Data selection and natural sampling: Probabilities do matter

Probabilistic accounts of Wason's selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 1996) are controversial, with some researchers failing to replicate the predicted effects of probability manipulations. This paper reports a single experiment in which participants sampled the data naturally-that is, sequentially. The proportions of possible data types (i.e., cards in the selection task) also reflected the probability manipulation. Other than this procedural difference, the materials were the same as those in Oberauer, Wilhelm, and Rosas-Diaz's (1999) Experiment 3, which failed to show probabilistic effects. Significant probabilistic effects were observed. Moreover, in a comparative model-fitting exercise, a revised version of the information gain model (Hattori, 1999, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, in press-b) was shown to provide better fits to these data than did competing explanations.     

Context,goal, utility,and relevance: A reply to Evans (2002) considering Oaksford (2002)

Yama (2001) argued that the matching bias effect was an amalgam of a genuine matching effect and a set size effect. However, Evans (2002) pointed out some problems with Yama's argument. One was on the matching index used in Yama (2001). The others concerned a gap between Yama's (2001) interpretation of matching bias and Evans' (1998) recent discussions that had placed emphasis on the problem of implicit negation. I reply to these claims taking Oaksford (2002) into consideration. Further, I propose a framework connecting context, goal, utility, and relevance, and including a hierarchical structure of goals. I argue that theories of reasoning can be developed and extended with the framework.     

How do people react to negative procedures? On the moderating role of authority’s biased attitudes

The authors focus on the effects an authority’s apparent inconsistency between persons on judgments of relational treatment and procedural justice following negative procedures (i.e., procedures that people commonly regard as unfair). In Experiment 1, participants responded most negatively following a procedure that denied them, but granted another participant, an opportunity to voice an opinion when the intergroup context raised suspicions of bias (i.e., when both the experimenter and another participant were outgroup members). In Experiment 2, participants responded most negatively when the experimenter had expressed biased attitudes in favor of another participant, but this effect occurred only following procedures that denied participants a voice opportunity. We conclude that authority’s biased attitudes help people to make sense of negative procedure information.     

In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making

Many theorists propose two types of processing: heuristic and analytic. In conflict tasks, in which these processing types lead to opposing responses, giving the analytic response may require bothdetection andresolution of the conflict. The ratio bias task, in which people tend to treat larger numbered ratios (e.g., 20/100) as indicating a higher likelihood of winning than do equivalent smaller numbered ratios (e.g., 2/10), is considered to induce such a conflict. Experiment 1 showed response time differences associated with conflict detection, resolution, and the amount of conflict induced. The conflict detection and resolution effects were replicated in Experiment 2 and were not affected by decreasing the influence of the heuristic response or decreasing the capacity to make the analytic response. The results are consistent with dual-process accounts, but a single-process account in which quantitative, rather than qualitative, differences in processing are assumed fares equally well in explaining the data.     

The role of a change heuristic in judgments of sound duration

The present study investigated whether the quality of a frequency change within a sound (i.e., smooth vs. abrupt) would influence perception of its duration. In three experiments, participants were presented with two consecutive sounds on each of a series of trials, and their task was to judge whether the second sound was longer or shorter in duration than the first. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to judge sounds consisting of a smooth and continuous change in frequency as longer in duration than sounds that maintained a constant frequency. In Experiment 2, the same bias was observed for sounds incorporating an abrupt change in frequency, but only when the frequency change was relatively small. The results of Experiment 3 suggested that the application of a change heuristic when generating duration judgments depends on the perception of change as originating from a single, integrated perceptual object.     

Think-aloud protocols and the selection task: Evidence for relevance effects and rationalisation processes

Two experiments are reported that employed think-aloud methods to test predictions concerning relevance effects and rationalisation processes derivable from Evans' (1996) heuristic-analytic theory of the selection task. Evans' account proposes that card selections are triggered by relevance-determining heuristics, with analytic processing serving merely to rationalise heuristically cued decisions. As such, selected cards should be associated with more references to both their facing and their hidden sides than rejected cards, which are not subjected to analytic rationalisation. Experiment 1 used a standard selection-task paradigm, with negative components permuted through abstract conditional rules. Support was found for all heuristic-analytic predictions. This evidence was shown to be robust in Experiment 2, where “select - don't select” decisions were enforced for all cards. Both experiments also clarify the role played by secondary heuristics in cueing the consideration of hidden card values during rationalisation. We suggest that whilst Evans' heuristic-analytic model and Oaksford and Chater's (e.g., 2003) optimal data selection model can provide compelling accounts of our protocol findings, the mental models theory fares less well as an explanation of our full dataset.     

A quantitative model of optimal data selection in Wason's selection task.

The optimal data selection model proposed by Oaksford and Chater (1994) successfully formalized Wason's selection task (Wason, 1966). The model, however, involved some questionable assumptions and was also not sufficient as a model of the task because it could not provide quantitative predictions of the card selection frequencies. In this paper, the model was revised to provide quantitative fits to the data. The model can predict the selection frequencies of cards based on a selection tendency function (STF), or conversely, it enables the estimation of subjective probabilities from data. Past experimental data were first re-analysed based on the model. In Experiment 1, the superiority of the revised model was shown. However, when the relationship between antecedent and consequent was forced to deviate from the biconditional form, the model was not supported. In Experiment 2, it was shown that sufficient emphasis on probabilistic information can affect participants' performance. A detailed experimental method to sort participants by probabilistic strategies was introduced. Here, the model was supported by a subgroup of participants who used the probabilistic strategy. Finally, the results were discussed from the viewpoint of adaptive rationality.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

When intuitions are helpful: Prior beliefs can support reasoning in the bat-and-ball problem

Intuitions are often considered suboptimal because they can bias people's thinking. The bat-and-ball problem is a celebrated example of this potentially detrimental aspect of intuitions since it elicits a very appealing and prepotent intuitive but incorrect response. We propose to show that certain kinds of intuitions (i.e., prior beliefs) can help people to reason better on this task. In two experiments, participants answered either a classic congruent version of the bat-and-ball problem in which the intuitively cued response fitted with prior knowledge (i.e., was believable) or a modified incongruent version in which the intuitively cued response conflicted with prior knowledge (i.e., was unbelievable). Results indicate that participants who solved the modified unbelievable version performed better than participants who solved the classic believable version. Our data highlight that prior beliefs, even in the bat-and-ball problem, can accidentally make people perform better, probably because they encourage them to adopt a more effortful processing strategy.     

In search of counter-examples: Deductive rationality in human reasoning

Dual-process theories come in many forms. They draw on the distinction between associative, heuristic, tacit, intuitive, or implicit processes (System 1) and rule-based, analytic, explicit processes (System 2). We present the results of contextual manipulations that have a bearing on the supposed primacy of System 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000). Experiment 1 showed that people who evaluated logically valid or invalid conditional inferences under a timing constraint (N=56), showed a smaller effect of logical validity than did people who were not placed under a timing constraint (N= 44). Experiment 2 similarly showed that stressing the logical constraint that only inferences that follow necessarily are to be endorsed (N = 36) increased the size of the validity effect, as compared to that of participants (N=33) given the standard instruction to make "logical" inferences. These findings concur with the thesis in dual-processing frameworks that "Rationality-2 processes" (Evans & Over, 1996), "test procedures" (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or "conclusion validation processes" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Schroyens, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2001) serve to override the results of System 1 processes.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences

Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Naming very familiar people: When retrieving names is faster than retrieving semantic biographical information

One of the most reliable findings in the literature on person indentification is that semantic categorization of a face occurs more quickly than naming a face. Here we present two experiments in which participants are shown the faces of their colleagues, i.e., personally familiar people, encountered with high frequency. In each experiment, naming was faster than making a semantic classification, despite the fact that the semantic classifications were highly salient to the participants (Experiment 1: highest degree obtained; Experiment 2: nationality). The finding is consistent with models that allow or parallel access from faces to semantic information and to names, and demonstrates the need for the frequency of exposure to names to be taken into account in models of proper name processing e.g. Burke, Mackay, Worthley and Wade (1991) .     

Bayesian Rationality for the Wason Selection Task? A Test of Optimal Data Selection Theory

Oaksford and Chater (1994) proposed to analyse the Wason selection task as an inductive instead of a deductive task. Applying Bayesian statistics, they concluded that the cards that participants tend to select are those with the highest expected information gain. Therefore, their choices seem rational from the perspective of optimal data selection. We tested a central prediction from the theory in three experiments: card selection frequencies should be sensitive to the subjective probability of occurrence for individual cards. In Experiment 1, expected frequencies of the p- and the q-card were manipulated independently by concepts referring to large vs. small sets. Although the manipulation had an effect on card selection frequencies, there was only a weak correlation between the predicted and the observed patterns. In the second experiment, relative frequencies of individual cards were manipulated more directly by explicit frequency information. In addition, participants estimated probabilities for the four logical cases and of the conditional statement itself. The experimental manipulations strongly affected the probability estimates, but were completely unrelated to card selections. This result was replicated in a third experiment. We conclude that our data provide little support for optimal data selection theory.     

Don't hate me because I'm beautiful: Anti-attractiveness bias in organizational evaluation and decision making

Within organizational judgment and decision making contexts, biases based on an evaluated person's attractiveness are among the most salient and frequently investigated. An enormous amount of research indicates favoritism for attractive people compared to unattractive ones. The current research demonstrates that the nature of this bias depends on whether one is evaluating a member of the same sex or the opposite sex. Experiment 1 (n = 2639) investigated selection of scholarship applicants and demonstrated that a pro-attractiveness bias held only for selection of opposite-sex scholarship applicants; no such bias was observed for highly attractive same-sex applicants. Experiment 2 (n = 622) investigated evaluations of prospective job candidates and demonstrated again that pro-attractiveness bias was observed only for opposite-sex candidates; participants discriminated against highly attractive same-sex candidates. Moreover, this bias was not observed among highly attractive participants; it held only for moderately attractive participants, those for whom highly attractive same-sex individuals can pose especially potent social threats. Findings suggest that attractiveness biases in organizational decision making are rooted partly in the social threats and opportunities afforded by attractive people.     

Effects of divided attention and social categorization on the own-race bias in face recognition

Perceivers remember own-race faces more accurately than other-race faces (i.e., Own-Race Bias). In the current experiments, we manipulated participants' attentional resources and social group membership to explore their influence on own and other-race face recognition memory. In Experiment 1, Chinese participants viewed own-race and Caucasian faces, and between-subjects we manipulated whether participants attention was divided during face encoding. We found that divided attention eliminated the Own-Race Bias in memory due to a reduction of memory accuracy for own-race faces, implicating that attention allocation plays a role in creating the bias. In Experiment 2, Chinese participants completed an ostensible personality test. Some participants were informed that their personality traits were most commonly found in Caucasian (i.e., other-race) individuals, resulting in these participants sharing a group membership with other-race targets. In contrast, other participants were not told anything about the personality test, resulting in the default own-race group membership. The participants encoded the faces for a subsequent recognition memory test either with or without performing a concurrent arithmetic distracting task. Results showed that other-race group membership and reducing attention during encoding independently eliminated the typical Own-Race Bias in face memory. The implications of these findings on perceptual-expertise and social-categorization models are discussed.     

Reversing the truth effect: learning the interpretation of processing fluency in judgments of truth

Repeated statements receive higher truth ratings than new statements. Given that repetition leads to greater experienced processing fluency, the author proposes that fluency is used in truth judgments according to its ecological validity. Thus, the truth effect occurs because people learn that fluency and truth tend to be positively correlated. Three experiments tested this notion. Experiment 1 replicated the truth effect by directly manipulating processing fluency; Experiment 2 reversed the effect by manipulating the correlation between fluency and truth in a learning phase. Experiment 3 generalized this reversal by showing a transfer of a negative correlation between perceptual fluency (due to color contrast) and truth to truth judgments when fluency is due to prior exposure (i.e., repetition).     

Metamemorial influences in recognition memory: Pictorial encoding reduces conjunction errors

Two experiments are presented that explore the role of the distinctiveness heuristic (e.g., Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) on rates of conjunction errors as a function of encoding condition. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate a reliable reduction of conjunction errors when participants study pictures relative to both reading words aloud and silently. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the nature of the pictures presented during the study phase is important for reducing conjunction errors. Collectively, the experiments demonstrate that participants can use the distinctiveness heuristic in addition to recall-to-reject strategies to avoid conjunction errors. These findings add to a growing body of literature that suggests that participants are able to use expectations for memory to guide their recognition decisions.     

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

Bayesian inference for the information gain model

One of the most popular paradigms to use for studying human reasoning involves the Wason card selection task. In this task, the participant is presented with four cards and a conditional rule (e.g., “If there is an A on one side of the card, there is always a 2 on the other side”). Participants are asked which cards should be turned to verify whether or not the rule holds. In this simple task, participants consistently provide answers that are incorrect according to formal logic. To account for these errors, several models have been proposed, one of the most prominent being the information gain model (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). This model is based on the assumption that people independently select cards based on the expected information gain of turning a particular card. In this article, we present two estimation methods to fit the information gain model: a maximum likelihood procedure (programmed in R) and a Bayesian procedure (programmed in WinBUGS). We compare the two procedures and illustrate the flexibility of the Bayesian hierarchical procedure by applying it to data from a meta-analysis of the Wason task (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). We also show that the goodness of fit of the information gain model can be assessed by inspecting the posterior predictives of the model. These Bayesian procedures make it easy to apply the information gain model to empirical data. Supplemental materials may be downloaded along with this article from .