Self-Interest, Economic Beliefs, and Political Party Preference in New Zealand

This study explored the associations among income level, economic beliefs, and political party preference in terms of self-interest and ideological theories of party preference. Results from a survey of 487 New Zealand voters showed that the income levels and economic beliefs of supporters of the four major parties were organized along a single dimension: ACT supporters had the highest income and strongest neoliberal economic beliefs, followed closely by National supporters, whereas Alliance supporters had the lowest income and strongest welfare-state economic beliefs, followed by Labour supporters. However, the prediction of party preference from income and economic beliefs showed a different pattern: Income significantly predicted support for ACT, National, and Alliance; economic beliefs had the strongest influence on National and Labour support; and economic beliefs interacted with income to influence ACT and National support, but not Labour and Alliance support. The results suggest that voters who have gained or lost the most from the implementation of neoliberal policies—in this case, those with the highest and lowest incomes (i.e., ACT and Alliance supporters), respectively—form political party preference mainly from economic self-interest, whereas middle-income voters (i.e., National and Labour supporters) form party preference from ideological congruence. Moreover, higher status individuals may be more likely to use ideology to express self-interested motivation.     

Values of British political extremists and potential extremists: A discriminant analysis

Studied the value systems of political extremists and potential extremists, comparing them with the value systems of centrist activists and supporters. Samples of political activists from the Labour, Conservative, Communist and National Front parties were obtained, as well as samples of non-active supporters. The non-active supporters were defined as Potential Extremists, if they supported a centrist party as first choice, but either Communist or National Front as second choice. All subjects completed the Rokeach Value Survey. Discriminant analysis showed that the four groups of activists could be clearly distinguished on the bask of their values. However the values of the Potential Extremists did not especially resemble the values of actual National Front or Communist activists. There were value differences between the Potential Extremists and the centrist supporters; nevertheless these two groups tended to be distinguished by very different values from those which distinguished between the activists. The appeal of value symbols for different types of political involvement was discussed.     

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.     

Some cognitive models of political party sympathy based on Swedish attitude data

Abstract.— The problem of this study was to formulate and test party sympathy models bearing upon the Swedish political party system. As subjects served representatives of the five largest Swedish political parties. Two basic assumptions-postulating interindividually shared cognitions of the political attitude system and postulating party sympathy to be based on political attitude consensus-were differently modelled and tested by a Euclidean distance approach to factor-analytically defined political attitude dimensions and related party and subject positions. Reported empirical validities, actual vs. predicted party sympathy, indicate the dominating relevance of a "capitalism-socialism" dimension but also point to the relevance of further dimensions. Because of indicated consistency with rather generally recognized political cleavages a model of ordered simple choices-for differentiation between the "bourgeois" parties probably modified-is suggested the most relevant reflection of cognitive structures and processes involved in political party sympathy.     

Capitalism and compassion: a test of Milbrath's environmental theory

From his observations of environmentalists Milbrath extracts the generalization that there is something inimical between capitalism and compassion. This was tested by applying scales of altruistic compassion and materialistic achievement motivation to supporters of three political parties in Queensland, Australia: a Leftist party, a moderate Conservative party and a Rightist party much given to advocating capitalism. Voters for the Rightist and Leftist parties showed a difference in compassion of only borderline significance. It is concluded that there are many roads to compassion, capitalism not excepted.     

BEFORE THE ORIGINAL POSITION: The Neo-Orthodox Theology of the Young John Rawls

This paper examines a remarkable document that has escaped critical attention within the vast literature on John Rawls, religion, and liberalism: Rawls's undergraduate thesis, “A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community” (1942). The thesis shows the extent to which a once regnant version of Protestant theology has retreated into seminaries and divinity schools where it now also meets resistance. Ironically, the young Rawls rejected social contract liberalism for reasons that anticipate many of the claims later made against him by secular and religious critics. The thesis and Rawls's late unpublished remarks on religion and World War II offer a new dimension to his intellectual biography. They show the significance of his humanist response to the moral impossibility of political theology. Moreover, they also reveal a kind of Rawlsian piety marginalized by contemporary debates over religion and liberalism.     

Political Expectations and Cultural Perceptions in the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations

In the various Arab-Israeli peace negotiations that have taken place since the late 1970s, each party entered the process, and continues to function within it, from the vantage point of different political expectations and cultural perceptions. These differences derive from the political features and social structures of the Arab parties and the Israeli side, which range from hierarchical to networked. Israel leans toward hierarchical order, whereas the Arab parties are more networked; these differences in the social and political environments influence the negotiating culture of each party. Hierarchical states develop goal-oriented negotiating cultures, whereas networked states have process-oriented negotiating cultures. The expectations that each side has of the other side to fulfill its part of the bargain are different as well; in hierarchical states such expectations are based on contracts, whereas in networked states such expectations are based on trust. Because it is unlikely that different cultural perceptions and the gap between the parties can be significantly bridged, it may be possible to cope with mutual problems if all parties were willing to accept a reality of perceptional pluralism (i.e., negotiating asymmetric arrangements, rather then each party insisting on mutual accommodation based on its own perspective).     

Beyond Establishment and Separation: Political Liberalism, Religion and Democracy

Does John Rawls??s political liberalism require the institutional separation between state and religion or does it allow space for moderate forms of religious establishment? In this paper I address this question by presenting and critically evaluating Cécile Laborde??s recent claim that political liberalism is ??inconclusive about the public place of religion?? and ??indeterminate about the symbolic dimensions of the public place of religion??. In response to Cécile Laborde, I argue that neither moderate separation nor moderate establishment, intended as regimes of religious governance that fix specific interpretations of principles of social and economic justice, are compatible with Rawls??s political liberalism. Furthermore, I claim that a state can ensure that both its religious and non-religious citizens enjoy a sense of self-respect and identification with their polity by leaving issues of symbolic establishment and separation open to democratic debate. I conclude that Rawls??s political liberalism transcends the standard distinction between moderate establishment and moderate separation and leaves the public place of religion open to the democratic contestation of ordinary legislative politics.     

Values-based Political Messages and Persuasion: Relationships among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values

The persuasive power of values-based political messages may depend on recipients having (1) shared values with the speaker (a type of personal identity match ); (2) shared political party identifications with the speaker (a type of social identity match ); and/or (3) expectations about values traditionally associated with different political parties (an expectancy violation/confirmation ). The independent and joint effects of these factors on the success of a persuasive message were examined, using the theoretical framework of dual-process models of persuasion. Participants (N = 301), classified according to their party identifications and primary value orientations, read a political speech that varied by argument quality, speaker party, and values evoked. Results indicated that value matching promotes close attention to the message, while party mismatching increases message rejection. These effects depend to some extent, however, on expectancies about values traditionally associated with different parties. Participants especially rejected messages from rival party members when the speaker evoked unexpected values. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the efficacy of values-based political communication.     

Social Issues,Authoritarianism, and Ideological Conceptualization: How Policy Dimensions and Psychological Factors Influence Ideological Labeling

Ideology's crucial theoretical and empirical role in explaining political behavior makes it imperative that scholars understand how individuals conceptualize and apply ideological labels. The existing literature on this topic is quite limited, however, because it relies almost exclusively upon data from the 1970s and 1980s, and it does not examine how psychological factors influence conceptualizations of ideological labels. This article uses data from two original laboratory experiments to test the relative impact of four major policy dimensions on participants' evaluations of candidate ideology and to test authoritarianism's role in shaping ideological conceptualization. These analyses indicate that individuals most often define liberalism and conservatism primarily in terms of social policies closely associated with religious values, each of which invert traditional ideological orientations toward the appropriate size and role of government. The causal mechanism shaping this relationship is authoritarianism, because, I argue, the religious social policy dimension most clearly evokes the deep‐seated value conflicts associated with an authoritarian view of political conflict.     

The Influence of Third Party Power and Suggestions on Negotiation: The Surface Value of a Compromise1

A simulated organizational dispute tested the influence of third party power and settlement suggestions on negotiation. Six different types of third party suggestions were tested: Integrative (highest possible value to both parties), compromise (the prominent solution equally favorable to both parties), unintegrative (lowest possible value to both parties), favorable (more value to subject than to opponent), unfavorable (more value to opponent than to subject), and no offers. Additional subjects bargained with no third party. The results suggest that the potential of a third party to impose a settlement influenced disputant perceptions of power and desire for third party involvement, but had only weak effects on communication processes and little effect on offer proposals. While integrative suggestions led to greater acceptability of the third party, compromise suggestions positively influenced the appearance of fairness and the use of rationality and exchange messages. Receipt of an unfavorable suggestion resulted in less favorable ratings of third party acceptability, greater perceptions of bias, and the use of more assertive messages and fewer upward appeals aimed at the third party than did receipt of a favorable suggestion. Implications for managerial dispute resolution behavior and subsequent perceptions of satisfaction and justice are discussed.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

Differentiation in Understanding One's Own and the Adversary's Identity in Protracted Intergroup Conflict: Zionism and Palestinianism

This study examines the meaning of identity for in-group and out-group members in protracted intergroup conflict, and the extent of differentiation people show in understanding in-group and out-group national identity. Based on the differential familiarity hypothesis, it was hypothesized that group members will show more differentiation when referring to in-group than to out-group identity. Based on the established relationship between cognitive complexity and political ideology, it was hypothesized that supporters of conciliatory political parties will demonstrate more differentiation when referring to in-group and out-group identity than supporters of nonconciliatory parties. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study that asked Arab and Jewish high-school students in Israeli schools about the meaning of Zionism and Palestinian identity.     

Psychological similarities and dissimilarities between left-wing and right-wing populists: Evidence from a nationally representative survey in France

Research in political science has focused on definitions of populism, platforms of populist parties, and demographic characteristics of those who support populist parties. Yet little is known about the psychological characteristics of populist supporters and how they might differ as a function of left-right ideology. Using a measure of populist attitudes in general, we investigated the role of Big Five personality traits as well as authoritarianism, social dominance, and system justification in a nationally representative sample of French respondents. We observed meaningful variability in relations between psychological characteristics and the endorsement of populist attitudes as a function of left-right ideological orientation, as well as variability in the psychological predictors of support for Jean Luc Mélenchon (a left-wing populist) and Marine LePen (a right-wing populist). We conclude that left-wing and right-wing populists are not the same, psychologically speaking, and that the differences are consistent with the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary forms of populism.     

Feed the Church,starve the party? Church-state relations and religious political mobilisation in 21 Catholic-majority countries

ABSTRACT

This contribution examines the effects of state religion policy on religious political mobilisation, focusing on the case of the Catholic Church in the post-Cold War era. Catholicism remains politically salient in most Catholic-majority societies, but the presence and success of parties that explicitly mobilise Catholicism in the electoral arena varies enormously. In addition, Catholic-majority countries display a wide variety of institutional arrangements governing the relationship between religion and state. This contribution presents a theoretical framework for analysing the effect of these institutions on the performance of political parties that seek to mobilise religion. Relying on a dataset that covers 137 elections in 21 Catholic-majority countries as well as key measures from the Religion and State (RAS) dataset, this contribution shows that countries with higher levels of state regulation of religion and friendlier religion-state relations are more likely to host parties that mobilise religion; it also suggests that funding for the Catholic Church may constrain such parties.     

A group just like me: The moderating role of conservation values on social projection

We examined the moderating role of personal values on social projection. Study 1 was conducted prior to the 1999 Israeli elections among activists of the Center party, a newly established centrist party. The more importance activists attributed to conservation values (values that emphasize stability and certainty) the more they projected their political views to their party. Study 2 was conducted prior to the 2003 Israeli elections among students with varied attitudes toward the Kadima party, another newly established centrist party. Conservation values interacted with support for the Kadima party in their effect on social projection: The more importance participants attributed to conservation values, the more positive was the relationship between support for the party and social projection. In Study 3, we examined the role of conservation values in an experimental study in which participants were members of a virtual team: Raising the accessibility of conservation values resulted in higher levels of social projection. Taken together, findings indicate that emphasizing conservation values leads to greater social projection. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value Differentiation Between Enemies and Allies: Value Projection in National Images

The current study aimed to investigate value projection between Palestinians, Israelis, Americans, and Swiss as a function of their group's stance toward the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. Drawing on image theory, we assumed that images—operationalized by value projection—would be a function not just of features of the target group, but of the rater group's relationship with the target group. Value projection can be seen as an indicator of (de)humanization as values represent goals and desirable behaviors of a person. We therefore expected higher projection to ally than to enemy groups, whereas we expected no difference in projection to out‐groups with neutral relations. Results show that allies did indeed project Security and Power to a higher degree to each other than to enemies, and enemies showed no, or even negative, projection onto each other. The ally of the enemy (Americans) was projected less negatively by Palestinians than vice versa, pointing to the higher complexity of third‐party images as opposed to the more classical ally and enemy images. As expected, Swiss students showed almost no difference in projection to the different out‐groups. These results confirm that the relationship between groups (e.g., alliance, enmity) rather than a consensual view of particular nations determines images.     

Does Partisan Bias Modulate Neural Processing of Political Information? An Analysis of the Neural Correlates of Corruption and Positive Messages

Daily worldwide newspapers print articles exposing government corruption. Yet these messages do not lead to a loss of votes for the corrupt parties. Sympathizers’ partisan bias, which respectively minimizes and maximizes corruption and positive messages of their own parties respectively, is widely considered the main cause of the loss of effectiveness of political communications. Despite the well-established existence of such bias when processing political information, little is known as to its psychological origin. Through the use of neuroscience (fMRI), this study explores the underlying brain mechanisms of negative (corruption) and positive political messages related to a conservative and a socialist Spanish political party, as well as the differences between their sympathizers. The findings reveal that negative (vs. positive) political messages exert the greatest neuroimaging impact on the electorate, as shown in aversive, risk, and disappointment-related brain regions. Interestingly, we show that there exists a main partisan bias against opposite parties (and not a positive bias toward one’s own party) that stems from a higher risk, ambiguity, and disbelief provoked by both positive and negative information about rival parties. Furthermore, this bias was more pronounced among conservative supporters. The current findings provide valuable insights for political parties to improve their communication campaigns.     

Religion in the Israeli Parliament: a typology

Because religion has been a constant source of social divisions and political conflicts, the role of Judaism in Israel is very often studied through the prism of a rigid religious–secular cleavage.Without denying the contentious character of religion in the political and social arenas, I suggest in this study that a closer look at the usages of religion in Israeli politics offers a more nuanced picture of the role of Judaism in Israel. In order to uphold this thesis, I identify the main usages of Judaism in the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) and scrutinise the extent to which these different mobilisations overlap or crosscut the secular–religious cleavage. This analysis leads to a typology of three usages of religion: religion as a source of authority, religion as a marker of identity and nation, and religion as a source of values. On this basis, I demonstrate that the role of religion in Israel and especially in the Israeli Parliament cannot be reduced to the divide between religious and secular groups. If in its first usage, the religious–secular cleavage indeed predominates, the use of religion as an identity marker does not necessarily lead to a conflict with secular members, while in its final form, religion is mobilised as a resource by members of both groups.     

关系补救：类型、潜在机制与作用模型

关系补救是当一种侵犯行为导致关系中的正面状态消失、负面状态出现时, 由一方、双方或第三方做出并使关系恢复到积极状态的一系列行为集合。现有研究主要集中在垂直关系补救与个体-组织关系补救方面。垂直关系补救分为挑战、提供、接受、感激四个阶段, 应根据关系违背类型和文化类型权变性地选择补救策略。个体-组织关系补救的潜在机制为信任展示机制和不信任的约束机制, 应根据一致性原则, 进行系统性与动态性的关系补救。未来的研究可以基于嵌入视角提炼工具变量, 并进行跨层次多要素协同整合分析, 推进本土化的实证研究。