Perceptions of Anti-Catholic Bias and Political Party Identification Among U.S. Catholics

Recent controversies in the news over anti-Catholicism alleged by elites on both the left and the right raise the question of how perceptions of religious prejudice relate to political preferences among Catholics. Using survey data on 746 self-identified adult Catholics, we examine the extent to which they perceive anti-Catholic bias and how those perceptions are related to political party identification. Catholics were asked whether they think there is a general anti-Catholic bias in the United States and whether each of seven sociopolitical groups is "hostile,""friendly," or "neutral" toward Catholics. The likelihood of perceiving a general anti-Catholic bias in the United States and anti-Catholic hostility from liberal sociopolitical groups increases with more frequent Mass attendance. The likelihood of perceiving hostility from conservative groups is unrelated to attendance. While the perception of a general anti-Catholic bias in the United States does not predict political party identification, perceptions of hostility from liberal groups tend to predict Republican identification, and perceptions of hostility from conservative groups tend to predict Democratic identification. Though perceived hostility from liberal groups has a stronger effect on party identification, we conclude that perceptions of anti-Catholic prejudice are related to the politics of some Catholics on both the left and the right.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

Coda--after "The end of the end of ideology"

Replies to comments by M. Glassman and D. Karno and R. K. Unger, on the author's original article on ideology. J. T. Jost thanks Glassman and Karno for returning him to his philosophical roots. Glassman and Karno argued in favor of an "instrumental pragmatist" approach to the study of ideology that emphasizes the strategic, purposive, goal-directed nature of political rhetoric and belief. He agrees that such an approach is helpful and empirically sound. He also agrees that ideological movements are often orchestrated by elites (e.g., party leaders) for strategic political purposes in a top-down manner. There are several other points, however, on which Glassman and Karno seem to misunderstand him. Regarding Unger's comments, Unger pointed out, quite correctly, that Jost said relatively little about the role of religious ideology in his discussion of ideological polarization in the United States. The ideological gulf between religious traditionalists and secular humanists has indeed been widening since 1980, and it corresponds strongly to right-left differences in political attitudes. Jost mentioned, somewhat cryptically, at the end of his article that "similarly fruitful analyses could be undertaken with respect to religious and other belief systems," and he is grateful for Unger's invitation to elaborate on this point.     

Authoritarianism without Dominant Ideology: Political Manifestations of Authoritarian Attitudes in Hungary

Since the publication of Adorno, Frenkel‐Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950 ) classic study, considerable debate has developed concerning the political and ideological correlates of authoritarianism. This paper examines relationships between authoritarianism, on the one hand, and self‐identification with ideological labels, attitudes toward political extremists, and party preferences, on the other hand. The survey data have been collected in Hungary between 1994 and 2002. Findings indicate that it is the center‐right ideology and political orientation that attracts most authoritarians, yet authoritarian extreme‐left also survives. The findings also show that liberal orientation and center‐left identification constitute the political counter‐pole of authoritarianism. Extreme‐right supporters are found to be attracted only to particular aspects of authoritarianism.     

The Intergenerational Transmission of Contending Place Identities

Although a considerable amount of research exists regarding the transfer of political orientations within the family, little systematic attention has been devoted to studying the transmission of place (territorial) identities in contexts where such identities constitute a basic cleavage of political competition. This article examines the transfer of place identities in Catalonia, Spain, where contending identities, along with left‐right ideology, give shape to a distinctive regional political life. Using data from region‐wide household surveys, we analyze the reproduction of place identities as observed in parent‐child pairs and triads and find that it exceeds the reproduction of other political orientations, including left‐right self‐location and party preference. The direct transmission model fares well against the rival hypothesis of indirect transmission via parental social characteristics and the competing impact of the local context. Parent‐child congruence varies according to the homogeneity of parental place identities, the same‐sex and cross‐sex combinations of parents and their children, and the ethnic composition of neighborhoods.     

Ideology and climate change denial

Examining the relation between ideological variables and climate change denial, we found social dominance orientation (SDO) to outperform right-wing authoritarianism and left–right political orientation in predicting denial (Study 1 and 2). In Study 2, where we experimentally altered the level of denial by a newscast communicating supporting evidence for climate change, we demonstrated that the relation between the ideology variables and denial remains stable across conditions (newscast vs. control). Thus, the results showed that denial can be altered by communicating climate change evidence regardless of peoples’ position on ideology variables, in particular social dominance. We discuss the outcome in terms of core elements of SDO – dominance and system-justification motives – and encourage researchers on climate change denial to focus on these elements.     

Personality,Ideological Attitudes,and Group Identity as Predictors of Political Behavior in Majority and Minority Ethnic Groups

Prior research on personality and politics has largely investigated relationships using national samples from North America and Europe. In contrast, we used multigroup path analysis to assess how Big Five personality, ideological attitudes (RWA, SDO), and group identities (National and Ethnic Identification) predicted right versus left Political Behavior (party support, past voting, present voting intention) across majority and minority ethnic groups in a New Zealand national sample (N = 6,333). The effects of personality on ideological attitudes and group identities were mostly invariant across ethnic groups and consistent with prior findings. In contrast, the effects of ideological attitudes on Political Behavior varied across ethnic groups being moderately strong for the European majority but nonsignificant for the minorities. Group identities had little effect on Political Behavior. We discuss cultural and contextual factors that might account for this disconnect between ideology and politics among the minority ethnic groups.     

"Oh Those Crazy Cards Again": A History of the Debate on the Nazi Rorschachs, 1946–2001

This essay provides a critical history of the debate on the Rorschach Inkblot Tests administered to 22 leading figures of the Third Reich who were imprisoned in Nuremberg in 1945–1946. This debate occurred in two stages. The question at the heart of the first stage was whether the Nazi leaders were sane or psychopaths. Despite a strong disagreement concerning the use of these diagnostic labels, there was a surprisingly broad agreement on the actual substance of the discrepant diagnoses. Divisions of opinion, however, arose from political dissension in two areas: the nature of liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, and the possibility of trust in any political leadership. The second stage was marked by an ideology of convergence aimed at establishing a consensual "scientific truth" on the Nazi Rorschachs. Thus, the politics of the second phase were motivated by interests and ambitions internal to the field of Rorschach expertise, rather than by extraneous political anxieties.     

French MEPs and religion: Europeanising ‘laïcité’?

What French members of the European Parliament (MEPs) believe and what they do as a result of these beliefs can be understood in comparison with what we know about MEPs from other member-states on the one hand, and about French national members of Parliament (MPs) and citizens on the other hand. French MEPs do not diverge much from MEPs of other nationalities in the way they deal with religion at the policy level. Significant French specificities remain regarding religion as a cultural and memory reference. The heritage of ‘laïcité’ leads to an emphasis on the separation between religion and politics and may be reactivated as a symbolic material to reassert French national identity in confrontation with other political traditions. Religious issues do not make for consensus and are still used as markers of ideological and party boundaries, between right and left and within each side, as they are a relatively costless resource to build a distinctive political profile. Beyond these distinctions, a ‘French way’ of handling religion is commonly acknowledged and ‘laïcité’ works as an encompassing and resilient framework. The European Parliament (EP) may offer a structure of opportunities and constraints to reformulate slightly the national narrative about religion, but it does not alter the beliefs and practices of French MEPs, who appear largely similar to French MPs and citizens to the extent that they are largely secularised and consider religion as a secondary purpose submitted to political rules and individual choice.     

Moral Conviction and Political Engagement

The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.     

黄兴政治伦理思想述评

黄兴政治伦理思想是其伦理思想的一个重要方面,其政治伦理思想的主要内容包括四个方面：强调伦理道德在政权和政党建设中的重大作用,倡导政治伦理化;诚挚的爱国之心是黄兴政治伦理思想的主体;团结友善、敬业奉献是黄兴政治伦理思想的外在表现;“为大多数人谋幸福”是黄兴政治伦理思想实践的理想境界。黄兴政治伦理思想的主要特点：一是糅合了中西伦理文化的优点;二是将改造国民社会心理与建设国家统一起来;三是鲜明的政治性和实践性。     

Beyond Altruism: Identity-Construction as Moral Motive in Political Explanation

This article explores conceptual issues pertaining to the role of moral motivation in political explanation. Employing data drawn from long interview with political activists from across the spectrum of American politics, I criticize both rational actor models and so-called "dual" motivational theories, that focus on altruism as the primary moral motive in politics, in contrast to the narrow focus on a certain conception of self-interest. Against both of these approaches, I offer an identity-construction approach to moral motives in politics. This model focuses on the complex interweaving of self and moral motives, and in particular focuses on the concerns political activists have for what kind of person they are and what kind of life they are living. These types of concerns are both moral and self-regarding, and therefore defy the dichotomy between self- and other-regarding at the heart of both rational actor and "dual" motivation accounts of moral motives.     

When ideology matters: Moral conviction and the association between ideology and policy preferences in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Do people's policy preferences toward outgroups in intractable conflict consistently correspond with political ideology? To what extent are policy‐related cleavages between the political right and left in such contexts fueled by moral conviction and emotions? Analyses of a survey of Jewish‐Israelis (N = 119) conducted immediately after a war between Israelis and Palestinians revealed little to no ideological differences in acceptance of “collateral damage,” support for retribution, or support for compromise when positions about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were devoid of moral fervor. Those on the left and right endorsed polarized policy preferences only when their positions about the conflict were held with moral conviction. Presence or absence of guilt about harm to Palestinians mediated the effects of moral conviction on policy preferences in this context. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Climate‐Change Dilemma: Examining the Association Between Parental Status and Political Party Support1

Determining when, and for whom, positive attitudes toward climate‐change actions translate into actual behavior is critically important in promoting pro‐environmental behavior. An important way climate change can be tackled is through changes to social policy at the governmental level, which, in turn, depends on individual voting behavior in democratic nations. The present study examined this issue with regard to political party support in New Zealand, and demonstrated—using a large general population sample of voters—that support for climate‐change actions predict differential support for center‐left and center‐right political parties only for people who have children. Parental status moderated the link between support for climate‐change actions and voting intentions. Practical and theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Self-category constructions in political rhetoric; an analysis of Thatcher's and Kinnock's speeches concerning the British miners' strike (1984–5)

This paper examines the way in which different speakers may construe both the context and the categories involved in a single event. This is achieved through an analysis of Margaret Thatcher's and Neil Kinnock's leadership speeches to their respective party conferences during the British miners' strike of 1984–5. The analysis shows that both speakers construe the nature of the event such that their party is representative of an ingroup which encompasses almost the entire population and such that their policies are consonant with the definition of the ingroup identity. Thus their category constructions mirror the ways in which the respective leaders seek to mobilize the electorate during the strike. This analysis is used for two purposes: firstly, to argue for an integration of self-categorization theory with rhetorical/discursive psychologies and hence for further research into the ways in which self-categories may be contested in argument rather than determined by cognitive computations; secondly, to argue for further research into how political rhetoric may affect mass action through the ways in which collectivities are defined.     

The Importance of Context in the Genetic Transmission of U.S. Party Identification

In this study, we discuss one example where behavior genetic findings vary greatly across political contexts. We present original findings on how party identification is heritable around the 2008 election on a sample of twins from Minnesota. As this is in contrast with findings from the late 1980s and with how a mid‐2000 study interpreted their results, we explain how the increasing partisan ideological polarization could be responsible for these seemingly contradictory findings. In the Minnesota sample, we show a genetic correlation between party identification and ideology, a finding consistent in the political science literature. We highlight how heritability of political characteristics, like all others, is population specific and highly context dependent stressing its nondeterministic nature.