Metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices: Reductionism and organicism in cancer research

Metaphysical presuppositions are important for guiding scientific practices and research. The success of twentieth‐century biology, for instance, is largely attributable to presupposing that complex biological processes are reducible to elementary components. However, some biologists have challenged the sufficiency of reductionism for investigating complex biological phenomena and have proposed alternative presuppositions like organicism. In this article, contemporary cancer research is used as a case study to explore the importance of metaphysical presuppositions for guiding research. The predominant paradigm directing cancer research is the somatic mutation theory, in which mutated genes are presumed to be ultimately responsible for explaining carcinogenesis. This reductionistic approach to cancer has been criticised recently, and an organistic approach has been proposed. The article concludes with a discussion of the reciprocal interaction of metaphysical presuppositions and scientific practices for investigating cancer's complex nature.     

Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

The standard event-causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event-causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the “agent-mind problem”, the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event-causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event-causal answers to the agent-mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event-casual view. The paper concludes with a burden-shifting argument against emergentist agent-causal theories and non-reductive event-causal theories of agency.     

Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection

One of the central problems afflicting reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the apparent fact that infants and small children are not cognitively capable of having the inductively based positive reasons required by this view. Since non-reductionism does not impose a requirement of this sort, it is thought to avoid this problem and is therefore taken to have a significant advantage over reductionism. In this paper, however, I argue that if this objection undermines reductionism, then a variant of it similarly undermines non-reductionism. Thus, considerations about the cognitive capacities of infants and small children do not effectively discriminate between these two competing theories of testimonial justification.     

Idealizing Reduction: The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics

The dominant view among macroeconomists is that macroeconomics reduces to microeconomics, both in the sense that all macroeconomic phenomena arise out of microeconomic phenomena and in the sense that macroeconomic theory—to the extent that it is correct—can be derived from microeconomic theory. More than that, the dominant view believes that macroeconomics should in practice use the reduced microeconomic theory: this is the program of microfoundations for macroeconomics to which the vast majority of macroeconomists adhere. The “microfoundational” models that they actually employ are, however, characterized by another feature: they are highly idealized, even when they are applied as direct characterizations of actual data, which itself consists of macroeconomic aggregates. This paper explores the interrelationship between reductionism and idealization in the microfoundational program and the role of idealization in empirical modeling.     

Collectivize social support? Elements for reconsidering the social dimension in the study of social support

Psychological models of mental disorders play an important role in the explanation of psychological deterioration. Researchers from this area usually study several cognitive and behavioral variables to account for the onset and maintenance of depression. However, many authors have detected the need to include a "social dimension" in the explanation of deterioration. In this sense, social support has become a crucial aspect in the study of mental health, and the psychological literature on this topic has generated an intense debate about several facets of the positive impact of social networks on psychological well-being. In this article, the author defends that this increasing centrality of the concept has been accompanied by a psychological reductionism that is making the role of "social aspects" to explain psychological well-being more problematic. Implications of this reductionism are discussed, and an alternative proposal is made to overcome some theoretical and empirical problems related to social support research.     

Accepting Testimony

I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle required. I consider two alternative weaker principles as complements to local reductionism; one yields counter–intuitive results unless we accept (APT) as well, while the other is too weak to enable local reductionism to avoid scepticism.     

Foundations of the human sciences 1 : Beyond reductionism: The emerging holistic paradigm in education

Abstract

Modern educational theory and practice are grounded in an objec‐tivistic, reductionistic world view, particularly a “natural science” conception of human development. Holistic education is a radically non‐reductionistic approach based upon a person‐centered, ecological, global and spiritual world view. As such, the holistic paradigm is an alternative not only to the scientistic reductionism of the modern age, but also to the intellectual reductionism of postmodern thought. Holistic education is a humanistic as well as spiritual critique of the dominant culture.     

Beyond reductionism: The emerging holistic paradigm in education

Abstract

Modern educational theory and practice are grounded in an objectivistic, reductionistic world view, particularly a “natural science” conception of human development. Holistic education is a radically non‐reductionistic approach based upon a person‐centered, ecological, global and spiritual world view. As such, the holistic paradigm is an alternative not only to the scientistic reductionism of the modern age, but also to the intellectual reductionism of postmodern thought. Holistic education is a humanistic as well as spiritual critique of the dominant culture.     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

Sex in the Head

Abstract Recent philosophical writing on sexual desire divides broadly into two camps. Reductionists take sexual desire to aim at an essentially physical bodily pleasure, whereas intentionalist accounts take a focus upon the reciprocal interaction of the mental states of the partners to be crucial for understanding the phenomenon. I argue that the apparent plausibility of reductionism rests upon the flawed assumption that sexual pleasure has the same uniform bodily character in all sexual encounters, which rests in turn upon flawed assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of persons as essentially embodied minds, I outline an alternative account of sexual desire, showing how the nature of the sexual pleasure we take in the body of another can be transformed by the significance the person or situation has for us. I proceed to show that my account of sexual desire is able to accommodate the entire range of sexual phenomena, including those that seem to undermine standard intentionalist accounts as well as those that reductionists have difficulty in fully explaining. Finally I make some brief remarks about the implications of my account of sexual desire for sexual morality, suggesting some reasons why it casts doubt on the view that universal participant consent is sufficient for a sexual act to be morally unproblematic.     

还原论对临床决策的影响

“看病贵”已经不仅仅是一个简单的医院职能问题了,从政治、经济、文化、社会、环境、医学、心理等各个领域,都对这个问题展开了广泛的探讨和研究,本文从哲学和医学发展史的角度,纵深剖析了还原论对医院临床决策的影响,指出当前医院的种种弊端在很大程度上是由于受到还原论的思维方式的不利影响,希望能够为临床决策的改进提供一条新的思路。     

A Contribution of Tipler's Omega Point Theory to Near-Death Studies

A fundamental principle of behavioral and natural scientists is reductionism: all mental phenomena can be reduced to a physical basis. Phenomena that have no physical basis cannot really exist. For most scientists this rules out transpersonal, spiritual or noetic, and religious phenomena, all of which maintain strongly antireductionist positions. Thus near-death researchers have an uphill battle to stay scientifically afloat. However, mathematician Frank Tipler argues that, while reductionism is necessary to the scientific world, it does not negate the religious, noetic, or spiritual dimension of human experience. He demonstrates by hard-core physics the existence of God and religious and spiritual phenomena. While the proofs he offers can be understood only by other astrophysicists, his overall viewpoint is comprehensible by laypeople. I present his concepts and arguments, and highlight the value of this orientation for near-death studies. Tipler's work takes the steam out of scientific rejection of religious, spiritual, or noetic phenomena, and makes it possible to accept these phenomena while maintaining a strictly scientific posture. Near-death researchers can gain a greater degree of scientific acceptance by adopting Tipler's position on reductionism.     

Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning

Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that reasons are premises of good reasoning – that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning towards φ‐ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this article, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out implications for the debate over pragmatic reasons for belief and other attitudes and for one influential form of reductionism about the normative.     

Complexity-based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints

In recent years, many philosophers of science have attempted to articulate a theory of non-epistemic emergence that is compatible with mechanistic explanation and incompatible with reductionism. The 2005 account of Fred C. Boogerd et al. has been particularly influential. They argued that a systemic property was emergent if it could not be predicted from the behaviour of less complex systems. Here, I argue that Boogerd et al.'s attempt to ground emergence in complexity guarantees that we will see emergence, but at the cost of rendering it either trivial or epistemic. There are three basic problems. First, neither the measures of complexity explicitly mentioned by Boogerd et al. nor the most popular measures in the literature can do the practical and theoretical work that they assign to complexity. Second, I argue that while the success of their view depends on restricting the base of information available to the reductionist, this cannot be done in a way that is metaphysically neutral with respect to emergence. Thus, their account renders emergence trivial. Third, I argue that grounding emergence in complexity can support only epistemic emergence. I conclude by considering the methodological import of their account.     

Lost forever or temporarily misplaced? The long debate about the nature of memory impairment

Studies of memory impairment in humans and experimental animals have been fundamental to learning about the organization of memory and its cellular and molecular substrates. When memory impairment occurs, especially after perturbations of the nervous system, the question inevitably arises whether the impairment reflects impaired information storage or impaired accessibility. This topic has been the subject of considerable commentary and experimental work over the years. In this reappraisal, I first consider four broad areas of behavioral study from the 1970s and 1980s that led to a dominant and compelling view of memory impairment as a deficit of information storage. Second, I identify some ambiguities that arise about how the terms "storage" and "retrieval" are applied, especially when the evidence is somewhat indirect and based on a behavioral-psychological level of analysis. I then review neurobiological findings that have been largely overlooked in these discussions. The relevant studies are ones where it has been possible to monitor neurons and synapses in direct relation to behavioral memory, for example, in animals with simple nervous systems and in single cell recordings from behaving monkeys. This work provides a straightforward and illuminating perspective on the question and confirms the view that first emerged from less direct evidence.     

Emotions,narrative and change

There is a wide agreement that emotions are central to the evaluation and understanding of change processes in psychotherapy. Unfortunately, most of the debate on the role of emotions has been influenced by the reductionist view of ‘psychophysiological symbolism’ (Averill 1996). We defend the position that, in order to understand their role in psychotherapy fully, we need to move in the direction of a more complex view of emotions. This paper presents a view of emotionsas social constructed phenomena operating via language and narrative. We present research suggesting that these narratives may be an essential process for understanding psychological disorders, how these disorders are developed and, finally, how they can be changed.     

Persons,Simplicity, and Substance

A novel argument has recently been advanced against materialism—the view that human persons are identical to composite, material objects. The argument claims that pairs of people are not conscious and that the only viable explanation for why they are not is because pairs of people are not simple. The argument concludes that only a simple thing can be the subject of conscious states. In this paper, I offer an alternative explanation for why pairs of people are not conscious: pairs of people are not substances. I provide two characterizations of substantiality. The first proposal claims that substances have irreducible causal powers, and the second claims that substances cannot have other substances as proper parts. The alternative explanation based on these characterizations of substantiality shows that being conscious is compatible with materialism.     

Sui generis phenomena and disciplinary axioms: Rethinking Pals' proposal

Daniel Pals and I have made independent arguments for the resolution of the debate over reductionism in religious studies with the adoption of appropriate ‘disciplinary axioms’. This paper undertakes a critical review of Pals' proposal, suggesting that his axiomatic conception of the sui generis nature of religious phemomena is substantively inadequate because he misconceives the theoretical grounds for axiom adoption in the social sciences. An argument is advanced, by comparison, for the advantages of an alternative formulation which demarcates religious phenomena in terms of ‘references to the transcendent’.