Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness

Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others.     

Effects of position of speed limit signs and the presence of speed camera on Malaysian drivers’ speed choice: An eye-tracking study

Speeding is one of the most common driving violations in the world including in Malaysia. Reducing speed-related fatalities is one of Malaysia’s strategies to improve road safety. The current study aimed to investigate the effect of speed limit sign positioning and the presence of speed camera on drivers’ judgments about the appropriate speed to drive and their associated eye movements. Twenty participants took part in the study, and thirty two images of roads with a range of actual speed limits were presented. In each picture the displayed speed limit was edited to 30% lower than what participants think is appropriate on average. Speed limit signs were either presented on the road or on the speed limit sign boards at the road sides, and a speed camera sign was either present or not. Drivers judged a lower appropriate speed to drive when the camera sign was present than absent, while there was a wider spread of differences between judged and displayed speed when the speed limit sign was presented on the board than on the road. Drivers were quicker in fixating and looked more at the general area in which the speed limit sign appeared. Therefore drivers’ visual attention across scenes may be manipulated by the sign positions. These low-cost interventions could be useful in managing speed choice in Malaysia.     

Judgments of mean speed and predictions of route choice

How are driving speeds integrated when speeds vary along a route? In a first study, we examined heuristic processes used in judgments of mean speed when the mean speeds on parts of the trip varied. The judgments deviated systematically from objective mean speeds because the distances driven at different speeds were given more weight than travel time spent on the different distances. The second study showed that when there was a 10–15 min pause during a travel the effect on the mean speed decrease was underestimated for driving speeds of 90 km/h and higher. In the third study, the objective mean speeds and the subjective biased mean speed judgments were used to predict choices between routes with different speed limits. The results showed that subjective judgments predicted decisions to maximize mean speed significantly better than objective mean speeds. Finally, some applied and basic research implications of the results were discussed.     

Speed behaviour as a choice between observing and exceeding the speed limit

Despite speed behaviour being defined as a choice between several possible speeds, studies using theory of reasoned action or theory of planned behaviour to predict and understand speed behaviour have focused on exceeding and not on observing the speed limit. This study examines whether the evaluation of exceeding but also of observing the speed limit contributes to improving predictions of self-reported speed behaviour and determining intentions to produce each of these two behavioural options. For a specific driving situation (straight road with 90 km/h speed limit), 238 young male drivers reported the speed at which they would drive at and where asked to assess the theory of planned behaviour key constructs with respect to observing and exceeding the speed limit by at least 20 km/h. Results showed that the amount of explained variance of self-reported speed behaviour, as well as intentions to observe and to exceed the speed limit by at least 20 km/h, increased significantly when the evaluations of the two options were introduced in the same stepwise regression analysis. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.     

The development, validation, and application of a video-based technique for measuring an everyday risk-taking behavior: drivers' speed choice

Drivers' choice of speed is an important aspect of everyday risk-taking behavior because it has been shown to be one of the most important predictors of road accident involvement. This research developed, validated, and applied a measure of drivers' speed choice that combined a high degree of experimental control with external and ecological validity. In Study 1, a video-simulation measure of drivers' speed choice was developed and found to relate specifically to speed-related accident involvement, implying a degree of external validity. In Study 2, the measure was used to investigate the effect of auditory feedback on drivers' speed choice. It was found that increasing the level of internal car noise decreased drivers' preferred speeds. Further analyses indicated that this was likely due to perceptual effects on speed estimation. Results are discussed in terms of road safety and the ability of video-based measures to facilitate experimental control over tasks involving complex ecological stimuli.     

The anatomy of credibility: A conceptual framework of valued career helper attributes

Research on the qualities and characteristics that individuals value in those from whom they seek “career help” is very limited. Existing studies provide little insight into the meaning behind the labels individuals use to identify valued qualities and characteristics. We address this neglected area using qualitative interviews based on life story method whereby individuals identified informal and professional career helpers and the qualities and characteristics they valued in these helpers. Meanings are explored, qualities and characteristics conceptualized and a new conceptual framework showing the relationship between concepts is developed. Findings give rise to a discussion about the value and meaning of knowledge, impartiality, power and influence from the perspective of individuals in receipt of career help, and in so doing we challenge some commonly accepted discourse about these concepts in the academic and professional careers literature.     

The benefits of knowing what you know (and what you don’t): How calibration affects credibility

People tend to believe, and take advice from, informants who are highly confident. However, people use more than a mere “confidence heuristic.” We believe that confidence is influential because—in the absence of other information—people assume it is a valid cue to an informant’s likelihood of being correct. However, when people get evidence about an informant’s calibration (i.e., her confidence-accuracy relationship) they override reliance on confidence or accuracy alone. Two experiments in which participants choose between two opposing witnesses to a car accident show that neither confidence nor accuracy alone explains judgments of credibility; rather, whether a person is seen as credible ultimately depends on whether the person demonstrates good calibration. Credibility depends on whether sources were justified in believing what they believed.     

On the role of language in social choice theory

Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory are usually compared either regarding the normative plausibility or regarding the logical strength of the axioms involved. Here, instead, we propose to compare axiomatizations according to the language used for expressing the axioms. In order to carry out such a comparison, we suggest a formalist approach to axiomatization results which uses a restricted formal logical language to express axioms. Axiomatic characterization results in social choice theory then turn into definability results of formal logic. The advantages of this approach include the possibility of non-axiomatizability results, a distinction between absolute and relative axiomatizations, and the possibility to ask how rich a language needs to be to express certain axioms. We argue for formal minimalism, i.e., for favoring axiomatizations in the weakest language possible.     

Verbal and nonverbal behaviour as a basis for credibility attribution: The impact of task involvement and cognitive capacity

Three experiments were able to demonstrate the usefulness of dual-process models for the understanding of the process of credibility attribution. According to the assumptions of dual-process models, only high task involvement and high cognitive capacity leads to intensive processing of verbal and nonverbal information when making credibility judgments. Under low task involvement and/or low cognitive capacity, people predominantly use nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. In Experiment 1, participants under low or high task involvement saw a film in which the nonverbal behaviour (fidgety vs. calm) and the verbal information (low versus high credibility) of a source were manipulated. As predicted, when task involvement was low, only the nonverbal behaviour influenced participants’ credibility attribution. Participants with high task involvement also used the verbal information. In Experiment 2 and 3, the cognitive capacity of the participants was manipulated. Participants with high cognitive capacity, in contrast to those of low cognitive capacity, used the verbal information for their credibility attribution.     

Effects of implementation intentions on the self-reported frequency of drivers' compliance with speed limits

This study tested the efficacy of implementation intentions in the context of drivers' speeding behavior. Participants (N = 300) completed self-report measures of goal intention and behavior, and they were randomly assigned to an experimental condition, which required them to specify an implementation intention, or a control condition. One month post-baseline, self-reported compliance with speed limits significantly increased for experimental participants but not for control participants. The effects of specifying an implementation intention on behavior increased with the strength of drivers' goal intentions. Finally, analysis of participants' implementation intentions revealed that specifying more behavioral strategies increased the frequency with which participants reported complying with the speed limit. Implications of the findings are discussed in relation to enhancing road safety interventions.     

The effect of aging in recollective experience: the processing speed and executive functioning hypothesis

This study was designed to investigate the effects of aging on consciousness in recognition memory, using the Remember/Know/Guess procedure (Gardiner, J. M., & Richarson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and Knowing. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press.). In recognition memory, older participants report fewer occasions on which recognition is accompanied by recollection of the original encoding context. Two main hypotheses were tested: the speed mediation hypothesis (Salthouse, T. A. (1996). The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in cognition. Psychological Review, 3, 403–428) and the executive-aging hypothesis (West, R. L. (1996). An application of prefrontal cortex function theory to cognitive aging. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 272–292). A group of young and a group of older adults took a recognition test in which they classified their responses according to Gardiner, J. M., & Richarson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and Knowing. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press. remember-know-guess paradigm. Subsequently, participants completed processing speed and executive function tests. The results showed that among the older participants, R responses decreased, but K responses did not. Moreover, a hierarchical regression analysis supported the view that the effect of age in recollection experience is determined by frontal lobe integrity and not by diminution of processing speed.     

The effect of choice on intention-behavior consistency

Three studies were conducted with the aim of investigating whether choice of behavioral alternative increases intention-behavior consistency. In Study 1 undergraduates were asked to write and mail back an essay on a topic they either chose or were assigned. Demonstrating an effect of choice, significantly more subjects who chose an essay topic mailed back the essays. These subjects also rated their intention to write the essay as stronger, thus suggesting that the difference between choice and no choice is that the intention is self-generated. Supporting this interpretation, no differences in mail-back rates were observed in Studies 2 and 3 between a difficult and easy choice condition. Furthermore, an alternative hypothesis that choice induces implementation intentions did not receive support since independent effects were in Study 2 found of deciding when and where to write the essay and in Study 3 of making an outline of the essay.     

The mnemonic effect of choice

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Making choices during encoding leads to superior memory compared with having the same choices made for you. Evidence also suggests that chosen items might be...     

The effect of forced choice on color discrimination

Color discrimination ability was measured at four spectral regions usually named blue, green, yellow, and red. Two methods, temporal forced-choice and phenomenal report, were compared. Data suggest that for color discrimination, phenomenal report is a preferable technique.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Choice-induced preferences in the absence of choice: Evidence from a blind two choice paradigm with young children and capuchin monkeys

In two studies, we provide a test of the revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences. To do so, we introduce a blind two-choice task in which preferences cannot guide choices. Children chose between two similar objects while ignorant of the objects’ identities, and then chose between the rejected alternative and a third similar object. Monkeys were given an illusion of choice between two similar objects, and then chose between the rejected object and a third similar object. Both children and monkeys preferred the third object, indicating that they devalued the rejected object. This response pattern did not occur when the children and monkeys were not given the opportunity to choose between the two initial items. These results provide evidence against a revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences and demonstrate that the process of making a choice itself induces preferences.     

Promoting drivers' compliance with speed limits: Testing an intervention based on the theory of planned behaviour

The efficacy of a theory of planned behaviour (TPB)‐based intervention to promote drivers' compliance with speed limits was tested. Participants (N=300) were randomly assigned to an experimental condition, and received persuasive messages designed to change beliefs as specified in the TPB, or a control condition. Baseline and follow‐up (1 month post‐baseline) measures of TPB variables and behaviour were collected using postal questionnaires. Results showed that the intervention had a significant effect on one control belief, and significantly increased perceived behavioural control and reported behaviour. Mediation analyses confirmed that the control belief change generated the perceived behavioural control change and that the perceived behavioural control change generated the behaviour change. Implications for promoting road safety are discussed.     

The effect of verbal reinforcement on career choice realism

Twenty-four male undergraduates viewed 102 slides containing occupational titles and stated whether or not each represented a realistic career choice. Each subject was given three trials, with the experimental subjects receiving positive verbal reinforcement on the second trial for realistic responses. (If the choice was congruous with the individual's occupational type, as determined by the Vocational Preference Inventory, it was scored as realistic.) The results of the research revealed a tendency for all subjects to increase in career choice realism as a function of participation in the experiment, with significantly (p < .05) more experimental subjects than control subjects demonstrating an operant pattern of responses. Implications of the findings for counselors were discussed.     

The effect of constant outcome value on judgments and decision making given linguistic probabilities

Two experiments were performed to determine whether judgments of the relative chances of two independent events occurring are biased by constant outcome values contingent on the events when the uncertainties are specified by linguistic expressions (e.g. doubtful). In Experiment 1, subjects directly judged the relative chances of the two events, of which one was represented by a spinner and the other by a linguistic probability expression. In Experiment 2, only linguistic probability expressions were used to describe the two events and a betting procedure was used. A bias was evident in both studies, such that the relative judgments tended to favour the event with the positive rather than the negative contingent outcome. The bias was smaller for the low- than for the high-probability phrases. Individual differences were great, with the bias appearing strongly in only about one-third of the population. Theoretical implications of the present and related results are discussed.     

The effect of prediction accuracy on choice reaction time

In this study, we examined the effect of prediction accuracy on reaction time (RT). Subjects performed on three blocks of choice RT trials, all of which involved the mapping of four stimuli (red, green, 1, or 0) onto two response keys. The subjects were told that the four stimuli were equally probable and that their task was to respond to each stimulus onset by pressing the correct key. In one block (stimulus-prediction), the subjects predicted, prior to each trial, the precise stimulus that would appear. In a second block (category-prediction), the subjects predicted the category of the stimulus (i.e., color or digit) that would appear. In a third block (no-prediction), the subjects simply responded to each stimulus without making a prior prediction. In the stimulus-prediction block, RT was faster for correct predictions than for incorrect predictions. In addition, RT was faster on trials in which an incorrect prediction involved the correct category than on trials in which it involved the incorrect category: that is, a "half-wrong" prediction was better than an "all-wrong" prediction. In the category-prediction block, RT was faster when the stimulus category was predicted correctly than when it was not. There was little evidence of a response-facilitation contribution to the correct-prediction effect. These results permit inferences concerning the encoding and organization of information in memory.