Enabling conditions and children’s understanding of pretense

Two experiments examined whether preschoolers’ difficulties on tasks that required relating pretending and knowledge (e.g., Lillard, A. S. (1993a). Young children’s conceptualization of pretense: Action or mental representational state? Child Development, 64, 372-386) were due to children’s inability to appreciate the causal mechanism behind enabling conditions. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were told about a character who knew about one kind of animal and did not know about another. The character acted in a manner consistent with both animals. Children were asked whether the character was pretending to be the animal of which he was ignorant. The character’s knowledge was either represented in a generic manner (as a picture) or in a manner that suggested a particular enabling condition relation that children found accessible (as a battery, which most 4-year-olds recognize is critical for making toys work). Children were more successful at relating knowledge and pretending in the battery condition. This improvement in performance extended to another task in which children had to identify the enabling condition relation between knowledge and identification, in which there were reduced demands on the inhibitory mechanisms necessary for success. Experiment 2 found that the results in Experiment 1 were not due to demands of the procedure used in Experiment 1. These results are discussed in the context of recent theories of theory of mind that focus on the importance of causal relations among mental states.     

Do preschoolers save to benefit their future selves?

Using a new paradigm for measuring children's saving behaviors involving two marble games differing in desirability, we assessed whether 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds saved marbles for future use, saved increasingly on a second trial, saved increasingly with age, and were sensitive to the relative value of future rewards. We also assessed whether performance on the saving paradigm was related to theory of mind performance. Children saved significantly more marbles on the second trial than the first and saved significantly more when a future reward was more desirable than a present reward (rather than the reverse). However, older children did not save significantly more than younger children. Performance on one of two false belief tasks was not correlated with saving behavior and performance on the other was only marginally correlated with the number of marbles saved on trial 2. Implications for children's future thinking and comparative research are discussed.     

Technical intelligence in animals: the kea model

The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.     

The relationship between theory of mind and episodic memory: evidence for the development of autonoetic consciousness

The study investigated a link between theory of mind and episodic memory involving autonoetic consciousness (). Eighty-nine Japanese 4- to 6-year-olds received two versions of a false belief task, a task of aspectuality or knowledge origins, and four memory tests. After controlling for age, most theory of mind abilities showed no interrelations, and own and other's belief understandings in deceptive appearance tasks were solely related to source memory, but not to free recall, temporal ordering, or working memory. Moreover, even when age and verbal intelligence were controlled, the association between representational change and source memory was highly significant in 6-year-olds but not in 4- and 5-year-olds. Results suggest that during development only a particular kind of theory of mind ability is integrated with episodic memory.     

Empathy, theory of mind, and individual differences in the appropriation bias among 4- and 5-year-olds

Evidence that young children often claim ownership of their partner’s contributions to an earlier collaborative activity, the appropriation bias, has been attributed to shared intentionality (Cognitive Development (1998) 13, 91–108). The current investigation explored this notion by examining individual differences in the bias among 4- and 5-year-olds as a function of empathy and theory of mind. On two occasions, children joined an adult and two dolls (with each doll being operated by one of the humans) in a picture matching board game before being asked to remember who placed each picture. Children showed a robust appropriation bias despite excellent recognition memory for the studied pictures (Study 1) and particularly in relation to the human sources (Study 2). Whereas higher levels of self-reported empathy were associated with a greater frequency of appropriation errors and fewer correct attributions for pictures placed by the adult and her doll partner, the opposite pattern emerged for theory of mind. Moreover, the positive relations between theory of mind and source monitoring accuracy remained robust after controlling for general ability and inhibitory skills. We consider the implications of these findings for understanding the processes driving the appropriation bias.     

Representational and executive selection resources in 'theory of mind': evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age

Effective belief-desire reasoning requires both specialized representational capacities-the capacity to represent the mental states as such-as well as executive selection processes for accurate performance on tasks requiring the prediction and explanation of the actions of social agents. Compromised belief-desire reasoning in a given population may reflect failures in either or both of these systems. We report evidence supporting this two-process model from belief-desire reasoning tasks conducted with younger and older adult populations. When task inferential complexity is held constant, neither group showed specific difficulty with reasoning about mental state content as compared with non-mental state content. However, manipulations that systematically increase executive performance demands within belief-desire reasoning caused systematic decreases in task performance in both older and younger adult groups. Moreover, the effect of increasing executive demands was disproportionately greater in the older group. Regression analysis indicated that measures of processing speed and inhibition contributed most to explaining variance in accuracy and response times in the belief-desire reasoning tasks. These results are consistent with the idea that compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age is likely the result of age-related decline in executive selection skills that supplement core mental state representational abilities, rather than as a result of failures in the representational system itself.     

The executive demands of strategic reasoning are modified by the way in which children are prompted to think about the task: Evidence from 3- to 4-year-olds

We investigated a test of strategic reasoning (the Windows task) that in different studies has yielded contrasting pictures of young children's executive abilities [Russell, J., Mauthner, N., Sharpe, S., & Tidswell, T. (1991). The “windows task” as a measure of strategic deception in preschoolers and autistic subjects. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 331–349; Samuels, M. C., Brooks, P. J., & Frye, D. (1996). Strategic game playing through the windows task. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14, 159–172]. An experiment with 52 three- to four-year-olds showed robust effects of different wordings for the prompts used to ask children to respond, and found that a single exposure to the facilitating wording led to improved performance on subsequent trials where the standard wording was used. This suggests that the effect of the wording was to help children infer an appropriate basis for responding, and not to reduce the trial-by-trial working memory or inhibitory demands of the task.     

The role of preschoolers' social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions

Preschoolers use information from interventions, namely intentional actions, to make causal inferences. We asked whether children consider some interventions to be more informative than others based on two components of an actor’s knowledge state: whether an actor possesses causal knowledge, and whether an actor is allowed to use their knowledge in a given situation. Three- and four-year-olds saw a novel toy that activated in the presence of certain objects. Two actors, one knowledgeable about the toy and one ignorant, each tried to activate the toy with an object. In Experiment 1, either the actors chose objects or the child chose for them. In Experiment 2, the actors chose objects blindfolded. Objects were always placed on the toy simultaneously, and thus were equally associated with the effect. Preschoolers’ causal inferences favored the knowledgeable actor’s object only when he was allowed to choose it (Experiment 1). Thus, children consider both personal and situational constraints on knowledge when evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions.     

Narrative accounts of illness in schizophrenia: association of different forms of awareness with neurocognition and social function over time

Awareness of illness in schizophrenia reflects complex storied understanding of the impact of the disorder upon one’s life. Individuals may be aware of their illness in different ways and this may be related to their functioning. A total of 76 adults with schizophrenia were assessed for their awareness of illness, neurocognition, social cognition, and social function concurrently and social function was also assessed at three later time points. A cluster analysis revealed 3 groups: generally full awareness, generally limited awareness, and superficial awareness. Comparisons between these profiles revealed the superficial group had poorer executive function, emotion recognition ability, and capacity for social relationships than the full awareness group, yet had better verbal memory and more social contacts than the limited awareness group. These results suggest assessing the narrative qualities of awareness of illness may reveal unique links with cognition and function, and this may have implications for interventions.     

Relations between episodic memory, suggestibility, theory of mind, and cognitive inhibition in the preschool child

The development of episodic memory, its relation to theory of mind (ToM), executive functions (e.g., cognitive inhibition), and to suggestibility was studied. Children (n= 115) between 3 and 6 years of age saw two versions of a video film and were tested for their memory of critical elements of the videos. Results indicated similar developmental trends for all memory measures, ToM, and inhibition, but ToM and inhibition were not associated with any memory measures. Correlations involving source memory was found in relation to specific questions, whereas inhibition and ToM were significantly correlated to resistance to suggestions. A regression analysis showed that age was the main contributor to resistance to suggestions, to correct source monitoring, and to correct responses to specific questions. Inhibition was also a significant main predictor of resistance to suggestive questions, whereas the relative contribution of ToM was wiped out when an extended model was tested.     

Applying an exemplar model to the artificial-grammar task: Inferring grammaticality from similarity

We present three artificial-grammar experiments. The first used position constraints, and the second used sequential constraints. The third varied both the amount of training and the degree of sequential constraint. Increasing both the amount of training and the redundancy of the grammar benefited participants' ability to infer grammatical status; nevertheless, they were unable to describe the grammar. We applied a multitrace model of memory to the task. The model used a global measure of similarity to assess the grammatical status of the probe and captured performance both in our experiments and in three classic studies from the literature. The model shows that retrieval is sensitive to structure in memory, even when individual exemplars are encoded sparsely. The work ties an understanding of performance in the artificial-grammar task to the principles used to understand performance in episodic-memory tasks.     

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

Lifespan aging and belief reasoning: Influences of executive function and social cue decoding

Older adults often perform poorly on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests that require understanding of others’ beliefs and intentions. The course and specificity of age changes in belief reasoning across the adult lifespan is unclear, as is the cause of the age effects. Cognitive and neuropsychological models predict that two types of processing might influence age differences in belief reasoning: executive functioning and social cue detection. In the current study we assessed 129 adults aged between 18 and 86 on novel measures of ToM (video clips and verbal vignettes), which manipulated whether true or false belief reasoning was required. On both video and verbal tasks, older adults (aged 65–88) had specific impairments in false belief reasoning, but showed no such problem in performing true belief tasks. Middle-aged adults (aged 40–64) generally performed as well as the younger adults (aged 18–39). Difficulties in updating information in working memory (but not inhibitory problems) partially mediated the age differences in false belief reasoning. Also, the ability to decode biological motion, indexing social cue detection, partially mediated age-related variance in the ability to interpret false beliefs. These results indicate that age differences in decoding social cues and updating information in memory may be important influences on the specific problems encountered when reasoning about false beliefs in old age.     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB.     

Selective deficits in episodic feeling of knowing in ageing: A novel use of the general knowledge task

Failure to recall an item from memory can be accompanied by the subjective experience that the item is known but currently unavailable for report. The feeling of knowing (FOK) task allows measurement of the predictive accuracy of this reflective judgement. Young and older adults were asked to provide answers to general knowledge questions both prior to and after learning, thus measuring both semantic and episodic memory for the items. FOK judgements were made at each stage for all unrecalled responses, providing a measure of predictive accuracy for semantic and episodic knowledge. Results demonstrated a selective effect of age on episodic FOK resolution, with older adults found to have impaired episodic FOK accuracy while semantic FOK accuracy remained intact. Although recall and recognition measures of episodic memory are equivalent between the two age groups, older adults may have been unable to access contextual details on which to base their FOK judgements. The results suggest that older adults are not able to accurately predict future recognition of unrecalled episodic information, and consequently may have difficulties in monitoring recently encoded memories.     

Developments in source monitoring: the role of thinking of others

Adults' source judgments are more accurate when they focus on speakers' emotions than when adults focus on their own emotions. Focusing on speakers may lead to better source memory because it encourages processing of the perceptual characteristics of the source and binding of that information to the content of what is being said. The purpose of the current work was to evaluate whether young children's source memory similarly benefits from this outward encoding focus and whether this effect changes developmentally. In Experiment 1, when 4- and 5-year-olds heard an audiotape of two dissimilar speakers, only the 5-year-olds showed better source memory when asked to adopt an other-focus. In Experiment 2, when 4- and 5-year-olds watched a videotape of two similar speakers, the same pattern was found. However, in Experiment 3, when 4-year-olds watched a videotape of two dissimilar speakers (a more optimal encoding condition in which 5-year-olds showed ceiling performance), 4-year-olds benefited from taking an other-focus during encoding. Overall, the data suggest that the benefit for source memory of focusing on another person develops over the preschool years.