Against Against Intuitionism

The main ideas behind Brouwer’s philosophy of Intuitionism are presented. Then some critical remarks against Intuitionism made by William Tait in “Against Intuitionism” [Journal of Philosophical Logic, 12, 173–195] are answered.     

In defense of caring

I hope to persuade Hilde L. Nelson that she is wrong about an ethics of caring....In conclusion, caring is an "ethics of attention," but it includes more than attention. 'Carers' must respond as well as attend. Much more needs to be done in describing caring responses, especially when social problems are involved. I agree with Nelson that an ethics or a moral orientation must deal with social problems. I also agree that, to date, most of us working on caring have written little on the subject. However, I do not agree that an ethics of caring is unable to address social problems. We have to work at showing that it can.     

Measuring the impact of informal caring

A factor-analysis of caregiving impact appraisals amongst a community-derived sample of informal carers of elderly people revealed two negative (care work strain and relationship dissatisfaction) and two positive (care work satisfaction and care lifestyle satisfaction) scales. Validity was assessed by means of concurrent correlations with levels of assistance with daily living tasks provided by carers and levels of behaviour problems exhibited by elderly dependents. Criterion validity was considered in relation to two important carer outcomes; willingness to care and a standardized measure of strain. Each of the four scales was significantly associated with concurrently assessed willingness to care. Care work strain and relationship dissatisfaction were associated with concurrently measured strain symptomology. Evidence of 6-month predictive validity was obtained for the care work strain scale.     

Sharing is caring for developmental psychology

Many of us, especially in the more experimental tradition, are used to doing it all ourselves: we don't know better than to collect our own data for every new study. We invest considerable amounts of time and resources in designing experiments, ethical review applications, participant recruitment, finding and training measuring assistants, and writing data management plans. And after all the hard work we end up with a sample size that hardly ever meets current standards. What if we could skip, or outsource some of these study aspects, allowing us to devote more of our time, energy, expertise, and experience to data analysis, reading, writing, and theory development? We argue that sharing data, expertise, and infrastructure could contribute to improving the credibility of research results, and to practicing more sustainable developmental science. In addition, we discuss several reasons that we believe may (currently) dissuade researchers from considering such sharing.     

Illness and the origin of caring

In recent years, many in medical education have examined the question of how best to reinvigorate the doctor-patient relationship, given the increasing technological distance that has emerged between them in modern medicine. In this paper it is argued that "humanism" and caring in medicine reflect the quality of transitional relatedness in the illness condition, a significant separation-attachment phase of life. By improving our understanding of the origin of caring, educational strategies for physicians in training may improve as might our abilities to provide care.     

Moral personality of brave and caring exemplars

Two contrasting types of moral exemplars were examined so as to identify personality variables associated with moral action. The sample comprised 50 Canadian awardees for either exceptional bravery or caring, as well as 50 comparison participants. Participants responded to a set of personality questionnaires and a life-review interview. Personality variables were found to substantially augment moral cognition in the prediction of exemplary action. In support of the notion that there is a personological core to the moral domain, it was found that moral exemplars were distinguished from the comparison groups by themes embodied in their life narratives. Specifically, moral exemplars had stronger motivational themes of both agency and communion, were more likely to construe critical life events redemptively, more frequently identified helpers in early life, and reported more secure attachments. Furthermore, the personality of caring exemplars was more nurturant, generative, and optimistic than that of brave exemplars; these somewhat divergent personality profiles imply multiple ideals of moral maturity.     

The Chinese clan as a caring community

Comprehensive care of persons in crisis requires a caring community. With the disappearance of traditional forms of community, conscious and intentional attention to the development of new forms of community is needed. The study of historic systems of mutual care, which have long served to meet the needs of persons in crisis, can help to inform this intentional process. The Chinese clan, with its long history, is a rich resource for such study.In 1971–72 he spent a sabbatical year in Singapore, serving as Clinical Director of the Churches' Counseling Service and teaching at Trinity Theological College. While he was in Singapore he did research on patterns of grief and mourning in traditional Chinese society.     

Against Couples

ABSTRACT The essay attacks the convention that a person should at any period in their life have not more than one sexual partner. The issues of the care of children and the desirability of a shared household are here bracketed out. The main argument proceeds by seeing conflicts between the requirement of exclusivity in sexual life, authenticity, and the principle that sexual communion should be an expression of love. A general social inertia, defined by the possessive introversion of couples, means that individuals will inevitably sometimes have to choose between sexual solitude and cultivating a more or less artificial relationship. The ideal of a single, central relationship is criticised on the grounds that (i) in some respects it is not desirable and (ii) it is in any case unrealistic to suppose that we can choose to create such an ideal relationship at will.     

Against Fallibilism

In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ‘infallibilism’, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power than fallibilism. In particular, I argue that an infallibilist can easily explain why assertions of ‘p, but possibly not-p’ (where the ‘possibly’ is read as referring to epistemic possibility) is infelicitous in terms of the knowledge rule of assertion. But a fallibilist cannot. Furthermore, an infallibilist can explain the infelicity of utterances of ‘p, but I don't know that p’ and ‘p might be true, but I'm not willing to say that for all I know, p is true’, and why when a speaker thinks p is epistemically possible for her, she will agree (if asked) that for all she knows, p is true. The simplest explanation of these facts entails infallibilism. Fallibilists have tried and failed to explain the infelicity of ‘p, but I don't know that p’, but have not even attempted to explain the last two facts. I close by considering two facts that seem to pose a problem for infallibilism, and argue that they don't.     

Against alief

A physicalist holds, in part, that what properties are instantiated depends on what physical properties are instantiated; a physicalist thinks that mental properties, for example, are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical “realizer” properties. One issue that arises in this context concerns the relationship between the “causal powers” of instances of physical properties and instances of dependent properties, properties that are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical properties. After explaining the significance of this issue, I evaluate two core lines of thought that have been advanced in favor of Subset Inheritance, the view that instances of dependent properties typically have some, but not all, of the powers of physical realizers, and do not have any powers that are not also powers of physical realizers. The first argument that I address turns on our intuitive reactions to certain cases; the second appeals to the phenomenon of multiple realization. I argue that neither line of thought succeeds, and thus that insofar as we grant that an instance of a dependent property inherits some of the powers of its physical realizer, defenders of subset inheritance have not provided a compelling reason to think that it will not inherit all of the powers of its physical realizer.     

Against relativism

Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.     

Against Propositionalism

‘Propositionalism’ is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations—all intentional attitudes—are relations to propositions or something proposition‐like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate ‘F’. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they are, and that propositionalism must be abandoned.     

Against liberty

Conclusion There are no private particular actions that should be altogether free of social interference. No absolute distinction can be made between types of actions affecting others and those affecting only the agent. Relative to a purpose in formulating an act of law, for instance, such a distinction can, however, be made. The idea of social freedom could therefore be thought to imply that even if there are no absolutely private particular actions, and even if society could interfere for any purpose to regulate the actions of the individual, not any reason for such interference is acceptable from the point of view of liberty. Acts of law should not be made unnecessarily inclusive with respect to their purpose and they should be designed to further public security. Not even in this weak formulation, however, can the principle of social liberty be defended against moral criticism. Some illiberal laws, in this sense, should after all be passed. Examples can be found in taxation law.The only reasonable conclusion to draw from all this is that there is no tenable principle of liberty.That there is no tenable principle of liberty does not mean that everything that has been condemned in the name of liberty should now be regarded as right. Many things said to result in a limitation of freedom could be wrong for other reasons. But probably not all of them are. So it will, I think, have some effects on our political views in general, if we accept the conclusion of this essay.