Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.     

The Guise of the Guise of the Bad

It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions.     

Moral Outrage: Territoriality in Human Guise

Moral outrage is a response to the behavior of others, never one's own. It is a response to infringements or transgressions on what people perceive to be the immunities they, or others with whom they identify, can expect on the basis of their rights and privileges and what they understand to be their reasonable expectations regarding the behavior of others. A person's culturally defined social identities and the rights and privileges that go with them in relationships to which those identities can be party make up the contents of that person's social persona and also constitute that person's social territory. Infringements of rights and privileges in the social and symbolic worlds in which humans live are the equivalent of encroachments on territory among animals, and moral outrage can be understood as the human expression of what we perceive as territorial behavior in animals. As emotion, outrage is affected by such clinical processes as displacement, rationalization, projection, and reaction formation. Outrage has an essential role in the maintenance of viable social groups, but it also exacerbates conflict among people who perceive one another as "others."     

Linguistic analysis of a bilingual stutterer

The ultimate test of the adequacy of linguistic models of fluency breakdown is the degree to which they may account for patterns of dysfluency in the speech of a stutterer who is fluent in more than one language. We present the case of an adult bilingual stutterer (Spanish-English), whose spontaneous language in both Spanish and English was structurally analyzed to assess the relationships of phonological and syntactic structure to the frequency and location of fluency breakdown. Our findings suggest that syntax is probably a greater determinant of stuttered moments than is phonology. Additionally, similarities and differences between English and Spanish sentence structure were associated with similarities and differences in the loci of dysfluencies across the two languages. The need for crosslinguistic research utilizing monolingual and bilingual speakers of languages other than English is emphasized.     

On Some Counter-Examples to the Guise of the Good-Thesis: Intelligibility without Desirability

This paper argues that there are cases, which various guise of the good-theses concerning desires, intentions and actions would not allow. In these cases the agent acts for considerations that the agent does not regard as good reasons. The considerations render the actions intelligible but not desirable (where desirability and intelligibility can be objective or subjective). These cases are atypical, but nonetheless show that those guise of the good-theses which do not allow them, should be revised. In typical cases the intelligibility of desires, intentions and actions co-varies with their desirability: there are both unintelligible cases without suitable desirability characteristics and cases where desirability characteristics make the desire, intention and action intelligible. The claim here is that there are further more atypical and puzzling, but equally possible cases, where intelligibility and desirability come apart. The paper first introduces the Guise of the Good - debates about desires, intentions, and actions, and suggests distinguishing the category of “acting for a reason” from “acting for a consideration not taken to be a reason”. It then argues that while desirability entails intelligibility, and lack of intelligibility entails lack of desirability, these two cases leave conceptual room for a third category, which is that of intelligibility without desirability. This is so, whether we examine objective or subjective intelligibility and desirability. The claim is meant to apply mutatis mutandis to characteristics of desires, intentions and actions. The paper then provides possible cases of intelligibility without desirability, and defends the view against some objections.     

语言的群体间偏差研究

个体在用语言来描述他人的行为时,会因为描述对象的群体种类不同而有偏差,具体表现为在描述群体内成员的积极行为和群体外成员的负向行为时,会使用较高抽象水平的词;在描述群体外成员的积极行为和群体内成员的负向行为时,会使用较低抽象水平的词。这种抽象水平的差异由语言范畴模型来具体表明。Maass等人把这种描述上的偏差命名为语言的群体间偏差。并认为在这一现象下有两种机制：动机机制和认知机制,研究表明认知机制能解释大部分语言的群体间偏差现象,而动机机制会在群体内形象受到威胁时发挥作用。     

Tomberlin,Frege, and Guise theory: A note on the methodology of dia-philosophical comparisons

Conclusion Tomberlin's comparative claims about the superiority of the De Dicto-De Re Account over Guise Theory concerning referential opacity are abortively premature. Nevertheless, he may be right. Yet the order of the day is to develop the De Re-De Dicto Account to the hilt. Not until this is done can any useful dia-philosophical comparison of the two theories yield any fruit. My deep desire is, of course, for the sheer enjoyment of experiencing the world from the perspective of each of the two views, indeed, from the perspective of other views — e.g., Frege's Sense/Referent Theory — that can be developed to the same data-encompassing stage as Guise Theory.     

Linguistic competence and expertise

Questions about the relationship between linguistic competence and expertise will be examined in the paper. Harry Collins and others distinguish between ubiquitous and esoteric expertise. Collins places considerable weight on the argument that ordinary linguistic competence and related phenomena exhibit a high degree of expertise. His position and ones which share close affinities are methodologically problematic. These difficulties matter because there is continued and systematic disagreement over appropriate methodologies for the empirical study of expertise. Against Collins, it will be argued that the term ‘expertise’ should be reserved for expertise (esoteric experts) and exclude everyday performance (ubiquitous experts). Wittgensteinian ideas will be employed to maintain that it is mistaken and misleading to derive substantive conclusions about the epistemology of expertise from ordinary linguistic competence and vice versa. Significant attention will be devoted to the notion of following a rule with particular reference to the intelligibility of tacit rule following. A satisfactory theoretical approach to expertise should not involve making important claims about ordinary linguistic competence.     

Proxytypes and Linguistic Nativism

Prinz (Perceptual the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, MIT Press, 2002) presents a new species of concept empiricism, under which concepts are off-line long-term memory networks of representations that are ‘copies’ of perceptual representations – proxytypes. An apparent obstacle to any such empiricism is the prevailing nativism of generative linguistics. The paper critically assesses Prinz’s attempt to overcome this obstacle. The paper argues that, prima facie, proxytypes are as incapable of accounting for the structure of the linguistic mind as are the more traditional species of empiricism. This position is then confirmed by looking in detail at two suggestions (one derived from recent connectionist research) from Prinz of how certain aspects of syntactic structure might be accommodated by the proxytype theory. It is shown that the suggestions fail to come to terms with both the data and theory of contemporary linguistics.     

Linguistic context and children's recall in a probe word task

A probe word task was used to test first-, third-, and fifth-grade children's recall of words in varying linguistic contexts. Consistent with expectations based on short-term memory considerations, words that occurred in meaningful sentence contexts were better recalled than those appearing in strings of unrelated words, and words that appeared toward the end of the sentence or string were better recalled than those occurring toward the beginning. At the same time, the effects of prior text on recall, seen clearly in tasks used in constructive memory research, were not present in this short-term memory task. These findings suggest that while within-sentence semantic relational and syntactic information may be used for partial analysis while material is still in working memory, this state does not permit access to already analyzed information in prior text.The authors express appreciation to Richard Schwartz, Ronnie Wilbur, and Harlan Schweer for their suggestions throughout the course of the study.     

Linguistic markers of decision processes in a problem solving task

Two distinct decision processes, involved in the construction of chunks, were characterized from the cognitive interpretation of Culioli’s enunciative operations in 80 thinking aloud verbal reports for the Tower of Hanoi puzzle. The instructions presented the tower to 20 participants, 10 years old, during four consecutive trials, with two distinct verbal labels, either as a collection or as a class, i.e. as Tower vs. Disks. Two studies analysed the repartition of linguistic markers: enunciative Locations between consecutive moves, interpreted as markers of automatic entailments and of attentional focusing; and Starting Terms, as markers of a categorizing process, reconstructing external occurrences at a higher level of control, and regulating the access to abstraction. In the first study sections were demarcated on every solution path by the achievement of subgoals, and by points of obligatory passage, and, in the second one, two distinct batches of moves were distinguished. Results allowed to characterize micro-processes involved in the interaction between internal and external spaces. A process of internalization and externalization, entailing perseverations, was observed in the case of holistic structure, at the beginning in condition Tower, and later in condition Disks where the emergence of this structure was attested. A third study analyzed individual differences in performance, showing two mechanisms of generalization, one in interactive processing, the other along the optimal strategy in the external space. These exploratory results open the way to a number of issues going far beyond the case of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle.