On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability

In standard treatments of probability, is defined as the ratio of to , provided that . This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of arise in the mind via implicit calculation of . We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by . Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that arises from the ratio fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.     

The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference

We report a large study in which participants are invited to draw inferences from causal conditional sentences with varying degrees of believability. General intelligence was measured, and participants were split into groups of high and low ability. Under strict deductive-reasoning instructions, it was observed that higher ability participants were significantly less influenced by prior belief than were those of lower ability. This effect disappeared, however, when pragmatic reasoning instructions were employed in a separate group. These findings are in accord with dual-process theories of reasoning. We also took detailed measures of beliefs in the conditional sentences used for the reasoning tasks. Statistical modelling showed that it is not belief in the conditional statement per se that is the causal factor, but rather correlates of it. Two different models of belief-based reasoning were found to fit the data according to the kind of instructions and the type of inference under consideration.     

Evaluating the fakability of a conditional reasoning test of addiction proneness

The quest to assess personality objectively is riddled with challenges. However, conditional reasoning (CR) methodology takes an innovative approach to personality measurement by indirectly evaluating the cognitive biases associated with specific dispositional traits. In addition to demonstrating strong criterion‐related validities, the CR format has been shown to be more resistant to response distortion than traditional self‐report measures so long as indirect measurement is maintained. The present study evaluated the necessity of maintaining the indirect nature of a CR‐based measure of addiction proneness. Results indicated that disclosing the purpose of assessment yielded significant mean shifts on a CR‐based measure of addiction proneness compared to those of an uninformed group. Specifically, when the construct of interest was made explicit, participants could identify the keyed response options when instructed to do so. These findings further underscore the necessity of maintaining indirect measurement when administering CR measures.     

Measurement issues associated with conditional reasoning tests: An examination of faking

Conditional reasoning (CR) is a new item format that measures personality by indirectly assessing reliance upon the cognitive biases associated with specific traits (James et al., 2005). Previous research suggests that, relative to self-report measures, responses on CR-based measures are more difficult to distort (LeBreton, Barksdale, Robin, & James, 2007). The issue of response distortion in the context of CR-based measures was evaluated in two studies. Study 1 (within-subjects) and Study 2 (between-subjects) both investigated whether responses on a CR-based test of addiction could be faked when indirect assessment was upheld. Results of both studies indicated that, unlike a self-report measure of a similar construct, the CR-based measure was unaffected by response distortion.     

Debiasing of Pessimistic Judgments Associated with Anxiety: A Test of the Availability Heuristic

This investigation directly tested the Consider-An-Alternative debiasing procedure and the reduction of pessimistic threat-related judgments associated with anxiety. Two separate generation interventions were included to test the availability heuristic as a possible explanation of the debiasing effect. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three interventions and probability estimates of future threat-related events were completed in a repeated measures experimental design. Level of trait anxiety was measured to assign participants to “normal” and highly anxious groups. The data were analyzed in a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed factorial repeated measures ANOVA. The results found that only the short debiasing intervention showed a significant reduction of pessimistic judgments in comparison to the control group. The results were interpreted as supporting the availability heuristic as an explanation of the debiasing effect. Further analysis also suggested that the content of recall may be as important to the debiasing effect as ease of recall.     

Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions

The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.     

Persistent overconfidence despite practice: The role of task experience in preschoolers’ recall predictions

In three experiments, preschoolers’ ability to predict their picture recall was examined. Children studied 10 pictures, predicted how many they would recall, and then attempted to recall them. This study-prediction-recall trial was repeated multiple times with new pictures on each trial. In Experiment 1, children were overconfident on the initial trial, and this overconfidence persisted across three trials. In Experiment 2, children predicted either their own performance or another child’s performance. Their predictions were overconfident across all trials regardless of whether they made predictions for themselves or for another child, suggesting that wishful thinking cannot fully account for their overconfidence. In Experiment 3, some children postdicted their previous recall performance prior to making each prediction. Although their postdictions were quite accurate, their predictions were still overconfident across five trials. Preschoolers’ overconfidence was remarkably resistant to the repeated experience of recalling fewer pictures than the children had predicted. Even asking them to report the number that they recalled on a previous trial, which they could do accurately, did not cause them to lower their predictions across trials.     

Modulation of the leniency bias in the discursive dilemma

We experimentally approach the discursive dilemma to gain insight into people's procedural appropriateness judgments. We relied on a vignette in which three people had formed opinions about two skills (premises) of a candidate to decide whether to hire her/him (conclusion). The dilemma arises when different outcomes (hire vs. not hire) are achieved depending on whether the majority opinion is independently considered for each premise or for the global conclusion of each judge. Participants were asked to choose the procedure they thought to be more appropriate to reach a decision. In Experiment 1, we found a leniency effect (a bias to prefer the aggregation procedure that led to hiring the candidate), which was reduced by introducing the participant as a juror with an exogenously provided negative opinion about the candidate's skills. In Experiment 2, we replicated the opinion effect, even when subjects did not participate as jury members. In Experiment 3, we found that the leniency bias was only reduced when participants' negative opinion was aligned with a majority of negative premises, but not with a majority of negative conclusions. We discuss present findings in terms of the identification of empirical regularities that may affect people's procedural legitimacy judgments.     

Persistence of overconfidence in young children: Factors that lead to more accurate predictions of memory performance

Young children are typically overconfident regarding both cognitive abilities. This overconfidence may be due to development underpinnings. Previous research has demonstrated that children exhibit robust and persistent overconfidence in a simple memory-recall task. Two experiments investigated this overconfidence in 1st–4th and 4th–6th grade students. In the first experiment, we explored both the development of accurate predictions of recall and young students’ confidence in their memory performance predictions. It was found that not until 4th grade did students’ overconfidence begin to wane. In the second experiment, we investigated a condition under which 4th–6th graders might make more accurate predictions of their ability to recall simple stimuli, specifically, when the items to be remembered were unfamiliar to the students. The results confirmed our overconfidence in familiarity hypothesis. We discuss these findings in the context of metacognition.     

The effects of metacognitive training on the academic achievement and happiness of Esfahan University conditional students

Although the current literature supports the effectiveness of metacognition as a learning strategy, little is known about the effects of metacognition on academic achievement and happiness. This study analyzed the effectiveness of training metacognition on the academic achievement and happiness of Esfahan University conditional students. Conditional students are the students whose averages are lower than 12 (12 out of 20). After three times of becoming conditional they are expelled from university. The sample consisted of 60 once-conditional female students. They were randomly selected and allocated to an experimental group and a control group. The independent variable was the metacognitive training sessions performed in the experimental group. The Oxford Happiness Questionnaire scores and the students’ second semester average scores in 2003–2004 were dependent variables. The study predicted that training in metacognition should have positive effects on the academic achievement and that it would increase students’ happiness. The results suggested that metacognitive training had increased the academic achievement average of the experimental group. Similarly, metacognitive training had increased the happiness scores average of the experimental group.     

Performance predictions affect attentional processes of event-based prospective memory

To investigate whether making performance predictions affects prospective memory (PM) processing, we asked one group of participants to predict their performance in a PM task embedded in an ongoing task and compared their performance with a control group that made no predictions. A third group gave not only PM predictions but also ongoing-task predictions. Exclusive PM predictions resulted in slower ongoing-task responding both in a nonfocal (Experiment 1) and in a focal (Experiment 2) PM task. Only in the nonfocal task was the additional slowing accompanied by improved PM performance. Even in the nonfocal task, however, was the correlation between ongoing-task speed and PM performance reduced after predictions, suggesting that the slowing was not completely functional for PM. Prediction-induced changes could be avoided by asking participants to additionally predict their performance in the ongoing task. In sum, the present findings substantiate a role of metamemory for attention-allocation strategies of PM.     

Depressive symptoms are associated with unrealistic negative predictions of future life events

This study examined the relationship between depressive symptoms and bias in the prediction of future life events. Responding to internet announcements, 153 participants varying widely in self-reported depression symptom severity estimated the probability of 40 events occurring over the succeeding 30 days. After the 30-day period, participants reported which events occurred. Optimistic/pessimistic biases were related to level of depressive symptoms. A non-significant optimistic bias characterized participants with low depressive symptoms whereas a significant pessimistic bias characterized participants with high depressive symptoms. Those reporting mild symptoms did not exhibit a systematic pessimistic or optimistic bias. General imprecision in predictions for undesirable events was associated with depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that depression is associated with pessimistic bias rather than accuracy in judgment.     

The moderating role of attitude strength in selective exposure to information

Individuals prefer to receive information that is consistent with their attitudes. Three experiments examined whether attitude strength moderates this selective exposure effect. Experiments 1A and 1B found that participants preferred attitudinally consistent information but that this effect was more pronounced to the extent that the attitude was strongly held. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and ruled out an alternative interpretation that a general tendency to hold strong attitudes rather than issue-specific attitude strength moderates selective exposure. Discussion concerns the implications of these findings and the possibility that other variables moderate the selective exposure effect.     

Effects of verbal information on fear-related reasoning biases in children

The present study made an attempt to induce fear-related reasoning biases by providing children with negative information about a novel stimulus. For this purpose, non-clinical children aged 9-12 years (N = 318) were shown a picture of an unknown animal for which they received either negative, ambiguous, positive, or no information. Then children completed a series of tests for measuring various types of reasoning biases (i.e., confirmation bias and covariation bias) in relation to this animal. Results indicated that children in the negative and, to a lesser extent, the ambiguous information groups displayed higher scores on tests of fear-related reasoning biases than children in the positive and no information groups. Altogether, these results support the idea that learning via negatively tinted information plays a role in the development of fear-related cognitive distortions in youths.     

When thoughts don’t feel like they used to: Changing feelings of subjective ease in judgments of the past

Thinking about the past is critical to everyday experiences, but people are not unbiased when doing so. Feelings of subjective ease that accompany generating reasons for known or alternative outcomes influence hindsight bias. But people do not always make decisions immediately after thinking about issues. Three experiments demonstrated that generating versus reading earlier generated reasons has markedly different effects on judgments, with theoretical and practical implications. Inevitability judgments were consistent with feelings of ease when generating reasons, but with numbers of reasons (content) when later reading those reasons. Experiments 2 and 3 also found that feelings of ease can be reconstructed if people reconsider their feelings when initially generating reasons. Discussion centers on the operation of subjective ease and its role in understanding judgment and decision making.     

Painful engagement in deliberate self-harm: The role of conditional goal setting

Conditional goal setting is the tendency for people to see attainment of their future personal goals as necessary for their well-being. It has been argued that this represents an unhealthy way of relating to one’s goals, as well as being particularly problematic when goals are perceived as unlikely. High conditional goal setting has been found to be related to depression and to hopelessness. The present study examined conditional goal setting in deliberate self-harm, where problematic thinking about the future is very prominent. A group of individuals attending hospital for a recent episode of deliberate self-harm (N = 25) were compared with controls attending hospital for minor injuries (N = 25) as well as a psychologically disordered but non-suicidal control group (N = 25). Participants generated goals and rated goal likelihood, the extent to which those goals were seen as necessary for their future well-being (conditional goal setting), and also the extent to which the goals were seen as sufficient for their future well-being (goal sufficiency). Deliberate self-harm patients showed a higher degree of both conditional goal setting and goal sufficiency than did both of the other groups, further confirming the idea of painful engagement with personal goals, rather than disengagement, as characterising deliberate self-harm.     

The role of componential analysis,categorical hypothesising,replicability and confirmation bias in testing for bilingual advantages in executive functioning

Kroll and Bialystok assert that managing two languages leads to a reorganisation of the neural circuits involved in language and cognitive processing and to bilingual advantages in executive functioning. This commentary documents that bilingual advantages in inhibitory control, switching and monitoring are difficult to replicate. Kroll and Bialystok argue that the use of componential analyses and categorical hypothesising are often responsible for the null results and that these research practices have created a false controversy surrounding the existence of bilingual advantages. An alternative perspective is presented suggesting that the appearance of a steady stream of published reports has been exaggerated because of the frequent use of risky small n's, a confirmation bias to report positive findings and a reluctance to conduct and report exact replications.     

Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior

People often make judgments about the ethicality of others’ behaviors and then decide how harshly to punish such behaviors. When they make these judgments and decisions, sometimes the victims of the unethical behavior are identifiable, and sometimes they are not. In addition, in our uncertain world, sometimes an unethical action causes harm, and sometimes it does not. We argue that a rational assessment of ethicality should not depend on the identifiability of the victim of wrongdoing or the actual harm caused if the judge and the decision maker have the same information. Yet in five laboratory studies, we show that these factors have a systematic effect on how people judge the ethicality of the perpetrator of an unethical action. Our studies show that people judge behavior as more unethical when: (1) identifiable vs. unidentifiable victims are involved and (2) the behavior leads to a negative rather than a positive outcome. We also find that people’s willingness to punish wrongdoers is consistent with their judgments, and we offer preliminary evidence on how to reduce these biases.     

Debiasing the hindsight bias: The role of accessibility experiences and (mis)attributions

Two studies tested the role of accessibility experiences and attributions in debiasing the hindsight bias. Participants listed 4 or 12 thoughts about how a college football game, or the 2000 US Presidential election, might have turned out differently. Listing 12 thoughts was experienced as difficult, suggesting to participants that there were few ways in which the event could have turned out otherwise. Hindsight biases increased under this condition, unless participants attributed the difficulty of the thought generation to their own lack of knowledge, which resulted in a trend in the opposite direction. The interplay of accessible content, accessibility experiences and attribution in mental simulation is discussed.