Beginning,ending and remembering

Wittgenstein famously opens his Philosophical Investigations with a quotation in which Augustine recounts how he acquired language. Instead of going into the widely discussed question of how Wittgenstein relates to Augustine's picture of language, this article inquires into what else might be at stake in invoking Confessions at the very beginning of his work. At the very least, such a gesture seems to suggest that Wittgenstein wants to inscribe himself into the Augustinian legacy. More specifically, this article argues that Philosophical Investigations centres on three problems that Wittgenstein has inherited from Augustine – namely what one might call the problem of beginning, the problem of ending and finally the problem of memory. The problem of beginning not only points to the local problem of how to start writing confessional philosophy, but also what authorizes such philosophy in the first place. The problem of ending concerns the direction of such philosophy and the problematic stance of its goal, while the problem of memory turns on the task of progressing from beginning to ending.     

Primary Prevention: Beginning at the Beginning

The growth and development of infants and children is examined from the perspective of parenting. White presents research evidence on early childhood development to substantiate his claim that educators and mental health specialists ignore these findings in their intervention approaches. The author sees the family as the first educational delivery system for the child, and presents concrete suggestions to aid educators and mental health specialists in their role. White concludes by favoring an educational approach to parenting over traditional social service work.     

In the Beginning

In this paper, a survey is made of some of the contributionsto the interpretation of Hartle and Hawking's theory of thewave function of the universe and its beginning. It is arguedthat there are considerable difficulties with the interpretationof the theory, but that there is at least one interpretationhitherto not found in the literature which survives existingphilosophical objections.     

The Paradox of Beginning: Hegel,Kierkegaard and Philosophical Inquiry

This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of “pure thought” as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline Hegel's strategy for resolving a crucial problem he takes himself to face. For his account of the nature of thought depends upon the idea of a form of inquiry in which nothing whatsoever is presupposed; but this idea appears basically paradoxical inasmuch as the mere act of beginning to inquire in a certain way embodies an assumption about how it is appropriate to begin. Turning to Kierkegaard, I consider a key objection to the effect that Hegel's strategy for resolving this paradox depends on the incoherent idea of a purely reflexive act of thinking. Finally, I draw out some central features of the alternative account of “situated” thought and inquiry which Kierkegaard presents as distinctively Socratic.     

Beginning kindergarteners' perception of number

97 children in 5 kindergarten classes when tested for perceptions of number could begin counting and 9 counted to 30, 84 counted a set of 6 correctly but when the blocks were covered 33 could say there were 6. 57 showed 1:1 correspondence but some had to count to decide. 14 showed conservation of number, but 94 recognized two sets were unequal and which one was larger. 30 pointed to the third car, but 24 could state an ordinal name for a target. Clearly the children varied greatly.     

In the Beginning Was the Deed

Winch's readings of Wittgenstein and Weil call for a significant rethinking of the relation between “metaphysics” and “ethics.” But there are confusions, perhaps to be found in all three of these writers, that we may slip into here. These are linked with the tendency to see idealist tendencies in Wittgenstein, and with his remark that giving grounds comes to an end, not in a kind of seeing on our part, but in our acting. The sense that we think we see in this suggestion is dependent on a distorted conception of “justification.” Getting clear about this involves coming to appreciate just how much of our nature as ethical beings is engaged when we do philosophy.     

当代的危机与哲学的开端--论胡塞尔与海德格尔的关系

对于当代的危机,胡塞尔与海德格尔都曾做出过诊断。作者试图借助于胡塞尔现象学的手段,将海德格尔的一个指路性明察具体化,从而表明对生活世界的遗忘源于古希腊哲学中。     

Beginning and Succeeding in Graduate School

Alcohol-dependent outpatients were clustered on the basis of their responses on the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI; Millon, 1983) personality disorder scales; male and female patients were clustered separately. The clusters were compared with respect to self-reported psychiatric, interpersonal, and drinking problems. The results, along with those of previous cluster analyses with male inpatients, suggest several reliable personality subtypes. One type (more common in inpatient settings) scores high on Negativistic and Avoidant/Schizoid or Dependent scales and reports numerous problems and intense distress. A second type (more common in outpatient settings) reports few problems and scores highest on Compulsive or Histrionic/Narcissistic scales. A third group (found in all and only male samples) scores high on Narcissism and Antisocial scales, readily admits substance problems, and may be interpersonally controlling and distancing.     

Forbidding Science: Some Beginning Reflections

Growing powers to manipulate human bodies and minds, not merely to heal disease but to satisfy desires, control deviant behavior, and to change human nature, make urgent questions of whether and how to regulate their use, not merely to assure safety and efficacy but also to safeguard our humanity. Oversight in democratic societies rightly belongs to the polity, not merely to self-appointed experts, scientific or ethical. Yet the task of governing the uses of dangerous knowledge is daunting, and there is little evidence that we have the will or the wisdom to do it well.