‐state reasoning. The results show that the combination of light WM load applied during story comprehension with heavy WM load during mental‐state reasoning results in an overestimation of the probability that the protagonist's behaviour will accord with a participant's knowledge. Conversely, a heavy WM load applied during story comprehension, regardless of the type of WM load during mental‐state reasoning, did not result in this probability estimation bias. We discuss these findings from the perspective of a WM representation account.     

Investigating ToM in aging with the MASC: from accuracy to error type

Growing evidence indicates that Theory of Mind (ToM) declines in normal aging. However, the majority of this research has used classic and static verbal tasks that present scenarios, which are very different from real life. The present study was designed to fill this gap by administering the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) to young and older participants. It allows one to analyze not only the accuracy, but also the typology of error in mental states attribution distinguishing between iper-ToM (over-mentalization), ipo-ToM (insufficient mentalization), and no-ToM (lack of mentalization). We recruited 30 young (20–29 years), 39 young-old (65–74 years), and 31 old-old (75–86 years) participants. Along with the MASC, we administered a classic ToM task, the Strange Stories, and several measures of cognitive functioning. Results showed that older adults were less accurate in mental state attribution than young adults in the MASC, but not in the Strange Stories. In addition, compared to young adults, older adults committed more errors of both ipo- and no-ToM, while young adults committed more often iper-ToM errors. Additionally, older adults, but not young adults, did not show a difference between iper-ToM and ipo-ToM errors, which were equally frequent in this age group. Globally, results indicated that older adults’ failure in classic ToM tasks may be due to both ipo- and iper-ToM and provide needed evidence for the MASC as a suitable measure of ToM in aging.     

Self-projection in younger and older adults: a study of episodic memory,prospection, and theory of mind

Self-projection is the ability to orient the self in different places in time and space. Episodic memory, prospection, and theory of mind (ToM) are all cognitive abilities that share an element of self-projection. Previous research has posited that each of these abilities stems from the same neural network. The current study compared performance of cognitively healthy older adults and younger adults on several self-projection tasks to examine the relatedness of these constructs behaviorally. Episodic memory and prospection were measured using an episodic interview task where the participants were asked to remember or imagine events that either had happened in the past or could happen in the future and then gave ratings describing the extent to which they were mentally experiencing the event and from what perspective they viewed it. ToM was measured by asking participants to make judgments regarding the intentions of characters described in stories that involved cognitive, affective, or ironic components. Our results demonstrate that aging influences episodic memory, prospection, and ToM similarly: older adult participants showed declines on each of these measures compared to younger adults. Further, we observed correlations between performance on the measures of episodic memory and prospection as well as between episodic memory and ToM, although no correlation between prospection and ToM was observed after controlling for chronological age. We discuss these results in the light of theories suggesting that each of these abilities is governed by a common brain system.     

Reasoning bias for the recall of one's own beliefs in a Smarties task for adults

While many studies in the theory of mind (ToM) literature have investigated how we understand others' mental states, few have explored the mechanism by which we reflect on our own mental states. This study examined how adults reflect on their own and others' mental states within the same ToM task. To do so, we modified the Smarties task, one of the traditional ToM tasks for children. The results showed that adult participants were biased by outcome knowledge when recalling their false belief and that the participants who overestimated their false belief also overestimated the mental states of a naive other. These results were analogous to young children's failure in the Smarties task. Considering the current findings, we discuss possible cognitive processes that are common across children and adults when reflecting on their own mental states and the mental states of others.     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释     

Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false‐belief reasoning

In their first years, children's understanding of mental states seems to improve dramatically, but the mechanisms underlying these changes are still unclear. Such ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) abilities may arise during development, or have an innate basis, developmental changes reflecting limitations of other abilities involved in ToM tasks (e.g. inhibition). Special circumstances such as early bilingualism may enhance ToM development or other capacities required by ToM tasks. Here we compare 3‐year‐old bilinguals and monolinguals on a standard ToM task, a modified ToM task and a control task involving physical reasoning. The modified ToM task mimicked a language‐switch situation that bilinguals often encounter and that could influence their ToM abilities. If such experience contributes to an early consolidation of ToM in bilinguals, they should be selectively enhanced in the modified task. In contrast, if bilinguals have an advantage due to better executive inhibitory abilities involved in ToM tasks, they should outperform monolinguals on both ToM tasks, inhibitory demands being similar. Bilingual children showed an advantage on the two ToM tasks but not on the control task. The precocious success of bilinguals may be associated with their well‐developed control functions formed during monitoring and selecting languages.     

Theory of mind ability in high socially anxious individuals

Background/Objectives: Research has demonstrated an association between social anxiety and impaired Theory of Mind (ToM). We assess whether ToM deficits occur even at a subclinical level of social anxiety and whether group differences in ToM performance are consistent with interpretation bias. We also explore potential reasons as to why socially anxious individuals may perform differently on ToM tasks.

Methods/Design: Undergraduate participants high (HSA; n?=?78) and low (LSA; n?=?35) in social anxiety completed a task of ToM decoding, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (MIE), a task of ToM reasoning, the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), and a post-task questionnaire about their experience completing the MASC.

Results: HSAs performed marginally worse than LSAs on the MIE on neutrally valenced trials, and their pattern of errors may be consistent with a negative interpretation bias. HSAs and LSAs did not differ overall in performance on the MASC, though HSAs reported experiencing more confusion and distress than LSAs during the task, and this distress was associated with more MASC errors for HSA participants only. These results provide insight into the nature of ToM ability in socially anxious individuals and highlight important avenues for future research.     

The effect of social role on theory of mind reasoning

The aim of this project was to explore the effects of social status on Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning. Neurologically normal adults' ToM performance was manipulated experimentally by temporarily putting them in a higher or lower status condition. Half the participants ‘won’ a mock competition and subsequently acted as instructor and evaluator. The other half ‘lost’ and subsequently acted as learner. Participants then completed ToM and control tasks including embedded false belief tasks and cartoon comprehension tasks. The hypothesis tested was that social role manipulation could affect performance on ToM tasks independently of any effect on control tasks. Results show an interaction between assigned status and task type. That performance on theory of mind tasks can vary independently of performance on matched control tasks is consistent with the idea that ToM reasoning can change as a result of a change in social status.     

孤独症个体的公平决策：心理理论和自我/他人情绪识别的作用

研究通过最后通牒任务,考查孤独症儿童在公平任务中的决策,以及心理理论和识别自我/他人情绪对决策的影响。29名孤独症儿童和三组对照组儿童参加实验结果发现,孤独症儿童在任务中面对不同分配比例的接受率（2:8、3:7）与对照组之间存在显著差异。心理理论能力和自我情绪识别都与决策存在相关：当处于不公平的情况下（1:9、2:8、3:7）,通过心理理论任务的孤独症儿童才会拒绝接受不公平分配,儿童也会感觉到不高兴并且做出拒绝的决定。     

不同形式的语言介入对汉语儿童心理理论发展的干预

为比较语言本身和语言交流的情境过程对儿童心理理论的贡献以及欺骗在此过程中的作用,本研究采用前后测对照实验设计探查了不同形式的语言介入和相关欺骗训练对儿童心理理论发展的影响。选取语言能力达到常模水平但未通过外表－事实区分任务的4岁组儿童77名,随机分为3个训练组和1个对照组,对其进行心理理论和语言能力前测,在各组的两种能力发展水平相当的前提下,对3个训练组分别作如下处理：完全训练组：带有心理状态动词的补语句法及欺骗训练;情境交际组：伴随语言情境交际训练和欺骗训练;补语句法组：心理状态动词和补语句法训练。一周后进行心理理论后测。结果表明,3个训练组与对照组之间在心理理论表现上均有显著差异。相对于一般语言交流的情境过程,补语句法和心理状态动词更能显著提高儿童的心理理论;早期欺骗经历也能促进儿童心理理论的发展,若二者结合使用则更利于儿童心理理论的改进     

Theory of Mind experience sampling in typical adults

We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind (ToM) attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period. Additionally, participants noted the direction of their thought (self versus other) and degree of socializing (with people versus alone) at the time of inquiry. We were interested in the relative frequency of ToM (mental state attributions) and how prominent they were in immediate social exchanges. Analyses of multiple choice answers suggest that typical adults: (1) spend more time thinking about actions than mental states and miscellaneous things, (2) exhibit a higher degree of own- versus other-directed thought when alone, and (3) make mental state attributions more frequently when not interacting (offline) than while interacting with others (online). A significant 3-way interaction between thought type, direction of thought, and socializing emerged because action but not mental state thoughts about others occurred more frequently when participants were interacting with people versus when alone; whereas there was an increase in the frequency of both action and mental state attributions about the self when participants were alone as opposed to socializing. A secondary analysis of coded free text responses supports findings 1–3. The results of this study help to create a more naturalistic picture of ToM use in everyday life and the method shows promise for future study of typical and atypical thought processes.     

Enhancing theory of mind in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia with transcranial direct current stimulation

Behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is a form of frontotemporal degeneration characterized by early changes in personality, emotional blunting, and/or loss of empathy. Recent research has highlighted that these features may be at least partially explained by impairments in the theory of mind (ToM; i.e., the ability to understand and predict other people’s behaviour by attributing independent mental states to them). The aim of this randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study was to test the hypothesis that transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the medial frontal cortex (MFC) selectively enhances communicative intention processing, a specific ToM ability. Using a single-session online design, we administered a ToM task that measures the ability to represent other people’s private and communicative intentions during active or sham tDCS to 16 bvFTD patients. To assess the impact of dementia on performance on the ToM task, we included 16 age-matched healthy volunteers who were asked to perform the entire experimental ToM task. BvFTD is characterized by an impairment in the comprehension of both communicative and private intentions relative to a healthy control group and by a disproportional impairment in communicative intention compared with private intention processing. Significant and selective accuracy improvement in the comprehension of communicative intentions after active stimulation was observed in patients with bvFTD. This is the first study that analyses ToM ability in patients with bvFTD using tDCS stimulation. Our findings could potentially contribute to the development of an effective, noninvasive brain stimulation treatment of ToM impairments in patients with bvFTD.     

Theory of mind and its relationship with executive functions and emotion recognition in borderline personality disorder

Impaired social cognition has been claimed to be a mechanism underlying the development and maintenance of borderline personality disorder (BPD). One important aspect of social cognition is the theory of mind (ToM), a complex skill that seems to be influenced by more basic processes, such as executive functions (EF) and emotion recognition. Previous ToM studies in BPD have yielded inconsistent results. This study assessed the performance of BPD adults on ToM, emotion recognition, and EF tasks. We also examined whether EF and emotion recognition could predict the performance on ToM tasks. We evaluated 15 adults with BPD and 15 matched healthy controls using different tasks of EF, emotion recognition, and ToM. The results showed that BPD adults exhibited deficits in the three domains, which seem to be task‐dependent. Furthermore, we found that EF and emotion recognition predicted the performance on ToM. Our results suggest that tasks that involve real‐life social scenarios and contextual cues are more sensitive to detect ToM and emotion recognition deficits in BPD individuals. Our findings also indicate that (a) ToM variability in BPD is partially explained by individual differences on EF and emotion recognition; and (b) ToM deficits of BPD patients are partially explained by the capacity to integrate cues from face, prosody, gesture, and social context to identify the emotions and others' beliefs.     

4、5岁儿童一般语言能力和心理理论关系的纵向研究

为探明汉语儿童语言和心理理论的发展, 追踪二者的动态关系及相互作用的方向, 本研究以80名4、5岁儿童为研究对象, 纵向探查了前后相隔6个月的儿童的一般语言能力和心理理论的发展状况, 并运用交叉-滞后组相关分析初步探查了二者是否存在因果关系及可能的作用方向。结果表明：4~5岁是汉语儿童心理理论发展的重要时期, 语言在这一阶段也得到快速发展。交叉-滞后组相关分析发现了4岁儿童语言和心理理论因果关系的证据, 但随着年龄的增长, 语言对心理理论的前提基础作用有所减弱, 5岁儿童没有表现出这种因果关系。     

Anticipatory postural adjustments during a Fitts’ task: Comparing young versus older adults and the effects of different foci of attention

Anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs) are an integral part of standing balance. Previous research with balance control has shown that adopting an external focus of attention, compared to an internal focus of attention, yields better performance during motor skills. Despite the importance of APAs, especially among older adults, and the potential benefits of adopting an external focus of attention, studies investigating methods for improving APAs are limited. The aim of this study was to compare behavioral, kinematic and APAs measures while adopting different foci of attention among young and older adults when performing a lower extremity Fitts’ task. Ten young adults (mean age 24 years ± 4.37) and ten older adults (mean age 75 years ± 5.85) performed a lower-extremity reaching task (Fitts’ task) while adopting an external focus (focus on target) and an internal focus (focus on limb) in a within-subject design. A motion capture system was used to record participants’ movement data. Custom software derived movement time (MT), peak velocity (PV), time to peak velocity (ttPV) and variability at target (SD_T). Electromyography (EMG) was used to determine APAs onset and magnitude. The findings showed that an external focus of attention led to significantly shorter MT, higher PV, shorter ttPV and more accuracy when reaching the target (SD_T) for both age groups. Also, EMG results showed that, with an external focus, APAs onset occurred earlier and APAs magnitude was more efficient. As predicted by Fitts’ Law, participants spent more time executing movements to targets with higher indices of difficulty. Older adults compared to young adults were more adversely affected by the increase of difficulty of the Fitts’ task, specifically, on measures of APAs. In conclusion, adopting an external focus of attention led to better overall movement performance when performing a lower extremity Fitts’ task. The task used in the present study can distinguish between APAs for older and young adults. We recommend that future studies expand on our findings in order to establish a performance-based objective measure of APAs to assess clinical interventions for postural control impairment.     

The Effect of Retention Interval Task Difficulty on Young Children's Prospective Memory: Testing the Intention Monitoring Hypothesis

The current study examined the impact of retention interval task difficulty on 4- and 5-year-olds’ prospective memory (PM) to test the hypothesis that children periodically monitor their intentions during the retention interval and that disrupting this monitoring may result in poorer PM performance. In addition, relations among PM, working memory, theory of mind (ToM), and 2 types of planning were investigated. Children (N = 64) were randomly assigned to an easy or difficult filler task during the retention interval prior to the PM task. Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds on the PM task, and children receiving the easy filler task outperformed those receiving the difficult filler task. Further, working memory, planning, and ToM were positively associated with PM for children receiving the difficult filler task but not for children receiving the easy filler task. Findings are interpreted with respect to the predictions of the intention monitoring hypothesis as well as the multiprocess framework of PM.     

Age effects on different components of theory of mind

The effects of aging on the cognitive and affective dimensions of theory of mind (ToM), and on the latter’s links with other cognitive processes, such as information processing speed, executive functions and episodic memory, are still unclear. We therefore investigated these effects in young (n = 25), middle-aged (n = 20) and older adults (n = 25), using separate subjective and objective assessment tasks. Furthermore, a novel composite task probed participants’ abilities to infer both cognitive and affective mental states in an interpersonal context. Although age affected the objective ToM tests, results revealed a direct aging effect on the second-order ToM, but an indirect one on the first-order cognitive ToM, mediated mainly by age-related declines in executive functions. This study supports the notion of an age-related distinction between subjective and objective assessments of ToM, and confirms that ToM is a complex mental ability with several characteristics reliant to some extent on executive processes.