Madhouse and the whole thing there

This article presents an autoethnography in the form of a short story of the experiences of a mental breakdown, and subsequent involuntary detainment, alongside the experiences of conducting PhD research outside the mainstream of the discipline of psychology. In response to criticisms of narrative approaches that they are methodologically solipsistic and present a socially atomised self, this narrative combines patient medical records with narrative recollections and reflections on the research process from a contemporary perspective. In doing so, the narrative explores and interrogates themes relevant to creative practice in psychological research, including the notion of authenticity, methodological issues of researching personal experience, the problem of subjectivity and, ultimately, the nature of madness and psychological distress, including its nonlinearity and otherness.     

It’s one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them

In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages. We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument for that view. We then consider a response to the nomic argument that we presented in an earlier paper (Baron and Tallant in Philos Phenomenol Res 93:583–606, 2016). We show that this argument suffers from a flaw. We then go on to offer a different response to the nomic argument. The core idea is that the current laws of physics are not integrated in the manner that Schaffer requires to get the nomic argument for monism off the ground.

     

Can one thing become two?

Philosophical Studies -     

Viewing the body as an (almost) ageing thing

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper examines the role of the body in the social and psychological study of ageing. Drawing upon the phenomenological tradition, it argues that the...     

How an unfamiliar thing should be called

An empirical method is described to derive good names for unfamiliar objects. It is based on three principles: (1) The names should be within users' linguistic capacities; (2) names should be informationally efficient; (3) names should form a classification system. The principles lead to a three-step method: (1) Subjects generate names for the objects; (2) a subset of the names, which fulfills the principles, is selected; (3) how good the names are is tested by matching and recall tasks. Steps 2 and 3 are iterated to improve the nnames. The names that result are natural, short, easily matched with their physical referents, and well recalled. The method is generalizable and ought to be useful in a large variety of situations where names for unfamiliar objects are needed.This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research Contract No. N00014-78-C-0433 to the first author. This report is No. 111 of the Institute of Cognitive Science's Technical Report Series.     

On-line instrumentation in psychology: Dildo or the real thing?

The impact of laboratory digital computers as reflected by research publications is evaluated.     

Family therapy as a rite of passage: play's the thing

Although there is a considerable literature about the nature of family problems and techniques of therapeutic change, little is known about how change in the family therapy setting can be maintained over time. The current paper suggests that important insights into the nature of family therapy can be gleaned by comparison with "naturally occurring" rites of passage. Anthropological analysis of these rites suggests several concepts that may guide the family therapist. These include: (a) the idea of a "therapeutic frame" that marks off the therapy setting; (b) the role of symbolic process and flexibility; (c) the concepts of liminal play and flow as explanations of therapeutic technique and potential; and (d) the relationship between the family in treatment and a wider community. Rites of passage can serve as an important source of comparison and insight into the nature of change in the family therapy setting.     

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Say the right thing: Apologies,reputability, and punishment

This research investigates how and when apologies work. Findings from three studies suggest that apologies influence punishment decisions, but not by reducing concerns about recidivism or perceptions of bad intentions. The extent to which future expectancies or perceived intent mediates the effects of apologies on punishment depends on the offender's reputability. However, the perceived appropriateness of the response fully mediates the effect of apologies on punishment, regardless of the offender's reputability. Overall, the findings suggest that saying the right thing helps those who do the wrong thing, but not by influencing others' beliefs about their past intentions or future behaviors.     

Deflationism: the best thing since pizza and quite possibly better

Philosophical Studies - I defend the deflationary theory of truth and reference I have proposed from the objections raised in Vann McGee’s “Thought, Thoughts, and Deflationism,”...     

There is no such thing as environmental ethics

Engineers and scientists, whose professional responsibilities often influence the natural environment, have sought to develop an environmental ethic that will be in tune with their attitudes toward the non-human environment, and that will assist them in decision making regarding questions of environmental quality. In this paper the classical traditions in normative ethics are explored in an attempt to formulate such an environmental ethic. I conclude, however, that because the discipline of ethics is directed at person-person interactions, ethics as a scholarly discipline does not help us understand how we ought to treat non-human nature. We therefore cannot look to ethics as a source for understanding our attitudes and for providing guidance to our actions with regard to the environment. To do so is to ask too much of ethics. If we are to find an acceptable environmental morality, it must come from a new paradigm. One approach might be to understand our attitudes on the basis of spirituality, modeled after animistic religions.     

Word as image: Gadamer on the unity of word and thing

Continental Philosophy Review - One of Gadamer's largest and most characteristic concerns has been to show that hermeneutics is a form of practical philosophy. The central task of hermeneutics...     

We want the same thing: projection in judgments of sexual intent

This article details two studies investigating the proximal role of social projection (i.e., assumed similarity) in judgments of sexual intent. Study 1 demonstrates that men and women who have a greater desire for casual sex are more likely to perceive sexual intent in others. Study 2 replicates this finding in a more realistic context and, further, situates judgments of sexual intent squarely into the cognitive domain, as results show that projection of casual sexual motivation is more likely when the target is similar to the perceiver and when the target's motivation is relatively ambiguous to begin with.