Effects of choice and relative frequency elicitation on overconfidence: further tests of an exemplar‐retrieval model

An experiment is reported in which participants rendered judgments regarding the disease states of hypothetical patients. Participants either reported likelihoods that patients had the target disease (no choice), or classified patients into disease categories and then reported likelihoods that their classifications were correct (choice included). Also, participants' likelihood judgments were made in response to either a probability probe question, or a relative frequency probe. Two distinct exemplar‐memory models were compared on their ability to predict overconfidence under these procedures. Both propose that people learn and judge by storing and retrieving examples. The exemplar retrieval model (ERM) proposes that amount of retrieval drives choice inclusion and likelihood probe effects. The alternative model assumes that response error mediates choice inclusion effects. Choice inclusion and the relative frequency probe reduced overconfidence, but the combined effects were subadditive. Only the ERM predicted this pattern, and it further provided good quantitative fits to these results. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Taking a social psychological approach to metacognitive judgments, this study analyzed the difference in realism (validity) in confidence and frequency judgments (i.e., estimates of overall accuracy) between one's own and another person's answers to general knowledge questions. Experiment 1 showed that when judging their own answers, compared with another's answers, the participants exhibited higher overconfidence, better ability to discriminate correct from incorrect answers, lower accuracy, and lower confidence. However, the overconfidence effect could be attributable to the lowest level of confidence. Furthermore, when heeding additional information about another's answers the participants showed higher confidence and better discrimination ability. The overconfidence effect of Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2. However, the results of Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ability, confidence, and accuracy. Finally, in both experiments the participants gave lower frequency judgments of their own overall accuracy compared with their frequency judgments of another person's overall accuracy.     

How Are Personality Judgments Made? A Cognitive Model of Reference Group Effects,Personality Scale Responses,and Behavioral Reactions

This article suggests that personality judgments are wholly relative, being the outcome of a comparison of a given individual to a reference group of others. The underlying comparison processes are the same as those used to judge psychophysical stimuli (as outlined by range frequency theory and decision by sampling accounts). Five experimental studies show that the same person's personality is rated differently depending on how his or her behavior (a) ranks within a reference group and (b) falls within the overall range of behavior shown by other reference group members. Results were invariant across stimulus type and response options (7-point Likert scale, 990-point allocation task, or dichotomous choice). Simulated occupational scenarios led participants to give different-sized bonuses and employ different people as a function of context. Future research should note that personality judgments (as in self-report personality scales) only represent perceived standing relative to others or alternatively should measure personality through behavior or biological reactivity. Personality judgments cannot be used to compare different populations when the population participants have different reference groups (as in cross-cultural research).     

Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask

Many studies have reported that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. However, some common analyses confound systematic psychological effects with statistical effects that are inevitable if judgments are imperfect. We present three experiments using new methods to separate systematic effects from the statistically inevitable. We still find systematic differences between confidence and accuracy, including an overall bias toward overconfidence. However, these effects vary greatly with the type of judgment. There is little general overconfidence with two-choice questions and pronounced overconfidence with subjective confidence intervals. Over- and underconfidence also vary systematically with the domain of questions asked, but not as a function of difficulty. We also find stable individual differences. Determining why some people, some domains, and some types of judgments are more prone to overconfidence will be important to understanding how confidence judgments are made.     

Depressive Cognition: A Test of Depressive Realism Versus Negativity Using General Knowledge Questions

This research is an examination of whether cognition in depressed individuals incorporates a realistic view of the world or a general tendency toward negativity. Participants provided two types of probability judgments of the likelihood that they correctly answered general knowledge questions: the probability that they correctly answered each of the individual questions and an aggregate judgment, after completing the questionnaire, of the percentage of all the questions they thought they had correctly answered. These tasks generally elicit overconfidence and accuracy in nondepressives. In accord with theories of both depressive realism and general negativity, in their item-by-item assessments of their answers to the individual questions, depressed participants demonstrated less overconfidence than nondepressed participants. In accord with the theory of general negativity but not with the theory of depressive realism, however, depressed participants demonstrated underconfidence in their aggregate judgments. The implications of these findings on theories of depressive cognition are discussed.     

Depressive cognition: a test of depressive realism versus negativity using general knowledge questions

This research is an examination of whether cognition in depressed individuals incorporates a realistic view of the world or a general tendency toward negativity. Participants provided two types of probability judgments of the likelihood that they correctly answered general knowledge questions: the probability that they correctly answered each of the individual questions and an aggregate judgment, after completing the questionnaire, of the percentage of all the questions they thought they had correctly answered. These tasks generally elicit overconfidence and accuracy in nondepressives. In accord with theories of both depressive realism and general negativity, in their item-by-item assessments of their answers to the individual questions, depressed participants demonstrated less overconfidence than nondepressed participants. In accord with the theory of general negativity but not with the theory of depressive realism, however, depressed participants demonstrated underconfidence in their aggregate judgments. The implications of these findings on theories of depressive cognition are discussed.     

Facing faces: studies on the cognitive aspects of physiognomy

Physiognomy, the art of reading personality traits from faces, dates back to ancient Greece, and is still very popular. The present studies examine several aspects and consequences of the process of reading traits from faces. Using faces with neutral expressions, it is demonstrated that personality information conveyed in faces changes the interpretation of verbal information. Moreover, it is shown that physiognomic information has a consistent effect on decisions, and creates overconfidence in judgments. It is argued, however, that the process of "reading from faces" is just one side of the coin, the other side of which is "reading into faces." Consistent with the latter, information about personality changes the perception of facial features and, accordingly, the perceived similarity between faces. The implications of both processes and questions regarding their automaticity are discussed.     

Affect Is Greater Than,Not Equal to,Condition: Condition and Person Effects in Affective Priming Paradigms

Affective primes may impact ensuing behavior through condition and person effects. However, previous research has not experimentally disentangled these two sources of influence in affective priming paradigms. In the current research, we simultaneously examine the influence of condition factors, in terms of prime valence, and person factors, in terms of affect reactivity and personality. In both studies, undergraduate participants (total N = 174) were primed with either positive or negative affective stimuli (words, Study 1; pictures, Study 2) prior to judging the likability of a neutral target (Arabic characters, Study 1; inkblots, Study 2). Although we did observe between‐condition differences for positive and negative primes, person‐level effects were more consistent predictors of target ratings. Affect reactivity (affect Time 2, controlling Time 1) to the primes predicted evaluative judgments, even in the absence of condition effects. In addition, the personality traits of Neuroticism (Study 1) and behavioral inhibition system sensitivity (Study 2) predicted evaluative judgments of neutral targets following negative affective primes. With effects for condition, affect reactivity, and personality, our results suggest that affective primes influence ensuing behaviors through both informational and affective means. Research using affective priming methodologies should take into account both condition and person‐level effects.     

The Role of Face Familiarity in Judgments of Personality and Intelligence

Personality judgments based on facial features are a common occurrence. The face familiarity overgeneralization hypothesis states that people make judgments of unknown faces based on their similarity to known faces. However, there is a dearth of research regarding how face familiarity relates to perceptions of personality and intelligence in strangers. The current article used two studies to provide evidence for the relationship between face familiarity and judgments of personality and intelligence. Study 1 showed that photographs perceived as familiar by one set of participants were rated more positively regarding personality and intelligence by a second group of participants. Study 2 found that high perceived familiarity resulted in positive judgments of personality and intelligence, whereas familiarity based on exposure did not. These findings indicate both that perceived familiarity significantly impacts positive judgments of personality and intelligence and that the face familiarity overgeneralization hypothesis is a useful framework for this area of research.     

How people make support judgments: individual differences in the traits used to infer supportiveness in others.

Social support and other social judgments are composed of several distinct components, of which relationship effects are an important part. With regard to support judgments, relationship effects refer to the fact that when judging the same targets, people differ systematically in whom they see as supportive. One explanation for this effect is that people differ in how they combine information about targets to judge supportiveness. Participants rated the supportiveness of hypothetical targets and targets from their own social networks. Multilevel modeling identified the traits participants used to make support judgments. There were significant differences in the extent to which participants used different target personality traits to judge supportiveness. In addition, participant neuroticism predicted the extent to which participants used target neuroticism and agreeableness to judge supportiveness.     

Often biased but rarely in doubt: How initial reactions to stigmatized applicants affect interviewer confidence

Building on a metacognitive framework of heuristic judgments, we investigate the effect of applicant stigma on interviewers’ overconfidence in their (biased) judgments. There were 193 experienced interviewers conducting a face-to-face interview with an applicant who was facially stigmatized or not, and who was visible (traditional interview) or not (partially blind interview), to the interviewer during the rapport-building stage. In traditional interviews, interview judgments of stigmatized applicants were negatively biased, and interviewers reported overconfidence in these judgments. This effect was partially mediated by the interviewer’s professional performance during rapport building. Interview procedure moderated both the direct and indirect effect (through professional performance) of applicant stigma on interviewer confidence. Results show that interviewer (over)confidence in biased judgments is driven by the initial effects of, and reactions to, the stigmatized applicant.     

The effects of source and type of feedback on child witnesses' metamemory accuracy

This study investigated the effect of feedback on the accuracy (realism) of 12‐year‐old children's metacognitive judgments of their answers to questions about a film clip. Two types of judgments were investigated: confidence judgments (on each question) and frequency judgments (i.e. estimates of overall accuracy). The source of feedback, whether it was presented as provided by a teacher or a peer child, did not influence metacognitive accuracy. Four types of feedback were given depending on whether the participant's answer was correct and depending on whether the feedback confirmed or disconfirmed the child's answer. The children showed large overconfidence when they received confirmatory feedback but much less so when they received disconfirmatory feedback. The children gave frequency judgments implying that they had more correct answers than they actually had. No main gender differences were found for any of the measures. The results indicate a high degree of malleability in children's metacognitive judgments. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of individual differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in underconfidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N= 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.     

The Role of Individual Differences in the Accuracy of Confidence Judgments

Generally, self-assessment of accuracy in the cognitive domain produces overconfidence, whereas self-assessment of visual perceptual judgments results in under-confidence. Despite contrary empirical evidence, in models attempting to explain those phenomena, individual differences have often been disregarded. The authors report on 2 studies in which that shortcoming was addressed. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 520) completed a large number of cognitive-ability tests. Results indicated that individual differences provide a meaningful source of overconfidence and that a metacognitive trait might mediate that effect. In further analysis, there was only a relatively small correlation between test accuracy and confidence bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 107 participants), both perceptual and cognitive ability tests were included, along with measures of personality. Results again indicated the presence of a confidence factor that transcended the nature of the testing vehicle. Furthermore, a small relationship was found between that factor and some self-reported personality measures. Thus, personality traits and cognitive ability appeared to play only a small role in determining the accuracy of self-assessment. Collectively, the present results suggest that there are multiple causes of miscalibration, which current models of over- and underconfidence fail to encompass.     

Overconfidence effects in category learning: a comparison of connectionist and exemplar memory models

Exemplar and connectionist models were compared on their ability to predict overconfidence effects in category learning data. In the standard task, participants learned to classify hypothetical patients with particular symptom patterns into disease categories and reported confidence judgments in the form of probabilities. The connectionist model asserts that classifications and confidence are based on the strength of learned associations between symptoms and diseases. The exemplar retrieval model (ERM) proposes that people learn by storing examples and that their judgments are often based on the first example they happen to retrieve. Experiments 1 and 2 established that overconfidence increases when the classification step of the process is bypassed. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that a direct instruction to retrieve many exemplars reduces overconfidence. Only the ERM predicted the major qualitative phenomena exhibited in these experiments.     

Factors influencing two types of congruence in multirater judgments

In two studies of 360° judgments, it was shown that congruence measured in terms of intercorrelations between ratings by different people (congruence‐r) and in terms of the discrepancy between those ratings (congruence‐d) were empirically independent of each other. Congruence‐r was greatest, and congruence‐d was smallest, between judgments made by a target person and his or her supervisor, rather than by subordinates or peers; the differential observability of rated behaviors predicted congruence‐r but not congruence‐d. Variations in both forms of congruence were found to arise from the source of a judgment, and from a target person's age, gender, cognitive ability, and certain personality attributes. Over‐ and under‐rating associated with a personality or another third factor was shown to derive from substantially different correlations between such a factor and the two separate judgments under consideration.     

Realism in Confidence Judgments as a Function of Working in Dyads or Alone

This study compares the realism of confidence judgments made by individuals and pairs of their answers to general knowledge questions, using a within-subjects design. In the initial Control condition, subjects first answered 30 questions and then confidence rated the chosen answer. For the next 30 questions (Condition 2), they wrote down an argument for the chosen answer and then confidence-rated their answer. In the third condition, the 40 subjects were divided into 20 pairs who then answered and confidence-rated the same 30 questions as in Condition 2. Pair members were asked to collaborate on all parts of the task. The results showed that overconfidence decreased in the Pair condition compared with the Single conditions. Analysis of the interaction in the Pair condition showed a higher overconfidence in those instances where one pair member dominated the interaction totally. Other analyses of the interaction in the Pair condition also supported the importance of argumentation between the pair members for realistic confidence judgments. A comparison with previous research suggests that the fact that the subjects first attempted the questions individually may have increased the proportion correct answers and limited the increase in confidence in the Pair condition. A control study, checking for the effect of subjects answering the same questions twice, found no effect of repetition for any of the three calibration measures used.     

Child witnesses' metamemory realism

This study investigated the degree of realism in the confidence judgments of 11 to 12-year-olds (41 girls and 40 boys) of their answers to questions relating to a short film clip showing a kidnapping event. Four different confidence scales were used: a numeric scale, a picture scale, a line scale and a written scale. The results demonstrated that the children showed a high level of overconfidence in their memories. However, no significant differences between the four confidence scales were found. Weak gender differences were found in that the girls were slightly, but significantly, better calibrated than the boys. In addition, although both boys and girls overestimated the total number of memory questions they had answered correctly, the boys gave higher estimates compared with the girls. In brief, the results indicate that, at least in the context investigated, 11-12 year-old children's confidence in and estimations of their own event memory show poor realism (overconfidence and overestimation). A comparison with previous research on adults indicates that 11 to 12-year-old children show noticeably poorer realism.     

Overconfidence and the Big Five

It has been consistently observed that people are generally overconfident when assessing their performance. In the current study, participants completed Goldberg's Big Five personality inventory and then completed a cognitive task designed to assess overconfidence (defined as the difference between confidence and accuracy). Extraversion significantly predicted overconfidence (with the other Big Five factors controlled statistically). In addition, openness/intellectance significantly predicted confidence and accuracy but not overconfidence (again, with the other Big Five factors controlled statistically). Theoretical implications and implications for future research are discussed.     

Confirming expectations in asymmetric and symmetric social hypothesis testing

This article examines individuals' expectations in a social hypothesis testing task. Participants selected questions from a list to investigate the presence of personality traits in a target individual. They also identified the responses that they expected to receive and the likelihood of the expected responses. The results of two studies indicated that when people asked questions inquiring about the hypothesized traits that did not entail strong a priori beliefs, they expected to find evidence confirming the hypothesis under investigation. These confirming expectations were more pronounced for symmetric questions, in which the diagnosticity and frequency of the expected evidence did not conflict. When the search for information was asymmetric, confirming expectations were diminished, likely as a consequence of either the rareness or low diagnosticity of the hypothesis-confirming outcome. We also discuss the implications of these findings for confirmation bias.