“I Just Miss Her. I Just Need Her Here.” Life After a Mother’s Cancer

The purpose of this research was to examine the lived experience of a family unit that lost their spouse/mother/sister-in-law to cancer. A phenomenological case study was used to guide this research. Four participants, or one family unit consisting of one spouse, one daughter, one son, and one sister-in-law to the deceased, were recruited from Southern Ontario. Background questionnaires and one-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with each family member. The following themes emerged: (1) Negatives and (2) Silver Linings. This paper only addresses the theme “Silver Linings”; the first theme was addressed in Part I of this research. Within the theme “Silver Linings,” there were two sub-themes: (1) “…She was remarkable” and (2) Hope for the future. Each will be discussed in turn. Overall, the research study revealed some silver linings that may come from a diagnosis of cancer in a family unit. The family found it difficult to find positives in the loss of their loved one; however, they were able to acknowledge that they have a heightened appreciation for others. This research study provides insight regarding the lived experiences of families coping with the cancer journey of a loved one. It may allow readers to develop a greater sense of appreciation for their health and family members.     

Understanding “His and Her” Work-Family Conflict and Facilitation

Work-family conflict (negative spillover between work and family) and work-family facilitation (positive spillover between work and family) are two aspects of the work-family interface. Prior work has established that these constructs are statistically and conceptually distinct, but less is known about what work and family characteristics are associated with conflict versus facilitation. Understanding who is most at risk for conflict and most benefiting from facilitation is necessary for establishing effective workplace policies. We used structural equation modeling to determine whether (1) work-family conflict and facilitation have different (statistical) predictors, and (2) whether these predictive relations are moderated by gender. Perceiving more work demands predicted greater work-family conflict, but was unrelated to facilitation. Perceiving more skill discretion at work and being married predicted greater work-family facilitation, but was unrelated to work-family conflict. Perceiving more decision authority and social support at work, and having more children, predicted less conflict and more facilitation. Most predictors were stronger for men than for women. We discuss implications of these results for designing effective policies to increase work-family facilitation and decrease work-family conflict for men and women.     

How do I remember that I know you know that I know?

Communication is aided greatly when speakers and listeners take advantage of mutually shared knowledge (i.e., common ground). How such information is represented in memory is not well known. Using a neuropsychological-psycholinguistic approach to real-time language understanding, we investigated the ability to form and use common ground during conversation in memory-impaired participants with hippocampal amnesia. Analyses of amnesics' eye fixations as they interpreted their partner's utterances about a set of objects demonstrated successful use of common ground when the amnesics had immediate access to common-ground information, but dramatic failures when they did not. These findings indicate a clear role for declarative memory in maintenance of common-ground representations. Even when amnesics were successful, however, the eye movement record revealed subtle deficits in resolving potential ambiguity among competing intended referents; this finding suggests that declarative memory may be critical to more basic aspects of the on-line resolution of linguistic ambiguity.     

‘I’

It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways, whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand. I develop an account based around these two requirements.     

‘Her Majesty the Baby’: narcissistic states in babies and young children

This article considers narcissistic states in babies and young children with some reference to the myth of Narcissus in Ovid’s Metamorphosis. The object-seeking character of babies from the beginning of life is elaborated in connection with selected research from mother–baby interaction. This forms the backdrop to a discussion of withdrawal into illusions of self-sufficiency and denial of dependence in adverse circumstances. Two clinical cases are discussed in some depth. One boy whose superiority, self-reliance and pseudo maturity is prompted by anxieties around separation as he approaches starting school is considered within the parameters of ordinary transient narcissism. The lengthy psychotherapy of another child, who developed entrenched narcissistic defences as a response to traumatic, abusive and neglectful experiences in early life, and who needed considerable help, is described in greater detail. Some links are made with difficulties associated with the emergence from narcissistic functioning and encountering the pain of separation and loss.     

How can I know I’ve perceived God?

In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of ones perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one directly enough by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not directly enough caused any such experience.     

‘I hope that I get old before I die’: ageing and the concept of disease

Ageing is often deemed bad for people and something that ought to be eliminated. An important aspect of this normative aspect of ageing is whether ageing, i.e., senescence, is a disease. In this essay, I defend a theory of disease that concludes that ageing is not a disease, based on an account of natural function. I also criticize other arguments that lead to the same conclusion. It is important to be clear about valid reasons in this debate, since the failure of bad analyses is exploited by proponents of the view that ageing is indeed a disease. Finally, I argue that there could be other reasons for attempting to eradicate senescence, which have to do with an evaluative assessment of ageing in relation to the good life. I touch on some reasons why ageing might be good for people and conclude that we cannot justify generalized statements in this regard.     

Am I You?

It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and the non-reflexive use exhibit the same logical grammar. The thesis that they do is in part motivated by the assumption that to show that my relation to you bears the same form as my practical self-relation is to show that, fundamentally, you are not an object for me to think about and act on, but a subject with whom to think and act together. I argue, to the contrary, that if my addressing you exhibited the same form as a relation I could literally be said to stand in to myself, then the nexus between us would be such that I am irretrievably alienated from you. To allow the possibility of addressing oneself is to assume one of the following accounts of the second-person pronoun. Either one has to follow R. Heck and conceive it as a merely linguistic phenomenon whose content can be analyzed in terms of “the person to whom I'm now speaking”; or one has to internalize the second person and follow Ch. Korsgaard in taking its prior use to be entirely within and independent of its linguistic expression. But to account for the idea of mutual recognition requires a third view according to which address is an act of mind sui generis for which linguistic expression is essential.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

I know I can do this,but where's my motivation?

Breadth of scope and inclusion of teachers as co-investigators made the Weinstein et al. intervention unusually powerful and well adapted to its context although its effects are difficult to interpret. Future efforts might build on this model by expanding its purview even further, particularly by including more self-report data, attending to educational aims and curricular content in addition to instructional method, addressing the value aspects as well as the expectancy aspects of motivation, and seeking to develop enduring dispositions of motivation to learn in students and autonomous goal setting in teachers.     

Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address.     

“The Flow of Her Cum”: On a Recent Semantic Shift in an Erotic Word

Recently there has been a semantic shift in the pornographic word ‘cum.’ Traditionally, the word, as a noun, is used to designate semen. However, ‘cum’ is now used to designate also female fluids during sexual activity. The concept of ‘female cum’ is discussed in relation to examples from a corpus of two hundred erotic short stories collected from the Internet, and to the physiological realities of female fluids during sex. In order to show how the innovation of ‘female cum’ is useful in written erotic narrative, a comparison is made with filmed pornography and drawn erotic comics. Finally, I argue that ‘cum’ in this new context is used as a device to arouse sexual excitement.