Against Radical Quantum Ontologies

Some theories of quantum mechanical phenomena endorse wave function realism, according to which the physical space we inhabit is very different from the physical space we appear to inhabit. In this paper I explore an argument against wave function realism that appeals to a type of simplicity that, although often overlooked, plays a crucial role in scientific theory choice. The type of simplicity in question is simplicity of fit between the way a theory says the world is and the way the world appears to be. This argument can be understood as one way of spelling out the so‐called “incredulous stare objection” that is sometimes leveled against surprising metaphysical theories.     

The Ways of Humans: The Emergence of Sense and Common Sense Through Language Production

The present paper is an extension of Elstrup (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, doi:10.1007/s12124-009-9095-x, 2009). Primarily, it is argued that the model presented in ‘The ways of humans’ describes the functional foundation of an emergent hierarchy and therefore cannot be reduced to its elements. Next, some ideas concerning the language mechanism, sense making and common sense are developed. Finally, it is argued that the scientific exploration of human development needs a unit of measurement. It is suggested that this unit can be found in time dependent sense making.     

Between Reason and Common Sense

This essay is intended as a companion‐piece to my article, “Reality in Common Sense: Reflections on Realism and Anti‐Realism from a ‘Common Sense Naturalist’ Perspective.” (Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 25, No. 4 (October 2002). It explores the epistemological dimension of the Common Sense Naturalism that I developed in that earlier, predominantly metaphysical essay; a position that combines the views of David Hume, Thomas Reid, and the Wittgenstein of On Certainty. My ultimate aim is to produce a comprehensive philosophy of common sense, one that with future installments, will come to include an ethical and social‐political philosophy as well. “Between Reason and Common Sense” offers a common sense naturalist reply to the skeptic. My basic argument is that the skeptic makes a Rylean category mistake, when he applies the concept of warrant to epistemologically basic beliefs, such as the belief in the external world or in the continued and distinct existence of bodies. He misidentifies these beliefs as being ordinary, when they are really a part of the framework that make the practices of believing and justifying possible. As a result, they are not themselves open to confirmation or disconfirmation. I also try to characterize the nature of the necessity carried by framework beliefs, in a way that avoids the charge that the common sense naturalist is simply a closet foundationalist.     

Common Sense and Maximum Entropy

This paper concerns the question of how to draw inferences common sensically from uncertain knowledge. Since the early work of Shore and Johnson (1980), Paris and Vencovská (1990), and Csiszár (1989), it has been known that the Maximum Entropy Inference Process is the only inference process which obeys certain common sense principles of uncertain reasoning. In this paper we consider the present status of this result and argue that within the rather narrow context in which we work this complete and consistent mode of uncertain reasoning is actually characterised by the observance of just a single common sense principle (or slogan). This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Defence of Scottish Common Sense

I provide a reading of Reid as an 'encyclopaedist', in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense, that is, as a scientist who conceives of himself as part of a broader scientific community, and who aims to make a contribution through work in a particular field. Reid's field is pneumatology. On this conception, Reid's recourse to 'common sense' is of a piece with the postulation, by any scientist, of a natural endowment for members of the same ostensible kind. Reid should therefore be understood as rejecting the classical tradition of epistemology and any conception of epistemology as first philosophy. His view resembles, rather, the modern position of 'natural epistemology', though admittedly, on account of his doctrine of active power, he is not committed to 'naturalism' in the contemporary sense.     

Against Radical Orthodoxy: The Dangers of Overcoming Political Liberalism

The article considers the critique of political liberalism offered by the Radical Orthodoxy movement. The first part deals with the claim that the underlying framework for the “secular” human condition ‐which would include political liberalism‐ is ontological violence and ethical nihilism. The second part of the article deals with the charge that liberalism leads to a social atomism and individualism which can be overcome with the help of a participatory‐analogical theology. I consider the invocation to unity, participation and transformation to be theologically incautious, and politically dangerous, in a way well understood by a tradition of political liberalism.     

A Common Sense Defence of Ostrich Nominalism

Philosophia - When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be...     

Metaphysics Within Science: Against Radical Naturalism

In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version of naturalistic metaphysics and propose that contemporary analytic metaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether (i) science and metaphysics are separable, (ii) intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and (iii) Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics is that successful scientific research presupposes metaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common to metaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories.     

Common Sense and the Theory of Human Behaviour

I offer an analysis of Reid's notion of the will. Naturalism in the philosophy of action is defined as the attempt to eliminate the capacity of will and to reduce volition to some class of appetite or desire. Reid's arguments show, however, that volition plays a particular role in deliberation which cannot be reduced to some form of motivation present at the time of action. Deliberation is understood as an action over which the agent has control. Will is a higher-order mental capacity enabling us to control our own attitudes, decisions and actions. Reid investigates several distinct forms of this control. I conclude with some remarks about the relation between Reid's arguments about the function of the will and his moral rationalism.     

Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality

Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of individuating perceptual experiences that does not depend on representationalism and raises a problem to the view defended by Hutto and Myin (Radicalizing Enactivism: basic minds without content. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2012) according to which, with respect to phenomenality, it is possible to adopt a view that partly construes experience in terms of engagement with the environment. I argue that Radical Enactivism should change: either deny that the environment plays any role in an account of the phenomenal character or embrace the view that the phenomenal properties of experiences are at least partly constituted by the environment itself.