不同博弈情境下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用

本研究借助经典的最后通牒博弈范式(UG)和独裁者博弈范式(DG),将回应者/接受者作为研究对象,考察了不同公平条件、平等条件下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用。实验结果发现:(1)在面对高不公平性的分配方案时,被排斥组比被接纳组更倾向于拒绝接受该分配方案;(2)被排斥组对高不公平性分配方案的满意度要显著低于被接纳组;(3)被排斥组在不平等的博弈(DG)条件下对分配方案的满意度显著低于平等博弈(UG)条件下对分配方案的满意度。本研究结果说明,社会排斥情境下的被试对公平与平等因素更加敏感:在高不公平条件下,被排斥的个体表现出更少的合作互惠行为,甚至不惜放弃自身经济利益,也要惩罚博弈对方的不公平行为;此外,在不平等的博弈条件下,被排斥的个体产生了更多的消极情绪体验。本文的研究结果提高了社会决策研究的生态效度和传统决策模型的预测效度,有利于更加完整透彻地了解社会决策的影响因素。     

社会公平感、机构信任度与公共合作意向

社会公平从古至今都是人类追求的崇高社会理想。对社会公平的感知即社会公平感直接决定着个体的机构信任,并影响其公共合作参与。本研究将社会公平感分为分配公平和程序公平,将机构信任度分为工具信任和动机信任,采用实验室情境设计的方法,引入最后通牒博弈和免责博弈范式,通过2个实验系统探讨"公正无私,一言而万民齐"的因果机制。研究发现分配公平与程序公平正作用于个体的公共合作态度与意向,在此基础上建立起公共合作的双路径模型:外部路径由分配公平产生工具信任和动机信任,进而触发公共合作;内部路径由程序公平产生动机信任和工具信任,进而触发公共合作;二者结合构成个体参与公共合作的双动力系统。双路径模型的适用性在组织情境和社会情境下均得到了支持。     

公平偏好的电生理测量：来自脑电、皮肤电和心电的证据

研究发现,人们普遍具有追求公平的偏好,即人们在追求个人收益时也会关注收益分配的公平性。随着电生理技术的发展,越来越多的研究者采用电生理技术对公平偏好进行深入探讨。本研究从脑电、皮肤电、心电等方面梳理公平偏好的电生理机制。脑电的研究发现,公平偏好相关的脑电主要涉及反馈相关负波和P300;皮肤电的研究发现,相比于公平分配,个体在不公平分配情况下其皮肤电的激活水平更高;心率的研究发现,相比于公平分配,个体遭遇不公平分配时其心率降低。研究公平偏好电生理机制有助于更深入地揭示公平偏好的产生根源与形成过程。未来可从公平偏好电生理的整合研究、公平偏好的脑成像与电生理的整合性探索,以及拓展公平偏好电生理的外部效度和研究范式等方面展开进一步探究。     

Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity

There is ample experimental evidence showing that people have a strong preference for equity in wealth allocation and social interaction. Although the behavior of gain sharing and responses to (un)fairness in allocation of wealth has been extensively investigated in studies employing economic exchange games, few studies have focused on how people respond to an unfair division of loss between individuals. In this study we developed a new variant of the ultimatum game and examined the participants' reactions to (un)fairness in both gain and loss sharing. Results from three experiments showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were generally higher in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, participants were inclined to associate loss with “unfair” and gain with “fair”, with stronger associations leading to higher rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, in subjective rating, unfair offers were perceived as being more unfair in the loss than in the gain domain. These results demonstrate an increased demand for fairness under adversity and the importance of justice in liability sharing.     

Altruistic behavior and cooperation: The role of intrinsic expectation when reputational information is incomplete

Altruistic behavior is known to be conditional on the level of altruism of others. However, people often have no information, or incomplete information, about the altruistic reputation of others, for example when the reputation was obtained in a different social or economic context. As a consequence, they have to estimate the other's altruistic intentions. Using an economic game, we showed that without reputational information people have intrinsic expectations about the altruistic behavior of others, which largely explained their own altruistic behavior. This implies that when no information is available, intrinsic expectations can be as powerful a driver of altruistic behavior as actual knowledge about other people's reputation. Two strategies appeared to co-exist in our study population: participants who expected others to be altruistic and acted even more altruistically themselves, while other participants had low expected altruism scores and acted even less altruistically than they expected others to do. We also found evidence that generosity in economic games translates into benefits for other social contexts: a reputation of financial generosity increased the attractiveness of partners in a social cooperative game. This result implies that in situations with incomplete information, the fitness effects of indirect reciprocity are cumulative across different social contexts.     

身体姿势启动的内隐权力感对公平决策的影响

已有研究表明, 扩张身体姿势可启动个体的权力感。基于具身认知的视角, 实验1考察身体姿势对免惩罚游戏的提议者进行金钱分配时的影响, 实验2和实验3分别考察最后通牒游戏、免惩罚游戏的回应者在蜷缩和扩张姿势下对各种分配类型方案的拒绝率。结果表明, 与蜷缩姿势相比, 扩张姿势使个体更倾向于在免惩罚游戏提议者角色时做出更多的利己不公平分配, 同时使个体更倾向于拒绝最后通牒游戏和免惩罚游戏中的不公平分配。本研究证明了扩张姿势启动的权力感可影响个体的公平决策。     

The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions

Physical appearance influences behavior in a number of environments, yet surprisingly little is known about the influence of physical attractiveness on the bargaining process. We conducted an ultimatum game experiment to investigate the influence of physical attractiveness and gender on ultimatum game decisions. Results from this study revealed no significant differences in the offers or demands attractive and unattractive people made. However, attractive people and men were treated differently by others. Consistent with the notion of a “beauty premium,” attractive people were offered more, but more was demanded of them. Men were also offered more, and less was demanded of them. We discuss implications of these results with respect to bargaining and the labor market.     

Responsibility: The tie that binds

People share significantly more money with others in common lab paradigms like the dictator game than they do in real life. What accounts for this difference? Paradigms like the dictator game link each recipient to a single dictator with the implication that each recipient can receive funds from only one person. We argue that this “burden” of responsibility to a single recipient helps to explain high levels of laboratory sharing. In two experiments—a modified dictator game experiment and a charitable giving experiment—participants donated significantly more to others when they were solely responsible for a recipient's outcome than when the responsibility for a recipient was potentially shared. Taken together with past findings from social psychology and experimental economics, the results show how unambiguous responsibility for a single recipient increases generosity.     

“追名弃利”：权力动机与社会存在对亲社会行为的影响

目前关于权力动机的研究主要关注权力动机的阴暗面, 但是对权力动机的积极面尚不清楚。本研究从公平与合作行为的角度出发, 分别采用最后通牒博弈和公共物品博弈任务, 探讨不同权力动机水平个体在内隐(眼睛线索)或外显(他人在场)社会存在下的亲社会行为是否不同。结果发现, 在眼睛线索或他人在场条件下, 相对于低权力动机者, 高权力动机者表现出更高的公平与合作水平。然而当没有社会存在线索时, 高低权力动机者的亲社会行为没有显著差异。结果提示高权力动机者出于名誉和地位的策略考虑, 也会表现出积极的亲社会行为。     

The Group-Based Binding Pledge as a Solution to Public Goods Problems

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximizing personal interests (defection) or maximizing collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. A public goods dilemma is a special case of a social dilemma in which people must contribute resources to provide a public good. Communication, especially face-to-face discussion, has been shown to be effective in facilitating cooperation in such situations, including asking members to make a pledge to contribute (cooperate). The purpose of this study was to evaluate some explanations for the effectiveness of a pledge in enhancing cooperation. Two hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students (in groups of four subjects) were asked to make choices in a public goods dilemma. The results suggest that a pledge is effective in enhancing cooperation because it induces group identity and the perception of criticality. It is suggested that when face-to-face discussion is not feasible, a pledge system may be effective in solving real life social dilemmas.     

两人和三人最后通牒博弈任务中嗓音吸引力对决策的影响

本研究用两人和三人最后通牒博弈任务探究男性嗓音吸引力对决策的影响。实验1发现, 高吸引力的嗓音会提高被试对不公平分配方案的接受率。实验2发现, 即使分配方案对第三方接受者公平, 对被试不公平, 第三方接受者的高吸引力嗓音仍然会提高被试对方案的接受率。综上, 嗓音吸引力可以诱发类似面孔吸引力的“美貌津贴”效应。     

Why do people reject unintended inequity? Responders' rejection in a truncated ultimatum game

Rejection of an inequitable and yet unintended outcome in a truncated ultimatum game was examined in an experiment with 46 undergraduate students (27 men and 19 women) from a large national university in Japan. In an ultimatum game, one of two players, the proposer, makes an offer to divide a fixed-sum of money. The other player, the responder, decides whether to accept or reject the offer. When the responder rejects the proposer's offer, neither of the two players receives a reward. Previous work examining the behavior of participants in the truncated ultimatum game employed strategy method in their experimental design. We examined whether these previous findings would be replicated in an experimental design that did not use the strategy method and instead used the standard one-shot game. Seven out of 46 responders given an inequitable offer rejected it, replicating prior results with the strategy method. We further found that subjects who rejected an offer that was involuntary and yet inequitable did not over-attribute intentions to the proposer's involuntary behavior more strongly than did acceptors. These findings strongly suggest that aversion to inequity is the explanation for the subjects' rejection of the inequitable offer.     

人际合作与冲突影响博弈决策的结果评价

人际合作与冲突是人际互动的两种主要形式, 在人类社会的发展中有着重要作用。脑成像研究表明, 当个体和人类同伴进行博弈时, 选择合作与选择冲突激活脑区的强度有所不同。但目前尚不清楚, 人际合作与冲突如何影响决策选择之后的结果评价过程。本研究采用Chicken Game任务对此问题进行了探讨, 研究记录了22名健康成人被试与人类同伴进行Chicken Game任务时的脑电活动。结果表明, 反馈负波(FRN)和P300不仅受到结果效价的影响, 同时也受到人际合作与冲突的影响。相对于选择冲突, 个体选择合作时, 输钱和赢钱反馈引发的FRN以及P300波幅差异更大。相关分析表明, RA (被试和解对方进攻)反馈引发的FRN波幅与接受该反馈后下一个trials中和解的选择率(以及总的和解率)呈显著的负相关。上述结果表明, 在社会博弈中, 合作增加了个体对博弈结果的预期, 从而引发更大的FRN效应; 并且合作共赢的结果所具有的物质意义与社会意义, 使其诱发更大的P300波幅。     

In-person contact begets calling and texting: interpersonal motives for cell phone use, face-to-face interaction, and loneliness

This study examined how cell-phone use is related to interpersonal motives for using cell phones, face-to-face communication, and loneliness. A survey of 232 college students who owned a cell phone revealed that affection and inclusion were relatively strong motivations for using voice calls and text messaging, and that interpersonal motives were positively related to the amount of cell-phone use, including calling and texting. The amount of face-to-face interaction was positively associated with the participants' cell-phone use and their interpersonal motives for using cell phones: the more the participants engaged in face-to-face interaction with other people, the higher their motives were and the more frequent cell-phone use was. Loneliness did not have a direct relation to cell-phone use. Instead, the participants with higher levels of loneliness were less likely to engage in face-to-face social interaction, which led them to use cell phones less and to be less motivated to use cell phones for interpersonal purposes.     

Counterfactual comparison modulates fairness consideration in the mini‐ultimatum game: An event‐related potentials study

Existing literature on the mini‐ultimatum game indicates that counterfactual comparison between chosen and unchosen alternatives is of great importance for individual's fairness consideration. However, it is still unclear how counterfactual comparison influences the electrophysiological responses to unfair chosen offers. In conjunction with event‐related potentials’ (ERPs) technique, the current study aimed to explore the issue by employing a modified version of the mini‐ultimatum game where a fixed set of two alternatives (unfair offer vs. fair alternative, unfair vs. hyperfair alternative, unfair offer vs. hyperunfair alternative) was presented before the chosen offer. The behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to accept unfair chosen offers when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. The ERPs results showed that the feedback‐related negativity (FRN) elicited by unfair chosen offers was insensitive to the type of unchosen alternative when correcting for possible overlap with other components. In contrast, unfair chosen offers elicited larger P300 amplitudes when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. These findings suggest that counterfactual comparison may take effect at later stages of fairness consideration as reflected by the P300.     

Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked

Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pre‐outcome period has an important function post‐outcome regret (usually) cannot have, namely to motivate the decision maker to reconsider the ongoing decision process and reverse the initial decision. Pre‐outcome regret should for these reasons be distinguished from post‐outcome regret, and studied separately. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they had imagined a ‘worst case’ outcome. In the third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre‐outcome period than afterwards. In a fourth study, participants reported regret ‘online’ during an economic game (a version of the ultimatum game). They regretted their decisions more before than after they knew the outcome. We conclude that experienced pre‐outcome regret is often stronger than post‐outcome regret, and typically increases during the pre‐outcome period. We suspect that the absence of JDM studies of pre‐outcome regret is a legacy of the dominant gambling metaphor within decision research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individualistic attitudes toward attractive rewards in older people: An experimental study using ultimatum games

This study used an ultimatum game to test the hypothesis that older individuals make more selfish offers when bargaining for highly attractive rewards, regardless of the impacts of others' responses on reward size. Both older and younger individuals separately participated in the experiment and made offers as allocators. The effects of four factors (age, certainty of the allocators' own reward depending on the recipient's response, the recipient's response, and type of rewards to be shared) on participants' offers and expectations of recipients' replies were observed. Older participants demanded higher shares for themselves than younger participants, even under the low certainty condition in the highly attractive reward scenario. Particularly in this scenario, older participants increased their portions immediately after receiving rejections. Moreover, they consistently expected the recipients to accept their offers regardless of the proposed distribution amount or bargaining conditions. It was implied that the high attractiveness of the rewards made it difficult for older individuals to predict the recipient's view of their proposals and thus contributed to them making selfish proposals.     

同伴特点如何影响人们的合作与冲突行为?

人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。     

Holding a mirror up to the self: egocentric similarity beliefs underlie social projection in cooperation

Similarity between partners entails positive consequences for cooperative interactions. But do people rely on this assumption to construe egocentric judgments about others? Five experiments examined the possibility that people project onto their partners because they believe that similarity to the self leads to success in cooperation. Studies 1a and 1b show that people hold an egocentric similarity belief in cooperation. Studies 2a and 2b test the existence of this belief in more indirect ways. The next three studies manipulate the applicability of the similarity belief and investigate its impact on projection. Study 3 finds that cooperation no longer leads to projection when participants expect a low probability of success. Study 4 replicates this effect in a real cooperative setting. Finally, Study 5 shows that projection occurs only when participants expect their characteristics to be responsible for the success of cooperation. The negative consequences of overestimating similarities in cooperation are discussed.     

Associations between empathy and altruistic sharing behavior in Chinese adults

Previous research has shown that affective empathy, rather than cognitive empathy, significantly predicts people’s altruistic sharing behavior in economic games. However, most of these studies were conducted in Western populations. There might be cultural differences in the relations between empathy and altruism due to different levels of empathy between Western and Asian individuals. In this study, we measured different aspects of empathy in Chinese adults as well as their allocation offers in the dictator and ultimatum games. We found that cognitive empathy, but not affective empathy, was a significant predictor of adults’ altruistic sharing behavior in the two economic games. Subjective family income was also revealed to be a significant predictor of individuals’ altruism in the ultimatum game, such that people with lower subjective family income tended to be more generous. Potential implications of our findings are discussed.