Outline shape is a mediator of object recognition that is particularly important for living things

We assess the importance of outline shape in mediating the recognition of living and nonliving things. Natural objects were presented as shaded line drawings or silhouettes, and were living and nonliving things. For object decision (deciding whether an object may be encountered in real life) there were longer response times to nonliving than to living things. Importantly, this category difference was greater for silhouettes than for shaded line drawings. For naming, similar category and stimulus differences were evident, but were not as pronounced. We also examined effects of prior naming on subsequent object decision performance. Repetition priming was equivalent for nonliving and living things. However, prior presentation of silhouettes (but not shaded line drawings) reduced the longer RT to nonliving things relative to living things in silhouette object decision. We propose that outline contour benefits recognition of living things more than nonliving things: For nonliving things, there may be greater 2-D/3-D interpretational ambiguity, and/or they may possess fewer salient features.     

Revisiting preschoolers' living things concept: a microgenetic analysis of conceptual change in basic biology

Many preschoolers know that plants and animals share basic biological properties, but this knowledge does not usually lead them to conclude that plants, like animals, are living things. To resolve this seeming paradox, we hypothesized that preschoolers largely base their judgments of life status on a biological property, capacity for teleological action, but that few preschoolers realize that plants possess this capacity. To test the hypothesis, we taught 5-year-olds one of four biological facts and examined the children's subsequent categorization of life status for numerous animals, plants, and artifacts. As predicted, a large majority of 5-year-olds who learned that both plants and animals, but not artifacts, move in goal-directed ways inferred that both plants and animals, but not artifacts, are alive. These children were considerably more likely to draw this inference than peers who learned that the same plants and animals grow or need water and almost as likely to do so as children who were explicitly told that animals and plants are living things and that artifacts are not. Results also indicated that not all biological properties are extended from familiar animals to plants; some biological properties are first attributed to plants and then extended to animals.     

Children's understandings of the attributes of life

Previous investigations of children's understandings of the life concept have focused on their classifications of the life status of familiar objects. In this study, we attempted to examine more directly the processes by which children infer life status by examining their reasoning about unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things to establish which attributes they associated most closely with life. Children age 7 and younger most often named attributes true only of animals but not of plants; older children more often named attributes true of both animals and plants. However, movement was the single attribute cited most frequently by children of all ages tested. In Experiment 2, 4- to 11-year-olds and adults were presented information about attributes of imaginary objects on a distant planet and were asked to infer if those objects were alive. Again, young children relied relatively heavily on qualities true only of animals but not of plants, whereas older children relied more on attributes true of both plants and animals. Also as before, movement was viewed as indicative of life at all ages tested. In Experiment 3, we examined the hypothesis that children discriminate among different types of motion and that the types of motion they associate with life are in fact typical of living things. Children ranging from age 5 through 11 were found to discriminate among different types of motion and to infer that objects were alive only when they showed the types of motion typical of living beings. The results of Experiment 3 allowed interpretation of seemingly conflicting results that have arisen in previous studies, as well as in Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study.     

4~7岁儿童依据对繁殖的朴素理解区分植物和非生物的认知发展

以152名4~7岁儿童为被试,采用访谈和判断选择任务探查他们对植物繁殖的认知。结果发现,①4~7岁儿童对植物繁殖的认知可分为不理解、部分理解和确切理解三种水平,儿童在入学后7岁能依据对植物繁殖的朴素理解区分植物与非生物;②通过降低材料难度和任务形式要求的难度,可以有效地发掘年幼儿童的认知潜能,即大部分6岁学前儿童就能够理解植物繁殖;③任务难度的改变对处于部分理解水平的5、6儿童影响更为显著：使他们在选择任务上的认知成绩优于访谈任务,对有明显果实和种子植物的认知优于无明显果实和种子植物的认知     

Category-specific naming errors in normal subjects: the influence of evolution and experience

The importance of "artifactual" variables (such as conceptual familiarity) have been highlighted in current accounts of category-specific disorders for living things (e.g., Funnell & Sheridan, 1992). The difficulties experienced by patients are essentially viewed as an exaggeration of normal processes and the implication is that normal subjects should also have greater difficulty naming living items (because they have lower conceptual familiarity than nonliving things). The current study examined normal subjects' ability to name pictures of artifact-matched sets of living and nonliving things in a naming-to-deadline paradigm. Contrary to the prediction, normal subjects made more nonliving naming errors. Furthermore, female subjects made more nonliving-thing errors than male subjects. These findings could not be reduced to differences in either category-based or gender-based familiarity ratings. Rather, it is proposed that an elaborated domain-specific evolutionary model parsimoniously explains both the greater incidence of living thing deficits in patients and the better performance of normal subjects with living things.     

Measuring the influence of similarity on category-specific effects

There is evidence for both advantages and disadvantages in normal recognition of living over nonliving things. This paradox has been attributed to high levels of perceptual similarity within living categories having a different effect on performance in different contexts. However, since living things are intrinsically more similar to each other, previous studies could not determine whether the various category effects were due to perceptual similarity, or to other characteristics of living things. We used novel animal and vehicle stimuli that were matched for similarity to measure the influence of perceptual similarity in different contexts. We found that displaying highly similar objects in blocked sets reduced their perceived similarity, eliminating the detrimental effect on naming performance. Experiment 1 demonstrated a disadvantage for highly similar objects in name learning and name verification using mixed groups of similar and dissimilar animals and vehicles. Experiment 2 demonstrated no disadvantage for the same highly similar objects when they were blocked, e.g., similar animals presented alone. Thus, perceptual similarity, rather than other characteristics particular to living things, is affected by context, and could create apparent category effects under certain testing conditions.     

A computational model of semantic memory impairment: modality specificity and emergent category specificity.

It is demonstrated how a modality-specific semantic memory system can account for category-specific impairments after brain damage. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis that visual and functional knowledge play different roles in the representation of living things and nonliving things is tested and confirmed. A parallel distributed processing model of semantic memory in which knowledge is subdivided by modality into visual and functional components is described. In Experiment 2, the model is lesioned, and it is confirmed that damage to visual semantics primarily impairs knowledge of living things, and damage to functional semantics primarily impairs knowledge of nonliving things. In Experiment 3, it is demonstrated that the model accounts naturally for a finding that had appeared problematic for a modality-specific architecture, namely, impaired retrieval of functional knowledge about living things. Finally, in Experiment 4, it is shown how the model can account for a recent observation of impaired knowledge of living things only when knowledge is probed verbally.     

Crowded and sparse domains in object recognition: consequences for categorization and naming

Some models of object recognition propose that items from structurally crowded categories (e.g., living things) permit faster access to superordinate semantic information than structurally dissimilar categories (e.g., nonliving things), but slower access to individual object information when naming items. We present four experiments that utilize the same matched stimuli: two examine superordinate categorization and two examine picture naming. Experiments 1 and 2 required participants to sort pictures into their appropriate superordinate categories and both revealed faster categorization for living than nonliving things. Nonetheless, the living thing superiority disappeared when the atypical categories of body parts and musical instruments were excluded. Experiment 3 examined naming latency and found no difference between living and nonliving things. This finding was replicated in Experiment 4 where the same items were presented in different formats (e.g., color and line-drawn versions). Taken as a whole, these experiments show that the ease with which people categorize items maps strongly onto the ease with which they name them.     

Left anterior lobectomy and category-specific naming

Damasio and colleagues (1996) have proposed that the left anterior temporal region supports knowledge pertaining to living objects, whereas more posterior temporal regions play a critical role in naming nonliving things. Accordingly, one might expect that left-sided anterior temporal lobectomy should have a more profound effect on the naming of living as opposed to nonliving things. As part of a multicenter collaborative project, seventy-nine patients (all left-hemisphere speech dominant) were tested pre- and post-left-temporal lobectomy on a task that required naming of living and nonliving items equated for name frequency, familiarity, and visual complexity. Consistent with the proposals of Damasio et al. (1996), left temporal lobectomy impaired naming ability, particularly for living things. When individual outcomes were considered, twice as many patients showed a relative decline in naming living as opposed to nonliving things.     

Sources of error in picture naming under time pressure

We used a deadline procedure to investigate how time pressure may influence the processes involved in picture naming. The deadline exaggerated errors found under naming without deadline. There were also category differences in performance between living and nonliving things and, in particular, for animals versus fruit and vegetables. The majority of errors were visuallyand semantically related to the target (e. celery-asparagus), and there was a greater proportion of these errors made to living things. Importantly, there were also more visual-semantic errors to animals than to fruit and vegetables. In addition, there were a smaller number of pure semantic errors (e.g., nut-bolt), which were made predominantly to nonliving things. The different kinds of error were correlated with different variables. Overall, visual-semantic errors were associated with visual complexity and visual similarity, whereas pure semantic errors were associated with imageability and age of acquisition. However, for animals, visual-semantic errors were associated with visual complexity, whereas for fruit and vegetables they were associated with visual similarity. We discuss these findings in terms of theories of category-specific semantic impairment and models of picture naming.     

An attenuation of the 'normal' category effect in patients with Alzheimer's disease: a review and bootstrap analysis

There is a consensus that Alzheimer's disease (AD) impairs semantic information, with one of the first markers being anomia i.e. an impaired ability to name items. Doubts remain, however, about whether this naming impairment differentially affects items from the living and nonliving knowledge domains. Most studies have reported an impairment for naming living things (e.g. animals or plants), a minority have found an impairment for nonliving things (e.g. tools or vehicles), and some have found no category-specific effect. A survey of the literature reveals that this lack of agreement may reflect a failure to control for intrinsic variables (such as familiarity) and the problems associated with ceiling effects in the control data. Investigating picture naming in 32 AD patients and 34 elderly controls, we used bootstrap techniques to deal with the abnormal distributions in both groups. Our analyses revealed the previously reported impairment for naming living things in AD patients and that this persisted even when intrinsic variables were covaried; however, covarying control performance eliminated the significant category effect. Indeed, the within-group comparison of living and nonliving naming revealed a larger effect size for controls than patients. We conclude that the category effect in Alzheimer's disease is no larger than is expected in the healthy brain and may even represent a small diminution of the normal profile.     

Musical instrument naming impairments: the crucial exception to the living/nonliving dichotomy in category-specific agnosia

In category-specific agnosia (CSA) patients typically have more trouble naming animals, fruits, and vegetables than tools, furniture, and articles of clothing. A crucial exception to this living vs nonliving rule involves the category of musical instruments. Patients with problems naming living objects often repeatedly fail to name musical instruments. In CSA it is crucial to equate living and nonliving object lists on object name frequency, complexity, and familiarity. The present study shows, however, that even the most rigorously controlled object lists can lead to erroneous conclusions if nonliving stimuli contain an overrepresentation of musical instruments. Naming capabilities of a herpes encephalitis patient were assessed using matched lists of living and nonliving objects and showed no indication of category-specific deficits. When exemplars were separated into biological objects, musical instruments and man-made artifacts, strong category-specificity emerged: artifact naming was flawless whereas musical instrument and biological object naming were both severely impaired. It is concluded that CSA is a veridical phenomenon but that our understanding of CSA is limited by adhering to the spurious living/nonliving distinction.     

The visual basis of category effects in object identification: evidence from the visual hemifield paradigm

The basis for the category specific living things advantage in object recognition (i.e., faster and more accurate identification of living compared to nonliving things) was investigated in two experiments. It was hypothesised that the global shape of living things on average provides more information about their basic level identity than the global shape of nonliving things. In two experiments subjects performed name-picture or picture-name verification tasks, in which blurred or clear images of living and nonliving things were presented in either the right or the left visual hemifield. With blurred images, recognition performance was worst for nonliving things presented to the right visual field/left hemisphere, indicating that the lack of visual detail in the stimulus combined with a left hemisphere bias toward processing high frequency visual elements proved detrimental for processing nonliving stimuli in this condition. In addition, an overall living things advantage was observed in both experiments. This advantage was considerably larger with blurred images than with clear. These results are compatible with the global shape hypothesis and converge with evidence using other paradigms.     

Inference is bliss: using evolutionary relationship to guide categorical inferences

Three experiments, adopting an evolutionary biology perspective, investigated subjects' inferences about living things. Subjects were told that different enzymes help regulate cell function in two taxa and asked which enzyme a third taxon most likely uses. Experiment 1 and its follow-up, with college students, used triads involving amphibians, reptiles, and mammals (reptiles and mammals are most closely related evolutionarily) and plants, fungi, and animals (fungi are more closely related to animals than to plants). Experiment 2, with 10th graders, also included triads involving mammals, birds, and snakes/crocodilians (birds and snakes/crocodilians are most closely related). Some subjects received cladograms (hierarchical diagrams) depicting the evolutionary relationships among the taxa. The effect of providing cladograms depended on students' background in biology. The results illuminate students' misconceptions concerning common taxa and constraints on their willingness to override faulty knowledge when given appropriate evolutionary evidence. Implications for introducing tree thinking into biology curricula are discussed.     

Differences in preschoolers’ and adults’ use of generics about novel animals and artifacts: A window onto a conceptual divide

Children and adults commonly produce more generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) about animals than artifacts. This may reflect differences in participants’ generic knowledge about specific animals/artifacts (e.g., dogs/chairs), or it may reflect a more general distinction. To test this, the current experiments asked adults and preschoolers to generate properties about novel animals and artifacts (Experiment 1: real animals/artifacts; Experiments 2 and 3: matched pairs of maximally similar, novel animals/artifacts). Data demonstrate that even without prior knowledge about these items, the likelihood of producing a generic is significantly greater for animals than artifacts. These results leave open the question of whether this pattern is the product of experience and learned associations or instead a set of early-developing theories about animals and artifacts.     

Evaluating feature-category relations using semantic fluency tasks

The issue of the relationship between semantic features and semantic categories has been raised by Warrington and colleagues, who claimed that sensory and functional-associative features are differentially important in determining the meaning of living and nonliving things (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). In the present study, the effectiveness of semantic memory search for living and nonliving things with sensory and functional-associative search cues was evaluated through eight different adaptations of the semantic fluency task. More living thing responses and clusters were generated from sensory than from functional-associative search cues, while the reverse pattern holds for nonliving things responses and clusters. The results thus provide consistent empirical support for the assumption that sensory properties are fundamental in the representation of living things, while functional-associative properties are fundamental in the semantic representation of nonliving things.     

A selective deficit for living things after temporal lobectomy for relief of epileptic seizures.

Unilateral left and right temporal lobectomy patients and normal control subjects were tested on confrontation naming, speeded naming, category generation, and category and associate matching tasks. Both groups of patients were disproportionately impaired for living relative to nonliving things in confrontation naming, speeded naming, and category generation. We argue that damage to the temporal lobe impairs lexical retrieval most strongly for living things and that the anterior temporal cortices are convergence zones particularly necessary for retrieving the names of living things.     

Category-specific naming and modality-specific imagery

Some attempts to explain category-specific disorders have stressed how different modality knowledge bases (i.e., visual knowledge vs motoric/functional knowledge) may underlie the distinction between living and nonliving things. This study examined 60 normal subjects for the relationship between picture naming in four subcategories (animals, fruit/vegetables, praxic and nonpraxic objects) and imagery vividness in seven modalities. Participants made more nonliving than living errors; and females made more nonliving errors than males. There was a significant correlation between naming of animals and fruits/vegetables and visual imagery vividness; however, this association was also significant for praxic and nonpraxic object naming. There was no evidence of associations between kinesthetic imagery and praxic object naming or gustatory/olfactory imagery and fruit/vegetable naming. These findings accord with the notion of a general association between visual imagery and picture naming, but provide no support for more specific links between modality-specific imagery vividness and naming in different categories.