Are effect sizes and confidence levels problems for or solutions to the null hypothesis test?

Some have proposed that the null hypothesis significance test, as usually conducted using the t test of the difference between means, is an impediment to progress in psychology. To improve its prospects, using Neyman-Pearson confidence intervals and Cohen's standardized effect sizes, d, is recommended. The purpose of these approaches is to enable us to understand what can appropriately be said about the distances between the means and their reliability. Others have written extensively that these recommended strategies are highly interrelated and use identical information. This essay was written to remind us that the t test, based on the sample--not the true--standard deviation, does not apply solely to distance between means. The t test pertains to a much more ambiguous specification: the difference between samples, including sampling variations of the standard deviation.     

Barriers to primary prevention efforts in the schools: Are we the biggest obstacle to the transfer of knowledge?

Dialogue and debate regarding the definition of prevention has subsided and has been replaced by research and information regarding pathways to dysfunction and effective primary prevention strategies. In spite of the solid research base and the strong desire of practitioners to apply prevention strategies, there continues to be sporadic implementation in schools. Barriers to the implementation of primary prevention programs include traditional professional practice within psychology, lack of communicating pertinent information between professions and policymakers, commitment of resources, and limited understanding of the pathways to successful and widespread implementation. Recommendations to address these barriers are discussed.     

Are people changed by the experience of having an episode of depression? A further test of the scar hypothesis

The purpose of this study was to identify characteristics of individuals before and after their first depressive episode. Subjects were 49 older persons assessed before and after their first depressive episode on depression-related psychosocial variables. The control group consisted of 351 never-depressed individuals. Consistent with previous findings, patients were more likely to be younger, female, and mildly depressed both before and after the episode. In addition, they were more likely to be employed. Following an episode of depression, the recovered patients described their social skills and health as poorer and their interpersonal dependency as greater than the controls. However, on an experiment-wise basis, the number of significant differences were no greater than expected by chance. The stress activation model was examined but did not appreciably enhance the results. Results suggest that most of the psychosocial variables associated with depression are state dependent.     

Do 18-month-olds really attribute mental states to others? A critical test

In the research reported here, we investigated whether 18-month-olds would use their own past experience of visual access to attribute perception and consequent beliefs to other people. Infants in this study wore either opaque blindfolds (opaque condition) or trick blindfolds that looked opaque but were actually transparent (trick condition). Then both groups of infants observed an actor wearing one of the same blindfolds that they themselves had experienced, while a puppet removed an object from its location. Anticipatory eye movements revealed that infants who had experienced opaque blindfolds expected the actor to behave in accordance with a false belief about the object's location, but that infants who had experienced trick blindfolds did not exhibit that expectation. Our results suggest that 18-month-olds used self-experience with the blindfolds to assess the actor's visual access and to update her belief state accordingly. These data constitute compelling evidence that 18-month-olds infer perceptual access and appreciate its causal role in altering the epistemic states of other people.     

Attacked by the gods or by mental illness? Hybridizing mental and spiritual health in Okinawa

In 1972, the reversion to Japanese rule brought with it many changes for Okinawans, among them the widespread introduction of psychiatry. Psychiatry was not well received at first due to the extensive presence of shamans, who had traditionally dealt with Okinawans’ spiritual and psychological afflictions. Both psychiatrists and shamans claimed to be able to heal those who were labelled ‘mentally ill’ or ‘mentally disordered’ by psychiatrists. This conflict between systems over the body of the patient/client is relevant to debates today about both the perceived value of generic mental health diagnosis and treatment regimes compared with indigenous healing,1 See Kleinman (, ); WHO (2001).  [Google Scholar] and the question of isolating how markers or symbols of identity are employed in patients’ help-seeking choices. We examine three cases from the 1970s of patients who were diagnosed as suffering from both schizophrenia and an indigenous condition known as kami daarii.     

Are awareness questionnaires valid? Investigating the use of posttest questionnaires for assessing awareness in implicit memory tests

Two experiments--one employing a perceptual implicit memory test and the other a conceptual implicit memory test--investigated the validity of posttest questionnaires for determining the incidence of awareness in implicit memory tests. In both experiments, a condition in which none of the studied words could be used as test responses (i.e., the none-studied condition) was compared with a standard implicit test condition. Results showed that reports of awareness on the posttest questionnaire were much less frequent in the none-studied condition than in the standard condition. This was especially true after deep processing at study. In both experiments, 83% of the participants in the none-studied condition stated they were unaware even though there were strong demands for claiming awareness. Although there was a small bias in the questionnaire (i.e., 17% of the participants in the none-studied condition stated they were aware), overall, there was strong support for the validity of awareness questionnaires.     

The illusion of mental health: in the mind of which beholder?

We reference self-ratings and clinician ratings of childhood anxious symptoms to a third data source well delineated with regard to the pathophysiology of anxiety. A total of 36 children with anxiety disorders and other children were administered yohimbine, an alpha-sub-2-adrenoreceptor antagonist, in response to which anxiety-prone children have blunted output of growth hormone. We assessed neuroendocrine reactions. In general, participants who claimed anxiety that was unconfirmed by clinicians displayed anxiotypic neuroendocrine profiles, whereas those who denied anxiety detected by clinicians did not, suggesting self-report may have had the advantage over clinician ratings in some instances. Nuanced and contextualized conclusions in this area of work are needed. In response to the question "the illusion of mental health: in the mind of which beholder?," we answer "it depends on the sample and the syndrome under study."     

The self: Your own worst enemy? A test of the self-invoking trigger hypothesis

The self-invoking trigger hypothesis was proposed by Wulf and Lewthwaite [Wulf, G., & Lewthwaite, R. (2010). Effortless motor learning? An external focus of attention enhances movement effectiveness and efficiency. In B. Bruya (Ed.), Effortless attention: A new perspective in attention and action (pp. 75–101). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] as a mechanism underlying the robust effect of attentional focus on motor learning and performance. One component of this hypothesis, relevant beyond the attentional focus effect, suggests that causing individuals to access their self-schema will negatively impact their learning and performance of a motor skill. The purpose of the present two studies was to provide an initial test of the performance and learning aspects of the self-invoking trigger hypothesis by asking participants in one group to think about themselves between trial blocks—presumably activating their self-schema—to compare their performance and learning to that of a control group. In Experiment 1, participants performed 2 blocks of 10 trials on a throwing task. In one condition, participants were asked between blocks to think about their past throwing experience. While a control group maintained their performance across blocks, the self group's performance was degraded on the second block. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to practice a wiffleball hitting task on two separate days. Participants returned on a third day to perform retention and transfer tests without the self-activating manipulation. Results indicated that the self group learned the hitting task less effectively than the control group. The findings reported here provide initial support for the self-invoking trigger hypothesis.     

Mental health problems in rural contexts: A broader perspective: Response to Jackson et al. (2007) Mental health problems in rural contexts: What are the barriers to seeking help from professional providers?

The objectives of this article are to expand and comment upon a recent review in Australian Psychologist of the literature in relation to mental health problems in rural contexts by Jackson et al. (2007). In the present article we review recently published qualitative research on the help‐seeking attitudes and experiences of rural Australian adolescents. While we agree on the utility of the Macintyre, Ellaway, and Cummins (2002) conceptual framework based on notions of health and place, we note that this framework specifically emphasises the importance of the collective dimension. We present a broader perspective on health and place than Jackson et al. (2007) by incorporating social geographic research. We argue that rural mental health research has been hampered by a simplistic view of social stigma of mental illness and that a more thorough conceptualisation of the phenomenon is needed. Finally, we make some further recommendations based on a broader perspective of mental health in rural contexts: one that incorporates an in‐depth understanding of the help‐seeking attitudes and experiences of rural adolescents as well as an appreciation of the collective social functioning of rural communities.     

Does coping help? A reexamination of the relation between coping and mental health

In a longitudinal community survey of 291 adults, we explored the relation between coping strategies and psychological symptoms. Respondents completed the revised Ways of Coping Scale (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) for a self-named stressful episode. Factor analysis produced eight coping factors: three problem focused, four emotion focused, and one (support mobilization) that contained elements of both. Multiple regression analyses indicated bidirectionality in the relation between coping and psychological symptoms. Those in poorer mental health and under greater stress used less adaptive coping strategies, such as escapism, but coping efforts still affected mental health independent of prior symptom levels and degree of stress. We compared main versus interactive effects models of stress buffering. Main effects were confined primarily to the emotion-focused coping scales and showed little or negative impacts of coping on mental health; interactive effects, though small, were found with the problem-focused scales. The direction of the relation between problem-focused scales and symptoms may depend in part on perceived efficacy, or how the respondent thought he or she handled the problem. Implications for the measurement of adaptive coping mechanisms and their contextual appropriateness are discussed.     

Are high-IQ individuals deficient in common sense? A critical examination of the ‘clever sillies’ hypothesis

A controversial hypothesis [Charlton (2009). Clever sillies: Why high-IQ people tend to be deficient in common sense. Medical Hypotheses, 73, 867–870] has recently been proposed to account for why individuals of high-IQ and high social status tend to hold counter-intuitive views on social phenomena. It is claimed that these ‘clever sillies’ use their high general intelligence and Openness to Experience to overanalyze social problems for which socially intelligent/common sense responses would seemingly be more appropriate. The first three sections of this review will consider i) the relationship between general and social intelligence; ii) the role of situational effects on the direction of the correlation between IQ and political attitudes; iii) the behavioral ecology of competitive altruism. While there is no hard evidence for Charlton's hypothesis, sophisticated although ultimately non-rational subjective analyses of social phenomena (i.e. ones that are disconfirmed by data, or reject empiricism) do seem to be favored by individuals in certain high-IQ knowledge work sectors. It is suggested that these function as costly signals of altruism, and that their popularity can best be understood in light of the theory that social attitudes are fundamentally influenced by perceptions of dominance and counter-dominance, with the latter playing an especially significant role in influencing the values systems of contemporary societies where the degree of conspicuous inequality is significantly evolutionarily novel.     

Is the sense of bodily ownership related to pre-reflective bodily awareness? A reply to Kuhle

There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily awareness: the sense of bodily ownership. Unfortunately, I argue, there is little reason to believe a relationship between pre-reflective bodily awareness and the sense of bodily ownership exists. Until more work is done, pre-reflective bodily awareness remains beyond our empirical grasp.     

Hypno-Operant therapy–A capsule description of a new approach in the mental health field

Abstract

The principles of behavior modification techniques, based mainly on Skinner's operant conditioning, me combined with hypnotic suggestion to create this new therapeutic technique. However, the assumption that learning is not mechanical (the S-R model) is an important element of this method, leaving an opening for the consideration of unconscious factors, especially in the management of sexual dysfunction.     

Are Openness and Intellect distinct aspects of Openness to Experience? A test of the O/I model

The Openness/Intellect (O/I) model proposes that Openness to Experience has two major facets—Openness and Intellect—that can be measured with the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS). Thus far, however, research has not shown distinct, unique relationships between the Openness and Intellect aspects and other outcomes. The present research evaluated the relationships between Openness and Intellect with two outcomes: creative behavior and achievement (conceptually closer to Openness) and fluid intelligence (conceptually closer to Intellect). Young adults completed the BFAS, several measures of fluid intelligence, and several measures of creative achievement. Latent variable models indicated that the Openness aspect significantly predicted creativity but not fluid intelligence; the Intellect aspect, in contrast, significantly predicted fluid intelligence but not creativity. The findings thus offer support for the validity of the O/I model.     

A modest proposal: A family therapist's response to pathogenic relatedness in mental health agencies or what to do about “the santa claus factor”

Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy -     

Outpatient benefits for mental health services in Medicare. Alignment with the private sector?

Revision of Medicare's benefit for outpatient mental health care is long overdue. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 expands the covered limit to $2,200 (from the $500 set in 1966) but retains the 50% coinsurance requirement for beneficiaries. There are several strong arguments supporting further changes in the benefit to reduce the coinsurance and include psychologists as covered providers. These are need among the elderly, changes in Medicare's inpatient reimbursement system, and innovations in treatment. Outpatient mental health care is a very small portion of Medicare expenditures, amounting to less than .1% of total costs. Using data from the Bureau of Data Management and Strategy at the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), it was estimated that $41.8 million was paid by HCFA for outpatient mental health care in fiscal year 1984. This article estimates the costs to Medicare and beneficiaries of reducing the coinsurance to 20% and including psychologists as eligible providers.     

A blessing in disguise? Empowering Catholic health care institutions in the current health care environment.

Health care institutions, including Roman Catholic institutions, are in a time of crisis. This crisis may provide an important opportunity to reinvigorate Roman Catholic health care. The current health care crisis offers Roman Catholic health care institutions a special opportunity to rethink their fundamental commitments and to plan for the future. The author argues that what Catholic health care institutions must first do is articulate the nature of their identity and their commitments. By a renewed commitment to the praxis of health care on their own distinctive terms, Roman Catholic health care institutions may reestablish a vision of human nature and human service in an increasingly secular society. Health care could then reclaim its place as a powerful setting for the expression of Roman Catholic faith, life and witness.     

Are people with high and low mental rotation abilities differently susceptible to the alignment effect?

We investigated whether the alignment effect (Levine et al, 1982 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 111 157-175) is influenced by mental rotation abilities. In two experiments, groups of undergraduate students with high and low performance in mental rotation tasks were required to study either schematic (experiment 1) or more complex (experiment 2) maps, and to perform a number of pointing tasks adopting a perspective which could be aligned, misaligned (45 degrees, 135 degrees), or counteraligned (180 degrees) with the perspective assumed during learning. Cognitive styles in spatial representation have also been considered. Results of experiment 1 show that people with low performance in mental rotation tasks prefer to adopt a representation of space focused more on landmarks. Their performance in the pointing tasks depends on the alignment conditions, with more errors in the counteraligned condition followed by the two misaligned and aligned ones. In contrast to this, high-ability mental rotators prefer survey and route spatial representations and are affected only by the aligned and non-aligned conditions. In the second experiment, practice was studied as a function of mental rotation and alignment. The group high in mental rotation ability was found to be free from the alignment effect in the pointing tasks performed after the final of four learning phases.