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《Philosophical Papers》2012,41(1):83-95
Abstract Curiously missing in the vast literature on Hilary Putnam's so-called model-theoretic argument against semantic realism is any response from would-be proponents of what Putnam would call magical theories of reference. Such silence is surprising in light of the fact that such theories have occupied a significant position in the history of philosophy and the fact that there are still several prominent thinkers who would, no doubt, favor such a theory. This paper develops and examines various responses to Putnam's argument on behalf of the proponent of a magical theory of reference. While Putnam's explicit replies to such responses to his argument seem to involve little more than name calling, I develop arguments that show that there are significant problems facing any would-be proponent of such a view. While magical theories of reference are far from the strawmen Putnam seems to take them to be, there are, I argue, genuine reasons for a semantic realist to prefer a non-magical theory of reference. 相似文献
3.
It is claimed that the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) works in a way that allows
a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist. This
is supposed to be possible by virtue of the appeal to confirmational holism that enters into the formulation of IA. Holism
about confirmation is supposed to be motivated in analogy with holism about falsification. I present an account of how holism
about falsification is supposed to be motivated. I argue that the argument for holism about falsification is in tension with
how we think about confirmation and with two principles suggested by Quine for construing a plausible variety of holism. Finally,
I show that one of Quine’s principles does not allow a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to
how we establish that mathematical entities exist. 相似文献
4.
Jonas Åkerman 《Philosophical Studies》2010,149(3):355-366
In the debate over what determines the reference of an indexical expression on a given occasion of use, we can distinguish
between two generic positions. According to the first, the reference is determined by internal factors, such as the speaker’s intentions. According to the second, the reference is determined by external factors, like conventions or what a competent and attentive audience would take the reference to be. It has recently been
argued that the first position is untenable, since there are cases of mismatch where the intuitively correct reference differs from the one that would be determined by the relevant internal factors. The
aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to this line of argument, it is the proponent of the second position that should
be worried, since this position yields counterintuitive consequences regarding communicative success in cases of mismatch. 相似文献
5.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):115-121
Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to
do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to
kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both
Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be
understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such
a challenge unscathed. 相似文献
6.
The present study explored several dispositional factors associated with individual differences in lay adult’s interpretation
of when an arguer is, or is not, committed to a statement. College students were presented with several two-person arguments
in which the proponent of a thesis conceded a key point in the last turn. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent
to which that concession implied a change in the proponent’s attitude toward any of the previous statements in the argument.
Participants designated as ‘liberal’ used the concession to infer substantial change in commitment to earlier statements in
the argument. A group designated as ‘conservative’ were reluctant to make any such inferences. A discriminant analysis indicated
that variables assessing participants’ attitudes toward argument as well as their cognitive and communication styles jointly
predicted their liberal or conservative status. The discriminant function and follow-up group comparisons indicated that liberals
were more likely than conservatives to engage in argument. This included a greater tendency to use argument as a source of
knowledge. Liberals also employed a more sophisticated message design logic than conservatives on a communication task. The
groups did not clearly differ with respect to participants’ implicit theory of argument, though trends were present that merit
attention in future research. Implications of these findings for future research on lay interpretations of commitment are
discussed. 相似文献
7.
This paper critically examines the volitional normative model of disease and its underlying nanotechnologic vision of medicine
both defended by Robert Freitas. Having provided an account of this vision, we explicate the highlight of the model, which
is a concept of disease based on individual values and preferences. The model’s normative positions are then critiqued based
on our argument that the epistemic basis of Freitas’s vision of nanotechnologic medicine and, by extension, of his volitional
normative model of disease is scientifically flawed. An ethical and social critique of the model is then conducted on the
basis of the model’s implicit ethical underpinnings. We argue that Freitas fails to justify the normativity of his model by
not addressing the ethical issues that permeate it, one of which is the question of responsibility regarding the development
of medical nanotechnology and the practice of new forms of medicine such as the one he envisions. We conclude that, due to
its radically individualistic position, the model implies an unjustified view of nanoethics and relegates this field of ethics
to the periphery of discussions of nanomedicine. 相似文献
8.
Michael Salter 《Res Publica》1999,5(2):161-193
This article addresses, from a Frankfurt School perspective on law identified with Franz Neumann and more recently Habermas,
the attack upon the principles of war criminality formulated at the Nuremberg trials by the increasingly influential legal
and political theory of Carl Schmitt. It also considers the contradictions within certain of the defence arguments that Schmitt
himself resorted to when interrogated as a possible war crimes defendant at Nuremberg. The overall argument is that a distinctly
internal, or “immanent”, form of critique is required of Schmitt's position, in which its is found wanting even on its own
terms. In principle, the application of this dialectical mode of critique can allow a genuine debate to emerge between those
seeking to continue both the Schmittian and critical theory traditions, whilst safeguarding the latter from the dangers of
formulating polemical interventions that are, in effect, counterproductive to their own intentions.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
9.
Severin Schroeder 《Philosophical Investigations》2013,36(3):201-209
In the so‐called private language argument, Wittgenstein argues both against the alleged epistemological privacy of sensations and against their alleged ontological privacy, that is, the common view that somebody else cannot have my pain. A prominent proponent of the claim of sensations' ontological privacy was Gottlob Frege, whose position has recently been defended by Wolfgang Künne. This paper reconsiders Wittgenstein's objections to ontological privacy and attempts to defend Wittgenstein's position against Künne's Frege‐inspired arguments. 相似文献
10.
Barry Miller 《Sophia》1967,6(1):8-20
Conclusion Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical
necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason
cannot escape contraction to a form so patently useless that no proponent of the contingency argument would want to employ
it. Many of the objections in Section 4 have point, however, only against an argument which uses such an unacceptable form
of the principle.
The objections in Section 5 are directed against an argument framed in the only other way allowable under Medlin’s dichotomy,
but which is of no use to the theist, for the simple-reason that its conclusion is not existential in the required (present
actuality) sense. Objections against such an argument would concern the theist only if their validity were so wide as to embrace
a truly existential argument as well. As we have-seen it is in just that case that they break down.
In neither Section 4 nor 5, therefore, does the article come to grips with the contingency argument. The objections leave
it untouched, because neither of Medlin’s notions of contingency and necessity corresponds to that which is operative in the
argument. 相似文献
11.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2008,47(2):223-230
In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning
the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately
explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques,
is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free
will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive.
相似文献
Joel Thomas TiernoEmail: |
12.
In this essay I critique a particular reading of Bergson that places an excessive weight on the concept of the ‘virtual’. Driven by the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the virtual, this image of Bergson (seen especially through his text of 1896,
Matter and Memory, where the idea is introduced) generates an imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or psychology, in his other works. In fact, I argue that the virtual is not the key concept for Bergsonism and
that there is a good deal of evidence in Bergson’s other writings, especially those connected with his actualist notion of
‘refraction’, to think of him as a perspectivist philosopher. Moreover, it will be seen that Virtualism resides within an economy of
reflection that is subsumed within the broader paradigm of Actualist refraction. Taking these optical metaphors seriously, the virtual
becomes a perspectival image seen from an actual position, or rather, an interacting set of actual positions. This interaction
is termed ‘virtualization’, denoting the substitution of a substantive conception with a processual one. In the first two parts of the essay, I direct
my remarks more towards Deleuzian readings of the actual rather than Deleuze himself (Deleuze is so open about the biases
he brings to his reading of Bergson as to be beyond criticism). In the second two sections, I pursue a philosophical argument
for the probity of a non-Virtualist position as such within philosophy, based upon the concept of refraction. This is done
not only because it is important that we remain open to other readings of Bergson that are not so heavily mediated in one
direction, but also in view of the power of refraction as a new concept for reconciling actual modes such as molar identity,
the present, and extension, with their virtual opposites. 相似文献
13.
Michel Alhadeff-Jones 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(5):477-490
The position adopted in this paper is inspired by Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity and his critique of scientific and
philosophical forms of reductionism. This paper is based on research focusing on the diversity of conceptions of critique
developed in academic discourses. It aims to challenge the fragmentation and the reduction framing the understanding of this
notion in educational sciences. The reflection begins with the introduction of some of Morin’s assumptions concerning the
paradigm of complexity. The next section provides a definition of the idea of critique and explores some limits associated
with contemporary references framing this notion. Theories of critique are at the core of several educational theories. Based
on the literature identified in French-speaking and English-speaking critical traditions in education, several factors determining
the way the idea of critique is reduced in education are highlighted. Stressing the tacit character of those variables challenges
the limits of traditional conceptions of critique in contemporary education. The position adopted denounces therefore the
fact that the current development of theories of critique in education does not provide a framework considering more systematically
their conditions of emergence, their own limitations, as well as the antagonistic, complementary and contradictory relationships,
which connect them to one another. Based on this position, this paper finally suggests that a distinction be made between
“hypocritique” and “hypercritique” as a semantic artifact, stressing the importance of challenging existing theories of critique
in education according to the level of complexity that one may attribute to them. 相似文献
14.
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL 《Journal of applied philosophy》2007,24(4):408-424
abstract R. M. Hare claims that we have duties to take the preferences of possible people into consideration in moral thinking and that it can harm a merely possible person to have been denied existence. This essay has three parts. First, I attempt to show how Hare's universalizability argument for our obligations to possible people may fail to challenge the consistent proponent of the actuality restriction on moral consideration, regardless of whether this proponent is construed as an amoralist or a fanatic. Second, I raise some objections to Hare's claim that a merely possible person can be harmed. Even if Hare could successfully overcome the objection that a possible person cannot be the recipient of harm, he would still need to show that this harm is morally significant. Third, whether or not Hare is able to answer these objections, I indicate how his moral theory still supports his general position on possible people — namely, that we are ceteris paribus morally bound to bring happy people (and avoid bringing miserable people) into existence. 相似文献
15.
Paul Dicken 《Sophia》2011,50(3):345-355
As part of his wider critique of the credibility of miraculous testimony, Hume also offers a rather curious argument as to
the mutual detriment of conflicting testimony for the miracles of contrary religious worldviews. Scholarship on this aspect
of Hume’s reasoning has debated whether or not the considerations are to be understood as essentially probabilistic, and as
to whether or not a probabilistic interpretation of the argument is logically valid. The consensus would appear to offer a
positive answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second. In this paper I expose a deeper fallacy in Hume’s
reasoning that undermines both probabilistic and non-probabilistic readings. My critique is closely based upon analogous considerations
in the philosophy of science, and the equally intriguing issue as to the epistemological relevance of conflicting scientific
theories throughout the history of science. 相似文献
16.
Nathan Gerard 《Psychologie appliquee》2023,72(1):13-25
This paper situates the burgeoning movement of critical work and organizational psychology (CWOP) within a broader and ongoing effort to rehabilitate work in a broken society. Drawing upon Loren Baritz's seminal critique of the field, The Servants of Power, the argument is made that while CWOP scholars clearly militate against pandering to the “power elite,” they nonetheless risk becoming servants of work, defined as the propensity to perpetuate work's outsized psychological significance. To support such an argument, a core yet neglected theme in Baritz's book is revisited, that of the role of the critic, to demonstrate how CWOP scholars might navigate their own entanglements with servitude while at the same time contest work's symbolic power. The paper also addresses the charge of intellectual elitism that can result from holding such a position of “critical distance” not just from mainstream scholarship, but from work itself. Implications for the future of CWOP are discussed. 相似文献
17.
Joel Thomas Tierno 《Sophia》2006,45(2):131-138
In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy.
I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by
nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent
by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from
freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate.
I thank Nick Trakakis for his continuing interest in my essay, “On the Alleged Connection Between Moral Evil and Human Freedom.”
The exchange of ideas in an atmosphere of mutual respect is the very heart of philosophy and I am grateful for the opportunity
to participate in such an exchange. I believe, as a consequence, that my thinking concerning the inadequacy of the traditional
free will theodicy has become more fully articulated. 相似文献
18.
Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
19.
Artemy Magun 《Continental Philosophy Review》2012,45(4):545-568
The article is dedicated to the politico-theological critique of Judaism from the position of Christianity. It shows the affinity of Marx’s early critique of liberal state and of Hannah Arendt’s criticism of formal legalistic thinking in the contemporary judicial treatment of Nazism (and of similar international political crimes). Marx’s critique of nation-state finds its unlikely continuation in Arendt’s critique of international law. The politico-theological argument is explicit in Marx and implicit in Arendt, but both develop the Hegelian criticism of liberal state which shows its reliance on the abstract law, on the one hand, and on the egotistic abstract individual, on the other. The theological undercurrent of the argument is both sign of its limitations, and of the subsisting relevance of the politico-theological framework, even in the similarly novel circumstances of the twentieth century. It is only within and through the theological critique and critique of theology that these issues would stand a chance of resolution. 相似文献
20.
John Protevi 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2010,9(3):417-436
In this article I will suggest ways in which adding the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to the mix can complement and extend
the 4EA approach to cognitive science. In the first part of the paper, I will show how the Deleuzean tripartite ontological
difference (virtual/intensive/actual) can provide an explicit ontology for dynamical systems theory. The second part will
take these ontological notions and apply them to three areas of concern to the 4EA approaches: (a) the Deleuzean concept of
the virtual will clarify the ontological status of perceptual capacity as sensorimotor skill; (b) the Deleuzean concept of
“intensive individuation” will clarify the ontological status of the genesis of perceptually guided behavior; (c) the Deleuzean
critique of confusing the actual and the virtual will enable us to intervene in the realism/idealism debate. These aspects
will not be addressed sequentially but will be interwoven into an unfolding argument. 相似文献