In defense of the mirror thesis

In this journal, Luke Russell defends a sophisticated dispositional account of evil personhood according to which a person is evil just in case she is strongly and highly fixedly disposed to perform evil actions in conditions that favour her autonomy. While I am generally sympathetic with this account, I argue that Russell wrongly dismisses the mirror thesis—roughly, the thesis that evil people are the mirror images of the morally best sort of persons—which I have defended elsewhere. Russell’s rejection of the mirror thesis depends upon an independently implausible account of moral sainthood, one that is implausible for reasons that Russell himself suggests in another context. Indeed, an account of moral sainthood that parallels Russell’s account of evil personhood is plausible for the same reasons that his account of evil personhood is, and that suggests that Russell himself is actually committed to the mirror thesis.     

Edward Aloysius Pace

Summary Edward Aloysius Pace, pioneer of experimental psychology among American Catholics, was the first American Catholic and the first Catholic priest to study with Wilhelm Wundt. Upon his return from Leipzig, where he received his PhD in 1891, he established a psychological laboratory and department of psychology at the Catholic University of America in Washington, DC. This department became the model for most of the early departments of psychology at Catholic colleges and universities as well as the training center of many teachers who staffed the new departments at these Catholic colleges and universities. From Catholic University of America in Washington, DC, the experimental psychology of Wundt radiated to Catholic circles throughout the United States.The best account of Pace's life is to be found in Hart C (ed), Aspects of the New Scholastic Philosophy (New York: Benziger 1932, pp 1–9); a series of philosophical essays dedicated to Pace by the American Philosophical Association on the occasion of his seventieth birthday     

Moral Evil and Leibniz’s Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is contingent on God’s will (a dimension of divine omnipotence), with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence, not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period.     

On Russell's vulnerability to Russell's paradox

Influenced by G. E. Moore, Russell broke with Idealism towards the end of 1898; but in later years he characterized his meeting Peano in August 1900 as ‘the most important event’ in ‘the most important year in my intellectual life’. While Russell discovered his paradox during his post-Peano period, the question arises whether he was already committed, during his pre-Peano Moorean period, to assumptions from which his paradox may be derived. Peter Hylton has argued that the pre-Peano Russell was thus vulnerable to (at least one version of) Russell's paradox and hence that the paradox exposes a pre-existing difficulty in Russell's Moorean philosophy. Contrary to Hylton, I argue that the Moorean Russell adhered to views which insulated him against the paradox. Further, I argue that Russell became vulnerable to his paradox as a result of changes in his Moorean position occasioned, first, by his acceptance of Cantor's theory of the transfinite, and, second, by his correspondence with Frege. I conclude with some general comments regarding Russell's acceptance of naïve set theory.     

The attraction of evil and the destruction of meaning

Does the concept of evil deserve special formulation in the realm of psychoanalytic thought? In agreement with authors such as Meltzer (1992) and De Masi (2003) and through selected moments from a boy's long analysis, I will propose a definition of evil as a state of mind, characterized by disregard for the human quality of the object and the destruction of meaning and meaningfulness of life in and for others. Evil drains, perverts and strips symbols of intentions and goals, leaving them empty of emotional significance. In my patient, the state of mind that he called evil exerted a seductive appeal and was accompanied by a sadistic excitement that he elevated into a state of sexualized well‐being, which progressively perverted and destroyed emotional meaning, contributing to his confusion and desperation. Confronting this pathological configuration and describing the situation that I felt existed within his mind and between us, and rearticulating emotional meaning where it had been perverted, cannibalized or left empty, was the principal – and at times only – clinical instrument available to lead him out of his descent into nothingness.     

MORAL INERTIA

Abstract. The phenomenon of moral inertia is often explained by reference to all-encompassing features of human nature, such as laziness and cowardice, but in fact it has many causes. A modern person may fail to "stand up" to social evil because he has difficulty seeing it-perhaps because it is deliberately hidden or because she and her neighbors cannot find ways to recognize and discuss it as a soluble problem. Fourteen factors contributing to moral inertia will be listed here under the headings of cognitive and linguistic factors. Further, a consideration of ideology's role (both liberal and Marxist) in inhibiting action against social evil will be presented.     

Cosmic Alienation and the Origin of Evil: Rejecting the “Only Way” Option

Abstract

For many contemporary theologians, God could not have created the universe in any other way than leading inevitably to evil. First, this essay will argue that non-human evil represents genuine evil. Second, it will argue that if contingency leads inevitably to evil, then God is too closely implicated in the creation of evil. Finally, I will re-explore the occurrence of a primordial deviation from God's original plan logically prior to creation as the best explanation for the origin of evil, thereby placing the origin of evil back in the context of freedom rather than implicating the nature of contingent reality.     

In between mental evolution and unconscious memory: Lamarckism,Darwinism, and professionalism in late Victorian Britain

In 1884 Samuel Butler published a collection of essays entitled Remarks on George Romanes’ Mental Evolution, where he attempted to show how Romanes’ idea of mental evolution presented similarities with his theory of unconscious memory. By looking at Romanes’ work through Butler’s writing, this article will reevaluate some aspects of their works regarding the complex debate about memory, heredity, and instinct. This paper will explore the main differences and similarities between Romanes’ science and Butler’s writing on science both in terms of their ideas and contents. It will then look into their different professional relationships with Darwin and how this determined the professional and public reception of their theories.     

Some consequences ofThe New Rhetoric: A critical study

This review article examines some aspects of the legacy of Perelman'sThe New Rhetoric as reflected in two volumes of his collected essays in the new edition of his Works as well as in a memorial volume edited by Michel Meyer and the acts of a colloquium sponsored by Meyer's Center for Argumentation.     

Shaping the Enemy: Foundational Labelling by L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Heyting

The use of the three labels (logicism, formalism, intuitionism) to denote the three foundational schools of the early twentieth century are now part of literature. Yet, neither their number nor their adoption has been stable over the twentieth century. They were not introduced by the founding fathers of each school: namely, neither Frege nor Russell spoke of ‘logicism’; and even Hilbert did not use the word ‘formalism’ to introduce his foundational programs. At a certain point, only Brouwer used the label ‘intuitionism’ in his scientific production to personify his philosophy of mathematics and he used the label ‘formalism’ for Hilbert’s foundational viewpoint. Starting with Brouwer, the origin of the use of the three labels to represent a foundational meaning, will be analysed in this paper. Thereafter, the role that Brouwer’s pupil Arend Heyting had in the production and use of foundational labels will be considered. On the basis of the comparison of the attitudes of these two scholars I will finally advance the thesis that not only the creation but also the use of labels, far from being a mere gesture of academic reference to literature, can be a sign of the cultural operation each scholar wanted to do.     

论牟宗三易学思想的演变

牟宗三的易学是其原创性哲学的重要内容,体现着时代精神。他的早期著作《从周易方面研究中国之元学及道德哲学》,以罗素哲学、数理逻辑、新实在论解读《周易》,阐述了自然哲学和自然主义道德论,对缺乏科学与逻辑并高度意识形态化而成为人性之桎梏的中国传统文化补缺救失;在中后期,面对物质主义和唯科学主义在世界的泛滥,寻求人类的终极关怀,创立道德形上学,其易学即为这一体系的构成部分。牟氏易学的发展既反映了时代的变化,也显示出其视野由中国到世界的逐步开阔化。     

Some early similarities and later differences between Bertrand Russell and B. F. Skinner

B. F. Skinner credited Bertrand Russell with converting him to behaviorism and with writing one of the books that most influenced him. Particularly in Skinner's early work, there are similarities between Skinner and Russell that extend across mathematics, determinism, positivism, verbal behavior, future communities, evolution, and pragmatism. Later, Skinner's views changed, and he parted company with Russell in most of these areas. Perhaps the most dramatic and fundamental departure came when Skinner embraced pragmatism, which Russell said he "hated." However, there was a time during which Russell wrote favorably of pragmatism as a view for science. Although the similarities between Skinner and Russell may have resulted from common cultural influences, Russell appears to deserve credit for leading Skinner into the stimulus-response behaviorism of two-term necessities; he may also deserve some credit for helping to lead him out of it and into the selectionist behaviorism of three-term contingencies.     

Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

Is evil just very wrong?

Is evil a distinct moral concept? Or are evil actions just very wrong actions? Some philosophers have argued that evil is a distinct moral concept. These philosophers argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. Other philosophers have suggested that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. On this view, evil is just very wrong. In this paper I argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. The first part of the paper is critical. I argue that Luke Russell’s attempt to show that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing fails. Russell’s argument fails because it is based on an implausible criterion for determining whether two concepts are qualitatively distinct. I offer a more plausible criterion and argue that based on this criterion evil and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct. To help make my case, I sketch a theory of evil which makes a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing. I argue that we cannot characterize evil as just very wrong on plausible conceptions of evil and wrongdoing. I focus on act-consequentialist, Kantian, and contractarian conceptions of wrongdoing.     

GAPS IN THE ARGUMENT: A DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COSMOLOGY

In this discussion review of Robert John Russell's collection of essays I agree with him about the necessity of human existence given the claims of Christian theology. I look in detail at his suggestions for speaking to this issue, especially his thesis of NIODA—noninterventionist objective divine action. I end up disagreeing with the suggestion and argue that in respects Russell is tackling the science-religion relationship in the wrong way.     

Jung, the trickster writer, or what literary research can do for the clinician

This paper aims to show how literary scholarship can contribute to clinical debates by offering different methods of reading and interpreting works by Jung. Firstly, as texts form much of the means by which Jungian ideas are transmitted and worked upon, literary research offers methods of examining the way we read for authority and orthodoxy. Secondly, it is invaluable to look at the way in which Jung actually wrote. Jung portrays a dynamic psyche in action in his writings. His works are not only about a creative archetypal psyche, they enact and perform this creativity in the way in which he uses words. The rich playfulness demonstrated in The Collected Works is an example of a writer as a mythmaker of the psyche, one who absorbs unconscious creative energies into his writing in ways that dissolve modernity's cultural boundaries of science and art. In addition, the aesthetic component in Jung's writing is not a decoration of his ideas. Rather, his 'literary' qualities are themselves forms of argument about the fragile state of modern subjectivity. Using his essays on 'Synchronicity', and the 'Trickster', the paper will show these works to be responses to three related crises that still face clinicians and scholars today: the problematic role of the hero myth as an individuation narrative, the nature of 'science', and the crisis of western modernity itself in desperate need of psychic healing. The paper will show that where writing on synchronicity aims to individuate science by adding a 'feminine' Eros to its Logos biases, the Trickster essay is designed to ameliorate modernity by providing frameworks to make visible marginal or excluded material. In these works Jung tries to rejuvenate the modern world by re-connecting traditional symbolic systems with the psyche through myth as a language of psychic relating.     

THEOLOGICAL APPROPRIATION OF SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS: RESPONSE TO HEFNER, WICKEN, EAVES, AND TIPLER

Abstract. Philip Hefner's focus on contingency and field as the guiding concepts in my thinking and his characterization of my theological enterprise as a Lakatosian research program are appropriate and helpful.
I welcome Jeffrey Wicken's holistic approach to the emergence of life. Theology can appropriate the language of self-organizing systems exploiting the thermodynamic flow of energy degradation for interpreting organic life as a creation of the Spirit of God.
However, I cannot sympathize with Lindon Eaves's equation of "hard science" with a reductionism which raises the double helix to the status of icon; the "meaning" of DNA derives from its place in the total phenomenon of life—not the reverse.
Frank Tipler's cosmology raises the prospect of a rapprochement between physics and theology in the area of eschatology. A Christian cosmology, however, would require at least three modifications: contingency in the history of creation; the uniqueness of Jesus' resurrection; and the relation of these to the problem of evil.